

**BERYL A. HOWELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : **Docket No.: 0090 1:22CR00086-001**
:
vs. : **Disclosure Date: April 24, 2023**
:
Roche, Michael :

PARTIES OBLIGATION AND RESPONSE TO PRESENTENCE REPORT

Pursuant to Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc. Rule 32(f)(1) and (2), the parties shall submit any material inaccuracies or disputes to the presentence investigation report (PSR), by May 8, 2023. This form and/or objections to the PSR shall be filed via CM/ECF.

Note: The probation office never includes information about 18 USC § 3553(e) or USSG § 5K1.1, pursuant to Rule 32(c)(3).

For the Government

(CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX)

- () There are no material/factual inaccuracies therein.
- () There are material/factual inaccuracies in the PSR.

For the Defendant

(CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX)

- () There are no material/factual inaccuracies therein.
- (✓) There are material/factual inaccuracies in the PSR.

Restrictions on Use and Redisclosure of Presentence Report

The presentence investigation report and this form are not public documents.

It is the policy of the federal judiciary and the Department of Justice that further redisclosure of the presentence investigation report is prohibited without the consent of the sentencing judge.

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL LEE ROCHE)))))	CASE NO. 1:22-CR-00086-BAH JUDGE BERYL A. HOWELL
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NOTICE OF MATERIAL/FACTUAL INACCURACIES IN THE PSI REPORT

Page 15, Paragraph 45:

Mr. Roche does not believe the 3-point enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2J1.2(b)(2) for substantial interference with the administration of justice should apply in this case. Application Note 1 states, “Substantial interference with the administration of justice’ includes a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence; or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.” This is clearly not applicable in this case. See *United States of America v. Hunter Seefried*, 2022 WL 16528415, (October 29, 2022) (attached).

Page 20, Paragraph 78:

The drug screen yielded *negative* results for marijuana. This was confirmed by Officer Logan from the Arizona probation office.

Page 22, Paragraph 87:

Mr. Roche is supporting himself and his family as a freelance musician working with his brother, Seth Roche.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Paul Bruno
 Paul Bruno, B.P.R. #17275
 Attorney for Michael Lee Roche
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 Nashville, TN 37219
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing *Notice Of Material/Factual Inaccuracies In The PSI Report* has been electronically delivered to Christopher Amore, Assistant United States Attorney, DOJ-USAO, District of New Jersey, 970 Broad Street, Suite 700, Newark, New Jersey 07102, on this the 8th day of May, 2023.

s/ Paul Bruno
Paul Bruno

2022 WL 16528415

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, District of Columbia.

UNITED STATES of America
v.
Hunter SEEFRIED, Defendant.

Case No. 21-cr-287 (TNM)
|
Signed October 29, 2022

Synopsis

Background: Defendant was convicted in a bench trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, [Trevor N. McFadden, J.](#), of obstructing an official proceeding. Government requested the application of sentencing enhancements for obstructing or interfering with the administration of justice.

[Holding:] The District Court, [Trevor N. McFadden, J.](#), held that obstructing an official proceeding, when the official proceeding at issue is the certification of electoral votes, does not qualify for sentencing enhancements for obstructing or interfering with the administration of justice.

So ordered.

Procedural Posture(s): Sentencing or Penalty Phase Motion or Objection.

West Headnotes (8)

[1] Sentencing and Punishment 🔑 Construction in general

In interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, courts apply the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation and look to the plain meaning of its terms.

[2] Sentencing and Punishment 🔑 Construction in general

Sentencing and Punishment 🔑 Commentary and policy statements

To discern the plain meaning of the text of the Sentencing Guidelines, courts look to dictionary definitions and analyze the word or phrase in context; relevant context may include the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines.

[3] Sentencing and Punishment 🔑 Construction in general

To discern the plain meaning of a word or phrase in the Sentencing Guidelines, courts looks to precedent to analyze how other courts have interpreted the phrase or similar phrases.

[4] Statutes 🔑 Dictionaries

In interpreting the meaning of a statute, courts may assess the customary usage of a phrase by searching relevant databases of naturally occurring language; this method is known as corpus linguistics.

[5] Constitutional Law 🔑 Executive Exercise of Statutory Authority as Encroaching on Judiciary

Congress has delegated substantial responsibility to the Sentencing Commission, but the interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines ultimately remains in the hands of the courts.

[6] Sentencing and Punishment 🔑 Obstructing justice and bribery

Sentencing and Punishment 🔑 Obstruction of justice

Conviction of obstructing an official proceeding, when the official proceeding at issue is the certification of electoral votes, does not qualify for sentencing enhancements for obstructing or interfering with the administration of justice.

📄 3 U.S.C.A. § 15; 📄 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(e); 📄 U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), (b)(2).

[7] **Sentencing and Punishment** 🔑 Construction in general

Statutes 🔑 Language

Terms may carry different meanings in a statute versus a Sentencing Guideline.

[8] **Sentencing and Punishment** 🔑 Burden of proof

It is the government's burden to prove that a sentencing enhancement applies.

Attorneys and Law Firms

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Edson Bostic, Pro Hac Vice, The Bostic Law Firm, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 Did the electoral certification on January 6, 2021, involve the “administration of justice”? The answer determines whether significant sentencing enhancements may apply to convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) for obstruction of an official proceeding. In the Court's view, the answer is no. Text, context, and precedent show that the “administration of justice” most naturally refers to a judicial or related proceeding that determines rights or obligations. The electoral certification was not such a proceeding.

I.

This Court found Hunter Seefried guilty of obstructing an official proceeding—the electoral certification—under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), along with four other counts. See Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 9; see also Tr. of Bench Trial

Verdict, ECF No. 109. Hunter Seefried was a 22-year-old forklift technician when he came to Washington on January 6. See PSR ¶ 76; see also Def.'s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 15, ECF No. 114. He watched as other protestors used a police riot shield and a wooden beam to shatter the Capitol's large windows. See PSR ¶ 19. He then cleared glass from a window and clambered through it, followed by other protestors. See id. ¶¶ 19–20. Once inside the Capitol building, Seefried joined other protestors in confronting U.S. Capitol police and even chasing an officer through the Senate corridors. See id. ¶ 21. Seefried's fellow rioters searched for Members of Congress and the location of the certification proceeding. See id. ¶ 22.

II.



Section 1512(c)(2) provides that “whoever corruptly ... obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so” faces a fine or up to 20 years imprisonment.

18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The Government has charged many defendants in the January 6 cases with violating this statute. See, e.g., *United States v. Hale-Cusanelli*, No. 21-cr-37, Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 59; *United States v. Reffitt*, No. 21-cr-32, Second Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 34; *United States v. Rubenacker*, No. 21-cr-193, Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 33.


The “official proceeding” at issue in these cases is the certification of electoral votes. During this proceeding, the “certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes ... [are] opened, presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States.” 3 U.S.C. § 15. Then, tellers “make a list of the votes as they [] appear” and “the result ... [is] delivered to the President of the Senate,” who announces the outcome of the election. *Id.* Finally, a list of the votes is entered in the House and Senate journals. *See id.* This Court has held—along with most other judges in this district—that the certification qualifies as an “official proceeding” under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c). See, e.g., *United States v. Hale-Cusanelli*, 2022 WL 4300000, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2022).

But does the electoral certification also involve the “administration of justice”? That is a thornier question. For defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), the Government has argued that sentencing enhancements for obstructing or interfering with “the administration of justice” should apply. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), (b)(2). One provision triggers







an eight-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person, or property damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.”



 *Id.* § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). And another prompts a three-level enhancement “[i]f the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice.”  *Id.* § 2J1.2(b)(2).

*2 For Seefried, this is not an academic question. If these enhancements apply, his sentencing guideline level is 25, with a recommended sentence of 57–71 months; if they do not, his level is 14, with a recommended sentence of 15–21 months.

The Court finds that the enhancements in  §§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) do not apply because the electoral certification does not involve the “administration of justice.”


III.


[1] In interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court applies the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation and looks to the plain meaning of its terms. Many circuits agree. *See, e.g.,*  *United States v. Savin*, 349 F.3d 27, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2003);  *United States v. Peterson*, 629 F.3d 432, 434 (4th Cir. 2011);  *United States v. Bustillos-Pena*, 612 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2010);  *United States v. Bahhur*, 200 F.3d 917, 927 (6th Cir. 2000);  *United States v. Smith*, 989 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2021); *United States v. Collins*, 754 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2014);  *United States v. Kirilyuk*, 29 F.4th 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2022).

[2] [3] To discern the text's plain meaning, courts look to dictionary definitions and analyze the word or phrase in context. *See, e.g.,*  *Kaufman v. Nielsen*, 896 F.3d 475, 485–87 (D.C. Cir. 2018). The relevant context for a sentencing guideline may include the commentary. *See, e.g.,*  *Kirilyuk*, 29 F.4th at 1137–39. Finally, the Court looks to precedent to analyze how other courts have interpreted this phrase or similar phrases.

A.

First, text. Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase “administration of justice” as “[t]he maintenance of right within a political community by means of the physical force of the state” and “the state's application of the sanction of force to the rule of right.” *Administration of Justice*, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, “due administration of justice” is defined as “[t]he proper functioning and integrity of a court or other tribunal and the proceedings before it in accordance with the rights guaranteed to the parties.” *Id.* Although the Guideline only contains the phrase “administration of justice,” not “due administration of justice,” the Government has given the Court no reason to believe these are not closely associated phrases. These definitions suggest that the “administration of justice” involves a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal that applies the force of the state to determine legal rights.

The certification does not share the characteristics of these definitions. The best evidence for what actually occurs during the certification is the statute proscribing its procedures. *See*  3 U.S.C. § 15. During the proceeding, “certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the electoral votes ... [are] opened, presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States.” *Id.* Then, tellers “make a list of the votes as they ... appear” and deliver the result to the President of the Senate after Members resolve any objections. *Id.* Finally, the votes are entered in the House and Senate journals. *See id.*

The certification is thus largely a ceremonial proceeding where Members and staff open, read, list, and announce the electoral votes. *See id.* It takes place within the deliberative branch of government—Congress—not the branches that typically exercise judgment (the judiciary), or force (the executive). *See generally* The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Congress applies no “physical force” or “sanction of force” during the certification. And the proceeding involves no possibility of punishment by the state, as a judicial, investigatory, or enforcement proceeding might to “maint[ain] [] right within a political community.” Nor does the certification involve the “proper functioning and integrity of a court or other tribunal ... in accordance with the rights guaranteed to the parties.” These definitions evoke traditional judicial or quasi-judicial bodies that decide or maintain the legal rights of the parties before them. In contrast, the certification confirms, announces, and officially records whom the people have chosen to be President and Vice President. *See*  3 U.S.C. § 15. In other words,

it commemorates and completes the peaceful transfer of executive authority.

*3 Consider another relevant definition. Black's Law Dictionary defines "obstructing the administration of justice" and "interfering with the administration of justice" as "[t]he skewing of the disposition of legal proceedings, as by fabricating or destroying evidence, witness-tampering, or threatening or intimidating a judge." *Pervverting the Course of Justice*, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (cross-referencing these phrases). This definition is probative because § 2J1.2 uses the terms "obstruct" and "interference" when discussing what a defendant might impermissibly do to the "administration of justice."

This definition further corroborates that the "administration of justice" involves something like a legal proceeding, such as a trial or grand jury hearing. Obstruction or interference with such a proceeding occurs through action that could "skew ... the disposition." The definition suggests that possible actions include falsifying or destroying evidence, tampering with witnesses, or threatening a judge. The certification does not resemble a trial or similar judicial proceeding where evidence could be falsified or destroyed, witnesses could be tampered with, or a judge could be intimidated so as to interfere with the disposition of parties' legal rights.

Indeed, the Government could have charged Seefried with violating § 1503, a different provision in the same statute that defines "obstruction of justice" as an act that "corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the *due administration of justice*." 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (emphasis added). But to the Court's knowledge, none of the January 6 defendants have been charged under § 1503. Though the Court hesitates to derive meaning from exercises of prosecutorial discretion, the existence of similar language elsewhere with a clear relationship to the enhancements in § 2J1.2 is curious. The official proceeding statute under which this Court convicted Seefried contains no such language. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512.

To be sure, some courts have recently interpreted the "administration of justice" in § 2J1.2 more broadly. In *United States v. Miller*, another judge in this district defined the individual words in the phrase by looking to Webster's Third New International Dictionary. See 21-cr-75, Tr. at 16

(May 23, 2022), ECF No. 73. The court explained that "administration in this sense means to mete out, and justice means fair treatment." *Id.* The court reasoned that these definitions are broad enough to encompass the certification because Congress was "adjudicating in some ... limited sense, subject to very substantial constraints, the results of the election." *Id.*

But this Court hesitates to slice and dice a term of art. "Adhering to the *fair meaning* of the text (the textualist's touchstone) does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word in the text The full body of a text contains implications that can alter the literal meaning of individual words." Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* 356 (2012) (Scalia & Garner); see also *Bostock v. Clayton County*, — U.S. —, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1825, 207 L.Ed.2d 218 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) ("[C]ourts must adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning of the words in a phrase."); William Eskridge, *Interpreting Law* 62 (2016) (noting that judges should follow ordinary meaning "when two words combine to produce a meaning that is not the mechanical composition of the two words separately").

*4 And even if segmenting the terms of the phrase were appropriate, another legal dictionary supports this Court's reading. Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "administration" as the "execution of a law by putting it in effect, applying it to the affairs of men." *Administration*, Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969). And it defines "justice" as "[t]hat end which ought to be reached in a case by the regular administration of the principles of law involved as applied to the facts." *Justice*, Ballentine's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969). Even separating the words supports the reading that the "administration of justice," as a legal term of art, refers to state action vis-à-vis legal rights.



In *United States v. Rubenacker*, another judge in this district interpreted the administration of justice broadly to apply § 2J1.2's enhancements to a January 6 defendant convicted under § 1512(c). See *United States v. Rubenacker*, 21-cr-193, Tr. at 71–72 (May 26, 2022), ECF No. 70. In *Rubenacker*, the court reasoned that the Black's Law Dictionary definition of "administration of justice" suggests "that the state would use mechanisms, such as the police or prosecutors, to force compliance with or maintain a right; that is not necessarily tied to a court or a particular tribunal." *Id.* at 72. The court explained that "the physical force of the


state” was present during the certification “in the form of law enforcement officers located in and around the Capitol to secure the proceedings.” *Id.* at 75. And it suggested that legislators’ statutory right to object during the certification “can be analogized to evidentiary objections.” *Id.* at 66.

This Court is unconvinced. The fact that law enforcement is present at an official proceeding—which will often be the case—surely cannot mean that the administration of justice is occurring. Consider a presidential inauguration. Police and Secret Service are present at this official proceeding to protect the incoming President and other distinguished attendees. But no one would say that the inauguration involves the “administration of justice”; it is a ceremonial proceeding that formally installs the Nation’s new leader.


The definitions of the “administration of justice” discussed above suggest that a judicial or quasi-judicial body must itself be applying the force of the state to decide legal rights, not that force need merely be present. The *Rubenacker* court’s other argument—that legislators have the right to object to the certification—also does not mean that the certification involves the administration of justice. Simply because Members may debate whether a certified vote is proper, and rules exist for resolving objections, does not mean they are administering justice. Indeed, if this were the case, it is hard to imagine a congressional proceeding that would not qualify, given that the legislative process often involves these same characteristics.

Admittedly, the dictionary definitions here are a bit unwieldy. Dictionary definitions are valuable because they are evidence of how ordinary speakers of language understand words and how legal interpreters understand terms of art. But dictionaries do not end the inquiry. This is so because not all “meanings appropriate to particular contexts are to be found in the dictionary.” *Scalia & Garner* at 70.

A reader therefore must look to context to determine “which of several possible senses a word or phrase bears.” *Id.*; accord  *Bostock*, 140 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“If the usual evidence indicates that a statutory phrase bears an ordinary meaning different from the literal strung-together definitions of the individual words in the phrase, we may not ignore or gloss over that discrepancy. Legislation cannot sensibly be interpreted by stringing together dictionary synonyms of each word.” (cleaned up)); see also  *id.* at 1766 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he meaning of language

depends on the way a linguistic community uses words and phrases in context.”). So the Court looks to both the context in which the “administration of justice” most often appears and the immediate context found in the commentary to  § 2J1.2.

B.

*5 The Court undertakes two analyses to understand how the “administration of justice” is properly understood in context. The first uses a methodology called “corpus linguistics” to assess the customary usage of the phrase at the time the Sentencing Commission crafted the Guidelines. The second looks to  § 2J1.2’s commentary, which the Court finds helpful but not dispositive.

1.

Although dictionaries provide a useful starting point, “[b]ecause common words typically have more than one meaning, you must use the context in which a given word appears to determine its aptest, most likely sense.” *Scalia & Garner* at 418; see generally Stephen C. Mouritsen, *The Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning*, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1915 (2010) (describing the shortcomings of collecting dictionary definitions and advocating for a broader, corpus-based approach to linguistic meaning). To understand what meaning the Guideline most naturally evokes, the Court also looks to customary usage at the time.

[4] Courts may assess the customary usage of a phrase by searching relevant databases of naturally occurring language. This method is known as corpus linguistics. “Corpus linguistics is an empirical approach to the study of language that uses large, electronic databases” of language gathered from sources. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, *Judging Ordinary Meaning*, 127 Yale L. J. 788, 828 (2018); see also Lawrence B. Solum, *Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record*, 2017 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1621, 1643–49 (2017) (explaining why the method helps clarify linguistic meaning).

Other courts have deployed corpus-based approaches to textual meaning. For example, Justice Breyer, writing for

the Court, adopted a corpus-based approach to illuminate the meaning of the phrase “carries a firearm.” See *Muscarello v. United States*, 524 U.S. 125, 128–31, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998) (recounting the phrase in context from dictionaries, literature, and newspaper articles found in computerized databases). Other courts have also conducted corpus-based analyses using publicly available databases. See, e.g., *Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc.*, 930 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); *United States v. Rice*, 36 F.4th 578, 583 n.6 (4th Cir. 2022); *Health Freedom Def. Fund, Inc. v. Biden*, No. 8:21-cv-1693, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2022 WL 1134138, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2022).

Because various publicly-available databases of language exist, see, e.g., <https://www.english-corpora.org/>; lnc18.lawcorpus.byu.edu, courts must choose a corpus carefully. The database searched should include texts from the relevant linguistic community that would read and understand the text at issue. Cf. Felix Frankfurter, *Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes*, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 536 (1947) (explaining that texts “addressed to specialists, [] must be read by judges with the minds of the specialists”); James A. Heilpern, *Dialects of Art: A Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Terms*, 58 *Jurimetrics J.* 377, 389–97 (2018) (explaining the promise of a corpus-based approach for terms of art).

The primary linguistic community using and understanding the Sentencing Guidelines is an informed legal audience—most notably, lawyers and judges. Unlike most statutes, which are at least theoretically intended to be read and understood by citizens, the Guidelines are a practitioner’s guide to federal sentencing. The Court therefore focused on the Corpus of Caselaw Access Project (COCAP), which compiles the text of federal and state court decisions. See <https://lnc18.lawcorpus.byu.edu/>.¹

*6 But just in case one thinks the Guidelines should be read like criminal statutes—directed to the general public—the Court also searched the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), which collects sources across genres, including fiction, magazines, newspapers, and academic articles. Cf. *Rice*, 36 F.4th at 583 n.6 (looking to a database collecting “documents an ordinary speaker of English would interact with regularly” when interpreting a criminal statute). At the very least, it would be notable if these corpora produced wildly different results. As it turns out, they did not.

