UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	
	:	**CASE NO. 21-CR-536 (CKK)**
v.	:	
	:	
[1] KAROL J. CHWIESIUK,	:	
[2] AGNIESZKA CHWIESIUK,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

Defendants Karol J. Chwiesiuk and Agnieszka Chwiesiuk, who are charged in connection with events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, have moved to transfer venue in this case to another district, specifically, "to any venue other than the Northern District of Illinois." ECF No. 61, p. 11. The Chwiesiuks fail to establish that they "cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial" in this district, Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a), and this Court should deny their motion.[1] Since the Chwiesiuks "make[] no effort to distinguish this case from these myriad others," *United States v. Griffith*, No. 21-244-2 (CKK), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18990, at *14 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2023), this Court should likewise "reject[] Defendant[s'] arguments in favor of transfer." *Id.*; *see also United States v. Eicher*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191794, at *7 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (this Court's analysis of *Skilling* factors as applied to January 6, 2021, cases).

[1] No judge on this Court has granted a change of venue in a January 6 prosecution, and, as Judge Friedman recently noted, "every judge who has ruled on a motion for a transfer of venue in connection with a January 6 case has denied the motion." *United States v. GossJankowski*, 21-CR-123 (PLF), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13118, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2023) (citing numerous cases).

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2021, a Joint Session of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate convened to certify the vote of the Electoral College of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. While the certification process was proceeding, a large crowd gathered outside the United States Capitol, entered the restricted grounds, and forced entry into the Capitol building. As a result, the Joint Session and the entire official proceeding of the Congress was halted until law enforcement was able to clear the Capitol of hundreds of unlawful occupants and ensure the safety of elected officials.

Karol J. Chwiesiuk and Agnieszka Chwiesiuk are siblings that in January 2021 were residing at their family home in Chicago, Illinois. They rented a car and travelled together from Chicago, Illinois, to Washington, D.C., prior to January 6, 2021. In the evening of January 5, 2021, K. Chwiesiuk walked from the Mayflower Hotel, where he and his sister booked a room, to the U.S. Capitol. There, K. Chwiesiuk took a selfie photograph in front of a barricade and a sign stating AREA CLOSED.



Images 1 and 1a (l to r): *A selfie photograph of K. Chwiesiuk in front of the U.S. Capitol the evening of January 5, 2021; and a close-up of the sign in the photo reads AREA CLOSED.*

On January 6, 2021, the Chwiesiuks attended the former President's rally and speech at the Ellipse, after which they marched down Pennsylvania Ave to the U.S. Capitol. Once they reached the restricted Capitol grounds, they walked together up to the NW Terrace of the Capitol, through the dense and raucous crowd gathered outside a breach point known as the Senate Wing Door, through a broken-out doorway, and unlawfully into the Capitol. Once inside, the Chwiesiuks walked south towards the Crypt, with K. Chwiesiuk stopping to step into and take a selfie inside of Senator Merkley's hideaway office. The Chwiesiuks spent approximately ten minutes inside the Capitol—from approximately 2:58 p.m. to 3:08 p.m.—before leaving through a broken-out window.

Based on their actions on January 6, 2021, the Chwiesiuks were charged with Entering and Remaining in a Restricted Building, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1); Disorderly or Disruptive Conduct in a Restricted Building, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2); Disorderly Conduct in a Capitol Building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D); and Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in a Capitol Building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). ECF No. 54. K. Chwiesiuk was additionally charged with Entering or Remaining in a Room Designated for the Use of a Member of Congress, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(C)(i)). *Id*.

The Chwiesiuks now move jointly for a change of venue. ECF No. 61. They contend that prejudice should be presumed in this district for several reasons: (1) the size and characteristics of the D.C. jury pool, (2) the pretrial publicity surrounding the events of January 6, and (3) the results of a media analysis. *Id*. at 3-12. In the alternative, the Chwiesiuks ask this Court to allow expanded examination of prospective jurors. Besides the request to allow expanded examination of prospective jurors, each of the defendant's arguments is without merit, and the motion should be denied. As to the request for expanded examination, the government agrees that the primary

safeguard of the right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire and, if necessary, expanded examination, to identify unqualified jurors.

ARGUMENT

The United States Constitution directs that "[t]he trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed." U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment similarly guarantees the right to be tried "by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. Const. amend. VI. These provisions provide "a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place." *United States v. Cores*, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958). Transfer to another venue is constitutionally required only where "extraordinary local prejudice will prevent a fair trial." *Skilling v. United States*, 561 U.S. 358, 378 (2010); *see* Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a) (requiring transfer to another district if "so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there").

The primary safeguard of the right to an impartial jury is "an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors." *Morgan v. Illinois*, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (italics omitted). Thus, the best course when faced with a pretrial publicity claim is ordinarily "to proceed to voir dire to ascertain whether the prospective jurors have, in fact, been influenced by pretrial publicity." *United States v. Campa*, 459 F.3d 1121, 1146 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). "[I]f an impartial jury actually cannot be selected, that fact should become evident at the voir dire." *United States v. Haldeman*, 559 F.2d 31, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam). And, after voir dire, "it may be found that, despite earlier prognostications, removal of the trial is unnecessary." *Jones v. Gasch*, 404 F.2d 1231, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

I. The Characteristics of the District of Columbia's Jury Pool Do Not Support a Change of Venue.

The Chwiesiuks contend that a D.C. jury cannot be impartial because of various characteristics of the District's jury pool: the size of the community, the prevalence of federal employees in the District, and the impact of January 6 on D.C. residents. ECF No. 61, pp. 3-5. None of these claims has merit.

A. The District of Columbia's political makeup does not support a change of venue.

The Chwiesiuks first contend that "the size of the community is a factor supporting transfer to another district" and that "the larger population of the District of Columbia does not foreclose a finding that prejudice may be presumed." ECF No. 61, pp. 3, 5. This argument lacks merit. Although the District of Columbia's population of nearly 700,000[2] is lower than the 4.5 million prospective jurors available in *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382, the district's population is still more than sufficient to select an impartial jury. It is worth noting that per the 2020 U.S. Census, the population of Wyoming (the nation's least populous state) aged eighteen or older is only 441,291[3] and Vermont's is only 524,751[4].

