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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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3	United States of America,) Criminal Action) No. 21-cr-689
4	Plaintiff,) SENTENCING HEARING
5	vs.
6) Washington, DC Thomas Patrick Hamner,) September 23, 2022) Time: 9:30 a.m.
7	Defendant.)
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9	TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE AMY BERMAN JACKSON
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Good morning, Your Honor. This morning we have criminal case No. 21-689, the United States of America v. Thomas Patrick Hamner. The defendant is present and in the courtroom, Your Honor. The probation officer present for these proceedings is Mr. Robert Walters. Will counsel for the government just make sure he has a little green light, reach into his microphone and identify himself for the record. MR. COLLYER: Good morning, Your Honor. Douglas Collyer for the United States. THE COURT: Good morning. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Counsel for the defendant. MR. SMITH: Good morning, Judge. Nick Smith for Thomas Hamner. THE COURT: All right. Good morning. And I note Mr. Hamner is present and appears to have some -- possibly some family members present as well. And I'm glad that they're here to support you. We're here this morning for Mr. Hamner's sentencing. He pled guilty -- not pursuant to any kind of plea agreement -- to Count 2, and only Count 2 of the indictment, and he's to be sentenced on that count. Pursuant to the parties' joint status report, any assessment of the impact of this guilty plea on the government's determination as to how to proceed on the

remaining counts is going to be made after today's hearing, in accordance with a schedule I'll set before we adjourn. But those counts are not before us today.

I want to note, in the event there are any members of the press or the public listening in on the public line, you have an absolute right to attend and report on what transpired during court proceedings, but the recording and dissemination of a recording of these proceedings would be a violation of our court rules.

The final presentence report in this case was filed on September 1st. I'm aware that you've filed many comments, but I want to make sure, Mr. Smith, that you both you and Mr. Hamner have had an opportunity to read the presentence report.

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor, we have.

THE COURT: And I realize there were some issues as to how to credit certain -- in particular, a criminal case and how to apply the guidelines. But with respect to the facts set forth in the plea agreement in the sentencing report, are there any disputes?

MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor, not except for the ones that the probation office reflected in the objections.

THE COURT: All right. With those noted, then, I'm going to accept the presentence report as undisputed, except for the places where there are objections noted, and as part of my findings of fact at sentencing.

And I don't believe there's any legal disputes we have to resolve, other than how the guidelines should be applied; is that correct?

MR. SMITH: Correct, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: So I've read the presentence report, but that's not all I've read. I've received additional materials concerning the defendant, including the government's memorandum in aid of sentencing, and attaching an FBI 302 memorializing one officer's experience during the incident that's at the heart of this case.

I've read the defendant's memorandum in aid of sentencing, which had a number of attachments, including a very heartfelt letter from the defendant's wife regarding his character and the ongoing impact of his incarceration on their family, their business, and their children. It also documents the defendant's attempts to resolve an outstanding warrant in California before his arrest in this case.

I read and received a series of character references that appear to have been generated in 2019 in connection with another purpose, with respect to either work or attendance at a service academy with respect to government contracts. I'm not sure if the authors are aware of their use for the purposes for which they're being supplied now, but I will take into consideration what it is that people who knew you and worked with you in the past had to say then.

They noted the defendant's professionalism, his trustworthiness, and his work ethic; called him a man of integrity and ethics at his business, dependable, knowledgeable and hard working, he plainly knows his trade. They were uniformly satisfied with the quality of the finished product and the standards of excellence that he lived up to. They describe him as detail-oriented, confident, punctual, somebody who connected well with other people, and was described as someone who delivers on what he promises. And he's somebody that you'd want on your side if events, as one person put it, went south.

There were a few letters from 2021, which were a little bit more relevant, that had been offered, I guess, in support of the defendant's release from pretrial detention. An accountant or someone who'd worked with him in his business remarked on how well Mr. Hamner insists on treating his employees and the importance of his continued role in the company to provide work for those employees and how he supports the families of the employees, as well as his own family.

Another person who he met through public forums and his church described him as warm and gregarious, generous with his time in supporting candidates in his community and educating his community.

The reason I go through this in so much detail is I want everybody to know I really do read and consider these letters

and I appreciate them all.

In a criminal case there's a statute that tells me how
I'm supposed to decide what the sentence is, it's 18 U.S. Code
§ 3553. It list a number of factors that I'm going to go
through one at a time later. But the advisory sentencing
guidelines and what they would recommend as a sentence is one
of the factors I have to consider in determining the
appropriate sentence here. I'm required to calculate what they
would recommend in every case. And the purpose of them is to
arrive at a recommended sentencing range based on the offense
and then various aggravating and mitigating factors.

So I'm going to begin with that calculation. It might sound more like math than law as I go through it, but I want everybody to understand that that's only the initial part of the analysis.

The defendant pled guilty to Count 2, which alleges that on or about January 6, at about 1:40 p.m., Mr. Hamner committed and attempted to commit an act to obstruct, impede, and interfere with a law enforcement officer lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder. And that's a violation of 18 U.S. Code § 231(a)(3) and 2. The maximum sentence for that offense could be up to five years of imprisonment. And the offense level that applies to that particular offense under the guidelines is disputed here.

This defendant pled guilty to obstructing, impeding, and interfering with officers, and everyone agrees that you start with § 2A2.4 of the guidelines, which is helpfully entitled "Obstructing or Impeding Officers." The base offense level under that guideline starts you off at level 10. But under that there's a specific offense characteristic that permits an increase of three levels under (b) (1) (A) if the offense involved physical contact or (B) a dangerous weapon was possessed or its use was threatened, then it goes up three more levels. And there are other increases that don't necessarily apply in this situation.

I do find -- and I'll set out in more detail in a moment -- that a dangerous weapon was possessed, or at least its use was threatened, and that this would, if that guideline was where we stopped, lead to an offense level of 13. But, § 2A2.4 has a subsection (c) that's a cross reference that leads you to another guideline.

And I just say to the members of the public who are listening to this, you can't blame this on me.

Yes, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I just want to clarify whether the Court would hear argument on this point before the Court makes its finding on the range, or is the Court inclined to just rely on the papers and --

THE COURT: I am, I believe, very thoroughly

1 knowledgeable about your arguments and the guidelines and I 2 don't think I have too many questions. And --3 MR. SMITH: Would Your Honor mind if I just make just a couple of quick points? Probably less than three minutes. 4 5 Because just --THE COURT: Well, let me wait until we get to the 6 point where that would be appropriate. 7 8 MR. SMITH: Okay. Thank you. 9 THE COURT: I understand that you have a lot to say. 10 These are two of the longer sentencing memoranda I've received. 11 And I've spent a lot of time digging into everything you have 12 to say and there may not be anything you need to add. 13 All right. So, where I was, was the cross reference in 14 § 2A2.4(c), which says if the conduct constituted aggravated 15 assault -- well, (c) sends you to another guideline. If the 16 conduct constituted aggravated assault, the guideline is 17 § 2A2.2 instead. And that's a very significant move because 18 that guideline starts at level 14, four levels higher, and then 19 it, too, has the specific characteristics that permit, this 20 time, an increase of four levels for the use of a dangerous 21 weapon and only three for its threatened use. And it permits 22 an adjustment if the victim is an official victim that isn't 23 available under § 2A2.2. 24 The presentence report says, "As it appears the instant

offense constituted an aggravated assault, this cross reference

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applies," but it doesn't detail its reasoning. So what is an aggravated assault under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and according to the Commission? The application notes say that an aggravated assault is a felonious assault that involves one of four things: (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury -- not merely to frighten -- with that weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; (C) strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or suffocate, or; (D) an attempt to commit another felony.

So the first question is: Is this an assault? The parties agree on what the definition of an assault is. They both point me to 994 F.3d 1096, at 1099, a Ninth Circuit case that applies the common law definition of a willful attempt to inflict injury on the person of another or to threaten to inflict when coupled with the apparent present ability to do so that cases a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm -- which is very close to what the definition would be if we were sitting in Superior Court in an assault case.