The Court queried the COCAP for the years 1977–1987. This period represents the decade before and including the year in which the Commission promulgated § 2J1.2. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 (effective Nov. 1, 1987). Cf. *Safelite*, 930 F.3d at 444 (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (looking to a ten-year period to generate a sample of written text around the time Congress first passed the relevant language). This search returned 14,118 hits, or “concordance lines.” Given such a large universe, the Court reviewed a random sample of 375 concordance lines containing the phrase “administration of justice” to see what sorts of official proceedings were discussed. This sample size produces a 95% confidence interval. A random sample can be generated through the database itself by filtering for a specific number of results.

The most frequent usage of the “administration of justice”—about 65% of the total hits—corresponds with the sense described above: a judicial proceeding deciding legal rights. The phrase appeared in conjunction with witness tampering, contempt of court, various evidentiary privileges, the effect of jury instructions on court proceedings, and the conduct of juries. The phrase also accompanies issues of judicial management, including delays in court proceedings, repeat litigants, and even courtroom dress code. Other hits dealt with media access to judicial proceedings. Finally, some hits reflected more general concerns about retroactivity and the “fair,” “proper,” “effective,” or “thorough” administration of justice by courts.

The next most common context in which the “administration of justice” appeared—around 25% of hits—involved disciplining judges or lawyers for conduct that interfered with judicial proceedings. Some hits referenced violations of various ethical rules, contempt of court, recusal, disqualification of counsel, and perjury when a lawyer testified before a grand jury. Again, the customary usage of the phrase was closely linked with judicial proceedings, or an actor who is intimately involved with the judicial process.

Another category of note—about 4% of hits—involved law enforcement activities. Some hits referenced conduct such as resisting arrest. Others discussed the need for anonymous informants to promote cooperation with law enforcement, the rationale for the exclusionary rule, and prosecutorial discretion. One discussed setting standards for roadside intoxication tests. These hits differed from those described

above in that they did not always involve a formal proceeding or a judicial body. But they all contemplate the state's application of force or the government's role in investigating and prosecuting crimes.²

*7 In contrast, the least common usage of “administration of justice” was as a broad term referring to government function generally. The Court identified three such entries out of the 375 it coded. One dealt with a public utility commission that discussed the administration of justice in broad terms. Another noted that local commissioners’ power to issue licenses involves the administration of justice. And another suggested that Texas counties are involved in the administration of justice. No entries discussed a Congressional proceeding.

This is not to say that because the administration of justice most often appeared in the context of a judicial proceeding means that it takes on that meaning in all contexts. And of course, the certification of electoral votes *could* involve the administration of justice, despite not appearing in this sample. But the vast majority of examples in the sample shared certain hallmarks such as action disruptive of, or prejudicial to, a court proceeding; discipline of judges and lawyers; and conduct that would disrupt or aid law enforcement investigations. The certification does not share these characteristics.

Even if the proper linguistic community is not lawyers and judges, a review of a broader set of sources does nothing to undermine the Court's findings. Querying COHA for the same time period returned 12 results for “administration of justice.” Though the Court hesitates to draw conclusions from such a small sample size—four of which are from the same book—these results largely support the Court's prior interpretation. The phrase most often appeared in the context of judicial decision-making, courts generally, bar associations, or law enforcement. Two concordance lines could be interpreted as referring to government generally, and two were unclear. These limited exceptions seem to be outliers.

In short, there is essentially no evidence that either judges, lawyers, or speakers more generally used the term “administration of justice” to refer to legislative proceedings like the certification of the electoral count. Instead, both professional and lay speakers overwhelmingly used this term to reference judicial proceedings or activities closely related to them. To be sure, corpus linguistics is but one tool in the interpretative toolbox. But “[i]ts foremost value may

come in those difficult cases where ... dictionaries diverge. In those cases, corpus linguistics can serve as a cross-check on established methods of interpretation (and vice versa).” *Wilson*, 930 F.3d at 440 (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Even though dictionaries do not necessarily diverge here, corpus linguistics provide further evidence that the Government is stretching the Guideline beyond its natural meaning.

2.

The Government offers a different bit of context. It argues that the commentary to § 2J1.2 defines the administration of justice broadly enough to encompass the certification. *See Gov't Mem. in Aid of Sentencing (Gov't Mem.)* at 29.

To begin, query whether the commentary to a sentencing guideline is authoritative. *See, e.g., United States v. Winstead*, 890 F.3d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting disagreement over this issue). The Supreme Court held in *Stinson v. United States* that the commentary should “be treated as an agency's interpretation of its own legislative rule.” 508 U.S. 36, 44–45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (citing *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945)). The Court explained that commentary which “interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” *Id.* at 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913.

*8 [5] Yet other circuits have explained that *Stinson* should be applied with care. This is so because it rests on *Seminole Rock* (later called *Auer*) deference, which the Supreme Court recently clarified. *See generally Kisor v. Wilkie*, — U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 204 L.Ed.2d 841 (2019). When *Stinson* was decided, courts were far more willing to defer to agency interpretations of text. After *Kisor*, they must be more careful to reduce ambiguity using the standard tools of statutory interpretation before deferring. *See* 139 S. Ct. at 2414. “Congress has delegated substantial responsibility to the Sentencing Commission, but, as the Supreme Court emphasized in *Kisor*, the

interpretation of [the Guidelines] ultimately ‘remains in the hands of the courts.’ ” [United States v. Nasir](#), 17 F.4th 459, 472 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting [Kisor](#), 139 S. Ct. at 2420); see also [United States v. Riccardi](#), 989 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[Kisor](#) must awake us from our slumber of reflexive deference to the commentary” (cleaned up)).

And the D.C. Circuit has suggested that courts should eschew deference to the Commission where the commentary expands the meaning of the text of the Guidelines themselves. See [Winstead](#), 890 F.3d at 1092 (“[S]urely [Seminole Rock](#) deference does not extend so far as to allow [the Commission] to invoke its general interpretive authority via commentary ... to impose such a massive impact on a defendant with no grounding in the guidelines themselves.”).

But the Court need not wade into that debate. Even if [§ 2J1.2](#)’s commentary bound the Court, it supports a narrower interpretation of the “administration of justice” than the Government offers. The commentary to [§ 2J1.2](#) provides:

“Substantial interference with the administration of justice” includes a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence; or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental or court resources.

[U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2](#) cmt. n.1. The modifying phrase “substantial interference” appears only in the three-level enhancement. Compare [§ 2J1.2\(b\)\(2\)](#), with *id.* (b)(1)(B) (eight-level enhancement referencing only the “administration of justice”).

As it has in prior cases, the Government relies on the last portion of the definition, “the unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental or court resources,” to argue that the enhancement applies. See Gov’t Mem. at 29. According to the Government, this part of the definition means that the “administration of justice” encompasses more than judicial proceedings. See *id.* Because the rioters’ disruption of the electoral certification caused “unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental ... resources,” the argument goes, they substantially interfered with the administration of justice. *Id.* While the events of January 6 caused the Government

to commit significant resources—evidenced in part by the number of cases charged in this district—this argument proves too much. If courts may enhance an obstruction-related sentence by eleven levels any time the Government can show that the offense caused unnecessary expenditure of its resources, “substantial interference with the administration of justice” could encompass just about anything. Indeed, the Government could theoretically trigger the enhancements at will.

The Government’s reliance on the “unnecessary expenditure” clause also obscures the rest of the definition. In short, it fails to read that phrase in context. Substantial interference with the administration of justice also “includes a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence[.]” [U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2](#) cmt. n.1. This portion of the definition fits the Court’s textual interpretation of the “administration of justice” in Part III.A. The list refers to investigations, verdicts, and judicial determinations—all of which involve the coercive force of the state and the actual or potential determination of legal rights in judicial or enforcement proceedings.

*9 Isolating the “unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental ... resources” clause also cuts out the “or court” part of the phrase. That “Governmental” appears next to “court” in a phrase about “resources” suggests that the term really refers to *prosecutorial* resources rather than the expenditure of resources by any public agency. See *Scalia & Garner* at 195–98 (explaining that words “associated in a context suggesting that [they] have something in common ... should be given related meanings” under the canon *noscitur a sociis*). After all, a broad definition of “Governmental” would include court resources, rendering the phrase “or court” superfluous. See *id.* at 176–79 (explaining that under the surplusage canon, “courts must ... lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make some idle and nugatory” (citation omitted)). That the other portions of the definition also refer to judicial-like proceedings bolsters this conclusion.

More, the Government ignores another section of the commentary that lists exemplar offenses to which this Guideline applies. See [U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2](#) cmt., Background. These offenses fit with the Court’s definition of “administration of justice” in Part III.A. For example: “using threats or force to intimidate or influence a juror or federal

officer; obstructing a civil or administrative proceeding; stealing or altering court records; unlawfully intercepting grand jury deliberations ... [and] using intimidation or force to influence testimony [or] alter evidence[.]” *Id.* All the examples that the Commission provides evoke traditional notions of judicial or enforcement proceedings and are consistent with the Court’s corpus linguistics analysis. None of them relate to a legislative proceeding.

[6] True, the commentary cross-references § 1512, along with a slew of other statutes. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt, Statutory Provisions. But that does not mean that the three- and eight-point enhancements apply to every situation in which the Government charges § 1512(c)—only that they could apply at times. Indeed, the mine run of § 1512(c) cases may well qualify for the § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) enhancements. For there are many “official proceedings” that involve the official application of force to decide legal rights, like a trial. But the key here is that the electoral certification is not one such proceeding. It does not qualify for these enhancements because it involves no judicial or quasi-judicial application of force to decide or maintain legal rights.

C.

Finally, precedent. Seefried cites decisions that he claims limit the “administration of justice” to “judicial or grand jury proceedings.” Def.’s Mem. at 4. The Government counters that other courts have applied the enhancement to proceedings that would not fit Seefried’s “narrow definition.” Gov’t Mem. at 30.

Seefried cites *United States v. Aguilar*, in which the Supreme Court construed the phrase “due administration of justice” in another section of the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See 515 U.S. 593, 598–99, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). Section 1503 makes it a crime to “corruptly ... influence[], obstruct[], or impede[], or endeavor[] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1503. This particular clause in the statute follows other prohibited conduct, most of which pertain to judicial proceedings. See *id.* (forbidding the influencing, intimidating, or impeding any juror or officer who may be “serving at any examination or other

proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate,” or injuring any such officer).

In *Aguilar*, the Court held that a man who made false statements to FBI agents—a potential grand jury witness—did not violate § 1503. See *Aguilar*, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. The Court reasoned that the FBI agents were not an “arm of the grand jury” and that grand jury had not “even summoned them to testify.” *Id.* at 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357. Because the defendant did not know that his false statements were likely to affect the grand jury proceeding, the Court explained that he could not be found guilty for “imped[ing] the due administration of justice.” *Id.* at 599–601, 115 S.Ct. 2357. Ultimately, *Aguilar*’s reasoning suggests that the “administration of justice” in § 1503 is analogous to a “judicial or grand jury proceeding.” *Id.* at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357.

*10 Seefried also cites various appellate decisions that follow *Aguilar* to interpret the “due administration of justice” in § 1503 to mean “interfering with the procedure of a judicial hearing or trial.” *United States v. Richardson*, 676 F.3d 491, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2012); see also *United States v. Brenson*, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Section 1503 employs the term ‘due administration of justice’ to provide a protective cloak over all judicial proceedings.”); cf. *United States v. Warlick*, 742 F.2d 113, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[O]bstruction of the administration of justice requires ... some act that will ... thwart the judicial process.”).

[7] Admittedly, terms may carry different meanings in a statute versus a guideline. See, e.g., *DePierre v. United States*, 564 U.S. 70, 88, 131 S.Ct. 2225, 180 L.Ed.2d 114 (2011). But *Aguilar*’s reasoning, and that of the circuit courts following it, is still a building block in the wall of evidence supporting the reading that the “administration of justice” involves a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding applying the force of the state to decide legal rights.

The cases the Government cites do not cast doubt on this Court’s interpretation of the “administration of justice.” See Gov’t Mem. at 30. Indeed, many of its authorities involve judicial or investigative proceedings from which punishment could follow. See, e.g., *United States v. Pegg*, 812 F. App’x 851, 860 (11th Cir. 2020) (defendant’s action “prevented the

government from prosecuting” another investigative target); [United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co.](#), 627 F. Supp. 2d 180, 200–04 (D.N.J. 2009) (defendants’ actions obstructed agency’s efforts to investigate a deadly accident); [United States v. Weissman](#), 22 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (defendant withheld subpoenaed documents from an investigative congressional committee and lied at his deposition). And even the case it cites that is furthest from a judicial proceeding still involved a law enforcement investigation. See [United States v. Ali](#), 864 F.3d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming application of the three-level administration of justice enhancement where man absconded abroad with children and several federal agencies and agents worked for days to complete his seizure). This Court’s interpretation fits comfortably alongside these holdings.

Finally, though it is historical rather than legal precedent, recall that the phrase “administration of justice” appears in one of our seminal founding documents: the Declaration of Independence. And it does so in the context of judicial proceedings. In castigating King George III, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to law for establishing Judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” *The Declaration of Independence* para. 8 (U.S. 1776). In short, text, context, and precedent suggest that the Government reads the “administration of justice” too broadly.

* * *

An inconsistency in the Government’s litigating position also bears noting. January 6 defendants have argued in motions to dismiss § 1512(c) because the statutory phrase “official proceeding” only references proceedings that involve the administration of justice, and the electoral certification does not. See, e.g., [United States v. Sandlin](#), 575 F. Supp. 3d 16, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2021). Seefried made the same argument here. See Mot. to Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 36.

*11 The Government has argued in opposition that § 1512(c) “operates as a catch-all to cover otherwise obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific” obstruction offense—such as obstruction of the administration of justice. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 7–

8, ECF No. 44. Most judges in this district have agreed. See, e.g., [United States v. Montgomery](#), 578 F. Supp. 3d 54, 61–65 (D.D.C. 2021) (explaining that Congress does not engage in the administration of justice). The Government cannot have its cake and eat it too. It would be incongruous for this Court to say pre-trial that the “official proceeding” of the electoral certification is more expansive than proceedings only involving the administration of justice, but then turn around at sentencing to say the opposite.

[8] It is the Government’s burden to prove that a sentencing enhancement applies. See [United States v. Bapack](#), 129 F.3d 1320, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1997). It has not done so here.

IV.

The Court acknowledges that this is a close interpretative call. If the Sentencing Commission had foreseen the Capitol breach, it may well have included “official proceeding” in the text of § 2J1.2. But the Commission did not. Given that courts should interpret the Guidelines using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, this Court declines to rewrite § 2J1.2 to say what it does not. If the Commission wishes to expand the text of the Guideline to include official proceedings such as the electoral certification, “it may seek to amend the language of the guidelines by submitting the change for congressional review.” [Winstead](#), 890 F.3d at 1092.

In the meantime, this Court may still consider the concerns underlying the Government’s requests for these enhancements under the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing. But for all of these reasons, the Court finds that Seefried did not obstruct, impede, or interfere with the “administration of justice” and that the enhancements in § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) are inapplicable.

SO ORDERED.

Attachment

Year	Corpus	Source or Source Type	Excerpt of Concurrence/ Dissent	Contextual summary	Classification/Description
1986	COCAP	Maine, In the Matter of Ronald L. KELLAM, 503 A.2d 1308	As we said in both Tenon and Ross, in determining appropriate disciplinary sanctions, we must be careful to assure the orderly administration of justice in the public interest.	Considering appropriate sanctions for a judge whose discourtesy to parties rose to violation of the Judicial Code.	Judicial discipline, judicial proceeding
1987	COCAP	Colorado, The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Complainant, v. Thomas H. MAY, Attorney-Respondent, 745 P.2d 218	We agree with the finding of the hearing board that the respondent's conduct violated C.R.C.P. 24 I.6 and the following disciplinary rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 1 - 102 (A) (1) (a) (a lawyer shall not violate a disciplinary rule); DR 6 - 101 (A) (2) (a) (a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances); DR 6 - 101 (A) (3) (a) (a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him); DR 7 - 101 (A) (1) (a) (a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client); DR 7 - 101 (A) (3) (a) (a lawyer shall not prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional relationship); and DR 1 - 102 (A) (5) (a) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).	Finding lawyer's failure to apprise client of case status violated state professional conduct rules.	Discipline of lawyer, judicial proceeding
1979	COCAP	Texas, Phil P. O'NEAL, Appellant, v. The COUNTY OF SAN SABA, Appellee, 577 S.W.2d 795	Nevertheless, there comes a time when the orderly administration of justice requires that the appellate process be not delayed further by the absence of the statement of facts.	Discussing failure of court reporter timely to prepare statement of facts needed for appeal.	Judicial proceeding, not delaying
1979	COCAP	Michigan, PEOPLE v. RAMIN, PEOPLE v. AUSTIN, PEOPLE v. GARGILL, PEOPLE v. HARRISON, 405 Mich. 482	In Rich, this Court refused retroactive application of a jury instruction on the defense of intoxication and specific intent because of the marked effect on the administration of justice in view of the professional reliance on the old rule.	Discussing reasons for a new rule's exclusively prospective application	Judicial proceeding, jury instruction
1977	COCAP	INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF EVANSTON et al., Defendants-Appellees, 53 Ill. App. 3d 443	Although summary judgment is an important tool in the administration of justice and its use encouraged in proper cases (Foodon v. Board of Governors (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 580, 586, 272 N.E. 2d 497; Allen v. Meyer (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 284, 292, 152 N.E. 2d 576), courts must remain cautious not to preempt the right to trial by jury where a material dispute may exist (Anderson v. Doric (3rd Dist. 1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 225, 227, 327 N.E. 2d 541).	Discussing impropriety of grant of summary judgment below.	Judicial proceeding
1980	COCAP	D. Mass., UNITED STATES of America v. John R. BARLETTA, 500 F. Supp. 739	Assuming the issue has potentially far-reaching ramifications with respect to the orderly and effective administration of justice in the district court, it is appropriate that this court detail the basis for its determination.	Asserting the ability of the court to defer ruling on an evidentiary motion against Government's contrary argument.	Judicial proceeding, judicial power & prerogative
1980	COCAP	Kansas, State of Kansas, Petitioner, v. R. Russell, Respondent, 227 Kan. 897	The imposition of the ethical obligation of honesty upon lawyers under DR 1 - 102 (A) (1) (4) and subsequent discipline for violation of the rule is permissible and may be necessary in the interests of the administration of justice.	Discussing tension between ethical rules and lawyer's First Amendment rights	Discipline of lawyer
1980	COCAP	N. Dakota, KFOG RADIO, INC. and WDAY, Inc., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. Cynthia ROTHIE, 298 N.W.2d 565	A literal interpretation of Article I, § 22 of the Constitution of North Dakota would wreak havoc with established judicial practices in that it would allow public access to all phases of the administration of justice, including chambers' conferences, plea bargaining and settlement conferences, a deputation proceedings, those juvenile proceedings presently closed, grand jury proceedings, and appellate court conferences.	Discussing ramifications of state constitutional provision concerning public's access to proceedings.	Judicial proceeding, judicial power & prerogative
1980	COCAP	Cal., Mook v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles City, 25 Cal. 3d 474	In a proceeding in which the Commission finds that: (1) the subject matter is generally known to the public; (2) there is broad public interest; (3) confidence in the administration of justice is threatened due to lack of public information concerning the status and conduct of the proceeding; and (4) the public interest in maintaining confidence in the judicial office and the integrity of the administration of justice requires that some or all aspects of such proceeding should be publicly conducted or otherwise reported or disclosed to the public, the requirement of confidentiality may, to the extent determined by the Commission be modified with respect to said proceeding; and after completion of the investigation, a public hearing shall be held and shall be publicly conducted.	Discussing when the Commission on Judicial Performance may allow disciplinary hearings to be public.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, judge
1984	COCAP	Pa., Smith v. Mason, 328 Pa. Super. 314	(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice.	Discussing when a person may be found in criminal contempt of court.	Judicial proceeding, contempt
1981	COCAP	Colo. People v. Gottinger, 623 P.2d 878	After reviewing the record, we conclude that cause for discipline has been established and a public censure is the appropriate discipline. In the formal complaint you were charged with violating Rule 24 (1) B), C.R.C.P., and the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1 - 102 (A) (5), DR 6 - 101 (A) (3), and DR 7 - 101 (A) (2) and (3), by reason of the following acts: (1) neglecting a legal matter entrusted to you; (2) failing to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services; (3) causing damage or prejudice to a client during the course of your professional relationship; and (4) engaging in conduct that was prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Concluding public censure was the appropriate discipline for a dilatory and otherwise negligent attorney.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, lawyer
1984	COCAP	DDC, Hastings v. Judicial Conf. of the United States, 593 F. Supp. 1371	It was for this reason that a separate standard for misbehavior, "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by bringing the judicial office into disrepute," was selected by the Senate Judiciary Committee for fear that such a general discipline standard directly embodied in the statute could be used to intrude into judges' personal life unrelated to his or her judicial conduct.	Limiting a statute controlling considerable judicial behavior to that which would interfere with judge's duties or taint public's perception.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, judges
1984	COCAP	Ind., In re Colestock, 461 N.E.2d 137	The proper administration of justice necessitates the maintenance of independent professional judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client.	Finding that a lawyer violated rules of professional responsibility.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, lawyer
1987	COCAP	Wash., In re Disciplinary Proceeding against Mark S. Deming, 108 Wash. 2d 82	Further, the holding of a private hearing would have damaged the public's confidence in the administration of justice and led to perceptions as to the objectiveness of the hearing.	Finding appropriate the procedure of a judicial conduct proceeding below.	Judicial proceeding