In *Mu'Min v. Virginia*, 500 U.S. 415, 429 (1991), the Supreme Court cited a county population of 182,537 as supporting the view than an impartial jury could be selected. And *Skilling* approvingly cited a state case in which there was "a reduced likelihood of prejudice" because the "venire was drawn from a pool of over 600,000 individuals." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382 (quoting

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[2] A number that, as the Chwiesiuks cite, is closer to 550,000 when adjusted for individuals who are over the age of 18. ECF No. 61, p. 3, fn. 1.

[3] https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/wyoming-population-change-between-census-decade.html

[4] https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-by-state/vermont-population-change-between-census-decade.html

Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991)). There is simply no reason to believe that, out of an eligible jury pool of nearly half a million, "12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled." *Id*. At any rate, attempting to draw a bright-line rule or identify a causal factor between a District's population and the impartiality of its jury pool is not fruitful or a useful consideration by this Court.

The Chwiesiuks then observe that "the size of the relevant communities has varied significantly" in cases where "pretrial publicity support[s] a presumption of prejudice," citing to a First Circuit case from 1952 where the Circuit found the District Court erred in denying a motion to continue a trial in response to a related highly publicized congressional hearing. *Id.* at 4, *Delaney v. United States*, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952). This case has been previously cited in a January 6 case, specifically defendants Biggs and Pezzola cited *Delaney* in a request to delay the start of their trial until December 12, 2022, a time after the conclusion of the public hearings of the U.S. House of Representatives' Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 Attack on the U.S. Capitol. *United States v. Nordean, et al.*, No. 21-175 (TJK), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111757, at *5 (D.D.C. June 24, 2022).[5] In that case, the government consented to the continuance for good cause shown. *Id*.

The general takeaway of the Chwiesiuk's argument is that the District is too small to be able to select a jury in a highly publicized matter. To the contrary, as the nation's capital and seat of the federal government, the District has been home to its fair share of trials in highly publicized cases. High-profile individuals such as Marion Barry, John Poindexter, Oliver North, Scooter Libby, Roger Stone, and Steve Bannon have all been tried in the District. *See United States v.*

[5] Jury selection in that case began on December 19, 2022. *United States v. Nordean, et al.*, 21-CR-175 (TJK) (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2022) (Minute Entry). The trial is presently ongoing.

Barry, 938 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1991); *United States v. Poindexter*, 951 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991); *United States v. North*, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam); *United States v. Libby*, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007); *United States v. Stone*, No. 19-cr-0018 (ABJ), 2020 WL 1892360 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2020); *United States v. Bannon*, No. 210-cr-670 (CJN). While it may be true that the population of the District of Columbia "does not foreclose a finding that prejudice may be presumed," ECF No. 61, p. 5, the number alone should do little to persuade this Court to make such a finding, and the Chwiesiuks do little to advance or develop the arguments beyond the presentation of numerical digits.

B. The impact of January 6 on Washington D.C. does not support a change of venue.

The Chwiesiuks contend that a D.C. jury could not be impartial because D.C. residents have been particularly affected by events surrounding January 6, including the deployment of the National Guard, the mayor's declaration of a state of emergency, road closures, and a curfew. ECF No. 61, p. 3. But January 6 is now over two years in the past. Many D.C. residents do not live or work near the Capitol where the roads were closed and where the National Guard was deployed. Again, there is no reason to believe that the District's entire population of nearly 700,000 people was so affected by these events that the Court cannot seat an impartial jury here.

Indeed, courts routinely conclude that defendants can receive a fair trial in the location where they committed their crimes, even though some members of the community were victimized. *See In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (Boston Marathon bombing); *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 399 (Enron collapse); *United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56, 155 (2d Cir. 2003) (1993 World Trade Center bombing); *United States v. Moussaoui*, 43 F. App'x 612, 613 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished) (September 11, 2001 attacks, including on the Pentagon). In *Skilling*, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Enron's "sheer number of victims" in the

Houston area "trigger[ed] a presumption of prejudice." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 384 (quotation omitted). "Although the widespread community impact necessitated careful identification and inspection of prospective jurors' connections to Enron," the voir dire was "well suited to that task." *Id.* In this case too, voir dire can adequately identify those D.C. residents who were so affected by January 6 that they cannot impartially serve as jurors. It bears repeating that "[t]he trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed" is required by the Constitution, absent a sufficient showing of prejudice by the defendant. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3. There is no reason to presume prejudice towards the Chwiesiuks in the District of Columbia.

C. The number of federal employees who reside in the District of Columbia does not support a change of venue.

The defendant argues that the Court should presume prejudice in this District because the jury pool would contain a high percentage of federal government employees or their friends and family members. ECF No. 61, p. 3. But the defendant does not explain how merely being employed by the federal government would render a person incapable of serving as an impartial juror. Although some federal employees, such as the U.S. Capitol Police, were affected by the events of January 6, many others were neither directly nor indirectly impacted. Indeed, many federal employees were nowhere near the Capitol on January 6 given the maximum telework posture of many federal agencies at the time. And the storming of the Capitol on January 6 was not aimed at the federal government in general, but specifically at Congress' certification of the electoral vote. There is therefore no reason to believe that federal employees with little or no connection to the events at the Capitol could not be impartial in this case. *See United States v. Bochene*, No. CR 21-418 (RDM), 2022 WL 123893, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022) (January 6 defendant's claim that federal employees would "have a vested interest in supporting their employer" was "exactly the

kind of conjecture that is insufficient to warrant transfer prior to jury selection").

Even assuming (incorrectly) that every federal employee is affected by improper bias, the Court could draw a jury from those District residents who are not employed by the federal government. According to the Office of Personnel Management, around 141,000 non-Postal Service employees worked in Washington, D.C., in 2017.[6] But many federal employees who work in the District live outside the District and would not be part of the jury pool. And the District has nearly 700,000 residents. Thus, even if every federal employee were disqualified, the Court would be able to pick a jury in this District.

II. The Pretrial Publicity Related to January 6 Does Not Support a Presumption of Prejudice in This District.

The Chwiesiuks contend that a change of venue is warranted based on pretrial publicity. ECF No. 61, pp. 5-12. "The mere existence of intense pretrial publicity is not enough to make a trial unfair, nor is the fact that potential jurors have been exposed to this publicity." *United States v. Childress*, 58 F.3d 693, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *see Murphy v. Florida*, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (juror exposure to "news accounts of the crime with which [a defendant] is charged" does not "alone presumptively deprive[] the defendant of due process"). Indeed, "every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits." *Reynolds v. United States*, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878). Thus, the "mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more," is insufficient to establish prejudice.

