UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND BANKRUPTCY COURTS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Criminal No. 21-CR-00234

JOSEPH W. FISCHER,
Defendant.
1:00 p.m.
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TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL J. NICHOLS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by notereading. PROCEEDINGS

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Criminal Case Year 2021-234, United States of America versus Joseph W. Fischer. Counsel, please come forward and introduce yourselves for the record, beginning with the government.

THE COURT: Let me just note that as it pertains to masks in the courtroom, my view is that whoever is at the podium should feel free to take his or her mask off. I would ask everyone else in the courtroom to stay masked. Otherwise but if you're at the podium, I found that it helps me hear, it helps the court reporter hear, it helps opposing counsel hear if you take off your mask.

MS. LOEB: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Alexis Loeb for the United States. With me is my colleague, James Pearce.

THE COURT: Counsel.
MS. ULRICH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Lori Ulrich for Joe Fischer, along with my co-counsel, Eugene Ohm.

THE COURT: Counsel.
So we're here principally on Mr. Fischer's motion to dismiss Counts One, Three, Four and Five of the superseding indictment. I think we need to arraign Mr. Fischer first on the superseding indictment. Correct? why don't we do that first and then we'11 proceed to the motion?

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Ms. Ulrich, please come
forward. May the record reflect that defendant, Joseph W. Fischer, and counse1 have received a copy of the superseding indictment. Do you wish to waive the formal reading of the seven-count superseding indictment and enter a plea?

MS. ULRICH: Yes.
THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: And how do you all wish to p1ead?

MS. ULRICH: Not guilty.
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. You might as well stay at the podium. It's your motion. I'd like to treat this as a, what would be your typical oral argument. Hear from defense counse1 on the motion, hear from the government and then I'11 give the defense time for a brief rebuttal at the end.

So I'm happy to hear from you on all the issues. I'11 have questions -- I think -- let me just say a few things. The two issues that are most interesting or I think difficult for me are, one, whether it can be said that vice President Pence was temporarily visiting the Capitol or whatever location we are describing here because I think that's -- we need to define what the location is that he's temporarily visiting, but whether he could be said to be temporarily visiting in light of his status as president of the Senate and the fact that his role at the time at least in part was as president in the Senate. So that's one issue.

And the second issue is as to 1512 (c) (2) isn't really whether -- I mean I'11 hear you on this question, but is not really whether the proceedings in Congress were an official proceeding. Obviously, all of my colleagues to address that issue have found that they were. But is really trying to figure out what work (C) (1) and (C) (2) are doing together, how they can be read correctly together. And in your view, what if anything (C) (2) covers that is not covered by (C) (1) on your reading. So again I'm happy to hear from you on all issues, but those are the two things in particular that I will want to focus on at some point.

MS. ULRICH: okay. I was kind of focusing on them myself, more so the official proceeding even though I know there are now ten opinions rejecting my argument. So I will start -- I'11 start with our position on Counts I think it's Four and Five and whether or not the vice president could be temporarily visiting the Capitol. So if the Court's okay, I'll start with that.

I think it's -- the reading of the statute is plain. It's our understanding the vice president has an office at the White House. He has an office at the Capitol. He was presiding over the Senate and the count that day in the House. And therefore, our position is he could not be temporarily visiting his office --

THE COURT: He doesn't -- I don't think it's really
disputed or at least the facts could show that he did not regularly visit that office or work out of that office and in any event, that office is on as I understand it the Senate side and at least for part of the certification, he was supposed to be on the House side. Correct?

MS. ULRICH: Yes. The certification was in the House. But the Capitol is -- I wouldn't break down like this courthouse into separate offices or separate floors. I mean it is one building. And when you come to the federal building, you're coming to your office. And I don't believe when I go to my office even though there's a lot of different agencies there, I'm not temporarily visiting and even if I go in on a Saturday, am I temporarily visiting my office? I think temporarily visiting is clear. It's plain. And it is our position that the vice president does not temporarily visit the Capitol and we're looking at it as one building, the Capitol, where he had an office and he presides over the Senate.

THE COURT: What about Vice President Pence's family members who are with him?

MS. ULRICH: Well, that would be a harder argument. That's not in the indictment and $I$ know in some of my other cases, the government threw that in there. But it's not --

THE COURT: The government notes that in the briefs here. But if hypothetically speaking, I thought that the vice
president could not temporarily visit the Capitol on January 6th in the context that we're talking about and if I thought that his family members could, is there enough in the record before me to deny your motion as to that count or those counts?