1987	COCAP	DDC, In re Sealed Case 652 F.2d 1268	The independent Counsel relies on a single quotation plucked from Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 52 S.Ct. 252, 255, 76 L.Ed. 374 (1932): "one of the duties which the citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned."	Rejecting government's request to subpoena potentially self-incriminating documents.	Judicial proceeding, court procedure
1980	COCAP	N.C. LEA COMPANY v. NORTH CAROLINA BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION, 517 N.C. 254	In order to promote the expedition administration of justice, we elect to exercise the rarely used general supervisory powers given that Court in article IV, section 12 (1) of the Constitution of North Carolina and choose to address two collateral issues not raised by the parties.	Guiding determination of damages.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1981	COCAP	Mich. Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 411 Mich. 63	On the other hand, there are other strong reasons that support activities germane to the State Bar's performance of its duties in the improvement of the administration of justice and the advancement of jurisprudence.	Assessing propriety of judges at various social functions.	Bar association regulating judges
1982	COCAP	I.D. Va., U.S. v. Caron, 551 F. Supp. 662	The concluding clause of the statute penalizes anyone who "corruptly... endeavor[s] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice."	Outlining provisions of s. 1503 against improper influence of witness, juror, or court official.	Judicial proceeding, perjury
1985	COCAP	Wash., State v. Samuel, 59 Wash. App. 564	The administration of justice would be greatly advanced if required to accommodate separate trials in all cases where multiple parties have participated in a criminal offense and where one or more have confessed to its commission." State v. Ferguson, 3 Wa. App. 898, 906, 479 P.2d 114 (1970), review denied, 78 Wa. 2d 496 (1971).	Finding no error in refusal to grant motion to sever.	Judicial proceeding, court procedure
1984	COCAP	Pa., In re Autonomous No. 60 D.B. 83, 33 Pa. D. & C. 34 187	The committee found that respondent had violated D.R. 1 - 102 (A) (5) in that his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Finding violation of professional rules requiring lawful behavior where lawyer consumed drugs and consorted with drug dealers.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, lawyer
1987	COCAP	Miss., In re Inquiry Court Judge Kelly COLLINS, 524 So. 2d 553	The Commission, based upon its findings of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute, as opposed to willful misconduct in office, has determined that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction finding that this case is somewhat similar to the trilogy of check collecting cases filed by the Commission.	Describing appropriate sanctions for personal use of labes of county printers.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, judge
1984	COCAP	C.A. 10, Barclayseman Corp. v. Kane, 746 F.2d 655	In a mandamus action in which petitioner seeks to have discovery orders involving a claim of privilege reviewed, we have held that review is appropriate when: "(1) disclosure of the allegedly privileged or confidential information renders impossible any meaningful appellate review of the claim of privilege or confidentiality; and (2) the disclosure involves questions of substantial importance to the administration of justice." United States v. West, 672 F. 2d 796, 798 - 99 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Winner, 641 F. 2d 823, 830 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting In re Processors, Inc. v. Hagler, 651 F. 2d 949 (8th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133, 102 S.Ct. 2959, 73 L.Ed. 2d 413 (5/1/1982).	Refusing to breach judicial privilege.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, judge

1980	COCAP	Md., Adams v. Peck, 288 Md. 1	It is very obvious that the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration of justice — namely, the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove.	Upholding absolute privilege for defamatory statements in documents prepared for use in litigation but not filed.	Judicial proceeding, procedures
1980	COCAP	Ak., Friedman v. District Court, 611 F.2d 77	In our judgment the court's order requiring appellant to bear a reasonable relationship to the proper administration of justice in that court. "Id. at 77."	Upholding court's requirements of minimum standards of dress.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1982	COCAP	Ga., Dewey v. Palmour, 164 Ga. App. 834	"This was in disobedience to a lawful order, or a command, if you want to call it that, of the court, which tended to obstruct the administration of justice."	Reviewing proceedings below to find in contempt attorneys who did not stand to reply to the court.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, lawyer
1984	COCAP	D. F.R. U.S. v. Accovolo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501	Finally, the Magistrate concluded that no condition or combination of conditions would assure the safety of the Government's witnesses and the community or insure the proper administration of justice in defendant's case.	Reviewing magistrate judge's pretrial detention of witness.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1985	COCAP	CITY CONSUMER SERVICES, INC., Plaintiff, v. David G. HORNE, et al., Defendants	Disqualification will not hinder the efficient administration of justice.	Considering motion to disqualify counsel.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1986	COCAP	D.C., In re James D. Hutchinson, 518 A.2d 992	The term "serious crime" shall include any felony and any lesser crime a necessary element of which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of such crime, involves improper conduct as an attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a "serious crime."	Considering whether conduct of attorney was "serious crime" requiring disbarment.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, lawyer
1979	COCAP	PURVISOR SUPREME COURT SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES TO AMEND INTEGRATION RULE ARTICLE II AND ARTICLE XI, 375 So. 2d 1	The goals of the Court's program are to improve the administration of justice in this state and to expand the delivery of legal services to the poor.	Describing goals of program providing for deposition of clients' common trust funds in savings accounts, interest payable to programs designed to benefit the public.	Judicial proceeding, policy
1979	COCAP	D.C., U.S. v. Walton, 411 A.2d 333	Although the court concluded that "there was an ample independent source of identification", it is added that it was so tainted by abuse and improper suggestiveness "that it would... be an aberration in the administration of justice" to permit it.	Describing reasoning to forbid in-court identification.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1979	COCAP	Ak., Hall v. State, 377 So. 2d 1123	Court's cost for the administration of justice, and in the conduct of trials in general must meet, of necessity, and in the very nature of things, be left to the discretion of the court charged with the duty of administering justice, and having the inherent power to regulate such matters in the trial forum.	Explaining finding of no abuse of discretion below.	Judicial proceeding, procedure

1987	COCAP	N.Y., In re Devine, 128 A.D.2d 1024	therefore, we sustain charge 1, but only insofar as it charges respondent with engaging in "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." (DR 1-102 [A] [5]) and "[c]onduct [ing] or knowingly fail[ing] to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal." (DR 7-102 [A] [1] [1]).	Upholding sanction for failure to comply with subpoena of documents in production to counsel.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, lawyer
1978	COCAP	Pa., In re Anonymous, No. 25 D.D. 77	The hearing committee found that while respondent had not violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (3), which provides for illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, it did find that respondent violated Rules of Professional Responsibility D.R. 1-102 (A) (4), in that he had engaged in conduct amounting to a form of misrepresentation, D.R. 1-102 (A) (5), in that he had engaged in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and D.R. 1-102 (A) (6), in that he had engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.	Characterizing behavior of lawyer who misrepresented facts in transaction.	Judicial proceeding, discipline, lawyer
1984	COCAP	C.A. 2, U.S. v. Aasi, 748 F.2d 62	This is a serious crime because the true administration of justice is the cornerstone of all our liberties.	Judge providing jury instructions	Judicial proceeding
1985	COCAP	N.Y., People v. Crissom, 128 Misc.2d 246	Requiring the party who waives the minutes to order that they promote the administration of justice.	Discussing incentives back of production requirements as between parties.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1986	COCAP	Minn., In re Marriage of Adams, 393 N.W.2d 508	Bredeman v. Bredeman, 253 Minn. 21, 24-5, 91 N.W.2d 84, 87 (1958) stated the rule that dissolution judgments may be set aside "under such circumstances as amount to a fraud on the court and the administration of justice. . . . * * * To be fraud on the court and the administration of justice, there must be found to be fraud on [the wife]."	Explaining controlling precedent.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1978	COCAP	C.A. 3, U.S. v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882	We are also conscious of undue delays in the administration of justice produced by unnecessary trials, and also of the crushing financial burden placed on the taxpayers who ultimately pay the expenses of federal criminal litigation.	Rejecting judicial economy arguments against allowing conditional pleas.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1986	COCAP	S.D.N.Y., U.S. v. Vitale, 635 F. Supp. 194	The obstruction of justice predicate contained in paragraph 5 provides: It was part of the pattern of racketeering activity that in or about September 1981, in the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere, that the defendants, Joseph Massimo a/k/a "Joseph Massimo," a/k/a "Joseph Massimo Vitali," a/k/a "Bobby," unlawfully, willfully and knowingly would and did corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in that the defendants would and did corruptly endeavor to counsel another person to avoid service of a grand jury subpoena, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503.	Recalling the indictment.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1978	COCAP	F.D. Pa., U.S. v. Simmons, 444 F. Supp. 500	The defendant argued that he could not be guilty of the offense because there was no judicial proceeding pending which could be equated to an "administration of justice."	Rejecting argument that grand jury must have heard testimony or decided to issue subpoena before it could be "obstructed."	Grand Jury
1984	COCAP	Ore., In re Complaint as to the Conduct of RICHARD F. CRIST, Accused, 683 P.2d 85	The complaint alleged that his described conduct violated DR 6-101 (A) (1) and (3), which provide that a lawyer shall not handle a legal matter when he knows, or should know, that he is not competent to do so, and that he shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. Violation of DR 1-102 (A) (5) was also charged. That rule forbids a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Assessing discipline of lawyer whose inexperience made him incompetent to handle a probate.	Discipline, Lawyer
1983	COCAP	Bankr. N.D. Ga., In re Seven Springs Apartments, Phase II, 33 D.R. 458	As the Supreme Court noted in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a supra, 458 U.S. 50 at 64, n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2867, n. 15, 73 L.Ed.2d 2598 at 610, n. 15: "The Framers chose to leave to Congress the precise role to be played by the lower federal courts in the administration of justice."	Explaining why courts cannot arrogate powers not given to them by Congress.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1983	COCAP	Ore., In re Complaint as to the Conduct of WILLIAM C. ROCHAT, Accused, 295 Or. 533	The accused's conduct with respect to his interaction with Calvin and with Wade was boorish in the extreme, but the issue is whether that conduct was "prejudicial to the administration of justice" or "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law" or both.	Finding that badgering of clerks was prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Discipline, Lawyer
1987	COCAP	F.D. Va., U.S. v. Alker, 666 F. Supp. 847	Ordinary civil court recognizes the importance of the orderly and efficient administration of justice but acknowledges the court's primary responsibility of assuring individuals their rights to a properly selected jury, based upon the Batson standards.	Qualifying criticisms of imprecision of guidance to lower courts.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1986	COCAP	Mass., Michael J. Foley vs. Lowell Division of the District Court Department, 398 Mass. 800	Although the single justice was not in error, it is appropriate that we consider the matter under our broader inherent common law and constitutional powers to supervise the administration of justice.	Taking cognizance of a justice's conduct.	Discipline, judge
1987	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Chernes, 360 Pa. Super. 246	But, while the mediation of courts is based upon the principle of judicial impartiality, disinterestedness, and fairness pervading the whole system of judicature, so that courts may as near as possible be above suspicion, there is, on the other side, an important issue at stake: that is, that cause may not be unfairly prejudiced, unduly delayed, or discounted through unfounded charges of prejudice or unfairness made against the judge in the trial of a cause. It is of great importance to the administration of justice that such should not occur.	Outlining the duties and discretion of a judge to vet his own impartiality.	Discipline, judge
1987	COCAP	Ore., In re Complaint as to the Conduct of FERRIS F. DOOTHIE, Accused, 740 P.2d 783	None of these cases contains any reasoned analysis explaining why the "administration of justice" language should include bar proceedings. Use in reflection, however, we conclude that it does.	Asserting that bar proceedings are "administration of justice" for purposes of rules of professional conduct.	Discipline, lawyer
1979	COCAP	C.A. 6, DETROIT POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Coleman A. YOUNG, Mayor of the City of Detroit, et al., Defendants-Appellants, 608 F.2d 671	See also President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police (1969), 174 (1967) (citing survey which found racially exclusionary hiring practices and racially discriminatory job assignments in Detroit Police Department).	Referencing President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice	Referencing President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice

1983	COCAP	D.C., In re Melvin J. WASHINGTON, 489 A.2d 452	Not only did Respondent engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in ignoring the various inquiries sent to him by Bar Counsel in the Jones Conservatorship case, but he made arguments and gave testimony at the hearing in this case that the Hearing Committee charitably characterized as "frivolous."	Characterizing conduct that resulted in three months' suspension.	Discipline, Lawyer
**1977	COCAP	Pa., Hamill Estate, 3 Pa D. & C. Md 100	This is a distinction well recognized in Commonwealth v. Shallow, supra, wherein the Supreme Court said: "The nature and character [of the duty] and the practice under the common law and related statutes must control the interpretation of the term 'court.' It is the duty of each entire as it requires joint consideration by all the members of the court? . . . The appointment and removal of public officials has far reaching consequences and should be exercised by all the available judges of the tribunal assembled. . . . (But there are many things in connection with the general administration of justice that may be done by fewer members)."	Elaborating on the court's functions.	Judicial powers & prerogatives
1980	COCAP	Md., Sweetwine v. State, 288 Md. 199	As pointed out in United States v. Tateo, supra, 377 U.S. at 466, the rule of United States v. Ball is also grounded upon fairness in the administration of justice, considering the interests of the public as well as those of the defendant.	Discussing the appropriate scope of grant of retrial.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1981	COCAP	Ore., In re Complaint as to the conduct of HECTOR E. SMITH, Accused, 292 Or. 84	Stipuly, by persuading his secretary to make a false acknowledgment in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Asserting liability under disciplinary rule for causing secretary (also a notary) to make a false acknowledgment on a power of a attorney.	Discipline, Lawyer
1979	COCAP	D. Minn., U.S. v. Hornell, 483 F. Supp. 1070	In re Murphy states that opinion work product "can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary circumstances - where weighty consideration of public policy and a proper administration of justice would militate against the nondiscovery of an attorney's mental impressions."	Discussing appropriate bounds of privilege.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1986	COCAP	C.A. 9, U.S. v. Kanter, 781 F.2d 1380	As discussed in Section I.A, supra, by developing a complete and searching record, the trial court can, and should, ensure that the thorough and effective administration of justice.	Grounding the inefficiency of trial judge's process.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1984	COCAP	Ind., In re McDaniel, 470 N.E.2d 1327	Respondent in further violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (A) (1), (4), (5) and (6), by engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. . . . Section 53a-147, a part of our penal code, covers the crime of bribery in broad terms and is not limited to the administration of justice and attempts to criminalize legislation.	Describing basis of liability for providing false testimony to grand jury.	Ferriary, Discipline, Lawyer
1977	COCAP	Conn., State v. Carr, Jr., 172 Conn. 458	The administration of justice under our adversary system largely depends upon the public's ability to rely on the honesty of attorneys who are placed in a position of being called upon to conduct the affairs of others both in and out of court.	Describing basis of liability for bribing a police officer.	Law enforcement
1981	COCAP	Md., Amy Gerl of Md. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683		Asserting and explaining judicial oversight of the bar.	discipline, judges
1977	COCAP	Fla., State v. Patrix, 46 Fla. Supp. 19	The court notes that to try both of these charges separately is not in the best administration of justice, for among other reasons— a) the cost and time of two trials, and b) inconvenience to witnesses returning for a second trial, and c) delay in the prompt resolve of the accusations.	Finding trial court exceeded discretion in requiring separate trials.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1981	COCAP	Miss., Jones v. State, 398 So. 2d 1312	We recognize that the fair and orderly administration of justice requires that trial judges must have reasonable discretion in dealing with errant jurors who demonstrate their unwillingness to abide by the instructions of the court, or other unanticipated occurrences which transpire during trials.	Defending discretion of judges to discontinue trials.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1985	COCAP	Wash., In the Matter of the Marriage of Joyce H.H. Respondent, and Daniel M. Hill, Appellant, 41 Wash. App. 434	Finally, we do not believe that retroactive application of Batson will "cast substantial doubt upon the validity of numerous prior judgments, and would impose a great burden on the administration of justice by allowing many cases to be reheard. . . ." Millbank, 103 Wn.2d at 342, quoting Annotation, Comment Note— Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Operating Decision, 10 A.L.R.4d 1371, 1391 (1966).	Deciding to allow retroactive application of new rule.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1980	COCAP	Pa., Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 418 A.2d 1361	The general subject is, therefore, one in which the public has an interest, with regard to which legislative action, in the interest of the public, is absolutely necessary. [The use of stenographers to report judicial proceedings] expedites judicial procedure, economizes the time of public tribunals, and so promotes the prompt administration of justice and reduces the amount of public moneys in that behalf expended.	Requiring county to pay costs of stenography.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1987	COCAP	Colo., Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145	Because the court could not sanction the method by which the jury panel was formed, it reversed the judgment below "in the exercise of our power of supervision over the administration of justice in the federal courts."	Quoting precedent in discussion of review of lower court's practices for calling potential jurors.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
**1985	COCAP	Fla., Fla. Bar v. Hawkins, 467 So. 2d 998	THE BAR states that acceptance of this petition will not adversely affect the public interest, undermine the purity of the courts, or hinder the administration of justice or the confidence of the public in the legal profession.	Granting petition for leave to resign where attorney repeatedly failed in his duties.	Discipline, Lawyer
1982	COCAP	MD., ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. WILLIAM H. PATTERSON, JR., 292 Md. 599	Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Quoting disciplinary rule as basis for liability of attorney who converted client funds to his own use.	Discipline, Lawyer
1980	COCAP	Kan., State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897	An attorney may also be disciplined for conduct which interferes with the processes of the administration of justice.	Quoting bases of liability for attorney's statements.	Discipline, Lawyer
1986	COCAP	D.C., Symmon Foundation, Inc. v. Bernstein, 503 A.2d 1254	Rule 60 (b), however, does not substitute or abrogate the court's "inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice."	Assessing remedial options against attorney's fraud on the court.	Discipline, Lawyer
1979	COCAP	Oh., In re McAuley, 63 Ohio App. 2d 5	His voiced concern that the holding of the majority invites state and federal authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government which will in the long run harm rather than help the administration of justice.	Discussing Supreme Court opinions on the limited reporter's privilege from testifying before grand juries.	Grand Jury