[6] OPM, Federal Civilian Employment, available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-reports/reports-publications/federal-civilian-employment/.

Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723. "It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." *Id.*

The Supreme Court has recognized only a narrow category of cases in which prejudice is presumed to exist without regard to prospective jurors' answers during voir dire. *See Rideau v. Louisiana*, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In *Rideau*, the defendant's confession—obtained while he was in jail and without an attorney present—was broadcast three times shortly before trial on a local television station to audiences ranging from 24,000 to 53,000 individuals in a parish of approximately 150,000 people. *Id.* at 724 (majority opinion), 728-29 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Court concluded that, "to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it," the televised confession "in a very real sense *was* Rideau's trial—at which he pleaded guilty to murder." *Rideau*, 373 U.S. at 726. Thus, the Court "d[id] not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire," that these "kangaroo court proceedings" violated due process. *Id.* at 726-27.

Since *Rideau*, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a "presumption of prejudice . . . attends only the extreme case," *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 381, and the Court has repeatedly "held in other cases that trials have been fair in spite of widespread publicity," *Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). *Rideau* was decided in 1963, and again, at that time the number of news media outlets was minimal and the flow of information and the power and influence of local television stations was great. This is a vastly different landscape from the news media environment and flow of information in 2023. In fact, in the half century since *Rideau*, the Supreme Court has never presumed prejudice based on pretrial publicity. *But see Estes v. Texas*, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (presuming prejudice based on media interference with courtroom proceedings); *Sheppard v. Maxwell*, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (same). In fact, courts have declined to transfer venue

in some of the most high-profile prosecutions in recent American history. *See In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (capital prosecution of Boston Marathon bomber); *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 399 (fraud trial of CEO of Enron Corporation); *United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56, 155 (2d Cir. 2003) (trial of participant in 1993 World Trade Center bombing); *United States v. Moussaoui*, 43 F. App'x 612, 613 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished) (terrorism prosecution for conspirator in September 11, 2001 attacks); *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 70 (Watergate prosecution of former Attorney General John Mitchell and other Nixon aides).

In *Skilling*, the Supreme Court considered several factors in determining that prejudice should not be presumed where former Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling was tried in Houston, where Enron was based. *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382-83. First, the Court considered the "size and characteristics of the community." *Id.* at 382. Unlike *Rideau*, where the murder "was committed in a parish of only 150,000 residents," Houston was home to more than 4.5 million people eligible for jury service. *Id.* at 382. Second, "although news stories about Skilling were not kind, they contained no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight." *Id.* Third, "over four years elapsed between Enron's bankruptcy and Skilling's trial," and "the decibel level of media attention diminished somewhat in the years following Enron's collapse." *Id.* at 383. "Finally, and of prime significance, Skilling's jury acquitted him of nine insider-trading counts," which undermined any "supposition of juror bias." *Id.*

Although these *Skilling* factors are not exhaustive, courts have found them useful when considering claims of presumptive prejudice based on pretrial publicity. *See, e.g.*, *In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d at 21-22; *United States v. Petters*, 663 F.3d 375, 385 (8th Cir. 2011). And contrary to the defendant's contention, those factors do not support a presumption of prejudice in this case.

Although the government has addressed some of the *Skilling* factors above, it will do so again briefly for the sake of completeness.

A. Size and characteristics of the community

The defendant suggests (ECF No. 61, pp. 3-5) that an impartial jury cannot be found in Washington, D.C., despite the District's population of nearly 700,000. Although this District may be smaller than most other federal judicial districts, as discussed above it has a larger population than two states (Wyoming and Vermont), and more than four times as many people as the parish in *Rideau*. The relevant question is not whether the District of Columbia is as populous as the Southern District of Texas in *Skilling*, but whether it is large enough that an impartial jury can be found. In *Mu'Min v. Virginia*, 500 U.S. 415, 429 (1991), the Court cited a county population of 182,537 as supporting the view than an impartial jury could be selected. And *Skilling* approvingly cited a state case in which there was "a reduced likelihood of prejudice" because the "venire was drawn from a pool of over 600,000 individuals." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382 (quoting *Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.*, 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991)). There is simply no reason to believe that, out of an eligible jury pool of nearly half a million, "12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled." *Id.*

B. Nature of the pretrial publicity

Nor does this case involve a "confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382. Even news stories that are "not kind," *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382, or are "hostile in tone and accusatory in content," *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 61, do not alone raise a presumption of prejudice. As in *Skilling* and *Haldeman*, the news coverage of the Chwiesiuks is "neither as inherently prejudicial nor as unforgettable as the spectacle of Rideau's dramatically staged and broadcast confession." *Id.* Indeed, although any media characterizations of the Chwiesiuks would be inadmissible, the photos and videos of the Chwisiuks that have been disseminated would be both

admissible and highly relevant at trial. *Compare Sheppard*, 384 U.S. at 360 (noting that information reported by the media was "clearly inadmissible" and that "[t]he exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news media make it available to the public"), *with Murray v. Schriro*, 882 F.3d 778, 805 (9th Cir. 2018) ("There was no inflammatory barrage of information that would be inadmissible at trial. Rather, the news reports focused on relaying mainly evidence presented at trial."); *Henderson v. Dugger*, 925 F.2d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[B]ecause we have found [the defendant's] confessions were admissible, the damage if any from the [pretrial] publicity is negligible.").

The defendant also argues that prejudice should be presumed based on statements by the various prominent nationwide news media specifically about police officers—like K. Chwiesiuk—who participated in the attack on the Capitol. ECF No. 61, pp. 7-10. This includes statements from Chicago public figures like Superintendent of Police David Brown and Mayor Lori Lightfoot. *Id*. pp. 9-10. But harsh condemnation of a defendant's actions is not uncommon in high-profile criminal cases, and it does not suffice to establish prejudice. In *Skilling*, the news stories about the defendant's involvement in Enron's collapse "were not kind," but they "contained no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382. And in *Haldeman*, although some of the coverage of the Watergate scandal was "hostile in tone and accusatory in content," the bulk of the coverage "consist[ed] of straightforward, unemotional factual accounts of events and of the progress of official and unofficial investigations." *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 61. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the coverage "was neither as inherently prejudicial nor as unforgettable as the spectacle of Rideau's dramatically staged and broadcast confession." *Id.* The same is true here, where news coverage has not reported on any confession or other blatantly prejudicial information

about the Chwiesiuks. And, again, statements by the Mayor and Superintendent of Police were made in and most heavily reported on in Chicago (the Northern District of Illinois) and not the District of Columbia. The statements are therefore inapplicable to the Chwiesiuks' motion to change venue, expect insofar as they want to exclude the Northern District of Illinois as the landing spot for a plane that is not going to take off from the District of Columbia. Also, many of the statements and news media sources cited by the Chwiesiuks are from national outlets with a national reach and readership. Exposure to these statements is hardly unique to Washington, D.C.