The conduct here fits the definition of an assault. And Count 2 is punishable for more than one year, so it is a felonious one. But is it an aggravated one? We don't have aspect (B), the serious bodily injury, and we don't have (C), the strangling or suffocation.

So do we have (A), the use of a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury? How do the guidelines define a

dangerous weapon? Again, you have to look at the application notes for the aggravated assault guideline, and it says,
"Dangerous weapon" has the meaning given that term in § 1B1.1,
application note 1. And that includes any instrument that's
not ordinarily used as a weapon -- could be a car, it could be
a chair, it could be an ice pick -- if that instrument is
involved in the offense with the attempt to commit bodily
injury.

Application note (1)(E) says a "dangerous weapon" means an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury, or an object that is not an instrument capable of it, but closely resembles one, or something the defendant used in a manner that created the impression that the object was an instrument that could cause bodily injury, such as when someone pretends to have a gun.

I find that the massive sign being pushed into and over the police line was capable of inflicting serious bodily injury and would qualify as a dangerous weapon, even if it's not something ordinarily utilized as a dangerous weapon. And this is supported by docket 28-1, the FBI 302 containing police eyewitness accounts of the size, weight, and sharp corners of the sign and its supporting metal frame and wheels.

But just having a dangerous weapon isn't enough for (A), there has to be evidence of the intent to cause bodily injury. The government says there can be little serious dispute on that

issue. And that seems to be the probation office's basis for applying the cross reference. But the government bears the burden by a preponderance and I don't see what the evidence of this defendant's state of mind is. Couldn't one also find that the goal was to push them back, disrupt the line and interfere and obstruct, as opposed to causing bodily injury?

I will give you a very brief opportunity, if you want to address this, on behalf of the government.

MR. COLLYER: Thank you, Your Honor. I would just -THE COURT: Yes?

MR. COLLYER: I would just add that I think the -not only is the manner in which the sign used important, but
the context in which it was used important. The sign was
pushed into and onto a group from which the defendant was
standing against, in the context of what was essentially a
medieval battlefield where there was constant hand-to-hand
combat for something over an hour. And not isolated incidents.
Constant assault. This is one of those examples.

So when you consider what took place -- which is clearly depicted on the video -- the manner in which the defendant is, with intensity, pushing that sign -- his knees are bent, his back is bent -- he is pushing that sign into the police. And then take the larger picture into context, which was this was a battlefield. And putting all those together, that clearly shows, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

intent here was to injure the police so that they could get through.

Now, I understand, of course, with any mens rea element the government can never affirmatively prove what's in somebody's head with direct evidence. But here, the circumstantial evidence, from the manner in which the sign was used, the sign itself, and the context in which it was used that day and what was happening at that time, at that very place, shows that the intent in throwing that sign was to injure the police officers so they could get through the line.

THE COURT: All right. At the time of the detention hearing I said, "This ruling is not based on a finding that the defendant threw the sign; that's not depicted in the video.

However, the billboard did not 'move toward the police line' -- as the defense had put it -- on its own. It was plainly being used." But then I said, "It was plainly being used in an aggressive, offensive manner to disrupt or dislodge the line of officers, and the defendant plainly participated, albeit close to the end of its journey."

And while the sign itself largely passed over the heads of the officers, we do have to take into account the fact that it was being held by the huge stand and with huge wheels, which have now been turned vertical and they're not horizontal on the ground. And the FBI 302 provided by the government includes an account of an officer who turned to face the wheel coming

straight at his head. But even he said, in docket 28-1, he saw rioters actively pushing the sign into and against the police line. He believed this was done by the rioters in order to breach the police line.

So I don't believe the government has proved by a preponderance that this meets the definition of aggravated assault in subsection A, the use of a dangerous weapon with the intent to cause bodily injury by a preponderance of the evidence. And if it did, then we'd have to deal with the question of if that use of the dangerous weapon is what elevates the base offense level to 14, why it would be fair to then add on the extra four points for the use of the same weapon as a special offense characteristic? But I don't think I have to address that because I'm not going with that theory of an aggravated assault.

But it's also the government's position that Count 2 falls into category (D), an assault that involved an intent to commit another felony. So what's the other felony? The government says Count 1, 18 U.S. Code § 111(a)(1) and (b). And it says that the assault committed in Count 2 involved an intent to commit Count 1, another felony. But the cases the government relies upon all involve something of a different nature, an assault on an officer when you're committing a robbery, when you're trying to get away from a drug offense or some other offense. And those cases seem inapposite to the

specific thing I'm being asked to do here.

Count 1 charges using the same large metal sign to assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with the same officers engaged in their very same official duties. And the government's asking me to find that the defendant committed the assault on the officers with the sign, in Count 2, with the intent to commit the felony offense of assaulting, impeding, and interfering with officers based on the exact same facts in Count 1, and that is another, quote/unquote, felony offense from the charge of impeding and interfering with the officers.

But I'm concerned that the case law doesn't go that far, even if some sort of elements/Blockburger type analysis would let you find the offenses to be different because they have different elements. And the only cases in which that finding has been made in this courthouse so far that the parties have identified are cases in which the parties took the issue off the table in the plea agreement.

And the extra problem that we have in this case is we're not using the 231 offense as another felony for the 111 offense. We're going the other way. You're saying the intent to commit the 111 offense was the other felony for purposes of Count 2. But, for a violation of 111(a)(1) to even be a felony, if you don't have physical contact with the victim, your acts have to involve the intent to commit another felony.

So, the other felony for Count 1 has to be Count 2.

So, I don't see how the interference with officers during a civil disorder can be the other felony that's the necessary element to charge a felony violation of § 111, while at the same time § 111 is the other felony that makes the interference with the officers an aggravated assault.

The government noted that the cross reference was applied in the Leffingwell case. But in that case the defendant pled to a § 111 violation. He did have physical contact with not one, but two victims. And most important, he agreed not to dispute the application of the guideline at the time of the plea. And that was the reason I gave on the record for using the aggravated assault guideline.

Similarly, Judge Friedrich, in the Creek case, had an agreed-guideline calculation in front of her. She was less troubled by the double counting issue. But there the defendant pled guilty to § 111 and the 231 was the other felony, so you only had to make the cross reference in one direction. Also, her defendant had physically grabbed an officer and forcefully dragged him across the plaza and thrown a strap weighted down with some metal objects in it at him.

I will give each party an opportunity to address that very narrow issue. I frankly don't think it's necessary, but if the government would like to say anything further about the issue, I'll be happy to hear it.

MR. COLLYER: Very briefly, Your Honor. The government would submit that this case is a palindrome to the Creek and McCaughey case, which is our convictions of 111 with 231 being the other felony.

THE COURT: All right. But, you understand, 231 -you didn't have to find that 231 was a felony using 111 to then
have -- you don't have -- you're only going one way, not two,
and that's what differentiates it for me a little. It's even
one more layer of problem here that you don't have there.

MR. COLLYER: But you also don't necessarily have to find another felony for 111 to be a felony. It can be the felony through the use of the weapon, which we have here. So both of those things -- or, excuse me, contact, which we have here. So both of those things elevate 111 separately.

THE COURT: We don't have contact here. We had contact in *Leffingwell*. We have the use of a weapon, but I think it had to be the other felony was the thing for 111 that makes it more contact.

MR. COLLYER: Your Honor, the sign makes contact with the police. Physical contact has been found in the context of an inmate throwing urine into a corrections officer's face. The inmate didn't actually touch the officer, the urine did, and physical contact was found there. That's a Seventh Circuit case. So that's a separate manner in which you can get to the 111.

