

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

<b>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</b>	:	
	:	<b>Case No. 1:22-cr-00016-1 (CJN)</b>
<b>v.</b>	:	
	:	
<b>BRYAN BUSTOS,</b>	:	
	:	
<b>Defendant</b>	:	

**GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM**

The United States of America, by and through its attorney, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, respectfully submits this sentencing memorandum in connection with the above-captioned matter. For the reasons set forth herein, the Government requests that this Court sentence Defendant Bryan Bustos to fourteen days’ incarceration, thirty-six months’ probation, sixty hours of community service, and \$500 in restitution.

**I. Introduction**

Defendant Bryan Bustos, a thirty-one-year-old chef from Long Beach, California, participated in the January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol—a violent attack that forced an interruption of Congress’s certification of the 2020 Electoral College vote count, threatened the peaceful transfer of power after the 2020 Presidential election, injured more than one hundred police officers, and resulted in more than 2.8 million dollars’ in losses.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Although the Statement of Offense in this matter, filed on November 7, 2022, (ECF No. 48 at 3), reflects a sum of more than \$1.4 million dollars for repairs, as of October 17, 2022, the approximate losses suffered as a result of the siege at the United States Capitol was \$2,881,360.20. That amount reflects, among other things, damage to the United States Capitol building and grounds and certain costs borne by the United States Capitol Police.

Defendant Bustos pleaded guilty to one count of violating 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). As explained herein, a sentence of incarceration is appropriate in this case because Bustos took photos and videos after illegally entering the Capitol Rotunda, posted those images on his social media accounts, and, as of the time of this filing, has not expressed any remorse for his actions.

The Court must also consider that Bustos's conduct on January 6th, like the conduct of hundreds of other rioters, took place in the context of a large and violent riot that relied on numbers to overwhelm police officers who trying to prevent a breach of the Capitol Building, and disrupt the proceedings. Here, the facts of and circumstances of Bustos's crime support a sentence of fourteen days' incarceration, thirty-six months' probation, sixty hours of community service, and \$500 in restitution in this case.

## **II. Factual and Procedural Background**

### *The January 6, 2021 Attack on the Capitol*

To avoid unnecessary exposition, the government refers to the general summary of the attack on the U.S. Capitol. *See* ECF No. 48 (Statement of Offense), at 1–3.

### *Defendant Bustos's Role in the January 6, 2021 Attack on the Capitol*

On January 3, 2021, Bustos travelled from Long Beach, California, to Washington, D.C., with his brother and co-defendant, Alexis Bustos, to protest Congress' certification of the Electoral College.

At approximately 2:04 p.m., Bustos entered the Capitol Grounds, near the north barricade access. Image 1 shows Bustos (carrying a large flag) and his brother and co-defendant, Alexis Bustos, captured on video entering U.S. Capitol grounds.



Image 1

At approximately 2:40 p.m., Bustos entered the Capitol through the Columbus Doors on the eastern side of the building. Bustos entered with an enormous crowd through the doors, despite their shattered glass panes. He then proceeded to the Capitol Rotunda. Image 2 shows Bustos entering the Capitol through the Rotunda Door. Image 3 shows Bustos within the Rotunda.




Image 2




Image 3

While in the Rotunda, Bustos posed for photos and filmed videos, which he posted on his Instagram Account. Image 4 is a photo of Bustos in the Rotunda, while Images 5 and 6 are still images from a video that the Defendant filmed.



Image 4



Image 5




Image 6



Bustos remained in the Capitol Rotunda until he exited at approximately 2:51 p.m., along with his brother and co-defendant Alexis Bustos. Images 7 and 8 show Bustos meeting his brother and exiting the Capitol.



Image 7




Image 8

In total, Bustos remained in the Capitol for approximately eleven minutes. After exiting the Capitol, Bustos remained on the Capitol steps with his brother and filmed a video of the two of them together, which he posted on his Instagram account. In the video, the two brothers appear to be laughing as they celebrate storming the Capitol. Image 9 below, is a photo from that video.



Image 9

*Bustos's Actions After January 6<sup>th</sup>*

Since the attack on the Capitol, Bustos deleted the incriminating photos from his social media accounts. At the time of his arrest, he declined to interview with the FBI. He then deleted his social media accounts, as evidenced in the PSR. Additionally, according to the PSR, Bustos agreed with the account of his illegal conduct, as documented in the Statement of the Offense, but declined to provide any additional statement. As of the time of this filing, he has not expressed any remorse for his actions.