MS. ULRICH: No. Because I certainly -- it's certainly not a fact that the government -- it's nothing that the government established factually or have alleged. I'm fairly certain that's not in the indictment. And it's certainly not anything they've established factually. But our position is really based on the --

THE COURT: Well, they wouldn't have to establish it factually now. That would be for trial just as Vice President Pence's presence would be an issue that they would have to prove, assuming it wasn't stipulated to. But for purposes of a motion to dismiss the indictment, do they have to have in the indictment each name of each person who was temporarily visiting in the sense used by the statute?

MS. ULRICH: It's our position that the answer to that question is yes I mean because we're here defending whether the vice president could temporarily be visiting. He had an office there. I mean I don't disagree it is a harder argument for us if they allege that his family was there. That would be a harder argument under the statute --

THE COURT: Would you make that argument?

MS. ULRICH: That's a good question. Would I make it? I don't know that I would make that argument.

THE COURT: I know you have other arguments about what the statute covers. I'm just talking about the specific question of the vice president's temporary visit and if we're talking about someone who isn't the president of the Senate, who doesn't have a statutory and constitutional role in the proceedings that are going on, for example, his wife or a child, it seems to me that those arguments about the vice president would not apply and you'd basically agree with that?

MS. ULRICH: Yes. I do.
THE COURT: Yeah. Al1 right. Do you want to address the other arguments about that statute and whether, for example, the Secret Service is the entity that has to create the perimeter and the like?

MS. ULRICH: No. We're actually -- I'm glad you brought that up. We're not -- we are withdrawing that. We're not pursuing that argument that the Secret Service has to be the one doing the cordoning off.

THE COURT: So is the only argument about those two counts then about Vice President Pence's status that day?

MS. ULRICH: Yes.
THE COURT: Got it. Okay. And then so if we are talking about somebody other than Vice President Pence, that motion would be very likely withdrawn or not filed?

MS. ULRICH: Yes. Yes.
THE COURT: okay.
MS. ULRICH: okay.
THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to go on to the other arguments then.

MS. ULRICH: So on the official proceeding and I didn't bring the (C)(1) statute. I can't phone a friend.

THE COURT: I know it pretty well at this point.
MS. ULRICH: So I mean obviously, we're here under (C) (2) --

THE COURT: It looks like you may have a friend.
MS. ULRICH: What's that? oh, that would be awesome.

THE COURT: So I understand the arguments here quite well. I have before me in another matter, the United States versus miller, similar arguments presented slightly differently. So I understand the arguments pretty well.

What I'm trying to understand is in your -- the way you interpret the statute, what if anything would 1512(C)(2) cover that isn't covered by (C) (1)?

MS. ULRICH: I do believe like the January 6 Commission right now would be covered by (C) (2). That you said that -- wait. Did you say that would be covered by (C) (1) and not (C) (2)?

THE COURT: That would be covered by (C)(2), but not
(C)(1). So it seems to me that (C)(2) should in a correct interpretation of the statute apply to some conduct that is not covered by (C)(1). I mean we can talk about how much more, but there really shouldn't be a debate in my view about that question. And so my question is in your view, what would (C)(2) cover that is not covered by (C) (1)?

MS. ULRICH: Okay. So for instance, in this January 6 Commission, I think that could conceivably be an official proceeding because the commission is they are subpoenaing records, they are subpoenaing individuals. If those individuals go in there and they lie, I think that the government would have a good argument under (C)(2) that that is in fact an official proceeding because now you've got adverse parties that are being directed to appear that presumably they are going to be under oath and presumably if they present or give them false documents, even (C) (1) would apply in that instance and that would be an official proceeding. So and our position, that's what we think would cover on January 6 Commission.

THE COURT: So assume the January 6 Commission is an official proceeding. If a defendant or if somebody stormed in and did something, maybe called in a bomb threat to prevent the day from happening, the committee hearing day or stormed in with the intent of disrupting or stopping it, would that be sufficient in your view?

MS. ULRICH: We11, I don't -- I can't say even that under those facts. When I look at this statute, this statute is to protect witnesses, it's to protect informants, the integrity of proceedings. So when I look at this, I look at it more as like somebody that was going to go in front of Congress and lie or they're going to present some false documents because (C) (2) was enacted -- that was really under the Sarbanes 0xley Act of 2002 and it was really meant to address corporate fraud and so I don't know. I'd have to think that one through. But someone storming the Capitol, I think there's other offenses that apply there.

THE COURT: But that's true also of lying under oath.

MS. ULRICH: We11, I do think this would -- but lying under oath is captured here because that would be obstructing in a January 6 Commission example. Lying under oath is certainly I think something that -- you know, and then you have to look at the word "corruptly." That would obstruct, influence, impede official proceeding or give them a false document. When I think of 1512 , that's how I think of it in that context. That it's really not like storming into some place to stop something from happening. It's more like we had the Poindexter case where he lied to Congress or, you know, people that have presented false documents. That's kind of what I think 1512, witnesses, victims, informants, jurors,
grand jurors. when I look at 1512, I fee1 that is what -that's the purpose of 1512 and I think that was the idea when it was enacted in 1982. And then in 2002, they added this section which is what we're here for and that was really for the corporate fraud issues.