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So I would submit that the question before the Court is: Is the conduct that constituted a violation of 231, does it also constitute a violation of 111? And the answer is yes. 111 is a very inclusive statute. There are six separate verbs that can separately be violations of that statute. And so if the conduct that constitutes the 231 would also constitute a 111 -- and in this case it would -- then it is with the intent to commit another felony. And so that's what I would say the issue is here. And the answer to that question is yes, it would constitute. I understand this is an issue of first impression so far in terms of the direction we're going; 231 conviction going to 111. But the logic holds true. If one is responsible for an aggravated assault on a violation of 111 with the intent to commit a 231, then one is responsible for an aggravated assault for a violation of 231 with the intent to commit a 111. that would be my point, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. MR. COLLYER: Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Smith, you can give your three-minute summary. MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge. We, the defense, completely agrees with the Court. The Court's put it in better ways --THE COURT: I haven't ruled yet.

MR. SMITH: -- than we have.

Well, we agree with the idea as expressed by the Court.

But, I'd like to add just a couple of points on the "another felony" issue. There's two problems, and the Court was sort of hinting at this. It's not just that the elements are similar between the 231 and 111 offense, it's the exact same fact conduct. So when the Court was pointing to the cases cited by the government where the other felony was a robbery in a drug deal case, or assault in some other -- you know, a bank robbery, it wasn't just that the elements of those two kinds of offenses are different, it's the different fact conduct.

Whereas, I think you just heard Mr. Collyer say that it's the exact same fact conduct.

physical contact here through the urine case and that makes it a felony, there still remains the problem that this is the exact same fact conduct. And so, as the Court put it, although there might not be a *Blockburger* issue, that doesn't mean that it's another felony to call the exact same fact conduct a different crime when -- another felony when it's the same conduct at issue.

So, it's bootstrapping. It's like a Mobius strip or something. This isn't how this is supposed to be used. And so -- oh, the other point I wanted to make, Your Honor, is that Mr. Collyer pointed out some of the element -- the diversity of

the elements in the 111(a) offense. But there's a D.C. Circuit case that holds that all of those elements are modified by forcible, the word "forcible." So the use of force has to be used for all of the elements in the 111(a) offense, the intentional use of force.

I think that's it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your argument.

The guidelines don't define another felony for purposes of the cross reference in 2A2.4, although I'm not sure it would help if they did. There is a definition of "another felony" in another guideline, § 2K2.1, which covers the possession of a firearm. That guideline has a special offense characteristic, (b) (6) (B), if the defendant used or possessed any firearm in connection with another felony offense or possessed it with reason to believe it would be used to possess in connection with another felony offense, and there's an increase that goes along with that.

And the guideline under § 2K2.1(c)(1) also has a cross reference if the defendant used a firearm in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense, and then it says you would use the guideline for that offense.

And, so, that guideline has application notes and it defines those terms. And it says, "Another felony offense for purposes of subsection (b)(6)(B) means any federal, state, or local

offense -- other than the explosive or firearms possession or trafficking offense -- punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." And "another offense," for purposes of subsection A, means a federal, state, or local crime other than the explosive or firearms possession offense, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought.

In other words, it defines "another" as another, the way people understand it. It doesn't directly answer the question of whether "another offense" means something, as Mr. Smith said, factually distinct, such as drug trafficking, robbery or assault, or just another offense with slightly different elements arising out of the exact same factual circumstances, the possession of that very weapon.

But there's no reason to believe that this is meant to be based on just the hypertechnical alignment of elements. Because when the guideline, at least in the gun context, tells you, well, you'd use the guideline for that offense instead of the firearms offense, it seems clear that it means something other than another gun possession offense. And it seems that the government's approach strips the provision of any meaning.

It strikes me that if the Commission is asking: Did you commit the assault with the intent to commit some other offense? it didn't mean with the intent to commit that exact same assault, just charged differently. They could have easily defined "another offense" as any offense with any different

elements that's a different offense, but they didn't.

It's also important to note that the cross reference says you go to aggravated assault if the assault on the police officer involved the intent to commit another felony, not the same intent needed to satisfy the elements of another felony, not that it was committed during the commission of another felony. This suggests that the guideline is meant to cover just the situation in the cases that you cited, where the assault on the police officer is intended to facilitate or further or advance or succeed in the commission of or evasion of apprehension for a second, different crime.

And the reason this is important, I think as I've already said, is if we use the guidelines specifically designated for an assault on officers, § 2A2.4, starting at the base level of 10, add the three levels for the possession and threatened use of a dangerous weapon -- which is indisputable here -- you get to a level 13. You adjust for his acceptance of responsibility and you're at a level 11.

But, if you utilize § 2A2.2 for aggravated assault, you start at a base level of 14. You add four levels for the same use of the same dangerous weapon and now you're at level 18. So you're already eight levels higher, but you're not done yet because under § 2A2.2 you get to add six levels for -- under § 3A1.2 for an official victim, if the victim was a government officer and the offense of conviction was motivated by that

status. That adds six levels.

But, the application notes explain that that enhancement is not available under § 2A2.2 because that guideline specifically incorporates the notion that it's a police officer involved from the start. So they incorporate that notion, but you end up at a lower guideline.

So, under aggravated assault you're now up to level 24.

You get three levels for acceptance of responsibility, level

21. We have a difference of ten levels on the guidelines chart for the exact same set of facts.

Then you have the problem that the criminal history category -- which I understand is disputed -- is calculated by the probation office to be Roman numeral V. The defendant says it's IV because his 2002 conviction involving marijuana in California, described in the presentence report in paragraph 41, was expunged under the California Health and Safety Code and shouldn't count. The probation office, the government disagree.

But I don't think I have to rule on that issue because Count 3 in the 2002 conviction was the possession of explosives and that wasn't expunged. And given the time you'd served when his probation was revoked on that count, as well as on the marijuana count in 2006, the three points was properly assessed, even if you don't include the marijuana at all.

So he's at a criminal history category of Roman numeral

V. Under § 2A2.2, the recommended advisory sentencing guideline range at level 11, category V, would be 24 to 30 months.

Under § 2A2.4, the advisory sentencing guideline range for an aggravated assault at category V would be 70 to 87 months, which I note already far exceeds the statutory maximum of 60 months anyway.

So you've got two guideline calculations for the exact same set of facts and a violation of a statute for which no guideline is even assigned in the manual that produce a 46-month -- or almost four-year -- difference on the low end and a 57-month -- so four and three-quarters -- difference on the high end, and the second one starts higher than the statutory maximum you could ever get, in any event.

Therefore, given the fact that the showing necessary for the application of the cross reference under subsection A has not been made, given the government's inability to produce evidence to establish the defendant's intent to cause bodily injury by a preponderance of the evidence, given the circularity involved in the government's proposal, that I find that subsection D applies, and that is that the assault, which is the offense of conviction, involved an intent to commit another felony when the other felony is the exact same assault that likely wouldn't be a felony unless it was committed with the intent to commit another felony.

And finally, at best, the cross reference is ambiguous.

And under such circumstances the Rule of Lenity requires the adoption of the definition that favors the defendant.

I find, for purposes of this case only -- and certainly not every criminal case and not every January 6 case -- that the appropriate guideline calculation in this case is the 24 to 30 months under § 2A2.2.

The analysis is fact dependent. However, I think it's important to point out, Mr. Smith, that it's very troubling that if you use only § 2A4.2, the guideline gives so much less weight to the official role of the victims, and the fact that they were law enforcement officers motivated the attack, which was unquestionably an assault with a dangerous weapon against law enforcement officers performing their duties during the time of a civil disorder.

And, therefore, I think it's necessary, no matter which way I rule on the guideline issue, to take both guideline ranges into consideration when applying the statutory factors under 3553(a), particularly (a)(7), which talks about the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities with defendants of similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and when determining what sentence would be sufficient, as well as not greater than necessary.

So that's my ruling with respect to the guidelines. So we understand where we are in terms of that. But, then I'm

also thinking about the other. And at that point now, would the government like an opportunity to speak regarding the appropriate sentence in this case?