*The Charges and Plea Agreement*

On September 29, 2021, the United States charged Bustos by criminal complaint with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2); 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D); and 18 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). ECF No. 1. On November 23, 2021, law enforcement officers arrested

him at his home in California. ECF No. 5. On January 13, 2022, the United States charged Bustos by a four-count information including the same violations included in the criminal complaint. ECF No. 22. On November 7, 2022, pursuant to a plea agreement, Bustos pleaded guilty to Count Four of the Information, charging him with parading, demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol Building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). ECF No. 46. By plea agreement, Defendant agreed to pay \$500 in restitution to the Architect of the Capitol. *Id.* at 6.

### **III. Statutory Penalties**

Bustos now faces a sentencing on a single count of violating 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). As noted by the plea agreement and the U.S. Probation Office, Bustos faces up to six months of imprisonment and a fine of up to \$5,000. He must also pay restitution under the terms of his plea agreement. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3); *United States v. Anderson*, 545 F.3d 1072, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir. 2008). As this offense is a Class B Misdemeanor, the Sentencing Guidelines do not apply to it. 18 U.S.C. § 3559; U.S.S.G. §1B1.9.

### **IV. Sentencing Factors Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)**

In this misdemeanor case, sentencing is guided by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which identifies the factors a court must consider in formulating the sentence. Some of those factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense, § 3553(a)(1); the history and characteristics of the defendant, *id.*; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law, § 3553(a)(2)(A); the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence, § 3553(a)(2)(B); and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. § 3553(a)(6). In this case, as described below, the Section 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of a sentence of fourteen days'

incarceration, thirty-six months' probation, sixty hours of community service, and \$500 in restitution.

**A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense**

The attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6 posed a grave danger to our democracy.” *United States v. Munchel*, 991 F.3d 1273, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2021). The attack “endangered hundreds of federal officials in the Capitol complex,” including lawmakers who “cowered under chairs while staffers blockaded themselves in offices, fearing physical attacks from the rioters.” *United States v. Judd*, 21-cr-40, 2021 WL 6134590, at \*5 (D.D.C. Dec. 28, 2021). While assessing Bustos’s participation in that attack to fashion a just sentence, this Court should consider various aggravating and mitigating factors. Notably, for a misdemeanor defendant like Bustos, the absence of violent or destructive acts is not a mitigating factor. Had Bustos engaged in such conduct, he would have faced additional criminal charges.

One of the most important factors in Bustos’s case is the fact that he documented and shared so much of his illegal conduct on social media, including posting photos and videos from inside the Rotunda, but has not made any corresponding statement indicating any remorse for his actions. Accordingly, the nature and the circumstances of this offense establish the clear need for a sentence of home detention in this matter.

**B. The History and Characteristics of Bustos**

As set forth in the PSR, Bustos does not have a criminal history. Despite lacking a criminal history, his actions during the January 6th Riot indicate a real need for a sentence that provides specific deterrence, as discussed further below. Additionally, as of the time of filing, Bustos has not expressed remorse for his actions on January 6th. According to the presentence report, during



his interview, Bustos agreed with his conduct as described in the Statement of Offense, but made no additional statements regarding his offense.

**C. The Need for the Sentence Imposed to Reflect the Seriousness of the Offense and Promote Respect for the Law**

The attack on the U.S. Capitol building and grounds was an attack on the rule of law. As with the nature and circumstances of the offense, this factor supports a sentence of incarceration, as it will in most cases, including misdemeanor cases, arising out of the January 6th riot. *See United States v. Joshua Bustle and Jessica Bustle*, 21-cr-238-TFH, Tr. 08/24/21 at 3 (“As to probation, I don’t think anyone should start off in these cases with any presumption of probation. I think the presumption should be that these offenses were an attack on our democracy and that jail time is usually -- should be expected”) (statement of Judge Hogan).