THE COURT: Right. But what I'm struggling with even with respect to your position is that there are already statutes that govern perjury and lying to official bodies, whether it's Congress or in a court proceeding or can't make false statements to the government.

MS. ULRICH: That's right.
THE COURT: Why would we think that Congress added 1512(C)(2) to do that here?

MS. ULRICH: Well, when I look at that, the thing is is and I know that we have the 1505 that was certainly the statute in Poindexter and after that, they amended the definition of corruptly to include, you know, if you personally lie or you get someone else to lie. But when they -- the thing is when they added that -- the definition of official proceeding, that was there I think from the get-go in 1982. So when they added 1512 (C)(2), they didn't go back and re-look at what an official proceeding is a proceeding before Congress. They were looking at corporate fraud and corporations that are presenting false documents. So the definition of official proceeding was already there and it
included a proceeding before Congress.
But when I look at the cases and not the ten against me that have rejected it here, but there's a few other cases that like kind of go around the edges. One is United States versus Guertin and that's a D.C. case by Judge McFadden here, but it's not a rioter case. It was a case in which they went in under the other prong of official proceeding and it was the federal regulatory agency. And Judge McFadden noted that in this case a gentleman had filled out his security clearance falsely and the government prosecuted him under 1512 and they said that can't be an official proceeding. And they look at a formal tribunal or adjudicative body before which persons are compelled to appear. Again it's not directly on point. But it goes back to the purpose of 1512 and that is, you know, we're here to protect the integrity of the proceedings. We don't want people lying before Congress. We don't want people lying before a court or a tribunal. We don't want them giving us false documents. That was the purpose of 1512.

And then we have I think it was the Ramos case that we cited in our brief again. It's a Fifth Circuit case. Obviously, this court is not bound. But they noted the statute was to protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process.

And then the one opinion that I was struck by the ten that reject my argument was Judge Bates in the McHugh
opinion here in D.C. and he went one step further and said that okay, but it has to involve -- we agree it has to be formal and but and we agree it has to be multiple entities and then Judge Bates said the multiple entity is the electors even though the electors weren't there on January 6th. So while, you know, he went that one step further than the other opinions, he also recognized that it has to be a little bit more formal and there has to be two parties.

And our position, of course, is the January 6th certification of the electoral college was really nothing more than ceremonial or ministerial, if you will. It is our position that there was nothing Congress could do to overturn that election. The state had litigated all of the issues. It was over and all they could do was certify. And even in the indictment itself, it says the certification of the electoral college and certification implies that that's all it is. They are attesting to something. It's just a certification. So I hope I answered the Court's questions on this. So for those reasons, it is our position that the certification --

THE COURT: Do you have a view of what corruptly means in this context or is your view more that it is sufficiently vague or overbroad or I mean I guess it's the whole statute is sufficiently infirm that it's not -- you don't have to define it. You just have to know that it's difficult to define.

MS. ULRICH: It is difficult to define and that's what Poindexter found and I know all the other opinions have said Poindexter is in and of itself it doesn't apply here, it's been limited. But when I looked -- I re-looked at Poindexter again, like the whole first part of the argument was the word "corrupt" is vague. End of story. But then they went into the legislative history and then they came up with this whole other aspect that, well, he didn't personally lie to Congress so it's unclear to us what corrupt is. So we're going to reverse the conviction. And then they amended the definition for 1505, but not for anything else in 1512. So it is our position that even though the courts here have all rejected is that, you know, corrupt is a vague word in the criminal context. It's vague.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's talk about your first -we11, I guess one of your arguments, the Count One argument.

MS. ULRICH: Yes. Count One, the civil disorder. So I don't have a lot to say about that. I was really more just relying on my briefs. If you have specific questions on that?

THE COURT: I mean why is it unclear that this was a civil disorder? It seems pretty clear to me.

MS. ULRICH: We11, you know, I just think it's --
THE COURT: Specifically, where is the mishmash or a lack of clarity as between the statute and what happened on

January 6th?
MS. ULRICH: I think that the language that and it's not all that different than corrupt, it's any act to obstruct, impede or interfere. That I think is to me the most troubling 1anguage. Again, it kind of ranks up there with corrupt. I know it's an act. And so I know the government's position is that it's not speech. But we do think that it is vague, any act to obstruct because people and again not really going to the facts because we're not, you know, making --

THE COURT: But this is much more specific. It's an act to obstruct, impede or interfere with any fireman or law enforcement officer. It's very specific about the person. That it's prohibiting the interference, obstruction or impeding as it relates to. And then lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties. So you have to have a fireman or a law enforcement officer acting in the scope of his or her official duties incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder. So you have to also have a civil disorder. Is it your view that this was not a civil disorder?