MR. COLLYER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, the events of January 6th, 2021 left a stain on this nation's history. Each individual participant contributed to the international embarrassment that is the Capitol riot. I know the Court is aware of what took place generally that day, so I will not belabor it. The government's sentencing recommendation is based upon actions this defendant took that day.

And just to note for the record, the government agrees with probation's PSI calculation, the final PSI, and still asserts that the final offense level should be 21.

I would also just move Exhibits 5, 8, and 9 into the record, which were previously provided to the Court and counsel. The government recommends a sentence of 60 months incarceration which, under the government's assertion, is the guideline sentence by function of 5G1.1(a).

The defendant was one of the first to breach the exterior barriers on January 6th. He was on the west lawn, near the Garfield Monument, south of the Peace Circle, when he observed the breach occur at 12:52 p.m. at the Peace Circle.

He then jumped the fence line that was in place and personally began pulling the fence down, inviting the thousands

of rioters behind him to storm the Capitol that day.

Within 30 minutes we can put him on the front lines on the West Plaza. It's important to note that in preparation for the violence, in between the time that he jumps that exterior barrier and tears it down and when he appears on the front lines on the West Plaza, he has replaced his baseball cap with a black helmet.

Once on the west front he began to pull away the bike rack barriers protecting police. He is photographed engaged in a tug of war with police over one such barrier. During the McCaughey trial, just, I believe, two weeks ago, a sergeant from Metro PD testified about the import of the bike racks that day. And he explained that the bike racks provided protection for the officers, but also acted as a force multiplier because they were able to exert defense over a larger horizontal field by nature of the bike racks which were an unbroken chain of protection.

However, once those bike racks started to get stripped away by people like the defendant, the officers were forced to stand shoulder to shoulder, which left their lines subject to easy breaches between the persons of the police officers. And with the constant waves of pressure from the crowd, which vastly outnumbered police, through active assaults and passive resistance, they were able eventually to break the police line in a number of spots. One such assault to help break the

police line was the assault for which the defendant stands convicted before the Court.

Now, defense has repeatedly submitted that the sign was just crowd surfing over the crowd. But that's belied by the body-worn camera footage. When the defendant first sees the sign coming north across the crowd he exclaims, "Oh, yeah." And then he taps a rioter between him and the police to warn him of the sign's arrival. The sign wasn't otherwise going to impact that rioter. The sign was moving north, parallel to the police line. That other rioter was between the defendant and the police line. The sign would have kept passing north behind him.

But, the defendant says to the guy in front of him, between him and the police, "Hey, here's this sign." And it's at the point where it reaches the defendant that the sign stops moving north, it stops moving parallel to the police line, and the defendant is part of the cohort that directs it east into and onto the police line. He did not grab it moments before it was going to pass over anyway. It was moving parallel to the police until he is part of the cohort holding it.

As I said before, the body-worn camera depicts the intensity with which he is pushing. His knees are bent, his back is bent, he is pushing into it. The police, at first, desperately trying to push it back before realizing it's not going to work and they just accept the sign being crashed down

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upon them.

I know this Court is aware of the -- and has noted the size and the weight of the sign and the danger it posed to police. And the Court has referenced the Capitol police officer who was out there without a helmet, protecting the Capitol, who narrowly avoided injury by happening to turn around at just the right instant to be able to avoid one of the casters hitting him. And I know the Court has viewed the videos of the assault and I know the Court agrees with the notion that the videos speak for themselves.

Moving to the defendant's history and characteristics. is the defendant's fifth felony conviction and 11th conviction overall. He has asserted that he is apologetic to the police and that he would have assisted injured police officers. But his history of violence and disdain for the police simply — throughout his criminal history belie that.

He has, multiple times, been convicted of resisting or obstructing police. He has either fought or fled from police multiple times. He bragged about doing so to the police when he was arrested for this offense; told them he's a runner and a fighter, but that these police are lucky today. Any assertion that he's apologetic to the police or would assist them is belied by his history and his actions.

But the police aren't the only victims of his crimes. He's been convicted of felony inflicting corporal injury on his

spouse in 2010. Convicted of felony force assault with a deadly weapon with great bodily injury in 2005.

And the defendant has put forth the negative effects that his incarceration is having on his family. But there's only one reason Thomas Hamner is where he is today, and that reason is Thomas Hamner. And it is not from a single bad decision, it's not from a single event. It is a repeated, 30-year history of this type of conduct that includes violence. January 6 was just the latest example.

Given his criminal history and his prior prison and criminal justice sentences, I don't think there actually could be specific deterrence in this case, Your Honor.

Defense says that the time he spent in jail thus far is sufficient to deter him from doing this again. But this is at least his third time obstructing law enforcement, it's at least third time assaulting individuals. How many times over the last 30 years has he stood before a court and said, "I won't do it again"?

Now, the defense argues that many of those who entered the Capitol that day received probationary sentences. And that's true, but none of those individuals assaulted anyone and, which I would note, that the circuit has noted puts them on a different level of defendant.

Defense has presented a number of comparator cases for the Court's sentencing consideration, leaning heavily on the

Leffingwell case. As the Court is aware, this case is easily distinguishable from Leffingwell. Mr. Leffingwell had no prior criminal history, he was a decorated military member, injured in service to this country. He was immediately apologetic to police. This defendant can make no such claims here.

The other cases that defense cites either did not involve an assault or, more glaringly, each one of those defendants had no criminal history.

As the Court noted, 3553(a) has the Court compare defendants to other defendants with similar records who engaged in similar conduct, not just the offense of conviction. And so the government submits that better comparative cases are the Howard Richardson case, where Richardson hit a police officer three times and then participated in the exact same sign assault that the defendant here participated in. He pled guilty to § 111(a)(1) and was sentenced to 46 months. And I would note that he, although had same escalating behavior in recent years, had no prior criminal history.

The *Creek* case, which we have discussed and the Court has noted, Creek pushed two officers, hit one of them and kicked the other. He, again, had no prior criminal history. He was sentenced to 27 months.

In Scott Fairlamb, Fairlamb pled guilty to 111(a)(1) and also a 1512. So I would note that it was the 1512, an obstruction charge, that drove the guideline calculation in

that case. But, it's analogous because here we have similar conduct and similarly situated defendants because Scott Fairlamb had a criminal history. Not as egregious as this defendant's, but he had a criminal history, including multiple prior convictions for assault. He was sentenced to 41 months in prison.

Your Honor, earlier this year CBS news conducted a poll and found that 62 percent of Americans surveyed believed that there would be violence from the losing side of an election in future years. Only 38 percent of Americans surveyed believed that the losing side would concede peacefully in future presidential elections. In order to prevent January 6, 2021 from becoming a quadrennial event in this country, the Court needs to send a message that what happened that day was unacceptable and that there are consequences.

For those reasons, the government respectfully requests the Court sentence the defendant to 60 months incarceration, a period of supervised release, the mandatory \$100 special assessment, and \$2,000 in restitution. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Smith, would you like to speak on the defendant's behalf?

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. I'm going to make a few points and then Mr. Hamner is going to allocute.

The first point I want to make is, as the Court knows,

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the guidelines range is presumptively the fair range. think our first position would be for all the reasons that it's the correct range that the Court calculated, it should also apply. Now, the Court noted that --THE COURT: I'm pretty sure that no defense attorney is going to want me quoting back to them in the future the fact that they just said the quidelines were presumptively fair. MR. SMITH: Well, I think, just as Your Honor said, that the facts are limited to this case in your calculations. I would make the same comment. But, so, one point the Court made was that that strikes the Court as a little bit -- that the Court was going to take into account the aggravated assault guideline even if it doesn't formally apply because it seems a little bit inappropriate in the circumstances of January 6 to apply a 24to 30-month range. But I point out that even Mr. Collyer just noted that some of his comparisons, which were sentenced using the aggravated assault quideline, fell within the 24- to 30-month range. Mr. Collyer just cited a case that he compared to Mr. Hamner, and that was a 27-month sentence. I think -- I can't remember which --THE COURT: Was that Creek? MR. COLLYER: (Nods head.) THE COURT: Okay. Go an.