		In determining the retroactivity of constitutional rules in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has considered three criteria: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."	Reciting doctrinal basis for retroactivity determination.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1985	COCAP	C.A. 7, 757 F.2d 811	Senior good	
1983	COCAP	N.Y., People v. Molins, 121 Misc.2d 483	Reciting doctrinal basis for giving retroactive effect to motion to suppress evidence.	Judicial proceeding, evidence
1987	COCAP	E.D. Ark., Civil v. Gen. Tpk. Co. of the Southwest, 669 F. Supp. 930	The speedy and efficient administration of justice requires, however, that "[n] either claim be disposed of at the first appropriate opportunity."	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1985	COCAP	C.A. 3, Morrison v. Kimmelman, 752 F.2d 918	He noted, for example, that "although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice."	Law enforcement
1979	COCAP	Md., In re Application of Howard C., 286 Md. 244	The majority would do well to bear in mind the comment of Judge Marckell for this Court in the case of In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 678, 39 A.2d 489 (1948), quoted many times since then, to the effect that "due regard for the administration of justice does not permit adjunction and reinstatement to be made more advanced to reform schools and the parole system."	Discipline, Lawyer
1982	COCAP	Mich., In re Grimes, 414 Mich. 483	The following acts or omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with another person, at a material and genuine for discipline, whether or not occurring in the course of an attorney-client relationship: "(1) conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice;"	Discipline, Lawyer
1985	COCAP	C.A. 7, Steide v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95	Steinle mistakenly believes that his duty to his client extends even to commencing a frivolous and needless action intended to harass appellees and to impede and obstruct the due administration of justice by intentionally forcing a United States District Judge to recuse himself from a pending criminal case on the eve of trial.	Discipline, Lawyer
1981	COCAP	Ind., In re Friedland, 416 N.E.2d 433	There are limits which have been drawn to guarantee the effective administration of justice through a defendant's right to competency must be respected, this right can not be manipulated in such a manner as to impede the efficient administration of justice.	Discipline, Lawyer
1981	COCAP	Colo., People v. Barnes, 636 P.2d 1323	Discussing rejection of defendant's request to discharge counsel and represent himself after jury was empaneled.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1987	COCAP	La., State v. Taylor, 502 So. 2d 537	Implications of the attorney-client privilege, "it would serve the orderly administration of justice and further insure the defendant a fair trial if the admissibility of the [attorney-client communications] could be determined in a pretrial proceeding."	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1984	COCAP	U.S. Claims, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. U.S., 4 Cl. Ct. 575	The interests embodied in rules dealing with pretrial disclosure are significant and are an essential part of the administration of justice.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1984	COCAP	Complaint Concerning The Honorable Robert Crowe WINTON, Jr., Judge of District Court, Hennepin County, State of Minnesota	Standard of Conduct The Code of Judicial Conduct focuses on conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, which includes but is not limited to criminal conduct.	Discipline, Judge
1980	COCAP	Mich., Hadjige v. Green, 97 Mich. App. 62	Factors to be taken into account in determining whether a decision is to be applied prospectively or retroactively are: (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the general reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.	Judicial proceeding, precedent
1977	COCAP	C.A. 5, U.S. v. Balkock, 551 F.2d 1377	Our inspection of the District's plan persuades us that, though it burdens the Court, counsel and others involved in the administration of justice, it does not, as a corollary, reward defendants with automatic dismissals in all cases of undue lenient.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1985	COCAP	N.J., Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552	The recusal of all judges so affected could impose a substantial burden on the administration of justice, particularly in Atlantic County.	Discipline, Judge
1978	COCAP	Ill., Reves v. License Appeal Councils of the City of Chicago, 62 Ill. App. 3d 600	The Illinois Supreme Court "has frequently held that differences in the size of the municipalities may raise special or unique problems in connection with many activities which justify classification including . . . [the] administration of justice."	Local commissioners issuing licenses
1987	COCAP	Me., State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020	The only authority cited by the Willoughbys to support their argument for the requirement of a specific intent is a definition of contempt in an Illinois case, picked up and quoted by this court in In re Holbrook, 153 Me. 276, 280, 177 A. 418, 420 (1935), along with an assortment of other definitions from other jurisdictions; any act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct the court in the administration of justice. . . (Emphasis added) We reject the Willoughbys' suggestion that "in calculated" as there used means "is specifically intended" "we read" "is calculated" as meaning nothing more than "is as a natural tendency."	Upholding contempt conviction.
1986	COCAP	Ala., Hall v. Hall, 483 So. 2d 747	This contempt power may not be taken away or bridled, as it is essential to the due administration of justice.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives

1980	COCAP	La., Thomas v. State, 381 So. 2d 108	The trial judge's knowledge of the condition of his docket, considered against the need for an orderly and prompt administration of justice, places him in a unique position to determine whether his dismissal should be with or without prejudice.	Allowing dismissal with prejudice considering previous continuances and judge's docket.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1983	COCAP	Colo., In re Stone, 703 P.2d 1319	Here, sufficient evidence was presented from which the trial court could conclude that the respondents know that the preliminarily qualified jurors were precluded from talking to anyone, including members of the media, about the case; that the respondents' conduct in contacting the jurors despite this knowledge was "willful and contemptuous when they knew their conduct was wrongful"; and that the respondents' conduct was "contemptuous because they knowingly interfered with the lawful Order of the court and that misbehavior was of such a character as to obstruct the administration of justice" and offend the dignity of the court.	Upholding contempt finding for improper contact with jurors.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1983	COCAP	N.J., In re Application of Matthews, 94 N.J. 59	His actions undertaken with such knowledge would demonstrate a fundamental lack of honesty and truthfulness, a deep want of trustworthiness and fidelity to those with whom he has entered a business relationship, and a chronic contempt for the administration of justice and the laws that govern the affairs of individuals.	Characterizing lawyer's engagement in criminal activity.	Discipline, Lawyer
1982	COCAP	Az., Diemo v. Bryant Air Conditioning Corp., 131 Ariz. 625	The policy underlying the statute of limitations is primarily for the protection of the defendant, and the courts, from litigation of stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on their rights and evidence may have been lost or witnesses' memories faded. This policy is sound and necessary for the orderly administration of justice.	Discussing doctrine.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1981	COCAP	Mass., Commonwealth v. Dungan et al., 384 Mass. 1	If the single justice concludes that the administration of justice would not be facilitated by reporting the appeal to the full bench, the Commonwealth can not proceed as if no determination had been made.	Affirming judicial prerogatives under state law.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1980	COCAP	C.A. 4, U.S. v. Endo, 635 F.2d 321	To the extent such a charge is valid at common law, it is constitutionally permissible as it discourages defendants from exercising their rights to testify, without substantially benefiting the administration of justice.	Considering whether a perjury information is constitutionally permissible.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1986	COCAP	N.C., Hogan et al. v. Forsyth County Club Corp., 79 N.C. App. 483	The Court noted that, according to her allegations, plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for her refusal to commit a criminal act and that to permit her discharge, without legal recourse, upon such grounds would be offensive to the compelling public interest in the administration of justice.	Assessing the bounds of at-will employment; plaintiff getting her day in court.	Judicial proceeding
1986	COCAP	Az., State v. Garcia, 151 Ariz. 245	In so holding, we are aware of the consideration regarding possible prior good faith reliance on RAH 4.01 and the administration of justice as the result of vacating prior convictions in cases where that instruction was given.	Discussing retroactive application of a new rule.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1986	COCAP	Ala., Blakey v. State, 715 P.2d 269	We are further satisfied that Judge Blair did not err in concluding, based on his factual findings, that Santanour's conduct did not "[fall] below an acceptable standard for fair and honorable administration of justice."	Reversing retroactive application of a new rule.	Law enforcement
1984	COCAP	Va., Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124	The orderly administration of justice requires that factual matters, such as continuances, be left with counsel.	Finding meritless dispute with court-appointed counsel.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1987	COCAP	Sup. Ct., Frasier v. Heebe, 96 L. Ed. 2d 557	Respondents assert that these requirements facilitate the efficient administration of justice, because nonresident attorneys allegedly are less competent and less available to the court than resident attorneys.	Finding discriminatory bar admission rules not backed by evidence.	Bar association rules regulating lawyers
1981	COCAP	Cal., Wengert v. County of Judicial Performance, 29 Cal. 3d 615	Prejudicial conduct must be "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute." (Constitution, art. VI, § 18, subd. (c); italics added.)	Assessing bases for disqualification of a judge.	Discipline, Judge
1984	COCAP	W.D. Mo., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1037	The preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar is paramount.	Explaining motivations for requiring disqualification of attorney likely to reveal confidential information.	Discipline, Lawyer
1981	COCAP	C.A. 9, Wheeler v. U.S., 640 F.2d 1116	The trial court's inherent power to protect the so-called administration of justice has provided the basis for orders issued to protect jurors after the trial has ended.	Discussing a post-trial protective order.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1978	COCAP	E.D. Pa., U.S. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 142	Whether government suffered any prejudice, the specifics of which are still unknown to me, it was plainly self-inflicted. Delay in the administration of justice has been the subject of much criticism.	Chiding the government's lack of preparation.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1977	COCAP	Tex., Howell v. State, 559 S.W.2d 432	"Administration of justice" has been described broadly. "The administration of justice consists in the trial of cases in the court, and their judicial determination and disposition by orderly procedure, under rules of law, and putting of the judgment into effect." (Masey v. City of Mason, 97 Ga. App. 790, 794, 104 S.E. 2d 518, 521-522 (1958).) We do not believe that the language "a lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice" is so vague and indefinite that it violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution of Texas.	Discussing state bar rules and refusing vagueness challenge in disciplinary case.	Discipline, Lawyer
1983	COCAP	C.A. 1, Austin v. Avarco Indus., Inc., 705 F.2d 1	In contrast to the problems of choice of forum, a choice of law and conflicting rules of navigation, if overseas in these cases, we see no similar burden on the administration of justice or on the flow of maritime commerce that will result from a denial of admiralty jurisdiction in this case.	Discussing concerns in the definition of the reach of admiralty jurisdiction.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1977	COCAP	C.A. 2, In re U.S., 565 F.2d 19	By withdrawing the majority of the information, the government profits in that the continued value of informants placed in strategic positions is protected, and other persons are encouraged to cooperate in the administration of justice.	Discussing the necessity of anonymity of informants to promote cooperation with law enforcement.	Law enforcement
1977	COCAP	C.A. 9, Vanman v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650	Particularly in an era of excessively crowded lower court dockets, it is in the interest of the fair and prompt administration of justice to discourage nonmeritorious litigation.	Quoting Supreme Court's reaffirmation of review of final likely to be "piecemeal" judgments.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1985	COCAP	C.A. 8, U.S. v. Ray, 768 F.2d 991	Section 2162(a)(2)(1) "the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a prosecution on the administration of justice."	Discussing dismissal under the Speedy Trial Act for delay between filing of, and hearing on, motions.	Judicial proceeding, procedure

1982	COCAP	S.D. W. Va., <i>Dostert v. Neely</i> , 537 F. Supp. 912	The Court reflected upon the extraordinary nature of the state's interest in <i>Dostert v. Neely</i> , supra: "In declining to enjoin the imposition of the disciplinary suspension against the plaintiff, the court wishes to emphasize the extraordinary state interest in disciplinary proceedings which affect a state judge. Disciplinary proceedings exist to vindicate the most fundamental state interests; it is need for a fair and impartial administration of justice for the benefit of all the state's citizens."	Discussing sanctions against judges.	Discipline, judge
1982	COCAP	Mich., In re <i>Hochkins</i> , 415 Mich. 1101	(5) Respondent's conduct aforesaid constitutes misconduct in office, in that said conduct was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice within the provisions of article 6, § 30 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, and OCIR 1963, 932.4, as amended.	Adopting a statement of reprimand against a judge.	Discipline, judge
1980	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Miller, 417 A.2d 128	In <i>Stovall v. Denno</i> , 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 19 97, 18 L.Ed.2d 1159 (1967), a majority of the United States Supreme Court agreed on the factors which should inform a decision regarding retroactivity: "The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice." (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 297, 87 S.Ct. at 1970.	Reciting standards for retroactive application.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1986	COCAP	Wash., In re <i>Disciplinary Proceeding Against Fred R. Staples</i> , 105 Wash. 2d 905	The Commission has held that Judge Staples' actions nevertheless do not fit within the "admission of justice" exclusion. We disagree.	Allowing a judge to engage in limited law reform efforts.	Judicial conduct
1980	COCAP	S.D.N.Y., <i>Wingate v. Harris</i> , 501 F. Supp. 58	Factors to be considered in determining whether transfer is appropriate typically include whether the statute of limitations has otherwise run, the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the effect on the efficient and expeditious administration of justice. E.g., <i>Sharr v. Taites</i> , supra, 561 F.2d at 794; <i>Exiles v. United States</i> , 396 F.Supp. 792, 796 (D.N.D. 1975).	Considering transfer.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1979	COCAP	C.A. 5, U.S. v. Williams, 594 F.2d 98	United States ex rel. <i>Brown v. Fogal</i> , 395 F.2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1968) (for breach of condition other than nonappearance, court may do all that is appropriate to orderly progress of trial and fair administration of justice.)	Collecting citations supporting history of criminalization of bail-jumping.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1985	COCAP	N.Y., <i>People v. Scala</i> , 128 Misc.2d 831	The court may order a pretrial hearing and physical examination of a defendant and a pre-arrest investigation by the Department of Probation to provide material that would reasonably aid in the administration of justice by facilitating the plea bargaining process. (<i>People v. Crosby</i> , 87 Misc.2d 1079, 1080 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County, 1976) J.)	Discussing pretrial abilities of court.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1985	COCAP	Colo., <i>Fanning v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth.</i> , 709 F.2d 22	The doctrine of equitable estoppel is premised upon principles of fair dealing and is designed to aid in the administration of justice where, without its aid, injustice might result. <i>City & County of Denver v. Stackhouse</i> , 135 Colo. 289, 310 P.2d 296 (1957); <i>Corporation of President Bishop v. Board of County Commissioners</i> , 609 P.2d 738 (Colo.App. 1984).	Discussing doctrine estopping plaintiff from raising issue in separate action that could have been raised in first.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1986	COCAP	N.J., <i>Battista v. Olson</i> , 213 N.J. Super. 137	In scrupulously guarding this fundamental right, our Supreme Court has noted that "[i]f jury is an integral part of the court for the administration of justice and on elementary principles its verdict must be obtained to the court's charge, biased solely on legal evidence produced before it and on freely free from the taint of extraneous considerations and influences."	Discussing jurist.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1980	COCAP	Okla., <i>Amoco Production Co. v. Lindsey</i> , 609 F.2d 733	Therefore, Appellee asserts that the court can impose a default judgment by analogy to the interrogatory statute, or in the alternative it is within the inherent power of the court "to do all things that are necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction." <i>Layman v. State</i> , 355 P.2d 444 (Okla.Cr.App. 1966)	Assessing whether default judgment would be appropriate.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1986	COCAP	Colo., <i>Rodriguez v. District Court</i> , 719 P.2d 699	The interest of the public in the fair and proper administration of justice includes concerns that trials be conducted in an evenhanded manner, that the participants in the adversary process, including witnesses, be protected from unfair tactics; and that the courts maintain the integrity of the judicial system and the highest ethical standards of the legal profession. <i>James</i> , 708 F.2d 49; <i>Glavin</i> , 517 F.2d 272; <i>Cl. Lowenthal</i> , supra, at 61.	Protecting privilege of communication of admission with counsel.	Procedure, policy
1986	COCAP	Colo., <i>People v. York</i> , 729 P.2d 348	The hearing board concluded that the respondent's admission of false documents to the grievance committee violated C.R.C.P. 241.6(7) and D.R. 1-102(A)(1) (violation of a disciplinary rule); DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); and DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).	Recalling findings below.	Discipline, Lawyer
1979	COCAP	Cal., <i>People v. Perez</i> , 24 Cal. 3d 133	Alternatively, the bar asserts that it adopted the rules under its authority to make regulations to aid in the administration of justice (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6031) and to ensure that persons admitted to the bar have received proper training (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6047).	Recalling State Bar's justifications for allowing supervised law students to participate in criminal matters.	Bar association, adopting rules

1981	COCAP	Mich., <i>Falk v. State Bar of Mich.</i> , 411 Mich. 63	defendants EDWARD G. PARTIN, JACK F. F. GREMILLON, JR., HAROLD SYKES, BEN TRANTHAM and CROCKETT CARLTON, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other and with their co-conspirators, Claude W. Robertson, Mitchell Husser and other unknown parties, to commit an offense against the United States, to-wit: Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503, that is to corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in that knowing that one Claude W. Robertson was a material Government witness at the trial of the criminal case, then pending	Influencing witness	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1981	COCAP	Mass., Commonwealth v. Brown, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 288	Public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system and community participation in the administration of justice are also critical by-products of a jury composed of a representative cross section of the community. <i>People v. Wheeler</i> , 22 Cal. 3d 258, 270-272 (1978).	Discussing the proportionality requirements for jurist.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1982	COCAP	Ok., <i>Vill. Of Oklahoma v. Wilgier</i> , 69 Ohio St. 2d 453	This is so because the mayor had the power to issue a warrant for the arrest of defendant to compel his appearance at a stated time by reason of the mayor's statutory powers enumerated in R.C. 1905.20, relating to criminal matters which, inter alia, provides: " * * * The mayor shall arrest and cause all writs and process that are necessary to enforce the administration of justice through out the municipal corporation. * * * "	Citing ordinance.	Law enforcement; Mayoral powers
1980	COCAP	W. Va., <i>Re: Bonn Brown</i> , 166 W. Va. 226	Woven throughout our disciplinary cases involving attorneys is the thought that they occupy a special position because they are actively involved in administering the legal system whose ultimate goal is the evenhanded administration of justice.	Discussing the disciplinary system.	Discipline, Lawyer
1983	COCAP	Ill., <i>People v. Siegel</i> , 111 Ill. 2d 167	The fact that the chose instead to make her demands in the midst of an already unstable, difficult and conceivably dangerous setting gives rise to a reasonable inference that her conduct was calculated to embarrass, hinder or obstruct the court in its administration of justice.	Evaluating conduct of disruptive individual	Judicial proceeding; disruptive incident
1981	COCAP	Del., <i>Hicks v. State</i> , 434 A.2d 377	When a defendant, for one reason or another, refuses the assistance of counsel, trial courts are faced with a difficult question: should the Court require "standby" counsel, even against the wishes of the defendant, in order to protect the defendant's basic rights? There is no right to standby counsel. Nevertheless, the appointment of standby counsel may benefit not only the defendant but also the Court, by insuring an orderly and fair administration of justice.	Assessing doctrine.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1983	COCAP	Baril, N.D. Ill., In re <i>Widman</i> , et al., 30 B.R. 133	The following assertion of Judge Will is not true and to that extent creates an appearance of disfavor in attempting to establish a point: "The Judicial Council's order was undeniably" necessary "for the effective and expeditious administration of justice." "The chaos and hardship to litigants that would have ensued at the expiration of the Matron stay, had there been no uniform procedure for carrying forward the business of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, are universally acknowledged."	Judge's assessment of delegations to bankruptcy judges.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1982	COCAP	Wash., <i>State v. Kelly</i> , 82 Wash. App. 112 C.A. 10, <i>Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Midland</i> , 607 F.2d 885	(2) On motion of the state, the court or a party, the court may continue the case when required in the administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced in the present event of his or her defense.	Ordering conditions for grants of continuances.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1979	COCAP	Pa., <i>In re: Anonymous</i> , No. 65 D.B. 75, 7 Pa. D. & C. 519, ... BOARD	Considering that this case is on appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the court has, in furtherance of the proper administration of justice, decided the issue of collateral estoppel on the merits of the case.	Discussing procedure in patent cases.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1980	COCAP	N.D. Tex., <i>Bulter v. Fritsch</i>	In <i>Ex Parte Reynolds</i> , supra, the progenitor of this line of cases, the court interpreted Robinson as diminishing the importance of the "relaxance" prong of the tripartite test of <i>Stovall and Davis</i> , and virtually eliminating the third branch of the test (effect on administration of justice).	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1977	COCAP	E.D. Ill., <i>Persico v. U.S. Dist. Ct.</i> , 426 F. Supp. 1013	For these reasons, this Court feels that unless reliance upon the old rule is so great that the account paying difficulties in the retroactive administration of justice forbid; it is important that some avenue of relief be made open to the petitioner.	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1982	COCAP	C.A. 1, <i>Fernandez v. Chardon</i> , 681 F.2d 42	There would also seem to be little impact on the administration of justice whether or not Rule 6 is applied retroactively.	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1985	COCAP	D. Mass., <i>Lombard v. Justice Kennedy Schriver Cr. For Mental Retardation, Inc.</i> , 556 F. Supp. 677	This is not a case, therefore, in which the unperfected duration of M.G.L. c. 260, § 7's tolling period would have pernicious consequences for the administration of justice.	Assessing the effects of mental incompetence on state tolling provision.	Judicial proceeding, powers & prerogatives
1977	COCAP	D. & C. 519, ... BOARD	Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Citing basis of liability for not informing client and not filing action.	Discipline, Lawyer
1986	COCAP	U.S. Claims, <i>Park v. U.S.</i> , 10 Cl. Ct. 790	This court also has said that a minimal showing of justice because it is much easier for defendant than plaintiff to determine, for example, the absence of defendant's witnesses and loss of defendant's documents.	Discussing showings for prejudicial delay.	Judicial proceeding, procedure
1986	COCAP	N.Y., In re <i>Padilla</i> , 67 N.Y. 2d 440	By statute, the Supreme Court has "power and control over attorneys and counselors-at-law and all persons practicing or assuming to practice law" in this State; and the Appellate Division is specifically "authorized to censure, suspend from practice or remove from office any attorney and counselor - allow admitted to practice who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice." (Judiciary Law § 90 [2] j.)	Reiterating court's control of conduct of lawyers.	Discipline, Lawyer