The Chwiesiuks also contend that the nationally televised hearings of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (Select Committee) support a change of venue. ECF No. 61, p. 12. But exposure to these public hearings and the Select Committees findings was not limited to D.C. Instead, the hearings were carried on national networks across the country. In similar circumstances, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of a change of venue where the defendants—who were high-ranking members of the Nixon administration—complained that they were prejudiced by news coverage of the Watergate-related hearings. *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 62-64 & nn.35, 43. The court of appeals observed that "a change of venue would have been of only doubtful value" where the "network news programs and legislative hearings" related to Watergate were "national in their reach." *Id.* at n.43.

Moreover, the 20 million viewers of the June 9, 2022, hearing represent only about 6% of the total U.S. population. The defendant has not pointed to any evidence that D.C. residents were more likely to have watched that hearing than citizens in other parts of the country. And even if D.C. residents tuned in at a higher rate, it is still likely that many D.C. residents did not watch the hearings. Moreover, those hearings have focused on the events of January 6 as a whole, not on the

actions of the defendant. There is no reason to believe that coverage of the hearings will create such a degree of bias against the Chwiesiuks that an impartial jury cannot be selected in the District of Columbia.

Additionally, a careful voir dire—rather than a change of venue—is the appropriate way to address potential prejudice from the Select Committee hearings. "[*V*]*oir dire* has long been recognized as an effective method of routing out [publicity-based] bias, especially when conducted in a careful and thoroughgoing manner." *In re Nat'l Broadcasting Co.*, 653 F.2d 609, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (italics in original). After a careful voir dire, this Court can select a jury from those residents who either did not watch the hearings or who, despite having watched the hearing, give adequate assurances of their impartiality. *See Haldeman*, 559 F.3d at 62 n.35 (rejecting claim of prejudice even though "several jurors" had "seen portions of the televised Senate hearings" related to Watergate).

The Chwiesiuks assert that a fair trial cannot be had in D.C. because of the volume of news coverage of January 6. ECF No. 61, pp. 10-11. But even "massive" news coverage of a crime does not require prejudice to be presumed. *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 61. And a comparatively small percentage of the news coverage of January 6 has focused on the Chwiesiuks. Unlike most cases involving pretrial publicity, where the news coverage focuses on the responsibility of a single defendant (as in *Rideau* or *Tsarnaev*) or small number of co-defendants (as in *Skilling* and *Haldeman*), the events of January 6 involved thousands of participants and have so far resulted in charges against more than 1,000 people. The Court can guard against any spillover prejudice from the broader coverage of January 6 by conducting a careful voir dire and properly instructing the jury about the need to determine a defendant's individual guilt.

And, in any event, any threat of such spillover prejudice is not limited to Washington, D.C.

because much of the news coverage of January 6 has been national in scope. *See Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 64 n.43 (observing that "a change of venue would have been of only doubtful value" where much of the news coverage was "national in [its] reach" and the crime was of national interest); *United States v. Bochene*, No. 21-cr-418-RDM, 2022 WL 123893, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022) ("The fact that there has been ongoing media coverage of the breach of the Capitol and subsequent prosecutions, both locally and nationally, means that the influence of that coverage would be present wherever the trial is held." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, many of the news stories that the Chwiesiuks cite were published by media organizations with wide national circulation, not purely local outlets. ECF No. 61, n.6 (Visual Capitalist); nn.7, 35, 46 (CNN); nn.8, 10, 13, 15, 24, 25, 32, 45 (Washington Post); n.11 (New Yorker); nn.12, 14, (New York Times); nn.16, 36 (Business Insider); n.18 (Washington Times); n.19 (Select Committee); n.20 (USA Today); nn.27, 43, 44 (Time); n.28 (Forbes); n.29 (CPOST); n.29 (Foreign Policy); n.29 (The Atlantic); n.30 (The Appeal); n.35 (Associated Press); n.37 (The Daily Beast); n.38 (WTTW); n.38 (Chicago Tribune); n.42 (CBS Chicago); n.42 (Chicago Sun Times); and n.42 (Chicago Sun Times).

As the Select Litigation poll demonstrates, the number of potential jurors exposed to "[a] lot" of news coverage of January 6 differs only slightly between Washington, D.C. (33%) and Atlanta (30%). ECF No.61, p. 10, n.39. Thus, the nature and extent of the pretrial publicity do not support a presumption of prejudice.

C. Passage of time before trial

In *Skilling*, the Court considered the fact that "over four years elapsed between Enron's bankruptcy and Skilling's trial." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 383. In this case, 26 months have elapsed since the events of January 6, and more time will elapse before trial. This is far more than in *Rideau*, where the defendant's trial came two months after his televised confession. *Rideau*, 373

U.S. at 724. Although January 6 continues to be in the news, the "decibel level of media attention [has] diminished somewhat," *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 383. Moreover, only a relatively small percentage of the recent stories have mentioned the Chwiesiuks, and much of the reporting has been national is scope, rather than limited to Washington, D.C.

D. The jury verdict

Because the Chwiesiuks have not yet gone to trial, the final *Skilling* factor—whether the "jury's verdict . . . undermine[s] in any way the supposition of juror bias," *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 383—does not directly apply. But the fact that *Skilling* considered this factor to be "of prime significance," *id.*, underscores how unusual it is to presume prejudice before trial. Ordinarily, a case should proceed to trial in the district where the crime was committed, and courts can examine after trial whether the record supports a finding of actual or presumed prejudice. In short, none of the *Skilling* factors supports the defendant's contention that the Court should presume prejudice and order a transfer of venue without even conducting voir dire.