MR. SMITH: So I think that itself shows that there's nothing wrong with how the Commission decided this type of offense would be sentenced.

The other point I want to make is 24 to 30 months, as the Court knows, is nothing to sneeze at. A day in prison is nothing to sneeze at, especially during the pandemic when, like Mr. Hamner experienced, you're in solitary confinement for hundreds of hours at a time when you're serving pretrial confinement and afterwards.

The Leffingwell case on disparity -- unwarranted disparities, Mr. Collyer is correct, there is more than a few ways in which Leffingwell's background is different than Mr. Hamner's, and yet the offense conduct is very important, too. There is no comparison between punching multiple officers in the head and touching the sign and holding the sign and carrying it and directing it, as Mr. Hamner did. That conduct is criminal, but it is not nearly as aggravated as intentionally punching someone in the head, which can give you a concussion, or worse.

Mr. Collyer said that none of the comparisons the defense offered involved assault. That's not the case. One comparison we made was to the *David Blair* case, that's 21-CR-186, where, after walking up to a cop and saying, "What's up, Motherfucker? What's up, Bitch?" the defendant assaulted the officer with a lacrosse stick. The sentence in that case,

for this charge, 231(a)(3), was five months.

THE COURT: That's part of the problem you have here, is that, as you know, every sentencing goes into so much more than just the offense conduct. We don't know what that person's record is, we don't know what they've done since. And, so, it's helpful to a certain extent, but it isn't helpful. You know, for instance, I know a lot more about the differences between Leffingwell and this case than either one of the two of you have acknowledged. But -- so that one I have a handle on, whether it's analogous or not. And the others are helpful, but I really want to know what the appropriate sentence is for this offense, for this defendant. I think that's the best place to focus your remarks.

I understand that disparities are a factor, but we really have to figure out what to do here. And at the end of the day, too many of the analogies start to be unhelpful because you can find anything -- it's like legislative history, you can find anything you want.

MR. SMITH: Well, let's put it this way, Judge: So in the case of *David Blair*, who assaults an officer with a lacrosse stick, he may have had no criminal history, but the criminal history -- which would seem to be the only difference with Mr. Hamner's case here -- is from ten years, it's a decade ago. I understand that it's still formally scored because of these quirks in how probation violations are scored, but if

that weren't the case, the criminal history would be three or two.

If the Court goes through all of the points that are jacking the range up, it's all the situation where the crime — the penalty for the crime itself falls outside of the range in which it's scored, but then it creeps into the range because there's a probation violation that extends it in.

So, if it weren't for that type of scenario -- I guess the Court can consider the argument I'm making as a departure type or variance argument, that the seriousness of the criminal history is overstated, given that it would ordinarily be outside of the count of the range.

And, so, we would say, our position on the criminal history, Judge, is he's changed. He left California when he was in with a bad crowd. He moved to Colorado. He's married, he has a family with lots of minor children, and he hasn't committed crimes for ten years. So we say that this is -- the criminal history score here is seriously overrated. And even if it's not, it doesn't mean that someone who assaults a cop with a lacrosse stick would have a five-month sentence and Mr. Hamner's would be above a 30-month -- the 30-month range that the Court has calculated.

Then there's Mr. Hamner's children. The Court, I think, has already noted that this situation is already a crisis for his family. One of his minor daughters is experiencing mental

health issues and having to see a therapist because of separation from her father. The business has been crushed, that Mr. Hamner was managing with his wife. I heard more about it this morning from his best friend, who is also here. It's a crisis in their family. And the Court might point out that the guidelines say this shouldn't be considered normally. Well, the Court is entitled to disagree with that as a policy matter, and also consider that for variance purposes. And it's serious. I don't understand why the Commission thinks that that's something that shouldn't be considered, because they—
I guess the reasoning is that it's true in every case; well, it's not.

I don't have children. Mr. Hamner has many children. There's a big difference there. It doesn't mean that someone with children is entitled to commit crimes or that's an excuse, but that's collateral damage, is something the Court should consider. And it's important, for deterrence, when I hear the prosecutor say sitting in hundreds of hours of solitary confinement is not deterrence, it makes me want to ask the prosecutor whether he's ever been to a federal prison, whether he's represented someone who has gone to jail.

It is a soul-crushing experience to be in a cell for 23 hours a day. There's social science literature backing this up. It's as easy as using Google. It's crushing. That's not an argument to pity Mr. Hamner, but it's certainly incentive

1 not to go back to where he is. 2 Judge, I think on remorse, I'm going to let Mr. Hamner speak for himself. 3 4 Are there any questions the Court has? 5 THE COURT: No. This is isn't usually where I ask 6 questions. I want to hear what people want me to hear, that's 7 really the purpose of the sentencing. So I don't have 8 questions for you. And I am happy to hear anything that 9 Mr. Hamner wants to say to me. And if you have more to say, 10 I'm going to listen. But it's time for him to speak, he can 11 come to --12 MR. SMITH: Okay. I'll let him take it away. 13 Thanks. 14 THE COURT: -- the lectern and join --15 THE DEFENDANT: May I remove my mask? 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. I would like to start by 18 apologizing to everybody involved, especially to those 19 individuals that may have been negatively impacted as a result 20 of my actions or behavior. I am deeply sorry. The events that 21 took place that day are by far one of the biggest regrets of my 22 lifetime. 23 My initial intent of attending the rally in support of 24 the President quickly became distorted when I made the decision 25 to not leave the rally directly after the speech. I have

replayed those moments over and over in my head, wishing that I had made a different choice. No matter how I tell the story, I have to accept the facts of my actions. Will the people I hurt ever be able to forgive me? How selfish I have been? If I had to do it over again, I would have chosen to put my family first and my freedom.

You see, in order to understand the background of how I ended up where I did, I first need to go back to the beginning.

Eleven years ago I made a choice, a choice that would end up changing the course of the troublesome road I had been traveling down. Although this choice meant that I would fail to complete the classes that I had been sentenced to, required by probation, and ultimately led to a warrant for my arrest. It also freed me from the bondage of my past dictations, and it did get me far away from the negative influence that I just could not seem to escape.

Looking back on that decision, I realize that there were probably different choices that I could have made that would have resulted in me completing my probation successfully, but at that time, I honestly felt that leaving California was my only option if I was going to survive. Coming to Colorado was, in fact, the single best decision I have ever made and led me to become the God-fearing man I am today.

The biggest blessing of all from that one decision was finding the love of my life, my wife Stephanie. After eight

years together we are stronger than ever. Having a blended family with seven children has been an unforgettable journey. And somehow we were still able to build not one, but two very successful businesses. One is a title company specializing in residential, commercial construction. The other is a franchise focused on kitchen and bathroom design and remodeling.

My two adult daughters are all grown up and out of the house now, as is Stephanie's oldest son. At home we have my nine-year-old son Blythe; Dillon who is 17; our beautiful 13-year-old daughter, Liliana, and our youngest little guy Ben, who has just turned five. I believe that parenthood requires a whole lot of love, not a whole lot of DNA, which is why they only know me as their dad. The love for my stepchildren is the greatest love I have ever known.

It was important for me to share those details with you in order for you all to understand the events that occurred right before my arrest. On November 5th, 2021 is a day where mine and my family's world fell apart. We received a call from the middle school that our daughter Liliana had been taken by the school resource officer to the hospital and put on an M1 hold. This came as a shock to us since we had already put a 504 and an IEP plan in place with her school which required all school staff and counselors to immediately phone home, should Liliana come to the office for any reason or if Lili started to express any unfavorable attitude or negative self talk.

Our daughter begged and pleaded with the officers and staff to call mom and dad. She knew it wasn't right that she was being taken off of school grounds without first speaking with the parents. Instead, we learned that not a single person decided they should call us before forcing our daughter to be taken to the hospital against her will.