1984	COCAP	Tex. State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507	As was said by this court in Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Stout, 530 S.W. 2d at 931: Delay hampers the administration of justice.	Affirming dismissal for prejudicial delay.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1987	COCAP	M.D. Fla., U.S. v. Leblond-Rivon, 667 F. Supp. 827	The court found that the district court's conclusion that publicity posed a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice was correct.	Discussing restraining order on attorneys regarding media contacts.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives
1984	COCAP	C.A. 9, U.S. v. Tertou, 742 F.2d 538	(Footnote citing the Speedy Trial Act)		Judicial proceeding; procedure
1979	COCAP	Ct. Customs & Patent Appeals, ASD Indus. of Al., U.S., 610 F.2d 770	Accordingly, and in furtherance of the administration of justice, we conclude that a trial de novo is indicated in this case so that the merits of the issue of the amount of the net bounty herein involved can be fully developed.	Considering impacts of recent statutory amendments on procedure.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1977	COCAP	N.C., In re Inquiry Concerning Judge W. Milton Nowell, 293 N.C. 235	We are entirely convinced that the ex parte disposition of a criminal case out of court, or the disposition of any case for reasons other than an honest appraisal of the facts and law as disclosed by the evidence and the advocacy of both parties, will amount to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Finding a violation of ethical rules in judge's disposition of a case outside of normal procedures.	Discipline, judicial; procedure
1977	COCAP	Black's Law Dictionary - Rev. 4th Ed., defines as that such a body as (p. 425) - "A tribunal is officially assembled under authority of law at the appropriate time and place, for the administration of justice. In re Carter's Estate, 254 Pa. 518, 99 A. 352.	When necessary, however, a justice instructs the police officer that a decision of the District of Columbia Superior Court had narrowed the application of 40 U.S.C. § 136 to prohibit only conduct engaged in "with the intent to disrupt or interfere with or impede the administration of justice or with the intent of influencing the administration of justice."	Recounting conduct of officers at Supreme Court.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1981	COCAP	C.A.D.C., Grace v. Burger, 214 U.S. App. D.C. 375	The trial court also found, pursuant to § 220 - 15, that appellee had the capacity to understand the proceedings against him, his plea was knowingly and voluntarily made; and acceptance of the plea was required in the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice.	Assessing court's finding that plea was voluntary.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1986	COCAP	C.A. 2, Lockett v. Montgomery, 784 F.2d 78	The findings in <i>W.D. Smith et al.</i> , which we have adopted, constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.	Assessing judge's involvement with female probation officer.	Discipline, judge
1983	COCAP	N.C., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 309 N.C. 635	The raising of revenue and the allocation of fiscal resources among all government entities is initially and primarily the responsibility of the legislative branch of government, and sound public policy considerations demand that when the judiciary seeks to use its inherent power to overcome its peculiar prerogative of the Legislature, it be held to a high standard and assume the burden of showing that the funds sought to be compelled are essential for the holding of court, the efficient administration of justice, or the performance of its constitutional and statutory duties.	Reciting standard for judicial, as opposed to legislative, exactions.	Judicial proceeding; financing
1983	COCAP	Tex., District Judges v. County Judge, 657 S.W.2d 908	"conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice" (Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 1 - 102, subd [A], par [5]).	Basis of liability for a lawyer's repeated violations of ethical rules.	Discipline, lawyer
1978	COCAP	N.Y., In re Newman, 64 A.D.2d 145			
1983	COCAP	Az., In re Appeal, 680 P.2d 163	To permit the losing party in an ongoing dispute to custody dispute, as in the case before us, to file a later adoption proceeding before a different Arizona juvenile judge while the dependency proceedings are being processed by another Arizona juvenile judge would cause havoc to the orderly administration of justice.	Discussing prudential concerns of lack of jurisdictional limits.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	S.D.N.Y., U.S. v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685	Applying this interpretation of the 1831 Act to the facts in <i>Nve</i> , the Supreme Court noted that the allegedly obstructive acts occurred more than one hundred miles from the court in which the underlying action was pending, and concluded that such acts were not "so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice," and therefore would not be punished by the offended court.	Recalling criteria for "obstruction."	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives
1986	COCAP	C.A. 11, U.S. v. Petrom, 798 F.2d 1478	(Footnote citing 1503)	Obstruction statute.	Unclear
1977	COCAP	Fla., State v. Patrus, 46 Fla. Supp. 19	This discretion should be exercised in fairness to all parties and the administration of justice.	Announcing bounds for courts' exercises of discretion.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1980	COCAP	W. Va., Puchinsky v. W. Va. Bd. of Law Examiners, 164 W. Va. 736	"Rather we think the language of these cases amply indicates that the purpose of the requirements was to insure that dishonest, unscrupulous or arrogant individuals would not use their knowledge of the law to perpetrate fraud upon the unsuspecting and unknowledgeable public or to obstruct the proper administration of justice for their own or their clients' benefit."	Citing, and then distinguishing, the motivation of bar rules from a lawyer's holding some or other political philosophy.	Discipline, lawyer
1986	COCAP	Minn., In re Marriage of Nordmark, 388 N.W.2d 436	A court retains inherent power to grant relief to a party who has been denied an opportunity to defend in a divorce action under such circumstances as amount to a fraud on the court and the administration of justice. <i>Bredemann v. Bredemann</i> , 253 Minn. 21, 24, 91 N.W.2d 84, 87 (1958).	Describing powers of the court.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives
1980	COCAP	W. Va., State ex rel. The Herald Mail Co., 165 W. Va. 103	Typical of the reasoning of these cases is <i>E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton</i> , <i>supra</i> , where the public interest was stated as follows: "It can never be claimed that in a democratic society the public has no interest in or does not have the right to observe the administration of justice."	Discussing access of journalists to judicial proceedings.	Judicial proceeding; access to
1986	COCAP	Pa., Kaplan v. Allegheny Co. Comm'n, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 896	In considering the serious request which was not made lightly, we are guided by the rationale of our Superior Court in <i>Crawford's Estate</i> , 307 Pa. 102, 108 (1931), wherein the court stated: "Due consideration should be given by him [judge] to the fact that the administration of justice should be beyond the appearance of unfairness."	Assessing whether any county judge would be able to hear the instant case.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1987	COCAP	C.A. 9, U.S. v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 1319	There is little doubt that Kelm's conduct hinders the administration of justice.	Assessing denial of continuance when <i>pro se</i> party repeatedly missed court and imposed requirements for appointed counsel.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1986	COCAP	D. Ark., Felton v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 1130	Nor does the public service or the administration of justice require complete immunity for such an action.	Refusing absolute privilege to public officers in the context of terminating employment.	Judicial proceeding
1987	COCAP	Mo., In re Clinton Adams, 737 S.W.2d 714	(4) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice	Stated as basis of liability under professional conduct rules for failures to advise client of adverse judgment, delay payment to government division, and acting against client's interests.	Discipline, lawyer

1983	COCAP	Colo., People v. Whitcomb, 676 P.2d 111	DR 1 - 102 (A) (5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); and DR 6 - 101 (A) (3) (neglect of a legal matter).	Reciting basis of liability resulting in suspension of one year and one day.	Discipline, lawyer
1986	COCAP	Barth, W. D. Ark., In re Worfall, 713 B.R. 386	It is in the best interests of the estate, the debtor and the creditors to dismiss this Chapter 11 case to effectuate a substantial savings in litigation and administrative expenses which would otherwise be incurred if it were to remain pending and to further serve the ends of the fair efficient and offe administration of justice.	Restating rationale for dismissal offered below.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1977	COCAP	C.A. 5, Hinks v. Heun-Norwood, 566 F.2d 1073	15 take such action could, in our judgment, establish a precedent which would not advance the proper administration of justice.	Characterizing the result of granting relief sought for first time on appeal.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1977	COCAP	La., Martin v. South Coast Corp., 356 So. 2d 599	In both instances, the trial judge's knowledge of "the condition of his docket, fairness not only to both parties but also to other litigants in his courts, and the need for an orderly and prompt administration of justice," provides him with superior ability to determine the terms of the dismissal.	Describing judges' latitude in dismissals.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1983	COCAP	C.A. 6, U.S. v. Schneider, 771 F.2d 149	Section 1503 also contains a specific prohibition case which makes illegal any actions whereby a person who "corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, induces, obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than \$,500.00 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.	(Cited in footnote of appeal reversing and granting new trial.)	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1987	COCAP	N.D. Ind., Naked City, Inc. v. Arepsod, 667 F. Supp. 1246	Prosecutor Ryan corruptly obstructed and impeded the due administration of justice in violation of 18 USC § 1503.	(Appendix stating cause of action from complaint.)	Lawyer misconduct
1987	COCAP	Pa. Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. Am. Federation of State..., 526 A.2d 769	Concomitantly, to promote and maintain the efficient administration of justice and the enforceability of their employees' contracts, the judges of the courts of common pleas must have input through the county commissioners. Id., 507 Pa. at 279, 489 A.2d at 1329-1330.	Judges must have collective bargaining input from county commissioners.	Judicial conduct
1983	COCAP	N.J., State v. Vasky, 203 N.J. Super. 91	It comprehends any act which is calculated to or tends to embarrass, hinder, impede, frustrate, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, or which is calculated to or has the effect of interfering its authority or its dignity; or which interferes with or prejudices parties during the course of litigation; or which tends otherwise to bring the authority or administration of the law into disrepute or disregard.	Underlying contempt order (on appeal).	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives
1977	COCAP	Az., In re Appeal in Pima City, 118 Ariz. 127	In determining whether to give a decision prospective or retrospective application, the purpose of the decision, reliance on a prior rule of law, and the possible effect upon the administration of justice are factors which must be considered.	Appeal from court order granting adoption and denying habeas as to two children.	Law enforcement
1977	COCAP	C.A. 3, Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, 552 F.2d 498	This statute provides that a federal court has the power to punish by fine or imprisonment such contempt of its authority as "misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice."	Underlying contempt order (on appeal).	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives
1979	COCAP	Ill., People v. Eldred, 73 Ill. App. 3d 192	This right may not be employed to thwart the administration of justice or to delay prosecution indefinitely.	Motion for continuance to employ different attorney in case below implicating right to counsel.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1980	COCAP	N.Y., Lipman v. Saltsberg, 107 Misc. 2d 276	"Finally, it does not serve the interests of the administration of justice to deny the making of a motion on to dismiss when, as here, the affidavit in support of the motion to dismiss goes beyond mere conclusory allegations of lack of proper service.	Review of denial of motion to dismiss.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1978	COCAP	Oh., State v. Conliff, 61 Ohio App. 2d 185	In the instant case, the record fails to disclose the statement constituted "an imminent threat to the administration of justice."	Underlying contempt finding (on appeal).	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives
1982	COCAP	Colo., People v. Kennel, 648 P.2d 1065	In addition, it was found that the respondent's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and reflects his unwillingness to practice law as intended was violation of DRI - 102 (A) (1) (5) and (6).	Grievance Committee's evaluation of attorney's conduct.	Discipline, lawyer
1978	COCAP	C.A. 1, Del Rio v. Northern Illinois Co., 574 F.2d 223	The trial court, citing to common law authorities, briefly adverted to the statute, but spoke mainly of the duty of compensation carriers in partial arrest, and the orderly process and administration of justice in general.	Lower court's assessment of workman's compensation scheme.	Unclear
1987	COCAP	Fla., Dudley v. State, 518 So. 2d 1052	First, a criminal contempt is classically defined in an act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity.	Underlying contempt order (on appeal).	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives; contempt
1982	COCAP	Fla., Bar v. Hoffer, 412 So. 2d 858	By reason of the foregoing, respondent has neglected a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of The Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 6 - 101 (A) (3), engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice as a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1 - 102 (A) (5); and engaged in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1 - 102 (A) (6).	Bar official's evaluation of attorney's conduct (on review).	Discipline, lawyer
1983	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Williams, 344 Pa. Super. 108	By resisting arrest, Williams threatened that time-tested yet fragile social balance whereby our elected representatives provide laws for the good of society, and public officers to execute and enforce them, and under which respect and obedience shown to officers discharging their lawful duties are essential to the orderly administration of justice as the laws themselves.	Evaluation of conduct (resisting arrest).	Law enforcement
1981	COCAP	Mich., Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 411 Mich. 63	In an integrated bar the compelling state interest is the administration of justice.	Court's assessment of policy aims.	Bar generally
1981	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Reid, 494 Pa. 201	The appellant was held in contempt of court and sentenced to five and one-half months imprisonment under Subsection 3 of The Penal Code which provides: "The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue attachments and to inflict summary punishments for contempts of court shall be restricted to the following cases: (3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, the judge obstructing the administration of justice.	Reciting statute in appeal from criminal contempt.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives; contempt
1984	COCAP	Nc., In re Complaint, 351 N.W.2d 693	Conduct which falls short of reaffirming one's fitness for the high responsibilities of judicial office constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.	Basis of liability in charges against judge.	Discipline, judge

1979	COCAP	C.A. 4, U.S. v. Baker, 611 F.2d 964	A witness violates no duty to claim it, but one who bribes, coerces, forces or threatens a witness to claim it, or advises with corrupt motive the witness to take it, can and does himself obstruct or influence the due administration of justice. 329 F.2d at 443.	Citing upholding of conviction under s. 1503, for inducing witness to use Amend. V privilege.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives; Tampering
1979	COCAP	Ill. People v. Page, 73 Ill. App. 3d 776	Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant willfully and knowingly interfered with the administration of justice.	Affirming conviction either for misleading court or causing delay, in either case giving rise to liability.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives; Tampering
1984	COCAP	S.C., Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363	Principles of fairness, certainty, and the proper administration of justice suggest that a decision so rendered should stand unless some compelling countervailing consideration necessitates re litigation.	Explaining doctrine back of question whether a party is precluded from re litigating an issue with a nonparty.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1978	COCAP	Fla. Bar v. Ward, 366 So. 2d 405	The Florida Bar in response submits that to grant the petition would not adversely affect the parity of the court system, hinder the administration of justice, or adversely affect the confidence of the public in the legal profession.	Petition to resign from bar.	Discipline, lawyer
1987	COCAP	D.C., In re Hutchinson, 518 A.2d 995	This court imposed a thirty-day suspension, even though we concluded that the attorney's conduct had perpetrated a fraud on the judicial system and compromised the administration of justice.	Describing previous sanction on lawyer.	Discipline, lawyer
1979	COCAP	C.A. 5, Stegmair v. Frammel, 597 F.2d 1027	"The administrative office of the courts was given authority to "serve as an agency to apply for and to receive grants or other assistance and to coordinate or conduct studies and projects in connection with the improvement of the administration of justice."	Describing the duty of court officers.	Judiciary generally
1987	COCAP	N.J., State v. Rancourt, 106 N.J. 123	State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 519 (1975) (prohibiting multiple prosecution for acts arising out of same arrest under court's supervisory power to ensure fairness in the administration of justice although rejecting constitutional attack.)	Outlining court's doctrine.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1987	COCAP	Md., Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Singleton, 532 A.2d 157	"We affirm any argument that the respondent is guilty of Disciplinary Rule 1-102 "Misconduct." (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule; (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; and (6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."	Upholding sanction of attorney in bar proceeding.	Discipline, lawyer
1987	COCAP	N.Y., Stock v. Stock, 127 A.D.2d 829	While we are sensitive to the fact that the efficacy of administration of justice can not be subject to the whims and inordinate delays of litigants, and we are convinced that the failure in this case of the plaintiff's new attorney to be prepared for trial could not have been avoided, there is nothing in this record to indicate bad faith on the part of the plaintiff in seeking an adjournment.	Reversing dismissal.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1982	COCAP	C.D. Cal., U.S. v. Dona, 584 F. Supp. 525	Since defendant Dona persisted in his contemptible conduct despite the warnings of the Court, and so misbehaved that in the presence of the Court he, Dona, outrageously obstructed the administration of justice, the Court finds said Dona in contempt of Court and he is ordered to be sentenced to a term of six months, all as appears conclusively in the transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, et al., January 25, 1982, which is hereby incorporated herein and made part hereof.	Contempt finding.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives; Contempt
1986	COCAP	D.C., In re Hutchinson, 518 A.2d 995	This court imposed a thirty-day suspension, even though we concluded that the attorney's conduct had perpetrated a fraud on the judicial system and compromised the administration of justice.	Recalling past sanction.	Discipline, lawyer
1986	COCAP	N.J., In re Mintz, 101 N.J. 527	Respondent's discussion of marketing another person, raising a false claim of physical inability to stand trial, cocaine selling, and jumping bail constituted unethical conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (5) and adversely reflecting on his fitness to practice law, in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (6).	Disciplinary proceeding.	Discipline, lawyer
1985	COCAP	C.A. 11, U.S. v. London, 714 F.2d 1538	London has not offered any reason why a finalist judgment given by a lawyer to his client does not constitute an endeavor to suppress the due administration of justice other than the fact that the obstruction occurred after the resolution of the lawsuit.	Appeal of conviction under s. 1503.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives; Tampering
1981	COCAP	Pa., In re Campolongo, 435 A.2d 581	Although clearly inappropriate and ill-advised, the question did not significantly diminish the proceedings and thus did not constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice.	Reversal of contempt finding.	Discipline, lawyer
1978	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 393 A.2d 386	It is precisely because "the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing, [as] a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation, against obstructions and outrages to it," Offutt v. United States, 388 U.S. 11, 14, 78 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11, 16 (1954), that the summary contempt power has been upheld against due process attacks, see e.g., Cooke v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 534, 45 S.Ct. 399, 69 L.Ed. at 773; Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888), and we therefore decline to adopt applicant's argument that summary adjudication is per se unconstitutional.	Assessing arguments on appeal of contempt finding.	Judicial proceeding; powers & prerogatives; Contempt
1985	COCAP	C.A. 1, Brockton Savings Bank v. Post, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5	A federal district court must be able "to protect the administration of justice by levying sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices." Post-bank International, Ltd. v. Playbox Enterprises, Inc., 663 F.2d 371, 386 (2d Cir. 1981).	Expounding doctrine.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1981	COCAP	N.H., State v. Parkhurst, 121 N.H. 821	Permitting a defendant to proclaim his guilt in open court and still avoid conviction is incompatible with the sound administration of justice.	Finding that guilty plea waive all but jurisdictional defects, remanding defective guilty plea.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1986	COCAP	La., State v. Williams, Permitted a defendant to proclaim his guilt in open court and still avoid conviction is incompatible with the sound administration of justice. See La.Cr.P. arts. 17, 20, 21.	A juror's failure to attend court interferes with the orderly administration of justice. See La.Cr.P. arts. 17, 20, 21.	Affirming trial judge's replacement of absent juror.	Judicial proceeding; procedure; juries
1977	COCAP	Va., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 699	They are matters involving a serious and substantial evil—the imminent and substantial threat to the orderly administration of justice posed by the premature disclosure of the confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.	Importance of confidentiality of review of judges.	Discipline, judges