Some defendants have suggested that this factor *supports* their claim of prejudice because several jury trials involving January 6 defendants have resulted in prompt and (until recently) unanimous guilty verdicts. But although the *Skilling* indicated that a split verdict could "undermine" a presumption of prejudice, it never suggested that a unanimous verdict—particularly a unanimous verdict in a separate case involving a different defendant—was enough to establish prejudice. The prompt and unanimous guilty verdicts in other January 6 jury trials resulted from the strength of the government's evidence. The Chwiesiuks recognize in their own motion that this was "likely the most documented crime in history." ECF No. 61, p. 11. Moreover, juries in two recent January 6 trials have either been unable to reach a verdict on certain counts, *see United States v. Williams*, No. 21-cr-618 (D.D.C.), or have acquitted on some counts, *see United States v. Rhodes, et al.*, No. 22-cr-15, ECF No. 410 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022). This indicates that D.C. jurors

are carefully weighing the evidence and not reflexively convicting January 6 defendants on all charges. And, as explained below, the jury selection in those cases actually indicates that impartial juries can be selected in this district.

III. The Poll Mentioned by the Defendant Does Not Support a Change of Venue.

The Chwiesiuks cite to a poll conducted by Select Litigation, a private litigation consulting firm, at the request of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia. ECF No. 61, n.39. Select Litigation conducted a telephone poll of potential jurors in the District of Columbia and in the Atlanta Division of the Northern District of Georgia and contracted with a media research firm to analyze news media coverage of January 6 in both of those jurisdictions. Although the Chwiesiuks "do not rely on the survey results themselves" and "cite only to the market comparison data from News Exposure for its conclusion that publicity has been more widespread in this jurisdiction," ECF No. 61, n.39, for the following reasons, this Court should not conclude that any findings of or data from that poll support the Chwiesiuks' request for a venue transfer.

A. Courts have repeatedly declined to find a presumption of prejudice based on pretrial polling without conducting voir dire.

The defendant argues that this Court should find a presumption of prejudice based at least in part on a poll of prospective jurors. But "courts have commonly rejected such polls as unpersuasive in favor of effective voir dire as a preferable way to ferret out any bias." *United States v. Causey*, 2005 WL 8160703, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2005). As one circuit has observed, the Supreme Court's emphasis on the important role of voir dire in addressing pretrial publicity "undercuts" the "argument that poll percentages . . . decide the question of a presumption of prejudice." *In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam); *see Mu'Min v. Virginia*, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991) (observing that, "[p]articularly with respect to pretrial publicity, . . . primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense").

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has rejected a claim of presumed prejudice based on the results of a pre-voir dire survey. *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 64. In *Haldeman*, seven former Nixon administration officials (including the former Attorney General of the United States) were prosecuted for their role in the Watergate scandal. *Id.* at 51. According to a poll commissioned by the defense in that case, 93% of the Washington, D.C. population knew of the charges against the defendants and 61% had formed the opinion that they were guilty. *Id.* at 144, 178 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Recognizing that the case had produced a "massive" amount of pretrial publicity, *id.* at 61, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless held that the district court "was correct" to deny the defendants' "pre-voir dire requests for . . . a change of venue," *id.* at 63-64. The court observed that the district court "did not err in relying less heavily on a poll taken in private by private pollsters and paid for by one side than on a recorded, comprehensive voir dire examination conducted by the judge in the presence of all parties and their counsel." *Id.* at 64 n.43; *see Jones*, 404 F.2d at 1238 (observing that it is "upon the voir dire examination," and "usually only then, that a fully adequate appraisal of the claim [of local community prejudice] can be made" (quotation omitted)).

Other circuits have similarly rejected attempts to elevate polling results over voir dire. In *United States v. Campa*, a pre-trial survey found that 69% of respondents were prejudiced against anyone charged with spying on behalf of Cuba, as the defendants were. *Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1157 (Birch, J., dissenting). The en banc Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion for change of venue, explaining that "[w]hen a defendant alleges that prejudicial pretrial publicity would prevent him from receiving a fair trial, it is within the district court's broad discretion to proceed to voir dire to ascertain whether the prospective jurors have, in fact, been influenced by pretrial publicity." *Id.* at 1146 (majority opinion).

Similarly, in *United States v. Rodriguez*, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009), a poll indicated that 99 percent of respondents had heard about the brutal rape and murder with which the defendant was charged, nearly 88 percent of those respondents believed he was guilty, and about 42 percent of respondents had a strongly held opinion of his guilt. *Id.* at 786; Brief for the Appellant, *United States v. Rodriguez*, No. 07-1316 (8th Cir.), 2008 WL 194877, at *19. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit found no presumption of prejudice, observing that a district court was not required "to consider public opinion polls when ruling on change-of-venue motions." *Rodriguez*, 581 F.3d at 786. And the court held that, in any event, the poll did not "demonstrate widespread community prejudice" because the "media coverage had not been inflammatory," two years had passed since the murder, and "the district court concluded that special voir dire protocols would screen out prejudiced jurors." *Id.*

There are good reasons to rely on voir dire, rather that public-opinion polls, when assessing whether prejudice should be presumed. First, polling lacks many of the safeguards of court-supervised voir dire, including the involvement of both parties in formulating the questions. Surveys that are not carefully worded and properly conducted can produce misleading results, such as by asking leading questions or providing the respondents with facts that will influence their responses. *See Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1146 (noting problems with "non-neutral" and "ambiguous" questions). Second, polling lacks the formality that attends in-court proceedings under oath, and it does not afford the court the "face-to-face opportunity to gauge demeanor and credibility." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 395. Third, polls ordinarily inform the court only the extent to which prospective jurors have heard about a case and formed an opinion about it. But that is not the ultimate question when picking a jury. A prospective juror is not disqualified simply because he has "formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case." *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717,

722 (1961). Instead, "[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court." *Id.* at 723. But pre-trial surveys are poorly suited to answering that ultimate question, which is best asked in the context of face-to-face voir dire under oath. *See Rosales-Lopez v. United States*, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (observing that the trial judge's function in voir dire "is not unlike that of the jurors later in the trial" because "[b]oth must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions").

In sum, federal courts have shown an overwhelming preference for assessing prejudice through court-supervised voir dire rather than through public opinion polls. And the defendant has not offered any reason to depart from that usual practice here. Thus, this Court need not give substantial weight to the polling when considering whether to presume prejudice. But, as explained below, the poll mentioned for limited purposes by the Chwiesiuks does not support a presumption of prejudice in any event.