**D. The Need for the Sentence to Afford Adequate Deterrence**

Deterrence encompasses two goals: general deterrence, or the need to deter crime generally, and specific deterrence, or the need to protect the public from further crimes by this defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B-C), *United States v. Russell*, 600 F.3d 631, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

*General Deterrence*

The need for general deterrence weighs heavily in favor of incarceration in nearly every case arising out of the violent riot at the Capitol. Indeed, general deterrence may be the most compelling reason to impose a sentence of incarceration. “Future would-be rioters must be deterred.” (statement of Judge Nichols at sentencing, *United States v. Thomas Gallagher*, 1:21-CR-00041 Tr. 10/13/2021 at 37).

General deterrence is an important consideration because many of the rioters intended that their attack on the Capitol would disrupt, if not prevent, one of the most important democratic processes we have: the peaceful transfer of power to a newly elected President.

The gravity of these offenses demands deterrence. *See United States v. Mariposa Castro*, 1:21-cr-00299 (RBW), Tr. 2/23/2022 at 41-42 (“But the concern I have is what message did you send to others? Because unfortunately there are a lot of people out here who have the same mindset that existed on January 6th that caused those events to occur. And if people start to get the impression that you can do what happened on January 6th, you can associate yourself with that behavior and that there's no real consequence, then people will say why not do it again.”). This was not a protest. *See United States v. Paul Hodgkins*, 21-cr-188-RDM, Tr. at 46 (“I don’t think that any plausible argument can be made defending what happened in the Capitol on January 6th as the exercise of First Amendment rights.”) (statement of Judge Moss). And it is important to convey to future potential rioters—especially those who intend to improperly influence the democratic process—that their actions will have consequences. There is possibly no greater factor that this Court must consider.

#### *Specific Deterrence*

As more fully discussed above, the facts of this case, including Bustos’s documenting and posting about his illegal conduct on social media and failing to show remorse, strongly weigh in favor of a sentence that will specifically deter Bustos from participating in any future illegal acts.

#### **E. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities**

As the Court is aware, the Government has charged hundreds of individuals for their roles in this one-of-a-kind assault on the Capitol, ranging from unlawful entry misdemeanors, such as

in this case, to assault on police officers, to conspiracy to corruptly interfere with Congress.<sup>2</sup> This Court must sentence Bustos based on his own conduct and relevant characteristics, but should give substantial weight to the context of his unlawful conduct: his participation in the January 6th riot.

Bustos has pleaded guilty to Count Four of the Information, charging him with parading, demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol Building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). This offense is a Class B misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C. § 3559. Certain Class B and C misdemeanors and infractions are “petty offenses,” 18 U.S.C. § 19, to which the Sentencing Guidelines do not apply, U.S.S.G. 1B1.9. The sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(6), do apply, however.

Section 3553(a)(6) of Title 18 directs a sentencing court to “consider ... the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Section 3553(a)(6) does not limit the sentencing court’s broad discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although unwarranted disparities may “result when the court relies on things like alienage, race, and sex to differentiate sentence terms,” a sentencing disparity between defendants whose differences arise from “legitimate considerations” such as a “difference[] in types of charges” is not unwarranted. *United States v. Bridgewater*, 950 F.3d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 2020).

“Congress’s primary goal in enacting § 3553(a)(6) was to promote national uniformity in sentencing rather than uniformity among co-defendants in the same case.” *United States v. Parker*,

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<sup>2</sup> Attached to this supplemental sentencing memorandum is a table providing additional information about the sentences imposed on other Capitol breach defendants. That table also shows that the requested sentence here would not result in unwarranted sentencing disparities.

462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006). “[A] defendant cannot rely upon § 3553(a)(6) to seek a reduced sentence designed to lessen disparity between co-defendants’ sentences.” Consequently, Section 3553(a)(6) neither prohibits nor requires a sentencing court “to consider sentencing disparity among codefendants.” *Id.* Plainly, if Section 3553(a)(6) is not intended to establish sentencing uniformity among codefendants, it cannot require uniformity among all Capitol siege defendants charged with petty offenses, as they share fewer similarities in their offense conduct than codefendants do. *See United States v. Smocks*, D.D.C. 21-cr-198 (TSC), Sent. Tr. at 48-49 (“With regard to the need to avoid sentence disparity, I find that this is a factor, although I have found in the past and I find here that the crimes that occurred on January 6 are so unusual and unprecedented that it is very difficult to find a proper basis for disparity.”) (statement of Judge Chutkan)