1977	COCAP	Pa., In re Anonymous No. 65 D.B. 75, Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania	Respondent did not advise [C] that the statute had expired, nor what action could be taken to protect his interest. It is charged that respondent's action involved a violation of: s. D.R. 1-102 (A) (5) — Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. s. D.R. 1-102 (A) (6).	Board outlining basis of liability.	Discipline, lawyer
1987	COCAP	E.D. Mich., Sinker v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1249	Although not an entirely unopposed mission, such a task would make the administration of justice by the Court an extremely arduous task.	Assessing the elaboration of RICO's test beyond its current scope.	Judicial proceeding; application of doctrine
1982	COCAP	Bankr. E.D. Mich., In re Rafter, 25 B.R. 244	Analysis Lifting the Stay for Cause: "Administration of Justice 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d) states: "On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay ... such as by terminating, annulling, modifying or conditioning such stay ... (1) For cause ... If the Court has found as sufficient cause for modifying the stay in this case that the administration of justice and the convenience of the parties is best served by having the State court act as the one tribunal before which all claims, counterclaims or cross-claims may be heard."	Outlining legal standard in bankruptcy court.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1981	COCAP	Ind., In re Moore, 428 N.E.2d 1257	From the foregoing findings we now find that Respondent filed the lawsuit when he knew that his action would merely serve to harass and maliciously injure others, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, which adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, and, by filing a lawsuit against a judge for conduct occurring in the performance of his judicial capacity, advocated a claim which is unwarranted under existing law.	Assessing complaint against attorney.	Discipline, lawyer
1987	COCAP	La., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Lucas, 429 N.W.2d 781	Consequently, the Council concluded that "the uniform effective and expeditious administration of justice within this Circuit requires that the attached rule for the administration of the bankruptcy system in this Circuit be adopted by the District Courts ... "Order of the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit, December 21, 1982.	Commission's findings affirmed.	Discipline, lawyer
1983	COCAP	C.A. 6, White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, 704 F.2d 242	Not in the slightest reference in his remarks to burdens on the administration of justice, to workload of court resources, or to the necessity of empaneling another jury in the event of a mistrial.	Recalling Judicial Council, C.A. 6 determination.	Judicial council determining rules
1987	COCAP	N.C., State v. Noreville, 321 N.C. 92	Such proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white population.	Expounding rationale of peremptory challenges.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1987	COCAP	Ala., Vienna v. Scott Westel Services, Inc., 749 P.2d 447	and 4) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule of law.	Discussing retroactivity standard.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1979	COCAP	Mich., Star Bar Grievance Administrator v. Del Rio, 407 Mich. 336	(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Reciting rules that govern professional conduct in review of determinations thereof.	Discipline, lawyer
1981	COCAP	Ok., St. v. Fox, 68 Ok. St. 23	Out of a concern for the "practical administration of justice," we conclude, with the trial judge here, that not enough evidence was introduced to warrant the requested instruction.	Affirming jury instructions of trial judge.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	S.D.N.Y., In re Lion Capital Group, 48 B.R. 329	In the letter, the movants renew their application to withdraw the reference because this will further the efficient administration of justice and contend that "[i]f indeed, the practical consequence of the withdrawal of the reference is that it should obviate the need for the prosecution and resolution of appeals from the bankruptcy judge's determination that the proceedings below are core proceedings ..."	Finding movants' motion unreasonable, and so denying it.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1989	COCAP	Ala., McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990	In State v. DeLombi, 117 R.I. 675, 370 A.2d 1273 (1977), the Rhode Island supreme court, relying in part on Coleman, adopted the requirement of either a grant of use and derivative use immunity for testimony given at a probation revocation hearing, or postponement of the revocation proceeding until after the criminal trial, on the reasoning that "the unfairness of the current practice, even if not so severe as to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation, is nevertheless as real and substantial that it calls for action by us on public policy grounds and in furtherance of our responsibility to assure a sound and enlightened administration of justice." Id. at 1275.	Resolving constitutional question, raised below, of coordination of probation and criminal proceedings.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1989	COCAP	Nev., Harvey v. State, 619 P.2d 1214	Inquiries would also prevent the effective administration of justice by resolving most conflicts situations at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings.	Reversing and remanding for want of separate trials below.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1982	COCAP	Del., In re Kennedy, 442 A.2d 79	"The respondent objects to the finding that the respondent in refusing to produce the records was 'prejudicial to the administration of justice' " in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (5) and 'conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law' " in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (6).	Requesting review of disciplinary determination below.	Discipline, lawyers
1983	COCAP	Kan., Bernworth v. Hughes, 234 Kan. 69	"We believe that the restrictive view to the contrary, that it can not, only encourage multiplicity of litigation and waste in the administration of justice."	Announcing rule for visitation and child support cases.	Judicial proceeding; procedure

1986	COCAP	C.A. 4, <i>In re Evans</i> , 801 F.2d 703	The repeated assertions by Mr. Evans, even after the dispositive approving opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on the very matters which Mr. Evans contended were erroneously decided by the Magistrate, and his continued and unrelenting groundless assertions that the Magistrate acted out of bias, "ribs" them in compliance with well-established rules of law, make it apparent that Mr. Evans acted originally, and continues to act in a way that is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (5). Such conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice and reflects adversely on his fitness to practice law.	Recounting reasoning of judge in disciplinary matter below.	Discipline, lawyers
1987	COCAP	<i>Ind., In re Carmody</i> , 513 N.E.2d 619		Affirming disciplinary findings below.	Discipline, lawyers
1985	COCAP	D. Conn., U.S. v. Curcio, 608 F. Supp. 1346	Furthermore, if the disqualification of one government attorney would serve as the predicate for the disqualification of the entire United States Attorney's Office, the administration of justice would be irreparably damaged.	Assessing and rejecting defendants' disqualification arguments.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1981	COCAP	N.C., State v. Boney, 302 N.C. 529	In summary, Richmond Newspapers does not survive to support defendant's demand that he be asked a new trial because a trial judge in the interest of the fair administration of justice may impose reasonable limitations upon the access of the public and the press to a criminal trial. U.S. at 18,651, Ed. 2d at 992, 100 S. Ct. at 2830.	Rejecting reasoning back of motion for new trial.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	C.A. 7, U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518	The warrant provision of § 853 (c) "which applies to the "appearance" of inpropriety issues under § 455 (a) but not to any actual conflict of interest under § 455 (b) ", reinforces our conclusion that § 455 (a) is concerned with perceptions rather than actual defects in the administration of justice.	Expounding doctrine of waiver for potential judicial conflicts.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1979	COCAP	Fla., <i>Sentinel Star Co. v. Booth</i> , 372 So. 2d 100	The standard to be met before first amendment freedoms can be abridged is that the expression by the press must constitute "an immediate, not merely likely, threat to the administration of justice."	Finding trial court was perfunctory in denying press access.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1982	COCAP	N.D. Tex., <i>Crane v. Brown</i> , 534 F. Supp. 1237	Texas counties perform a number of functions to the state including the supervision of state elections, the collection of state property taxes, the construction of state roads, bridges and ferries, and the administration of justice. The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized that when counties act in certain capacities they are agents of the state.	Law enforcement/policy	Broad description
1981	COCAP	Conn., <i>State v. Gunning</i> , 183 Conn. 299	Defendant, the state or the administration of justice.	Assessing police conduct in matter below.	Law enforcement
1981	COCAP	C.A. 1, <i>Feinstein v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.</i> , 643 F.2d 880	However, the interest of comity and the efficient administration of justice will best be served by avoiding the duplication of administrative arrangements necessitated by such a requirement. 12, Supp. 882, supra, 13	Jurisdictional concerns in handling medical malpractice claims.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1982	COCAP	Cal., <i>Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. Bloom Development Corp.</i> , 138 Cal. App. 3d 268	No exception to the application of a receiver should not be made without a full and complete hearing unless the due administration of justice clearly requires it. " [Cohen v. Herbert (1966)] 186 Cal.App.2d 488, 495 [8 Cal.Rptr. 922]	Clarifying procedural requirements upon lower court.	Judicial proceeding; procedure

1979	COCAP	W.D. Pa., <i>Albright v. Albright</i> , 463 F. Supp. 1220	Despite the threat to negate that sometimes results, the doctrine of judicial immunity is thought to be in the best interests of "the proper administration of justice. [I]f it allows [a] judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him [to] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself." <i>Bradley v. Fisher</i> , 13 Wall., at 347.	Affirming judicial immunity.	Judicial proceeding
1983	COCAP	Pa., <i>Commonwealth v. McCool</i> , 457 A.2d 1312	[I]f the desirability of permitting a defendant at a minimal time to obtain private counsel of his choice must be weighed against the public need for an efficient and effective administration of justice.	Announcing balancing considerations for finding counsel of one's choice.	Judicial proceeding
1977	COCAP	Ill., <i>People v. Lott</i> , 66 Ill. 2d 290	This court reemphasized in <i>People v. Shum</i> (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 261, 265, "the belief that adequate opportunity to defend is the first essential of a fair trial." "Speedy administration of justice is desirable, but the desire for speed must not be allowed to impinge upon the constitutional requirement of a fair opportunity to defend."	Finding unfair surprise on defense counsel of remotized testimony.	Judicial proceeding; evidentiary issue
1981	COCAP	E.D. Va., U.S. v. <i>Computer Sci. Corp.</i> , 511 F. Supp. 1125	The exclusion of the occupational groups and of women with young children rests upon a factual finding by this court that jury service by these groups would entail undue hardship, extreme income variance or serious obstruction or delay in the fair and impartial administration of justice.	Appeal based on defects in jury selection.	Judicial proceeding; jury
1985	COCAP	Fla., <i>Evartson v. Willard</i> , 468 So. 2d 936	This discretionary power is considered basic to the police power function of governmental entities and is recognized as critical to a law enforcement officer's ability to carry out his duties. See A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 1-4.1 (2d ed. 1980); President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, "The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 105" (1967).	Referencing President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice	
1987	COCAP	Cal., <i>People v. Sanders</i> , 191 Cal. App. 3d 79	It is the honor of the government " public confidence in the fair administration of justice, and the efficient administration of justice. [Citations.] " [C] <i>People v. Manchaca</i> , supra, 32 Cal. 3d at p. 866.	Appraising duties of police officers.	Law enforcement
1986	COCAP	C.A. 4, <i>In re Evans</i> , 801 F.2d 703	In <i>Greenfield</i> , supra, an attorney was suspended from practice for three years for professional misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. After a judge had denied the attorney's motion in a pending action, <i>Greenfield</i> , along with another attorney, <i>Rohlsater</i> , wrote two letters to the judge accusing him without any basis in fact of misconduct in office. The attorneys also prepared and circulated letters and affidavits concerning the alleged misconduct to the presiding judge of the court, as well as the Governor, the District Attorney, and the Judicial Conference.	Collecting precedent to uphold instant disciplinary finding.	Discipline, lawyer
1982	COCAP	C.A. 11, U.S. v. <i>Gonzales</i> , 671 F.2d 441	In passing the Act, Congress sought to promote not only the defendant's right to a speedy trial, but also the public's interest in the efficient administration of justice.	Legislative history of Speedy Trial Act.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1977	COCAP	Cal., <i>Cooper v. City of Los Angeles</i> , 69 Cal. App. 3d 529	The principle is founded upon a need for judicial economy in the administration of justice.	Rationale for lower court's strict compliance with instructions on remand.	Judicial proceeding; procedure

1980	COCAP	Mass., <i>Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court</i> , 379 Mass. 846	In broader terms, the statute's purposes go beyond protection of juvenile privacy to encompass the State's interest in sound and orderly administration of justice; ipso important, the statute help to obtain just convictions for the types of crimes from which the victims had often suffered at the hands of the criminal justice system, who often assault -ants had often gone free.	We also note the immense burden on the administration of justice in our civil courts were such retroactive application permitted.	Expounding policy back of statute limiting press access to some trials while reviewing the same.	Judicial proceeding; media access to
1981	COCAP	Cal., <i>In re Marriage of Lee</i> , 124 Cal. App. 3d 371		We have given complete retroactive effect to the new rule, regardless of good faith reliance by law enforcement authorities or the degree of impact on the administration of justice, where the "major purpose in new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials."	Rejecting fully retroactive application of new rule.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1980	COCAP	Colo., <i>People v. Hardin</i> , 607 P.2d 1291	Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 91 S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971)		Explaining doctrine concerning retroactive application.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1987	COCAP	Ark., <i>Clark v. State</i> , 291 Ark. 405	The first which it finds must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice.		Assessing when language rises to contempt in review of contempt conviction.	Judicial proceeding; Contempt
1986	COCAP	Ala., <i>Farkigh v. Ansbach</i> , 728 F.2d 637	We have denied broader retroactive application of a new rule going to defendant's right to a fair trial on grounds of reasonable reliance by law enforcement officials on the old rule and potential impact on the administration of justice. See <i>Lauderdale</i> , 548 F.2d at 383.		Discussing retroactive application of a new rule.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1977	COCAP	N.C., N.C. St. Bar v. <i>Hall</i> , 293 N.C. 539	Both the court and the prosecuting attorney may well decline to accept such plea in cases where the due administration of justice might be improperly affected, for when the plea is accepted it is accepted with all the implications and reservations which under the law and accurate pleading appertain to that plea. " <i>Winsett v. Schaldt</i> , <i>Comer v. Motor Vehicles</i> , 239 N.C. 190, 194-95, 79 S.E. 2d 501, 504-505 (1954).		Discussing doctrine back of plea of nolo contendere in remanding and denying state bar summary judgment.	Judicial proceeding
1984	COCAP	D.D.C., <i>Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.</i> , 604 F. Supp. 280	The basic rationale for the exceptions related to the administration of justice is that the "unhindered and untrammeled functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional democracy." "For it is clear that when a court is prevented by outside pressure or other interference from adjudicating claims between litigants before it, the rule of law is significantly impaired.		Explaining the rationale of anti-trait injunctions to evaluate whether defendants were interfering with administration of justice.	Judicial proceeding
1984	COCAP	Colo., <i>People v. Barron</i> , 677 P.2d 1370	Criminal contempt consists of conduct that obstructs the administration of justice or tends to bring the court into disrepute.		Rejecting rules in review of erroneous dismissal for supposed lack of jurisdiction over matter brought by information.	Judicial proceeding; contempt
1983	COCAP	Ala., <i>Osley v. State</i> , 671 P.2d 1277	For the reasons we have expressed with respect to our conclusion that the conduct involved here did not fall below an acceptable standard for the fair and honorable administration of justice, we conclude that the conduct was not shocking and that judicial integrity does not require suppression of the truth flowing from it.		Explaining the exclusionary rule.	Law enforcement

1983	COCAP	Az., <i>State v. Hooper</i> , 703 P.2d 482	Finally, we believe retroactive application of the Chapple rule would have an undesirable effect upon the administration of justice.		Discussing retroactivity	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1982	COCAP	C.A.D.C., <i>Narf Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal</i> , 223 U.S. App. D.C. 65	Legislative history of copyright provision.		Referencing House Committee on Administration of Justice	
1977	COCAP	C.A. 5, <i>Chapman v. U.S.</i> , 547 F.2d 1240	The Supreme Court's test for whether a "new rule" in the area of criminal procedure is to be retroactively applied calls for the consideration of three criteria: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standard, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards."		Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1987	COCAP	Cal., <i>Camarena v. Siquero Int. Co.</i> , 190 Cal. App. 3d 1089	As the Supreme Court in <i>Bertone v. National General Corp.</i> , supra, 13 Cal. 3d at pages 50-51, said: "The malicious commencement of a civil proceeding is actionable because it harms the individual against whom the claim is made, and also because it threatens the efficient administration of justice."		Rejecting argument for elimination of liability for malicious prosecution.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1983	COCAP	Fla., <i>In re Certificate</i> , 467 So. 2d 286	These judicial officers are necessary for the proper administration of justice, and we recommend they be made permanent and funded by the state.		Recommending creation of new state judges.	Judiciary generally
1984	COCAP	C.A. 4, U.S. v. <i>Carvalho</i> , 742 F.2d 146	Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair: our system of justice suffers when any defendant is treated unfairly.		Reversing convictions because of government's introduction of dubious evidence.	Judicial proceeding; evidentiary issue
1978	COCAP	Pa., <i>Commonwealth v. Garrison</i> , 478 Pa. 356	Under this subsection, allegedly contemptuous conduct will not justify imposition of summary criminal contempt except where it causes an obstruction of the administration of justice.		Announcing rule in overturning contempt conviction.	Judicial proceeding; Contempt
1979	COCAP	C.A. 4, U.S. v. <i>Newswander</i> , 590 F.2d 1269	This "natural consequence," the government contends, would have obstructed the due administration of justice.		Government's contentions regarding <i>stare decus</i> for an obstruction charge.	Judicial proceeding; tampering
1982	COCAP	N.C., <i>Wright v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co.</i> , 59 N.C. App. 591	The physician-patient privilege thus did not bar his testimony, and the court was not required as a prerequisite to its admission to find that disclosure of the information was "necessary to a proper administration of justice."		Rejecting challenges to introduction of evidence.	Judicial proceeding; evidentiary issue
1980	COCAP	Ill., <i>People v. Laws</i> , 82 Ill. App. 3d 417	The court weighed the above factors and determined that not only would it penalize law enforcement agents who had acted in accord with the present state of the law, it also would amount to an overwhelming burden on the administration of justice.		Recalling denial of retroactive effect for impacts on law enforcement.	Law enforcement
1978	COCAP	Mass., <i>In re Bonin</i> , 375 Mass. 680	It is also charged that, by the foregoing acts, the Respondent violated Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:17 (2), in that he engaged in misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.		Recalling charge in disciplinary hearing of judge before another court.	Discipline, judge
1983	COCAP	E.D. Pa., <i>Stevens Yachts of Annapolis, Inc. v. Yacht Charter, Inc.</i> , 571 F. Supp. 467	Severance of this action into two actions and transfer of the cases to Texas and the Virgin Islands respectively is not in the interest of the administration of justice if a forum can be found in which all claims can be litigated simultaneously.		Refuting motion to sever.	Judicial proceeding; procedure