B. The Select Litigation poll does not demonstrate pervasive prejudice in the District of Columbia.

The Select Litigation poll does not support a presumption of prejudice in this District. As an initial matter, the Select Litigation poll selected only one comparator jurisdiction—the Atlanta Division of the Northern District of Georgia. The defendant has not requested a transfer to that district or division, but instead asks this Court for a transfer to any other district aside from the Northern District of Illinois. The Select Litigation survey tells the Court nothing about the views or media exposure of prospective jurors in any other district. The poll therefore cannot show that selecting an impartial jury would be any more difficult in the District of Columbia than in any other district. *See United States v. Haldeman*, 559 F.2d 31, 64 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam) (observing that a change of venue "would have been only of doubtful value" where the

pretrial publicity was national in scope).

Understood in context, the Select Litigation poll does not indicate any higher degree of juror bias than in *Haldeman*, where the en banc D.C. Circuit found no presumption of prejudice. In *Haldeman*, 61% of respondents expressed a view that the defendants were guilty, as opposed to the 71% here. *See Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 144, 178 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But the survey in *Haldeman* first asked respondents whether they had formed an opinion about whether the indicted Nixon aides were guilty or innocent, giving options for both "No" (*i.e.* had not formed an opinion) and "Don't Know/No Opinion." *Id.* at 178 n.2. The survey then asked whether respondents thought the defendants were "guilty or innocent in the Watergate affair," giving options for "Not Guilty Until Proven" and "No Opinion/Don't Know." *Id.* Only after (a) being prompted to consider whether they could actually form an opinion, and (b) being reminded of the presumption of innocence, did 61% of respondents say "guilty." *Id.*

In any U.S. jurisdiction, most prospective jurors will have heard about the events of January 6, and many will have various disqualifying biases. But the appropriate way to identify and address those biases is through a careful voir dire, rather than a change of venue based solely on pretrial polling and media analyses. As in *Haldeman*, there is "no reason for concluding that the population of Washington, D. C. [i]s so aroused against [the defendant] and so unlikely to be able objectively to judge [his] guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence presented at trial" that a change of venue is required. *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 62.

IV. The January 6-Related Jury Trials That Have Already Occurred Have Demonstrated the Availability of a Significant Number of Fair, Impartial Jurors in the D.C. Venire.

At this point, more than a dozen January 6 cases have proceeded to jury trials, and the Court in each of those cases has been able to select a jury without undue expenditure of time or effort. *See Murphy*, 421 U.S. at 802-03 ("The length to which the trial court must go to select jurors

who appear to be impartial is another factor relevant in evaluating those jurors' assurances of impartiality."); *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 63 (observing that "if an impartial jury actually cannot be selected, that fact should become evident at the voir dire"). Instead, the judges presiding over nearly all of those trials were able to select a jury in one or two days. *See United States v. Reffitt*, No. 21-cr-32, Minute Entries (Feb. 28 & Mar. 1, 2022); *United States v. Robertson*, No. 21-cr-34, Minute Entry (Apr. 5, 2022); *United States v. Thompson*, No. 21-cr-161, Minute Entry (Apr. 11, 2022); *United States v. Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, Minute Entry (Apr. 25, 2022); *United States v. Hale-Cusanelli*, No. 21-cr-37, Minute Entry (May 23, 2022); *United States v. Anthony Williams*, No. 21-cr-377, Minute Entry (June 27, 2022); *United States v. Bledsoe*, No. 21-cr-204, Minute Entry (July 18, 2022); *United States v. Herrera*, No. 21-cr-619, Minute Entry (D.D.C. August 15, 2022); *United States v. Jensen*, No. 21-cr-6, Minute Entries (Sep. 19 & 20, 2022); *United States v. Strand*, No. 21-85, Minute Entry (D.D.C. Sep. 20, 2022); *United States v. Alford*, No. 21-cr-263, Minute Entry (Sep. 29, 2022); *United States v. Riley Williams*, No. 21-cr-618, Minute Entries (D.D.C. Nov. 7 & 8, 2022); *United States v. Schwartz*, No. 21-cr-178, Minute Entries (D.D.C. Nov. 22 & 29, 2022); *United States v. Gillespie* No. 22-cr-60, Minute Entry (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2022); *United States v. Barnett*, 21-cr-38, Minute Entries (D.D.C. Jan. 9 & 10, 2023); *United States v. Sheppard*, No. 21-cr-203, Minute Entries (D.D.C. Jan. 20 & 23, 2023); *United States v. Eckerman*, No. 21-CR-623, Minute Entry (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2023). The only exceptions have trials involving seditious conspiracy charges. *See United States v. Rhodes, et al.*, No. 22-cr-15, Minute Entries (Sept. 27, 28, 29; Dec. 6, 7, 8, 9, 2022). And, using the first five jury trials as exemplars, the voir dire that took place undermines the defendant's claim that prejudice should be presumed.

In *Reffitt*, the Court individually examined 56 prospective jurors and qualified 38 of them (about 68% of those examined). *See Reffitt*, No. 21-cr-32, ECF No. 136 at 121. The Court asked

all the prospective jurors whether they had "an opinion about Mr. Reffitt's guilt or innocence in this case" and whether they had any "strong feelings or opinions" about the events of January 6 or any political beliefs that it would make it difficult to be a "fair and impartial" juror. *Reffitt*, No. 21-cr-32, ECF No. 133 at 23, 30. The Court then followed up during individual voir dire. Of the 18 jurors that were struck for cause, only nine (or 16% of the 56 people examined) indicated that they had such strong feelings about the events of January 6 that they could not serve as fair or impartial jurors.[7]

In *Thompson*, the Court individually examined 34 prospective jurors, and qualified 25 of them (or 73%). *See Thompson*, No. 21-cr-161, ECF No. 106 at 170, 172, 181, 190, 193. The court asked the entire venire 47 standard questions, and then followed up on their affirmative answers during individual voir dire. *Id.* at 4-5, 35. Of the nine prospective jurors struck for cause, only three (or about 9% of those examined) were stricken based on an inability to be impartial, as opposed to some other cause.[8]

Similarly, in *Robertson*, the Court individually examined 49 prospective jurors and qualified 34 of them (or about 69% of those examined). *See Robertson*, No. 21-cr-34, ECF No.