Cases involving convictions only for Class B misdemeanors (petty offenses) are not subject to the Sentencing Guidelines, so the Section 3553(a) factors take on greater prominence in those cases. Sentencing judges and parties have tended to rely on other Capitol siege petty offense cases as the closest “comparators” when assessing unwarranted disparity. But nothing in Section 3553(a)(6) requires a court to mechanically conform a sentence to those imposed in previous cases, even those involving similar criminal conduct and defendant’s records. After all, the goal of minimizing unwarranted sentencing disparities in Section 3553(a)(6) is “only one of several factors that must be weighted and balanced,” and the degree of weight is “firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” *United States v. Coppola*, 671 F.3d 220, 254 (2d Cir. 2012). The “open-ended” nature of the Section 3553(a) factors means that “different district courts may have distinct sentencing philosophies and may emphasize and weigh the individual § 3553(a) factors differently; and every sentencing decision involves its own set of facts and circumstances regarding the offense and the offender.” *United States v. Gardellini*, 545 F.3d 1089, 1093 (D.C.



Cir. 2008). “[D]ifferent district courts can and will sentence differently—differently from the Sentencing Guidelines range, differently from the sentence an appellate court might have imposed, and differently from how other district courts might have sentenced that defendant.” *Id.* at 1095. It follows that a sentencing court in a Capitol siege petty offense case is not constrained by sentences previously imposed in other such cases. *See United States v. Stotts*, D.D.C. 21-cr-272 (TJK), Nov. 9, 2021 Sent. Hrg. Tr. at 33-34 (“I certainly have studied closely, to say the least, the sentencings that have been handed out by my colleagues. And as your attorney has pointed out, you know, maybe, perhaps not surprisingly, judges have taken different approaches to folks that are roughly in your shoes.”) (statement of Judge Kelly).

Additionally, logic dictates that whether a sentence creates a disparity that is unwarranted is largely a function of the degree of the disparity. Differences in sentences measured in a few months are less likely to cause an unwarranted disparity than differences measured in years. For that reason, a permissible sentence imposed for a petty offense is unlikely to cause an unwarranted disparity given the narrow range of permissible sentences. The statutory range of for a petty offense is zero to six months. Given that narrow range, a sentence of six months, at the top of the statutory range, will not create an unwarranted disparity with a sentence of probation only, at the bottom. *See United States v. Servisto*, D.D.C. 21-cr-320 (ABJ), Dec. 15, 2021 Sent. Hrg. Tr. at 23-24 (“The government is trying to ensure that the sentences reflect where the defendant falls on the spectrum of individuals arrested in connection with this offense. And that’s largely been accomplished already by offering a misdemeanor plea, which reduces your exposure substantially.”) (statement of Judge Berman Jackson); *United States v. Dresch*, D.D.C. 21-cr-71 (ABJ), Aug. 4, 2021 Sent. Hrg. Tr. at 34 (“Ensuring that the sentence fairly reflects where this individual defendant falls on the spectrum of individuals arrested in connection with the offense

has largely been accomplished by the offer of the misdemeanor plea because it reduces his exposure substantially and appropriately.”) (statement of Judge Berman Jackson); *United States v. Peterson*, D.D.C. 21-cr-309, Sent. Hrg. Tr. at 26 (statement of Judge Berman Jackson) (similar).

Although all the other defendants discussed below participated in the Capitol breach on January 6, 2021, many salient differences explain the differing recommendations and sentences. While no previously sentenced case contains the same balance of aggravating and mitigating factors present here, the sentences in the following cases provide suitable comparisons to the relevant sentencing considerations in this case.

- *United States v. Paul Spigelmyer*, 1:21-cr-00218 (The defendant remained in the Rotunda for nearly ten minutes, posted statements on his social media account encouraging the riot, and did not show any remorse for his actions. The court sentenced the defendant to 45 days’ home detention, sixty hours’ community service, and \$500 in restitution.)
- *United States v. Philip Weisbecker*, 1:21-cr-00682 (The defendant wandered through Capitol, including the Rotunda, taking photographs of himself and posting statements on social media, which indicated a lack of remorse. The court sentenced the defendant to thirty days’ intermittent confinement and twenty-four months’ probation, although in that case the defendant was also verbally abusive towards law enforcement, which justified the longer sentence of incarceration.)
- *United States v. Tina Logsdon*, 1:22-cr-00023 (The defendant posted of a video of herself inside the Capitol, within the Visitor’s Center, saying that she had “stopped the vote.” The court sentenced the defendant to fourteen days’ intermittent confinement and thirty-six months’ probation. Although, in that case, the defendant also engaged

in violent rhetoric on her social media accounts and remained in the Capitol for approximately thirty minutes.)