1980	COCAP	Minn. Krug v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 291 N.W.2d 26	The rules of this court are designed to effectuate the orderly administration of justice and do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. For it retains the constitutional power to hear and determine, as a matter of discretion, any appeal in the interest of justice.	Allowing appeal where defendant could have raised all issues on appeal of first judgment.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1978	COCAP	C.A. 4, <i>Doleman v. Muncy</i> , 579 F.2d 1258	The concurrence argued that neither history, nor the desired prophylactic utility of the exclusionary rule as applied in Fourth Amendment claims, nor any sound reason relevant to the administration of justice justified a federal court, on collateral review of a state court conviction, to review asserted Fourth Amendment claims with the application of the exclusionary rule in precisely the same manner as it would or could have been utilized on direct review.	Discussing the contrary view of the concurrence.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1983	COCAP	D. P.R., <i>Schwartz v. Colegio De Abogados De Puerto Rico</i> , 565 F.Supp. 963	Law 43, which as we know establishes the integrated bar of Puerto Rico, charges the Colegio with the duty of "cooperating" in the improvement of the Administration of Justice [and] to render such reports and give such advice as the Government may require of it."	Describing the nonjudicial powers of lawyers and the bar.	Judiciary generally
1984	COCAP	C.A. 6, U.S. v. August, 745 F.2d 400	Both August and Popoff were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States of the due administration of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (Count One).	Comparing indictments for interference with grand jury system in bankruptcy court and influence clerk of court in duties.	Judiciary generally
1983	COCAP	N.J., <i>Fellerman v. Bradley</i> , 191 N.J. Super. 75	This court can not sanction the frustration of its order (in this case a consent order) by permitting a post-judgment invocation of the attorney-client privilege to unduly interfere with and frustrate the proper administration of justice which it is entrusted to foster.	Rejecting postjudgment assertion of attorney-client privilege.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1983	COCAP	Mass., in re Altar, 389 Mass. 153	1 Rule 4.01, § 12 (2), inserted by 365 Mass. 696 (1974), reads as follows: "The term 'serious crime' shall include (a) any felony, and (b) any lesser crime (involving conduct of an attorney demonstrating unfitness to practice as a lawyer), a necessary element of which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of such crime, includes interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy, or solicitation of another, to commit a 'serious crime.'"	Citing in footnote the relevant rule supporting reversal of judgment below and two years' suspension, as per the Board's recommendation.	Discipline; lawyer
1982	COCAP	Wash. State v. Jones, 97 Wash. 2d 159	One situation where the proper administration of justice requires the discharge of a jury is where the jury is unable to agree on a verdict.	Reviewing propriety of discharge of jury.	Judicial proceeding; jury
1985	COCAP	C.A. 7, U.S. v. Rovinson, 768 F.2d 809	We agree with the well-reasoned Wesley and Lester decisions holding that it is entirely proper to charge defendants under § 1503 with interfering with the due administration of justice when the conduct of the defendant results in tampering with a witness.	Rejecting appellants' contention that they were improperly charged.	Judicial proceeding; witness tampering
1982	COCAP	D. Nev., in re Santa Barbara, 94 F.R.D. 105	We have inherent power in the interest of the orderly administration of justice and under Rule 41 (b), FRCP, to dismiss for disobedience of its orders.	Outlining remedial options.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1979	COCAP	Md., St. v. Hicks, 283 Md. 310	Postponement of cases from dates scheduled for trial is one of the major factors contributing to delay in the administration of justice, civil as well as criminal.	Discussing legislative history.	Judicial proceeding; delay of
1987	COCAP	N.J., in re Rigoboli, 107 N.J. 192	Both the Master and the DRB found that respondent violated DR 1-102 (A) (5), which provides that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law; ... DR 1-102 (A) (4), which provided that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; ..." and DR 1-102 (A) (5), which provided that a lawyer shall not "[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."	Outlining lawyer's complicity as assessed in briefs in trial and Board review below.	Discipline; lawyer
1987	COCAP	C.A. 7, U.S. v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991	The Eleventh Circuit rejected Silverman's argument stating: "Silverman's proposed instruction inaccurately explained 'specific intent'; it placed the burden on the government to prove that it is purpose and object of Silverman's endeavor was to influence or obstruct due administration of justice."	Rejecting intent as <i>mens rea</i> in obstruction.	Judicial proceeding; witness tampering
1984	COCAP	Mo., State v. Butler, 676 S.W.2d 809	[I]t wholly fails to take into account the enormous societal cost of excluding truth in the search for truth in the administration of justice.	Explaining the inevitable discovery doctrine.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1987	COCAP	E.D.N.Y., U.S. v. Galko, 668 F. Supp. 736	It is not important in the issue of prejudice in that of the efficient administration of justice. In particular, we question the traditional assumption that denial of severance in cases such as this promotes efficiency.	Assessing motion for severance.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	La., in re Whitaker, 463 So. 2d 1291	By reason of the foregoing Paragraph A, (1) you to have engaged in willful misconduct relating to your official duty and persistent and public conduct not preceptual to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.	Violation of ethical rules in practice of law by a sitting judge.	Discipline; judge
1980	COCAP	Cl. of Claims, John M. Grieg, 224 Cl. Ct. 617	We have weighed the conflicting views of the parties in this matter and conclude that the administration of justice will best be served in the circumstances by the court's exercise of its discretion to permit defendant to except to the trial judge's decision consisting of his findings, opinion, and conclusion of law.	Explaining exercise of discretion.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1980	COCAP	Mich. People v. Rice, 101 Mich. App. 1	The record and third factors to be considered under the three-prong test for retroactivity can be dealt with together, since, as the Court noted in <i>Hanpton</i> , supra, "the amount of past reliance will often have a profound effect upon the administration of justice."	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1984	COCAP	Ne., in re Complaint, 351 N.W.2d 693	He also contends that his suspension from office would impose a burden on other judges who will be called upon to handle the caseload in the Eighth Judicial District and would perhaps result in delays in the administration of justice.	Exceptions of judge to suspension from office.	Discipline; judge
1984	COCAP	C.A.D.C., Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 724 F.2d 211	See Award of Attorneys' Fees Against the Federal Government: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice of the House Committee on Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (testimony of Sen. DeConcini)	Referring to House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and Administration of Justice	(collecting sources discussing fee awards to attorneys)

1979	COCAP	R.L. JWA Realty v. City of Cranston, 399 A.2d 479	This general rule, rather than depending upon any fundamental principle of the law of evidence, is designed to expedite the orderly administration of justice in eminent domain proceedings.	Discussing doctrine back of evidentiary rules.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1983	COCAP	Mo., State v. Garreto, 699 S.W.2d 468	Additionally, in view of the mass of evidence in the instant case, the efficient administration of justice was served by trying all counts of the amended information at one time.	Upholding finding that all counts were part of a common scheme.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1980	COCAP	Mo., State v. Fitzpatrick, 185 Mont. 187	At least in the limited context of sentencing, the courts can recognize that inherent institutional bias and the debilitating effect that it has on the administration of justice.	Discussing means to limit vindictive sentencing.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1984	COCAP	Az., in re Riley, 142 Ariz. 604	Respondent was found guilty of violating DR 1-102 (A) (5), conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, although the Committee stated that it felt "considerable empathy for the respondent in the circumstances in which these statements were made.	Basis of liability under conduct rules for statements to reporters.	Discipline; lawyer
1982	COCAP	Oh., State v. McKinley, 7 Ohio App. 3d 225	Here, substitution was a matter of necessity, where the due administration of justice made it imperative, and no prejudice resulted.	Finding no error in service of substitute judge.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1981	COCAP	U.S. Army Ct. Crim. Rev., U.S. v. Lay, 10 M.J. 678	The Supreme Court stated in <i>Santobello v. New York</i> , 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), that "the disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of justice.	Laying doctrinal background for instant analysis of plea bargains.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1984	COCAP	Fla. St. v. Johnson, 8 Fla. Supp. 2d 116	The Court is of the opinion that the question and opinion contained in the amended Order of Classification (a copy of which is attached hereto and is incorporated by reference [see preceding order]) involve issues of statewide application, which are of great public importance and will affect the uniform administration of justice in this state.	Court's order setting standards for roadside intoxication tests.	Law enforcement
1980	COCAP	Fla. Bar, Inc. v. Grady, 506 So. 2d 274	Neither the insurance companies nor their insureds, the employees, are officers of the legal system, nor, unlike lawyers, are they governed by a code of conduct casting upon them duties with respect to the administration of justice beyond that required of the ordinary citizen.	Rejecting attempts of attorneys to impute themselves as parties.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	Mich., in re Westhoff, Jr., 204 N.J. Super. 300	And "accusably" the false swearing must have obstructed or tended to obstruct the administration of justice ... It is the obstruction of judicial power which makes it contempt."	Reciting legal standards in review of contempt finding.	Judicial proceeding; Contempt
1985	COCAP	Conn., in re Investigation, 4 Conn. App. 544	(a) Whenever it appears to the superior court for any judicial district that the administration of justice requires an investigation to determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that a crime or crimes have been committed within the judicial district, said court may order an inquiry to be made into the matter, to be conducted before any judge, state referee, or any three judges of said court designated by it.	Reciting statute back of investigatory abilities.	Law enforcement
1981	COCAP	La., Corcoran v. Parish of Jefferson, 405 So. 2d 667	In the case of <i>Tafaro's Investment Company, Inc. v. Division of Housing Improvement</i> , et al., 261 La. 183, 259 So. 2d 457 (La. 1972) the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the difference between the legislative and judicial functions of public bodies stating that when a judicial function is involved, an analogy to judicial process is made and the procedural safeguards developed in the administration of justice must be observed.	Analysis of judicatory hearings at the Parish level.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	C.A.D.C., Urban v. U.S. National, 768 F.2d 1497	Neither it is so that "in dealing with a litigant, the court" has an obligation to protect and preserve the sound and orderly administration of justice.	Outlining appropriate response to "profitless" pro se litigants.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1981	COCAP	Mich., People v. Young, 410 Mich. 363	Retrospective application of the Kansas policy would have an adverse effect on the administration of justice.	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1985	COCAP	E.D.N.Y., Latzer v. Abrams, 662 F. Supp. 1314	The footnote in <i>Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia</i> , 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), to which the court made reference in <i>Romano</i> , explicitly recognizes that a trial judge may, "in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial" just as "a government may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions upon the use of the streets in the interest of such objectives as the free flow of traffic."	Discussing limitations on press access to trials.	Judicial proceeding; media access to
1979	COCAP	C.A. 5, U.S. v. Gaston, 608 F.2d 607	The indictment charges that Gaston "did willfully and knowingly corruptly endeavor to influence Johnny Self, a witness before the said Grand Jury, in investigating alleged violations of the false claims and false statements laws [and thereby corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice ... [in that Gaston] urged and advised Johnny Self to give false testimony before said Grand Jury in relation to the aforesaid violation."	Introducing the issue before taking it up on appeal.	Judicial proceeding
1986	COCAP	Ill., Timothy Myers v. Bridgport Machines Div. of Teetron, Inc., 113 Ill. 2d 112	The former non-conventive doctrine is reiterated in <i>Bohr v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.</i> (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 135, 146; <i>People ex rel. Atchison, Topelka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Clark</i> (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 515, 529) and allows courts to strike a balance between the convenience of the litigants and the efficient administration of justice.	Discussing state of doctrine.	Judicial proceeding
1987	COCAP	Tex., Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332	After overruling the motions the court stated (1) that legislative continuances, "in this particular case" would violate Article I, § 13, Texas Constitution providing that all courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, (2) that the statute providing for legislative continuances was a "self-serving law passed by the legislators for their own self preservation," and (3) the said motions for continuance interfere "with the orderly administration of justice."	Recalling proceedings below in mandamus action.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	Wis., Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777	When a patient and understanding judge gives every consideration to a defendant's change of position the day before "trial and the defendant attempts to mock the administration of justice, there is no abuse of discretion.	Evaluating procedural decisions below.	Judicial proceeding; procedure

1981	COCAP	N.C. State v. Simpson	Consequently, the present case is one in which the defendant's right to be free from repeated trials is outweighed by the public's interest in the administration of justice, and we find defendant's double jeopardy challenge without merit and overruled.	Overruling double jeopardy challenge.	Judicial proceeding
1987	COCAP	Bankr. E.D. Mich., In re Miramar, Inc., 70 B.R. 32	Questions would thus arise in numerous other circumstances as to which time computation rules to apply: the efficient administration of justice requires that the Court and counsel look to one rule or time computation in bankruptcy — Bankruptcy Rule 9006.	Explaining rejection of movant's position.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1980	COCAP	D. Del., Coastal Ore Station Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 495 F. Supp. 1172	While the federal courts in the District of Columbia are called upon to handle a much larger percentage of FOIA litigation and are therefore perhaps more overburdened by in camera review in such cases than most courts, see Weisman v. Central Intelligence Agency, 555 F.2d 692, 697 n.11 (D.C. Cir., 1977), this Court has recently encountered a disturbing increase in requests for in camera review in non-FOIA litigation which similarly threatens to strangle the administration of justice in that District.	Discussing rationale for burden of government to demonstrate a document's exemption from FOIA.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1978	COCAP	Me., State v. Oatzenb, 389 A.2d 22	However, when the physical or mental condition of the patient is at issue in such action, suit or proceeding or when a claim in the exercise of sound discretion, deems such disclosure necessary to the proper administration of justice, no information communicated to, or otherwise learned by, such physician in connection with such attendance, examination or treatment shall be privileged and disclosure may be required.	Discussing limits of privilege.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1978	COCAP	N.C. In re Inquiry ..., 295 N.C. 291	However, a judge may not, through negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad faith, behave in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice so as to bring the judicial office into disrepute.	Outlining bases of a judge's liability as against canons and ethical responsibilities.	Judicial conduct
1985	COCAP	Ill. People v. Priestland, 109 Ill. 2d 369	The waiver rule, on other like rules of procedure finds its justification upon the interest of a fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice in waiver of appeal.	Finding no facial constitutional issue in waiver of appeal.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1979	COCAP	Cal., People v. Cooper, 94 Cal. App. 2d 672	Like the United States Supreme Court, California courts use the following criteria to determine whether a new rule of decisional law in criminal cases should be applied retroactively: (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new rule.	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1986	COCAP	Cal., Price v. Sup. Ct. Madera City, 186 Cal. App. 3d 156	As we have seen, all of the duties pertaining to the office of superior court clerk, whether essential to the office or specifically prescribed by statute, are ministerial functions necessarily subject to the control of the judges of the court for as essential to the proper administration of justice.	Reviewing behavior of court personnel.	Judiciary generally
1984	COCAP	N.Y., People v. Varela, 124 Misc. 2d 992	The power that a court has over its judgments and its process notwithstanding, it is equally well established that, in the interests of orderly administration of justice, judges as a general rule should not disturb, vacate, reconsider or modify determinations of a Judge of concurrent jurisdiction (28 N.Y. Jur. 2d, Courts and Judges, § 86, p. 153).	Outlining appropriate bounds of discretion in bail continuation.	Judicial proceeding; procedure

1985	COCAP	Cal., People v. Lloyd, 606 P.2d 249	An investigation filed by the complainant with the Grievance Committee. The respondent's conduct in case No. 85A - 56 violated C.R.C.P. 241.6 (1) (violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and C.R.C.P. 241.6 (7) (failure to respond to a request from the committee), and DR 1 - 102 (A) (1) (violation of a disciplinary rule) DR 1 - 102 (A) (4) (conduct involving dishonesty), DR 1 - 102 (A) (5) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 1 - 102 (A) (6) (conduct that adversely reflects on fitness to practice law), DR 6 - 101 (A) (3) (neglect of legal matter), and D 87 - 101 (A) (2) (failure to carry out employment contract with client).	Bar Grievance Committee	Discipline, lawyer
1983	COCAP	C.A.D.C., U.S. v. Richardson, 702 F.2d 1079	The entire purpose of the finality requirement of section 1291 is to "discourage undue litigiousness and needless appeals, particularly by frustrated administration of justice, particularly by making the conduct of criminal cases."	Concluding full review of evidence's sufficiency would be available after a final verdict.	Judicial proceeding
1986	COCAP	La., State v. Green, 493 So. 2d 1178	Professionals' responsibility does not encompass the use of the attorney-client privilege as a subterfuge and all conspiracies, either active or passive, which are calculated to hinder the administration of justice will violate the privilege.	Press to evidentiary ruling.	Judicial proceeding; evidentiary issue
1977	COCAP	Pa., Williamson v. Elbert, 239 Ga. 702	The proper administration of justice demands that a court have the power to discipline attorneys and disbar by contempt proceedings.	Upholding contempt order.	Judicial proceeding; Contempt
1979	COCAP	N.Y., People v. Le Grand, 67 A.D.2d 446	More important than any inhibiting effect on the right to gather news is the public interest in the fair administration of justice.	Press privilege yields to defendant's need for exculpatory evidence.	Judicial proceeding; press access to
1984	COCAP	N.D. Ok., U.S. v. Caldwell, 594 F. Supp. 548	More important than any inhibiting effect on the right to gather news is the public interest in the fair administration of justice.	The court severed sua sponte.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1984	COCAP	Alb., Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Piquet, 684 P.2d 114	the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule of law.	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1977	COCAP	Ind., In re Merritt, 266 Ind. 353	Respondent's actions as set forth above constitute a course of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice as well as neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him in that respondent failed to protect his client's interest by filing an answer to the defendant's request for admission and left the jurisdiction without notifying his client that he would be unable to appear to represent him at the scheduled trial date and failed to direct his client's attorney who could represent the client at such trial.	Describing predicate conduct justifying liability to sanction as a matter of law.	Discipline, lawyer
1983	COCAP	S. Ct., Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2538	The Framers chose to leave to Congress the power to be played by the lower federal courts in the administration of justice.	Discussing separation of powers	Judiciary generally