[7] For those struck based on a professed inability to be impartial, see *Reffitt*, No. 21-cr-32, ECF No. 133 at 49-54 (Juror 328), 61-68 (Juror 1541), 112-29 (Juror 1046); ECF No. 134 at 41-42 (Juror 443), 43-47 (Juror 45), 71-78 (Juror 1747), 93-104 (Juror 432), 132-43 (Juror 514); ECF No. 135 at 80-91 (Juror 1484). For those struck for other reasons, see *Reffitt*, No. 21-cr-32, ECF No. 134 at 35-41 (Juror 313, worked at Library of Congress); ECF No. 134 at 78-93 and ECF No. 135 at 3 (Juror 728, moved out of D.C.); ECF No. 135 at 6-8 (Juror 1650, over 70 and declined to serve), 62-73 (Juror 548, unavailability), 100-104 (Juror 715, anxiety and views on guns), 120 (Juror 548, medical appointments); ECF No. 136 at 41-43 (Juror 1240, health hardship), 53-65 (Juror 464, worked at Library of Congress), 65-86 (Juror 1054, prior knowledge of facts).

[8] For the three stricken for bias, see *Thompson*, No. 21-cr-161, ECF No. 106 at 51-53 (Juror 1242), 85-86 (Juror 328), 158-59 (Juror 999). For the six stricken for hardship or inability to focus, see *Thompson*, No. 21-cr-161, ECF No. 106 at 44 (Juror 1513), 45 (Juror 1267), 49-50 (Juror 503), 50-51 (Juror 1290), 86-93 (Juror 229), 109-10 (Juror 1266).

106 at 73. The Court asked all prospective jurors whether they had "such strong feelings" about the events of January 6 that it would be "difficult" to follow the court's instructions "and render a fair and impartial verdict." *Robertson*, No. 21-cr-34, ECF No. 104 at 14. It asked whether anything about the allegations in that case would prevent prospective jurors from "being neutral and fair" and whether their political views would affect their ability to be "fair and impartial." *Id.* at 13, 15. The Court followed up on affirmative answers to those questions during individual voir dire. Of the 15 prospective jurors struck for cause, only nine (or 18% of the 49 people examined) indicated that they had such strong feelings about the January 6 events that they could not be fair or impartial.[9]

In *Webster*, the Court individually examined 53 jurors and qualified 35 of them (or 66%), *Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 115 at 6, though it later excused one of those 35 based on hardship, *Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 114 at 217-18. The Court asked all prospective jurors whether they had "strong feelings" about the events of January 6 or about the former President that would "make it difficult for [the prospective juror] to serve as a fair and impartial juror in this case." *Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 113 at 19. During individual voir dire, the Court followed up on affirmative answers to clarify whether prospective jurors could set aside their feelings and decide the case fairly. *See, e.g., id.* at 32-33, 41-42, 54-56, 63, 65-66. Only 10 out of 53 prospective jurors (or about 19%) were stricken based on a professed or imputed inability to be impartial, as

[9] For those struck based on a professed inability to be impartial, see *Robertson*, No. 21-cr-34, ECF No. 104 at 26-34 (Juror 1431), 97-100 (Juror 1567); ECF No. 105 at 20-29 (Juror 936), 35-41 (Juror 799), 59-70 (Juror 696), 88-92 (Juror 429); ECF No. 106 at 27-36 (Juror 1010), 36-39 (Juror 585), 58-63 (Juror 1160). For those struck for other reasons, see *Robertson*, No. 21-cr-34, ECF No. 104 at 23-26 (Juror 1566, hardship related to care for elderly sisters), 83-84 (Juror 1027, moved out of D.C.); ECF No. 105 at 55-59 (Juror 1122, language concerns), 92-94 (Juror 505, work hardship); ECF No. 106 at 16-21 (Juror 474, work trip); 50-53 (Juror 846, preplanned trip).

opposed to some other reason.[10] The *Webster* Court observed that this number "was actually relatively low" and therefore "doesn't bear out the concerns that were at root in the venue transfer motion" in that case. *Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 115 at 7.

In *Hale-Cusanelli*, the Court individually examined 47 prospective jurors and qualified 32 of them (or 68%). *Hale-Cusanelli*, No. 21-cr-37, ECF No. 91 at 106, 111. The Court asked prospective jurors questions similar to those asked in the other trials. *See Hale-Cusanelli*, No. 21-cr-37, ECF No. 90 at 72-74 (Questions 16, 20). Of the 15 prospective jurors struck for cause, 11 (or 23% of those examined) were stricken based on a connection to the events of January 6 or a professed inability to be impartial.[11]

In these first five jury trials, the percentage of prospective jurors stricken for cause based on partiality is far lower than in *Irvin*, where the Supreme Court said that "statement[s] of impartiality" by some prospective jurors could be given "little weight" based on the number of other prospective jurors who "admitted prejudice." *Irvin*, 366 U.S. at 728. In *Irvin*, 268 of 430 prospective jurors (or 62%) were stricken for cause based on "fixed opinions as to the guilt of petitioner." *Id.* at 727. The percentage of partiality-based strikes in these first five January 6-related

[10] Nine of the 19 stricken jurors were excused based on hardship or a religious belief. *See Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 113 at 46 (Juror 1464), 49-50 (Juror 1132), 61 (Juror 1153), 68 (Juror 951), 78 (Juror 419); *Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 114 at 102-04, 207, 217 (Juror 571), 188 (Juror 1114), 191 (Juror 176), 203-04 (Juror 1262). Of the ten other stricken jurors, three professed an ability to be impartial but were nevertheless stricken based on a connection to the events or to the U.S. Attorney's Office. *See Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 113 at 58-60 (Juror 689 was a deputy chief of staff for a member of congress); *Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 114 at 139-41 (Juror 625's former mother-in-law was a member of congress); 196-98 (Juror 780 was a former Assistant U.S. Attorney in D.C.).

[11] *See Hale-Cusanelli*, No. 21-cr-37, ECF No. 90 at 61-62 (Juror 499), 67-68 (Juror 872), 84-85 (Juror 206), 91-94 (Juror 653); ECF No. 91 at 2-5 (Juror 1129), 32 (Juror 182), 36 (Juror 176), 61-62 (Juror 890), 75-78 (Juror 870), 94-97 (Juror 1111), 97-104 (Juror 1412). For the four jurors excused for hardship, see *Hale-Cusanelli*, No. 21-cr-37, ECF No. 90 at 77-79 (Juror 1524), 99 (Juror 1094); ECF No. 91 at 12 (Juror 1014), 31 (Juror 899).

jury trials—between 9% and 23% of those examined—is far lower than the 62% in *Irvin*. The percentage in these cases is lower even than in *Murphy*, where 20 of 78 prospective jurors (25%) were "excused because they indicated an opinion as to petitioner's guilt." *Murphy*, 421 U.S. at 803. *Murphy* said that this percentage "by no means suggests a community with sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to impeach the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their own." *Id.* As in *Murphy*, the number of prospective jurors indicating bias does not call into question the qualifications of others whose statements of impartiality the Court has credited.