In any event, the goal of minimizing unwarranted sentencing disparities in § 3553(a)(6) is “only one of several factors that must be weighted and balanced,” and the degree of weight is “firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” *United States v. Coppola*, 671 F.3d 220, 254 (2d Cir. 2012). The § 3553(a) factors that this Court assesses are “open-ended,” with the result that “different district courts may have distinct sentencing philosophies and may emphasize and weigh the individual § 3553(a) factors differently; and every sentencing decision involves its own set of facts and circumstances regarding the offense and the offender.” *United States v. Gardellini*, 545 F.3d 1089, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2008). “[D]ifferent district courts can and will sentence differently—differently from the Sentencing Guidelines range, differently from the sentence an appellate court might have imposed, and differently from how other district courts might have sentenced that defendant.” *Id.* at 1095.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Numerous judges of this Court have concluded that a sentencing court in a case involving a violation of a Class B misdemeanor under 40 U.S.C. § 5104 may impose a “split sentence” – a period of incarceration followed by a period of probation – for defendants convicted of federal petty offenses. *See, e.g.*, 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3); *see also, United States v. Little*, 21-cr-315 (RCL), 2022 WL 768685, at \*1 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022) (concluding that “a split sentence is permissible under law and warranted by the circumstances of this case”); *see generally* Appellee’s Brief for the United States, *United States v. Little*, No. 22-3018 (D.C.) (filed Aug. 29, 2022). Approximately nine judges of this district have authorized and imposed such split sentences pursuant to law. *But see United States v. Panayiotou*, No. 22-CR-55 (DLF), 2023 WL 417953 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2023) (holding that such sentences are impermissible under Section 3561(a)(3)).

In the alternative, courts have also issued sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(10), which authorize limited periods of intermittent confinement as a condition of probation. The courts have consistently found that such a sentence is permissible for up to two weeks’ imprisonment served in one continuous term. *See, e.g., United States v. Mize*, No. 97-40059, 1998 WL 160862, at \*2 (D. Kan. Mar. 18, 1998) (quoting Section 3563(b)(10)’s legislative history in interpreting the term to mean a “brief period of confinement, e.g., for a week or two, during a work or school vacation,” described above and reversing magistrate’s sentence that included 30-day period of confinement as a period condition of probation). To this end, at least four of the judges of this Court have

**V. Conclusion**

Sentencing requires the Court to carefully balance the § 3553(a) factors. Balancing these factors, the Government recommends that this Court sentence Defendant Bustos to fourteen days' incarceration, thirty-six months' probation, sixty hours of community service, and \$500 in restitution. Such a sentence protects the community, promotes respect for the law, and deters future crime by imposing restrictions on his liberty as a consequence of his behavior, while recognizing his acceptance of responsibility for his crime.

Respectfully submitted,

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imposed sentences under §3563(b)(10). Indeed, a sentencing court may also impose multiple intervals of imprisonment under §3563(b)(1). See *United States v. Anderson*, 787 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D. Md. 1992); *Panayiotou*, 2023 WL 417953, at \*9 (“in a case in which the government exercises its prosecutorial discretion to allow a defendant to enter a plea to a single petty misdemeanor, it can request that a court impose a sentence of intermittent confinement as a condition of probation.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)).

In this district, at least two judges have similarly imposed multiple terms of imprisonment, to be served intermittently, consistent with this subsection. Such sentences are particularly appealing in light of the fact that it has been nearly three years since the World Health Organization first declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic in March 2020, and over two years since the first COVID-19 vaccine was administered in the United States in December 2020, allowing detention facilities to now more safely handle the logistical and practical concerns associated with multiple stints of imprisonment.



**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

On this 9th day of February, 2023, a copy of the foregoing was served upon all parties listed on the Electronic Case Filing (ECF) System.

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