1983	COCAP	C.A. 11, U.S. v. Cross, 708 F.2d 631	As recently as Rose v. Mitchell, supra, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the longstanding fundamental principle that discrimination in the administration of justice harms the accused and undermines the integrity of the judicial process itself.	Assessing constitutional significance of discriminatory jury formation in trial below.	Judicial proceeding; jury
1987	COCAP	C.A. 5, U.S. v. Madigan, 824 F.2d 370	This circuit and others have held that, when the delay is short and the defendant does not show more than minimal prejudice, reprobation has little, if any, adverse impact on the administration of justice and the administration of the act.	Affirming dismissal without prejudice.	Judicial proceeding
1984	COCAP	C.A. 10, U.S. v. Dressel, 742 F.2d 1256	The trial court must determine whether postponement will adversely affect the effective and fair administration of justice.	Reciting considerations.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1977	COCAP	Pa., Hamill Estate, 3 Pa. D. & C.D. 100	We hold, under these circumstances, that judge is already assigned and sitting on other cases or otherwise engaged in the administration of justice in the judicial district are not "reasonably available" for serving as a court en banc.	Deciding composition of en banc court.	Judiciary generally
1979	COCAP	Mich., In re Freedman, 466 Mich. 256	Petitioner had the burden by clear and convincing evidence to persuade the panel and board he has the proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards imposed on State Bar members and can be safely recommended to aid in the administration of justice.	Denying reinstatement on advice of Bar Grievance Board.	Discipline, lawyer
1983	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Edgington, 317 Pa. Super. 545	It is evident that the orderly administration of justice requires that a criminal controversy, like any other litigation, some day come to an end.	Denying reargement of validity of guilty plea.	Judicial proceeding
1980	COCAP	S.D.N.Y., Park-Tower Development Group, Inc. v. Goldfield, 87 F.R.D. 96	In recommending the appointment of a Special Master, the Magistrate noted that while the Master's recommended functions could, as a technical matter, be performed by a magistrate, it would be seriously prejudicial to the proper administration of justice in this District to allocate so much of a magistrate's time to serve the parties in this particular multi-million dollar lawsuit.	Assessing sanctions for default.	Judicial proceeding; appointment of special master
1981	COCAP	N.C., Cox v. Haworth, 804 N.C. 571	We also reject defendant's contention that retroactive application of Nicholson will unduly burden the administration of justice.	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1983	COCAP	S.C., Creel v. King, 287 S.C. 205	When the first case was called for trial, in order to facilitate the administration of justice, the trial judge ordered that all four cases arising out of the accident be consolidated.	Reversing and remanding order for consolidated trials below.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1985	COCAP	N.H., Eshleman's Case, 126 N.H. 1	While the duty of a lawyer to disclose facts regarding his own conduct to an investigating tribunal is not entirely clear in the Code of Professional Responsibility (see American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 8.1 and comment thereon), an attorney in this State is subject to discipline for failing to report to the Committee on Professional Conduct unprivileged knowledge of a lawyer's conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or conduct reflecting adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law. DR 1 - 103 (1) - 102 (4), (5), (6).	Addressing failure to disclose disciplinary record.	Discipline, lawyer
1981	COCAP	C.A. 8, Skerr v. Moore, 647 F.2d 854	Removal should be limited to cases urgently demanding that action, but the balancing of the defendant's confrontation right with the need for the proper administration of justice is a task uniquely suited to the trial judge.	Assessing possible contempt below.	Judicial proceeding; Contempt

1978	COCAP	Ill. People v. Stewart, 58 Ill. App. 3d 620	To sustain a finding of direct contempt of court, it must be shown that the particular conduct was calculated to obstruct, hinder or obstruct the court in its administration of justice, or to lessen its authority or dignity, or to bring the administration of law into disrepute.	Reviewing contempt finding.	Judicial proceeding; Contempt
1982	COCAP	Mish., In re Contempt ..., 113 Mich. App. 549	This power is essential to preserve the authority of the courts and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute.	Upholding summary contempt.	Judicial proceeding; Contempt
1985	COCAP	Mish., Moorhouse v. Ambassador Ins. Co., Inc., 147 Mich. App. 412	The following considerations are pertinent to the issue of whether Ross should be given full retroactive, limited retroactivity, or prospectively only: (1) the purpose of the new rule, (2) the general reliance upon the old rule, and (3) the effect of full retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice.	Discussing retroactivity	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1981	COCAP	C.A.D.C., Grace v. Burger, 214 U.S. App. D.C. 375	The Court made clear, however, that critical to its decision was the fact that the statute was drawn narrowly to apply only to picketing with an intent to interfere with the administration of justice.	Reviewing overbreadth of statute used below.	Judicial proceeding
1992	COCAP	Ore., In re Bevans, 655 P.2d 573	Section 18 (b) specifies that the applicant must show that "he has the good moral character, general fitness to practice law and that his or her resumption of the practice of law in this state will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or the public interest."	Outlining legal standard back of reinstatement.	Discipline, lawyer
1982	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Folkenhan, 452 A.2d 750	Appellant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove an "actual obstruction" of the administration of justice.	Finding meritless appeal of obstruction for refusal to participate.	Judicial proceeding; interference with
1979	COCAP	Mass., Berube v. McKesson Ware & Spurio Co., 7 Mass. App. Ct. 426	Furthermore, the judge who allowed the motion had been involved with several phases of the action's development and undoubtedly was aware that at its restoration to the trial list would not disrupt the administration of justice in the county.	No abuse of discretion in (affirmed) order allowing motion for relief from judgment.	Judicial proceeding
1977	COCAP	N.D., Shark Bros. Inc. v. Cass City, 256 N.W.2d 701	If such bifurcated procedures were encouraged or sustained, it would create duplication, and needless, and waste manpower and money, with no appreciable result, and all without improving the administration of justice.	Refusing to allow bifurcated procedure in judicial and administrative venues.	Judicial and administrative proceeding
1984	COCAP	Mid., St. v. Fezzari, 470 A.2d 1269	Castle v. State, 237 Ind. 83, 143 N.E.2d 570, 572 (1957) ("trial court failed in its duty to cause efficient administration of justice.")	Collecting precedent on judicial reactions to delay caused by congestion.	Judicial proceeding; delay of
1979	COCAP	Cal., In re Jonathan S., 83 Cal. App. 3d 468	Moreover, unauthorized ex parte contacts of whatever nature erode public confidence in the fairness of the administration of justice, the very content by which the system holds together.	Assessing liability to sanctions of juvenile court judge.	Discipline, judge
1986	COCAP	In re Anonymous Nos. 26 D.B. 73 and 32 D.B. 73, Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania	What is at issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner met the burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications and that the resumption of practice by him will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, nor subversive to the public interest.	Considering reinstatement.	Discipline, lawyer
1985	COCAP	D.C., In re Washington, 489 A.2d 452	In Bar Docket No. 57-83, the Hearing Committee found that Respondent was guilty of neglecting a legal matter entered to him, in violation of DR 6-101 (A) (3), and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102 (A) (5), and for these violations the Hearing Committee recommended a suspension of six months.	Recommendation of Hearing Committee.	Discipline, lawyer
1980	COCAP	Tex., Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306	As a matter of sound administration of justice, Texas courts will not intervene in the domestic affairs of nonresidents, but will have them litigate in their home states.	Recalling transcript below	Judicial proceeding
1987	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 367 Pa. Super. 6	And in desperation, he did what he did in order to delay the administration of justice.	Recalling transcript below	Judicial proceeding; contempt
1986	COCAP	Cal., Hilson v. Sup. Ct. of San Diego City, 185 Cal. App. 3d 409	Implicit in what we said is that the judicial power to punish a lawyer summarily for contempt of court, essential to facilitate the orderly administration of justice (Gallagher v. Municipal Court (1948) 33 Cal. 2d 784, 788 [192 P.2d 965]), is qualified by the cumulative effect of the lawyer's right to engage in respectful advocacy on behalf of his client (Cooper v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal. 2d 291, 303 [10 Cal.Rptr. 842, 359 P.2d 274]), strict compliance with the statutory framework and the lawyer's personal right to due process.	Recalling previous refusal to find contempt	Judicial proceeding; contempt
1986	COCAP	W.D. Pa., U.S. v. Renfroe, 634 F. Supp. 1536	Next, the defendant in Local 542 contended, as does the respondent, that the fact that the trial judge did not bring the contempt charge immediately when the act was committed, but instead delayed 24 hours, was proof that respondent's conduct did not obstruct the administration of justice as required under 18 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1) and therefore it was not properly punishable summarily under Rule 42 (a), Fed.R. Crim.P., and should have been prosecuted only after notice and hearing before another judge as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 42 (b).	Rejecting theory against contempt.	Judicial proceeding; contempt
1978	COCAP	N.Y., Wain v. Astra Labs & Cas. Ins. Co., 96 Misc.2d 545	Although the court in Craig did indicate that the news articles were "by any standard" unfair, it nevertheless found that the clear and present danger test had not been met, stating that the articles "must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice."	Outlining standards for contempt.	Judicial proceeding; contempt
1985	COCAP	C.A. 11, U.S. v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460	Based upon these facts, the jury found defendant committed a corrupt endeavor, tending to impede the administration of justice.	Overturning jury verdict based on facts not violative of s. 1503.	Judicial proceeding; jury
1987	COCAP	S. Ct., Frazier v. Heebe, 96 L. Ed. 2d 557	Before further explanation, the court declared that the in-state attorney's admission to the bar "does not raise the same concern for the efficient administration of justice that admission of nonresident attorneys does."	Recalling facts below	Bar generally
1980	COCAP	Conn., State v. Ailben, 182 Conn. 124	To compel the government to do so "would create an insuperable obstacle to the administration of justice in many cases in which there is no semblance of the type of oppressive practices at which the double jeopardy prohibition is aimed."	Denouncing from requiring government to prosecute all counts against the same defendant "at one go."	Law enforcement; prosecutorial discretion
1980	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Brady, 508 A.2d 286	The needless delays engendered by frivolous appeals hinder the administration of justice as well as the public interest.	Refusing to entertain appeal upon finding below motion is frivolous.	Judicial proceeding; procedure

1979	COCAP	N.D., In re Marrago, 285 N.W.2d 541	The primary aim of disciplinary proceedings against a judge is to maintain the honor and dignity of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice.	Policy back of judicial discipline.	Discipline, judge
1980	COCAP	Ore., In re Complaint ..., 290 Or. 113	and that his resumption of the practice of law in this state will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive to the public interest.	Quoting rules on bloc.	Bar generally
1979	COCAP	Wash., In re Zdaric, 92 Wash. 2d 777	The Board modified the conclusion to find a violation of (CRP) DR 1-102 (A) (5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).	Board Conclusion	Discipline, lawyer
1985	COCAP	Miss., Clark v. Miss. Bar Ass'n, 471 So. 2d 352	The Mississippi State Bar Complaints Tribunal found the appellant guilty of violating the following disciplinary rules: DR 1-102, Misconduct (A) A lawyer shall not: (1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule; (3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude; (4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; (5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.	Board Conclusion	Discipline, lawyer
1987	COCAP	C.A. 11, U.S. v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498	Similarly, if it comes to quite serious, recurring prosecution will have a severe impact on the administration of justice.	Outlining factors to determine propriety of prosecution.	Law enforcement; prosecutorial discretion
1983	COCAP	Fla. State ex rel Hart-Hanks v. Austin, 2 Fla. Supp. 2d 160	Access or closure issues involving the press require a showing (a) that the action is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.	Outlining where press freedoms recede before needs of defendant.	Judicial proceeding; press access to
1981	COCAP	Pa., Neyer v. Commonwealth, 20 Pa. D. & C. 659	The same question can not be presented in successive petitions for writs of habeas corpus before the same court (Conn. ex rel v. Skovins, 24 Beav. 94 (1902)), and we fail to see how the prompt and orderly administration of justice is to be fostered by presenting a subsequent petition to the very court whose purported function is being complained of under a subsequent petition presently being considered by our Federal district court.	Agreeing with magistrate that habeas petition lacked merit.	Judicial proceeding; delay of
1979	COCAP	C.A. 5, United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 406	It is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.	Policy back of upholding judicial immunity.	Judiciary generally
1981	COCAP	Sup. Ct., U.S. v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702	ZWICKER has consulted with an attorney concerning the legality of his activities and has been informed that the Superior Court for the District of Columbia had construed the statute that prohibited leafletting, 40 U.S.C. § 13k, to prohibit only conduct done with the specific intent to influence, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice.	Outlining lawyer's assessment of legality of defendant's leafletting.	Unclear
1983	COCAP	C.A. 5, Stretton v. Pennrod Drilling Co., 701 F.2d 441	The Supreme Court has often considered the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice as a relevant factor in determining the retroactivity question.	Discussing retroactivity.	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1983	COCAP	In re Anonymous No. 4 D.B. 76, Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania	Hearing committee [] in its report filed May 18, 1983 recommended that the petition for reinstatement be denied because petitioner failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he has the moral qualifications required for admission to the practice of law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and because the admission of Petitioner to the resumption of the practice of law would be detrimental to the administration of justice and subversive to the public interest.	Committee Recommendation	Discipline, lawyer
1986	COCAP	Mo., St. ex rel McNeal v. Donascher, 711 S.W.2d 566	In leaving the breadth of the jurisdiction of the associate divisions of the circuit courts to the judiciary, the General Assembly may well have believed that the circuit courts, subject to the supervision of the Supreme Court and certain statutory restrictions (some of which are mentioned in this opinion), can best decide what cases or classes of cases should be assigned to associate circuit judges in order to promote the efficient administration of justice in Missouri.	Considering whether refusal of jurisdiction was misconduct.	Discipline, judge
1987	COCAP	Sup. Ct., Griffith v. Ky., 1987 U.S. LEXIS 283	Justice Powell has pointed out that it "hardly comports with the ideal of 'administration of justice with an even hand,' " when "one chance beneficiary -- the lucky individual whose case was chosen at the occasion for announcing the new principle -- enjoys retroactive application, while others similarly situated have their claims adjudicated under the old doctrine."	Discussing retroactivity	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1980	COCAP	E.D. Pa., Wilkinson v. Ehl, 484 F. Supp. 1072	The destructive effect of evidence has a uniquely damaging effect on the administration of justice, for a law enforcement officer has been destroyed it can not be redressed for judicial review.	Withholding immunity from law enforcement officers who destroyed evidence.	Law enforcement; destruction of evidence
1977	COCAP	Ill. People ex rel. Harrod v. Ill. Courts Combrh, 69 Ill. 2d 445	Here the plaintiff argued that the phrase "conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice or which brings the judicial office into disrepute," was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.	Reciting precedent in instant consideration of judge's conduct.	Discipline, judge
1986	COCAP	Pa., Brookings v. State, 495 So. 2d 135	The modern view is that the privilege promotes the administration of justice by "encouraging clients to try the facts fully before their counsel."	Articulating rational for, while refusing to find waiver of, attorney-client privilege.	Judicial proceeding; evidentiary issue
1980	COCAP	Ill. Harleton Whittier, Inc. v. Bards, 82 Ill. App. 3d 443	Finally, requiring defendant to defend this lawsuit in Illinois is neither reasonable nor in keeping with the orderly administration of justice.	Refusing to require defendant to defend the case in Illinois.	Judicial proceeding; procedure
1981	COCAP	Mo., State v. Gordon, 621 S.W.2d 262	To those aware of the problem, it is readily apparent that compliance with the seemingly clear instructions just noted [Note 5 (c) under MAJ- CR2d 15.00] would contribute more to the orderly administration of justice than have the efforts of this and other appellate courts to approve or disapprove of the absence thereof [the instruction on conventional manslaughter] in specific cases.	Reversing and remanding on account of failure properly to instruct the jury.	Judicial proceeding; jury
1984	COCAP	N.J., Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 197 N.J. Super. 63	Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and relationships which, rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of justice.	Qualifying spousal privilege.	Judicial proceeding; evidentiary issue
1985	COCAP	Miss., Myers v. Miss. St. Bar, 480 So. 2d 1080	The courts of this state are dedicated to the fair and equal administration of justice and act in accordance with that high principle.	No error where court was unaware that a party had no representation.	Judicial proceeding

		E.D. Mich., U.S. v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252	He who makes studied inquiries of jurors as to what occurred there acts as his part, lest he be held as acting in obstruction of the administration of justice.	Upholding prohibition on post-trial contact between lawyer and jurors.	Judicial proceeding; jury
1977	COCAP		Thereafter, on August 25, 1983, a criminal complaint was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Douglas County charging appellant with perjury, false swearing, and obstructing the administration of justice.	Consequence for appellant who had made false sworn representations to grand jury.	Grand Jury
1986	COCAP	Pa., Commonwealth v. Thomas, 506 A.2d 420			
1979	COCAP	C.A.D.C., In re Hafsin, 194 U.S. App. D.C. 237	The First Amendment Interest in Litigation and the Administration of Justice Defendants correct point out that attorneys "have historically been officers of the courts [.]'"	Discussing lawyers' qualified retention of First Amendment rights.	Judicial proceeding
1979	COCAP	Mich., People v. Karim, 405 Mich. 482	(1) The purpose of the new rule; (2) general reliance on the old rule and (3) the effect on the administration of justice.	Discussing retroactivity	Judicial proceeding; retroactivity
1977	COHA	Toorow's Son (Robert Hoskins)	The court may in its wisdom temper the administration of justice by causing the degree of punishment, but in this case sees no reason for leniency.	Judicial decision-making	Judicial decision-making
1977	COHA	NYT Letter to Editor	His characterization of the legal profession as being motivated by self-interest does a disservice to the thousands of lawyers who have actively involved themselves in nonprofit charitable activities in their local communities throughout the state. It also fails to take into consideration the active, concerted effort of state and local bar associations to aid in the administration of justice, which is a social commitment.	Bar associations upholding the administration of justice	Bar associations
1979	COHA	JUSTICES, 5-4, LIMIT COURTROOM ACCESS BY PRESS AND PUBLIC, JUDGES PRETRIAL BAN UPHHELD (NYT)	Justice Powell said that a judge, when presented with a request to close a hearing, should first decide "whether there are alternative means reasonably available by which the fairness of the trial might be preserved without interfering substantially with the public's interest in prompt access to information concerning the administration of justice."	Judge deciding whether to close a hearing to access	Judicial decision-making
1980	COHA	Realities and Illusions (Frances Moley, autobiography)	This court modeled after the Chicago Municipal Court was an innovation in the administration of justice.	Expansion of municipal court to take civil and criminal jurisdiction.	Courts generally
1980	COHA	Realities and Illusions (Frances Moley, autobiography)	My familiarity with Pound's writing came from the writing of my essay on the Cleveland Municipal Court, in which I included a sprinkling of quotations from Pound's article on the administration of justice in the modern city.		Courts generally
1980	COHA	Realities and Illusions (Frances Moley, autobiography)	While he had expressed views concerning the administration of justice which were rated liberal, he was as solidly Republican and as conservative as William H. Taft.	Author's view of Pound	Courts generally
1980	COHA	Realities and Illusions (Frances Moley, autobiography)	When the survey was about half finished, he proposed to the Committee that there be a division of the survey which would deal with the influence of the newspapers in the administration of justice.	Press reporting about the administration of justice	Unclear
1982	COHA	Jimmy Carter, Speaking Out for Human Rights, TIME	Neither did the adults who managed the education system, nor the lawyers and judges in our courts, nor the Governor, nor those who led our Government in Washington and were responsible for the administration of justice in our great and free nation. I	School desegregation	Government generally

1982	COHA	Bennett H. Beach, No Longer Best or Brightest, TIME	"Rose Bird," said Deukmejian in his campaign, "has done more damage to the California Supreme Court and the administration of justice than any of her predecessors."	Campaign for state chief justice	Courts generally
1984	COHA	Gertude Himmelfarb, The Complaisant Utopian, The New Republic, 12/31/84, Vol. 191 Issue 26, p25-30, 4p	or a concept of "political justice" that does away with a need for any kind of polity or any administration of justice; or a humanism that would like to "extirpate" much of human nature as we know it, including sex, emotion, parental love, even parental identity.		Government generally
1985	COHA	Paul Johnson, A History of the English People	Henry V made a deliberate effort to grasp again all the reins of power; hugely self-confident, industrious, clear in his objectives and determined to have his way in all things, he was a brightening and much feared figure among the ruling class, but he simply did not have the time to supervise directly the administration of justice and finance, while engaged on a war of conquest.	Henry V's reign	Executive power; law enforcement
1986	COHA	Leon Botstein, Better Than Receiving, The New Republic, 12/29/86, Vol. 195 Issue 26, p34-38, 4p	For example, Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller have consistently sponsored studies and issued reports under their own aegis intended to shape social legislation, foreign policy, public opinion, and the administration of justice.	Describing robber barons' philanthropy.	Unclear

All Citations

--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2022 WL 16528415

Footnotes

- 1 The Court has collected and coded the hits from the databases it queried into a spreadsheet appended as Attachment A.
- 2 The Court identified a few other categories, all of which had only a few hits. These referred to grand juries, bar associations, and two committees (one Congressional and the other Presidential) that have the phrase "administration of justice" in their title. The Court also coded a few entries as "unclear" if the context in the concordance line did not provide enough information to categorize the entry.

End of Document

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