For the next several hours our daughter was missing and could not be located. The school was telling us she was at Memorial Hospital, the hospital was telling us they did not have anyone there by that name. The police were telling us they had taken her to the hospital, so she should be there. It took many hours for them to locate our daughter, and my wife was finally brought back to her room, where she was located.

The nightmare continued after the hospital told my wife she could not stay with our daughter and had to leave the hospital. Lili was terrified and all alone. The hospital forcefully kept her for the next three days, eventually releasing her on Monday, November 8th. We were all so thrilled that Lili's back at home, safe with her family once again. Little did I know that once again we would be torn apart from each other just one day later.

I was leaving a business meeting with the Salvation

Army, one of my clients, when I was met with the 12 to 16

officers and agents, with weapons drawn. They yelled at me to

put my hands in the air. They told me I had a warrant having

to do with the January 6th, 2021 event, and that I was under arrest. To this day I cannot understand why I made the statement about being a runner and a fighter, other than that was me trying to explain who I had used to be, but that I am not that type of person any longer.

I most definitely was holding some resentment after the weekend we went through as a family and had some less-than-positive feelings over the handling of my baby girl, although that is certainly no excuse. I owe an apology to those officers and those agents, the Court, to my family, to my nation. And this is not the kind of example I wish to set for my children or anybody, and I could have done better.

These circumstances were about to have a lasting impact -- negative impact on my daughter, who not only just suffered the most traumatic weekend of her young life, but now the person she had looked at as a father figure for eight years was not going to be coming home anytime soon. She's being re-traumatized, after already suffering from severe abandonment issues from her absent biological father. Her mental state has now become even more fragile than ever, with several more suicide attempts and hospitalizations to follow while I have been incarcerated.

My wife also discovered and informed me that our 17-your-old son had been secretly dealing with severe depression for years and used cutting as a means for escape.

He apparently decided that we had our hands full with our daughter, that he did not want us to know that he was suffering as well.

Only now my wife has been left to deal with all of the day-to-day challenges on her own, trying to raise our young now-five-year-old son who just started kindergarten, while also supporting our older children who struggle with severe depressions, anxiety, OCD, ADHD, and bipolar disorders, as well as having to operate both businesses. No one should be expected to take on such tasks all alone. But she is truly, truly my champion, and I will never be able to repay her for this gift.

I pray for their forgiveness, love, and support. It pains me to know how much hurt I have caused them. I have a lot of work to do in order to right the wrongs for the mental anguish I inflicted. I have a spiritual commitment. For the community I can give time and service for the crimes I committed. I can serve the sentence imposed. I do not ask for mercy, what I ask for is opportunity. May I be given an opportunity to do better as a citizen in this society, to be the best father and husband I can be, and prove that I am no longer the person I used to be.

Thank you for allowing me to address the Court, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you for speaking.

What I want to do now is just take a few minutes to organize my thoughts in light of everything I've just heard, and ask you all to stay close to the courtroom. It's only going to be about 10 or 15 minutes. But I'm going to take a break now and return. You all can remain seated. Thank you. (Recess.)

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, recalling criminal case 21-689, United States of America versus Thomas Patrick

Hamner. Mr. Hamner is present in the courtroom. Probation

officer is Officer Walters. Counsel for Mr. Hamner is

Mr. Smith. Counsel for the government is Mr. Collyer.

THE COURT: Mr. Smith and Mr. Hamner, if you would come back to the lectern, please. It's very difficult to talk to somebody who is over there. You're the one who needs to hear what I have to say.

As I said, I'm going to go through every single factor in the sentencing statute, and that takes time, but it's because they're all equally important.

The first thing I have to consider is the nature and circumstances of the offense. You swore at the plea hearing that you were in fact guilty of taking steps to obstruct, impede, or interfere with law enforcement officers who were engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties during a civil disorder. While we may have struggled to identify which of the artificial categories created by the U.S.

Sentencing Commission is best suited to the facts, the facts are clear; you can watch it all unfold on videotape.

On January 6th a mob descended on the United States
Capitol, which was closed to the public as the Vice President
of the United States and members of Congress were performing
their constitutionally assigned duty of certifying the results
of a democratic election. The building was closed to the
public and it was being protected by members of the U.S.
Capitol Police and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department as
some members of the angry mob were trying to force their way
inside.

Apparently this defendant seems to have assigned himself a position as a member of what you could describe as the January 6 offensive line. He suited up in his helmet and he took multiple enthusiastic and entirely unlawful steps, in three multiple locations, to add his physical effort, his physical strength to the effort to breach the barricade and to disrupt or dislodge the line of police so that the rioters behind him could gain entry to the building.

Ultimately, as we know, the mob was successful in overpowering and overwhelming the officers. Many people were injured, several died, the building was damaged and defiled, and the counting of the Electoral votes was indeed stopped as the participants had to be hurried off to protect their lives and all of the people who had entered the building without the

use of any of the usual security precautions had to be rounded up and shown the door. And, miraculously, they were able to reassume the count after that was done.

I'm not exactly sure what the purpose of the history lesson and the argument about how seldom the civil disorder statute has been used in the sentencing memo was supposed to be. The defense made a strategic choice to plead guilty to that count without benefit of an agreement. Maybe that charge hasn't been used a lot before, but maybe that's because we haven't had to face this sort of all-out assault on a government building -- and not just any government building, but the center of our democracy, the U.S. Capitol -- very often.

The attack on the seat of government, the attack on the democratic process and the peaceful transfer of power that until that day had been one of the fundamental things that made America America was unprecedented. It was intolerable. And it caused incalculable harm. You might have to dust off an old provision of the criminal code when faced with something you should never have had to address in the first place.

And there is a lot more to it than what the defense describes as lending his weight to the corner of a heavy sign. Although I do appreciate the fact that in the sentencing memo the defense has, at last, finally conceded that the defendant personally did something and that he indeed interfered with law

enforcement and that it was at least reckless. But the memo continues to gloss over things, with the use of the passive voice, or words suggesting that the sign had some intentionality of its own.

I want to be clear: The sign did not, as the memo put it, lumber towards the officers. It was lifted, it was carried, it was pushed, and it was heavy and it was huge. The video exhibits capture, along with the photographs,

Mr. Hamner's posture and his effort. He's putting his back and his legs into it. And it is entirely too cute and somewhat inconsistent with the plea of obstructing and impeding and interfering with the officers to minimize it as recklessly crowd surfing a dangerously heavy sign. I do not think so,

Mr. Smith.

This was not the gleeful passing of an inebriated fan boy over the heads of an adoring crowd at a concert. This was a weapon, a battering ram, a use of force. And suggesting once again that the billboard was being forced over, as opposed to into the line of police, ignores the fact that the sign had a huge base, and for the flat part to pass over the officers -- which it did just barely -- the base and wheels had to be headed right at them.

And you can see on the video that the defendant does take the time and make the effort to get the attention of another protestor in its path -- berating and taunting the

officers with a bullhorn -- to let that guy know it's coming. Plus, you can plainly see that the only reason it went over anyone's head is that there is a line of approximately a dozen officers on the other side grabbing it with both of their arms and pressing it upward to defend themselves.

And the participation and the effort to propel the sign towards the line of officers wasn't all the defendant accomplished that day. According to the sentencing memo, he's seen at the Capitol at 2:52 p.m. I think, according to chronologies generated during the various congressional investigations and hearings and published on multiple news outlets, the President wasn't even speaking by that point, hadn't even talked about marching down Pennsylvania Avenue yet. I'm not certain about that.

But early on the defendant is already there and ready for action, and he is there as the first rioters break through police line at the Peace Circle. He then hops over the barricades himself and begins tearing down fencing, even as other protestors are urging him not to. This makes it easier for the gathering crowd behind him to maneuver and to get closer to the building.