Far from showing that "an impartial jury actually cannot be selected," *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 63, the first five January 6-related jury trials have confirmed that voir dire can adequately screen out prospective jurors who cannot be fair and impartial, while leaving more than sufficient qualified jurors to hear the case. The Court should deny the defendant's request for a venue transfer and should instead rely on a thorough voir dire to protect the defendant's right to an impartial jury.

V. A Written Screening Questionnaire Is Not Necessary in This Case.

The defendant also contends that this Court should use "a written screening questionnaire and individual follow-up questioning of prospective jurors" in selecting a jury. ECF No. 61, p. 13. At least as to the contention that a written screening questionnaire is necessary, the Chwiesiuks are incorrect. Although this Court has discretion to use a written questionnaire, it need not do so because it can select an impartial jury using only in-person voir dire.[12] Issues of pre-trial publicity

[12] Some judges in this District have used written questionnaires to aid in screening potential jurors in particular cases. *See, e.g., United States v. Stone*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2020 WL 1892360, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2020); *United States v. Lorenzana-Cordon*, No. 03-CR-331, 2016 WL 11664054, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2016). One judge used a questionnaire in a January 6 trial. *United States v. Alford*, 21-cr-263, ECF Nos. 46 at 15, 50 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022) (TSC). And in *United States v. Samsel*, 21-cr-537 (Dec. 15, 2022) (Minute Order) (JMC), the court has indicated that it plans to use a juror questionnaire in advance of the March 6, 2023 trial. But the practice is not common in this District. And judges in many January 6 cases have achieved the efficiency often served by questionnaires by using a hybrid voir dire in which the court initially asks questions of

and potential prejudice are more meaningfully explored by in-person examination than by use of a jury questionnaire. "[W]ritten answers [do] not give counsel or the court any exposure to the demeanor of the juror in answering the . . . questions." *Mu'Min*, 500 U.S. at 425. A prospective juror's tone of voice and demeanor are important. *See Rosales-Lopez*, 451 U.S. at 188 (observing that the court "must reach conclusions" based on its "own evaluation[] of demeanor evidence and of response to questions"). Indeed, "[h]ow a person says something can be as telling as what a person says." *United States v. Jackson*, 863 F. Supp. 1449, 1459 (D. Kan. 1994); *see also Mu'Min*, 500 U.S. at 433 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("A particular juror's tone of voice or demeanor might have suggested to the trial judge that the juror had formed an opinion about the case and should therefore be excused."). And even where a questionnaire is used, in-person follow-up questioning is important to give the court the "face-to-face opportunity to gauge demeanor and credibility." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 395. A jury questionnaire would not materially assist jury selection in this case, since there is no suggestion that this particular defendant has received significant, unfavorable pretrial publicity, and any potential prejudice due to general media coverage of the events of January 6, 2021, can be adequately probed through in-person voir dire examination.

As to the Chwiesiuks' request to be able to perform individual follow-up questioning of prospective jurors, the government does not object. In *United States v. Guy Reffitt*, 21-CR-32 (DLF), a January 6 case involving felony charges that likely received more pretrial media coverage than this one, the Court did not circulate a jury questionnaire in advance of trial. Instead, it conducted in-person voir dire in two phases. It first asked a large group of prospective jurors a series of standard questions—including questions about exposure to pretrial publicity and the

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the entire venire, with prospective jurors noting their answers on notecards, followed by individual questioning.

ability to set aside any preconceived opinions—with the prospective jurors noting their answers on a notecard. The court then conducted individual voir dire, following up on any affirmative answers to the standardized questions. A similarly thorough voir dire examination that probes each individual juror's exposure to pretrial publicity and her ability to lay aside her impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court is an efficient and effective way to screen for prejudice among potential jurors in this case. *See United States v. Alford*, Crim. No. 21-CR-263, ECF No. 46 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022) ("Alford Order") (Chutkan, J.) (denying defendant's request to transfer venue but granting request for expanded examination of prospective jurors).

VI. The Fact that the House Speaker Allowed a Single Member of the News Media Access to U.S. Capitol CCV Does Not Support the Chwiesiuks' Motion to Change Venue

Without offering any context and in support of their request that this Court find a presumption of prejudice, the Chwiesiuks mention that "in only the last few days, reports indicate that House Speaker Kevin McCarthy granted Fox News host Tucker Carlson access to 41,000 hours of security footage from January 6 and further plans to provide access to January 6 defendants and the public as well." ECF No. 61, p. 12. The government does not know the extent of any material that a member of the legislative branch purportedly provided to a single member of the news media or to other individuals. This Court should not find a presumption of prejudice or grant a request for a change of venue based on the unsupported allegation that pertinent information may exist somewhere, especially when that somewhere is not currently known to either the prosecution or the defense. Chief Judge Howell identified this argument's fallacy when considering a similar motion in the context of the January 6 House Select Committee: "Taken to its logical endpoint, defendant's argument would preclude nearly any criminal trial on any subject, ever, from proceeding, as it is always possible that relevant information exists somewhere that is

not fully known by or in the possession of the parties." *United States v. Williams*, 21-CR-377 (BAH), ECF No. 108, at 5-6.

Here, however, this information is not being used in support of a request to continue a trial, but rather to change venue. It is unclear how this single news media personality's opinions—which the Chwiesiuks call an "unprecedented event" and one that is "understandably holding the attention of the American public," ECF No. 61, p. 12—relates to a motion for a change of venue. It is worth reiterating the observation from the en banc *Haldeman* court that a change of venue "would [be] only of doubtful value" where the pretrial publicity is national in scope *United States v. Haldeman*, 559 F.2d 31, 64 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam). This Court should not find a presumption of prejudice based on this or any other factor brought forth in the Chwiesiuks' filing that would merit a transfer of venue.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to transfer venue should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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By: 

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