The defendant ends up at the front of the loud and growing crowd at the West Plaza, then wearing the helmet he decided to bring with him to the Capitol. He joins others trying to wrestle the bike racks being used as barricades out

of the hands of D.C. police officers. Again interfering with law enforcement officers struggling to do their duties. Those bike racks weren't much, but it's about all they had on January 6 and they served the purpose the prosecutor just described. But then, as we know, at about 1:40 p.m., when other members of the crowd started to move the sign that they had discovered towards the officers standing between them and the building, the defendant adds his strength to that effort. And shortly thereafter, at 2 p.m., the Capitol is breached.

People talking about January 6th often talk about a mob, but you can't use language that divests the individuals who comprise the mob of their individual responsibility. This defendant's presence added bulk and power to the mob. And he didn't just simply add his presence, as many of those convicted of the misdemeanors did, he added his physical strength and he added action. He took affirmative steps to make sure the rioters could get past the barricades and past the officers that were standing in their way.

And by helping to remove the obstacles in the mob's way, he helped it achieve its goal and, let's be frank, his goal to stop the certification of the election. That's what Stop the Steal meant.

Defendant's family, defendant's wife in particular, and the defendant implore me to take a note of the impact of any potential sentence on the family. And my heart goes out to

both of you. I can truly, deeply empathize with the struggles with sons and daughters going through emotional issues. And I agree with you, Mr. Hamner, they're not your stepchildren, they're your children, and your love for them is demonstrated and it's beautiful and it's real. And it's also true that no parent is ever happier than their unhappiest child, which is an adage that is 100 percent true.

But unfortunately, it is this conduct that I just described and the decision to leave Colorado with all of that -- some of that happening even before January 6th -- and not today's sentence that brought about your separation from your children as they continue to struggle with these things.

But, as that leads into, I'm also supposed to think about the history and characteristics of the defendant. This offense is not your entire life story and it's not all there is to you. You showed me today how articulate and intelligent you are, and your love for and understanding of your family and your children's issues. Not all fathers get it, I can assure you, and not all of them are as deeply involved.

You're also a small business owner and trusted with remodeling of people's homes. You provide employment for other people, who you treat well, and you've been described as trustworthy, fair, and ethical, performing your work with proficiency, skill, and great attention to detail. You are a loving father in your blended family and you are involved and

helpful in your community.

Your history does also, though, include significant prior involvement with the criminal justice system, some of which was violent. There are five prior felony convictions. Several involve violent assaults on women. And there were ongoing problems with compliance with your conditions of supervision.

And the record reflects a current theme of disrespect for law enforcement, fleeing from arrest, resisting arrest, and disrespect for courts in general when you bragged about that in this case.

I agree that the overall calculation of the criminal history score under the guidelines tends to overstate his record, and I agree that all of it happened some time ago. But, as Mr. Hamner was taken into custody in Colorado Springs on November 9th, 2021, it was he who yelled out to a woman that the arrest was for the January 6th event, "I was there." And then he tells the officers, "You're lucky I ain't running and making you go through hell right now. Just look at my rap sheet. I'm a runner and I'm a fighter, but ain't that today because I know that I've been doing right."

So, maybe he hasn't changed as much as he would like me to believe from the guy who committed those offenses because he's still bragging about them when he gets arrested for this offense. And he says he's remorseful for what he did on

January 6 now, but even ten months after the attack on the Capitol, after the full scope of the damage was known and there was plenty of time for a cooler head to prevail, the defendant was not the least bit sorry or chastened. It wasn't really until he was hurt by it and his family had to suffer the idea of being sorry really came to the fore. And I didn't really hear as much about -- I heard about if he could make the choice again, he would choose his family and his freedom. And that's all important, but there was not as robust an apology to the officers, which is what this is all about.

I'm required, according to the statute, to impose a sentence that's sufficient but not greater than necessary to accomplish the purposes that are set out in the statute. And there's a lot of them and they often point in different directions. But I'll tell you what the law says, it says I must consider the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense. I'm supposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct -- and that means yours, but other people's, too. I'm supposed to protect the public from further crimes committed by you, if that's necessary, and to provide you with whatever training or medical care is needed in the most effective way.

Looking at all those factors, I do agree that this defendant has already suffered some real punishment. His

incarceration to date has placed him far away from his children at a time in their lives when they need him greatly. Maybe that separation didn't cause their struggles, but it certainly hasn't helped them and it may have exacerbated them. His business is struggling he did not have the opportunity to be with his father at the end of his life. He has suffered and his family has suffered.

I don't think the government's recommendation of the statutory maximum gives sufficient credit for that, or for the fact that he has accepted his responsibility and pled guilty. You don't usually get the statutory maximum when you plead guilty. But I also have to think about a sentence that will recognize the seriousness of this conduct and deter not only you, but other people from thinking that they just get to take matters in their own hands again. It's not as if the divisions in our country have eased in any way.

So I'm not satisfied that a time-served option would serve those statutory purposes. The heated rhetoric that brought the defendant to the District of Columbia has not subsided. The lie that the election was stolen and illegitimate is still being propagated. Right now, government officers involved in the investigation and prosecution of alleged crimes related to January 6 and related to the former President are under attack and subject to threats in unprecedented numbers. And it's not only certain media

figures, but very prominent political figures are eagerly and cagily predicting, or even outright calling for violence in the streets if one of the multiple ongoing investigations doesn't go his way.

So it needs to be crystal clear that it is not standing up for America to stand up for one man instead of the Constitution. And it is not ever justified to attack law enforcement officers who were just performing their sworn duty to protect the U.S. Capitol from attack and attempting to hold back this effort to undo a democratic election in this country that you say you are patriotic about.

What happened on January 6 and the effort to keep that spirit alive a year and a half later is the antithesis of what America stands for. It is the definition of tyranny and it is authoritarianism.

I do agree entirely that we have to make sure that January 6 protestors that broke the law aren't treated more harshly than others who break the law. But I also can't set up some separate category and say, oh, it's okay on January 6 for somebody to attack a line of police officers when they're trying to protect a federal building and control a crowd, when we all know perfectly well that it wouldn't be acceptable in the middle of some other protest.

The sentencing statute also requires the Court to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities

among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. That means your sentence has to be fair when you compare it to other people's. You can't paint everybody who participated in January 6 with the same brush. Same came to protest what they had been told falsely was a stolen election, but they didn't go inside and they're not charged with anything. Some entered but didn't hurt anybody or break anything or interfere with law enforcement. That's not this case.

And defendant fits in the more serious category of people who did interfere with besieged officers struggling to do their job while under attack. But it's also true that within that group there are individuals who engaged in much more egregious conduct, assaulting officers directly with weapons or chemical sprays, and in some cases causing serious injuries. The defendant should not be subject to the sentences warranted in those cases. And I'm not sure the government proposal makes all those fine distinctions.

The defense points me to the sentence in Leffingwell, says it would be a gross unwarranted disparity if he were sentenced -- if this defendant were sentenced to more than the 16 months in that case. But that case does not fit the description of a defendant with similar record who has been found guilty of similar conduct.

You seem to have taken time to read the transcript and

you couldn't have missed the distinctions, but then you quoted my own transcript back to me -- as if I don't know it very well -- very selectively and pretended that the distinctions weren't there. The gentleman had no prior criminal record whatsoever. There was no weapon involved. He had extraordinary personal circumstances; brain damage due to exposure to IEDs in his years of service in the military.

He got inside without assaulting or hurting anyone and stood there largely inactive after that. And when officers started pushing the crowd back, when he was in front, he punched. He punched people wearing full riot gear and vests and helmets. And he apologized that very day to them when he was being processed and didn't even recognize when they had all the equipment off that that's who it was.

So the analogy was inappropriate.

But, finally, it's important to note that while the guidelines are supposed to serve the function of ensuring parity among similarly situated people, there's circumstances they don't cover. And I completely agree with the defense that it is important to take into consideration the fact of the conditions that this defendant has had to endure during the approximately 11 months that he's spent awaiting trial or today and that they've been particularly harsh. It's true you were locked up through nobody's fault but your own, but the jail experience has been overshadowed by the specter of the virus

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and the need for more isolation, less contact with counsel, less contact with family, less opportunity to move within the facility, constant worry. And it's similar to the situation that permits a court to find a basis for a departure, even under the Smith case when you're talking about immigrants. So in my view, given all of that, just plain credit for time served doesn't necessarily account for the time sufficiently. So in my discretion, when I'm looking at all of the sentencing factors, including the need for the sentence to be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to provide just punishment and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, the sentence I impose will reflect that. In other words, while I might agree that a sentence greater than the one I will impose could be appropriate, it would be greater than necessary in this case. In an exercise of discretion and after consideration of all of the sentencing factors, the sentence to be imposed is as follows: It is the judgment of the Court that you, Thomas Hamner, are hereby sentenced to a period of 30 months incarceration on Count 2, with credit for the time you've already served. I recommend that you be designated to a facility as close to your family as absolutely possible. Do you have a request, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. The facility that

you're referring to is FCI Englewood, which is a one-and-a-half hour drive from the home.

THE COURT: All right. It was my very strong recommendation that he be designated to that particular facility.

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: This is based on a consideration of all the statutory factors, as well as the recommended sentencing guideline range under both §§ 2A2.4 and 2A2.2, and it would be my sentence no matter which calculation I ultimately determined should apply.

You're further sentenced to serve a 36-month time of supervised release. I find that you don't have the ability to pay a fine and, therefore, waive the imposition of a fine. You are required, though, to pay a \$100 special assessment because this is a felony. It's immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. If you change your address after you've been released, after any change of the address you have to notify the Clerk of the Court until such time as the obligation is paid in full. While you're incarcerated you can make payments on the assessment through your participation in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

As for restitution, the government has pointed over and over again, in all these cases, to the over \$1.5 million worth

of damage due to the building in connection with the pleas in this case, and that's probably a vast understatement. And in each case people charged or pled guilty to misdemeanors have been paying \$500 worth of restitution and people charged with felonies, such as Mr. Leffingwell, whose sentence you've asked me to look at, were ordered to pay \$2,000 in restitution. The defendant will be ordered to pay \$2,000 worth of restitution in this case.

Within 72 hours of your release from custody you must report in person to the probation office in the district in which you are released. I will transfer supervision to the district in which you reside, but I will not transfer jurisdiction of this case to any other court.

While on supervision you may not possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon. You may not use or possess an illegal controlled substance. And you may not commit another federal, state, or local crime. You must abide, also, by the general mandatory conditions of supervision adopted by the U.S. probation office, as well as the standard conditions that are set forth in the judgment and commitment order, as well as the following special conditions:

It is a federal statute that requires you to submit to the collection and use of DNA identification information while incarcerated or at the direction of the U.S. probation office.

I will sentence you to perform, over the period of your

supervised release, 200 hours of community service at a location and at a schedule to be approved by the probation office.

Given the significant record that includes violent offenses and offenses committed while intoxicated and the commission of this offense, notwithstanding the years that have gone by since those, it's going to be a condition of your release that you participate in a substance abuse and mental health assessment to determine whether any sort of substance abuse, anger management, or other therapeutic intervention is warranted. And, if so, and if indicated by the assessment, at the direction of the probation office you must participate in any outpatient therapy indicated at their direction and under their supervision. You must abide by the rules and regulations of any program and execute any releases necessary to enable the probation officer to monitor your compliance with the

Given the nature and circumstances of the offense and the information related to your criminal history and your poor record of compliance with supervision in the past and your bragging consistent with that record at the time of your arrest, I find, pursuant to *United States versus Malenya*, 736 F.3d 554 that this condition is reasonably related to the factors set forth in 18 U.S. Code § 3553, including the need to defer future criminal conduct, to protect the community, and to

provide the defendant with any needed treatment in the most effective way possible, and that it involves no greater depravation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes identified in this section.

On release it is also a condition that you make payments on any outstanding balance on the restitution obligation at a rate to be determined by the probation office, but no less than \$100 a month.

Within 60 days after the commencement of your supervision, I'm going to ask the U.S. probation office supervising you to submit a progress report to the Court. Upon receipt of the report I'll determine if we should schedule some sort of video reentry hearing to talk about your either success on the program, in which case I want to be able to talk to you about that, and if there are problems, I want to be able to talk to you talk to you about that.

Mr. Smith, do you have any objections to the special conditions set forth today and the special conditions that are the standard conditions applied by our probation office?

MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Probation office has to release the presentence investigative report to all appropriate agencies in order to execute the sentence of the Court.

Treatment agencies shall return the presentence report to the probation office upon defendant's completion or termination

from treatment.

Mr. Hamner, you have the right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court if the period of -- well, actually, those are just usually restrictions imposed in the situation of a plea agreement. There is no plea agreement.

You have the right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court. If you choose to appeal, you must file any appeal within 14 days after the Court enters judgment. If you're unable to afford the cost of appeal, you may request permission from the Court to file an appeal without cost to you.

At this point we're not in a situation where there was a plea agreement and other charges are being dismissed; they're pending. And I don't think either side has had an opportunity yet to think about everything we heard today and how that's going to bear on what's going to happen next. So what I would like to get is some sort of a joint status report from the parties, setting forth either your joint or your different positions on further proceedings in the case and when and how those should be undertaken.

And so how much time do you think, Mr. Collyer -because imagine you're going to have to confer with others in
the U.S. Attorney's Office -- to provide something like that?

MR. COLLYER: Your Honor, I would ask -- my plan had been to ask for a status conference in 30 days, to allow effective computation on that. So to the extent of just filing

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       a joint status report, rather than a status conference, I would
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       still ask for the same 30 days.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, does that work for
       you?
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                 MR. SMITH: Well, I can't speak to the government's
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       ability to confer on the issue before then. We would probably
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       ask for something a little bit sooner than 30 days, maybe 15,
       two weeks, or --
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                 THE COURT: Well --
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                 MR. SMITH: But, you know --
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                 THE COURT: Let me look at my calendar.
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              The defendant has, still, speedy trial rights with
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       respect to those charges.
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                 MR. SMITH: We waive any objection to tolling under
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       the Speedy Trial Act.
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                 THE COURT: Today is the 23rd. I'm going to ask for
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       the status report on Friday, October 14. That's about three
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              I'm kind of splitting the difference here. If you are
       weeks.
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       agreed as to what your position is and you want to file it
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       sooner, you can file it sooner. But until I've seen it, I
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       don't know what the next thing I'm setting is, whether I'm
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       setting a motion schedule, whether I'm setting a trial
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       schedule, whether I'm doing nothing. So I would like to get
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       the report and then see what to do from there.
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              And given the defendant's waiver, I find at this point
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       that the time in the speedy trial calculation between today and
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       the 14th is excluded from the speedy trial calculation.
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       then we'll figure out what happens next when I see what you all
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       think should happen next.
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              All right. Mr. Smith, is there anything further I need
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       to do right now on behalf of Mr. Hamner?
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                 MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Collyer, anything further
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       on behalf of the government?
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                 MR. COLLYER: No, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. All right.
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              Mr. Hamner, I really did appreciate your remarks and the
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       sincerity with which they were offered. And I wish you and
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       your wife the best with all of your children.
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                 THE DEFENDANT: I apologize for -- making sure I
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       apologize to those officers. That was definitely something
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       that I needed to do.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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                 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
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2	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
3	
4	I, JANICE DICKMAN, do hereby certify that the above and
5	foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript of my
6	stenographic notes and is a full, true and complete transcript
7	of the proceedings to the best of my ability.
8	Dated this 16th day of October, 2022
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12	Janice E. Dickman, CRR, CMR, CCR
13	Official Court Reporter Room 6523
14	333 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001
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