MS. ULRICH: Well, I think the point is what if I'm there on January 6th and the sheer numbers are an obstruction? I think there's like thousands of people there and that is certainly obstructing the law enforcement and firemen were there. But what if -- when I look at that, am I -- it doesn't
say I'm acting with an intent to obstruct --
THE COURT: So there may be some applications of this statute in context of January 6th that might be at the periphery of whether we are certain or not that it's within the statute. But why isn't what's alleged to have happened here sufficient?

MS. ULRICH: Because it says any act to obstruct, impede or interfere and that's pretty much as far as it goes in Count One. I could be there committing, you know, committing what could be perceived as an act to obstruct because I'm present with a thousand people that, you know, half of which are there to interfere with this vote. And me, that's not my purpose. I don't have an intent to obstruct. But my mere presence there, my being in this crowd is obstruction. It's obstructing. And this statute does not charge -- is not charging -- the statute itself doesn't say with the intent to obstruct.

THE COURT: Right. So let me put it a little differently. The indictment here in your view I take it on its face does not distinguish Mr. Fischer's conduct from others who might have merely been milling about or something like that, even though we know or at least the government has put forward some information to suggest that he's more than that. But the indictment at least on its face doesn't distinguish between and among people who acted differently.

MS. ULRICH: It does not. But our challenge, of course, is to the vagueness of the statute itself and we're not --

THE COURT: But if Mr. Fischer's conduct was plainly at the core of what everyone would understand the statute to apply to, you can't bring a vagueness challenge then.

MS. ULRICH: Well, we're not making a vagueness as applied. We're saying the statute is vague because it doesn't have this intent element. So it really it doesn't -- you know, I'm not really getting into his actions. I do think that's something we would certainly argue if Your Honor goes against us. We would be arguing to the jury during trial. His actions then are certainly relevant. But for the legal argument today, that's our position.

THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Why don't I hear from the government? AS I said, unless there is anything you'd like to say now, I will give you time for rebuttal.

MS. ULRICH: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Loeb, I'm happy to hear from you in any order that you'd like to take things. Obviously, I have some questions about specific things I'm thinking about. But I don't want to preempt your doing the argument in any order you'd like.

MS. LOEB: Thank you, Your Honor. I thought I would
focus on responding to the points you discussed with defense counsel. So starting with the issue of temporarily visiting --

THE COURT: Yes.
MS. LOEB: -- I think Your Honor was correct to zone in on the issue with the vice president's family members. And one point I want to add which we did make in our brief is that it would be pretty absurd for the statute to leave the public official himself unprotected while protecting the family members and --

THE COURT: I saw that point. It's not that he would be unprotected. It would be that this one particular criminal statute might not apply because of the unique nature of the vice president in our constitutional structure, he may have actually not been temporarily visiting this one particular location. It could be a very sui, sui, sui generis situation. It wouldn't distinguish between the vice president and his family anywhere else in the world. It would be only one place in Congress where he has this very, very unique role.
mS. loeb: Yes. But the point of the statute is to deter people from entering these areas around the public officials. And so even if, yes, the Secret Service, of course, could still protect him, it would be strange to -- it would be strange for there to be a hole in the statute that
it's designed to deter people from approaching the area where he is.

THE COURT: Is it your view that if vice President Pence or Vice President Harris now went up to the Senate, worked in his or now her office, awaiting a vote that he or she might have had to break the tie of, that vice President Harris, for example, now would be temporarily visiting the Senate?

MS. LOEB: The Senate chamber. Yes.
THE COURT: Or her office in the Senate.
MS. LOEB: Yes. Yes. Our position --
THE COURT: And that's just because she -- the facts would show don't go there -- she doesn't go there very often?

MS. LOEB: It's because the definition of temporarily visiting means visiting a place for a limited time for a particular purpose essentially. So our position is that one can temporarily visit the office.

Of course, here as you noted and as Judge Bates found, this isn't the vice president's regular office. And on January 6th, he was, for example, in the house chamber and in many other locations that --

THE COURT: Was I temporarily visiting my chambers if I was coming in irregularly during COVID?
mS. LOEB: Yes.
THE COURT: I was temporarily visiting my own
chambers?
MS. LOEB: Your own chambers? Yes. During the -yes. You were visiting --

THE COURT: And when did my visits start to become not temporary visits? when I came in every week?

MS. LOEB: Our view is that you're always temporarily visiting your chambers because you're going there -- each time you're going there, you're going there for a limited time for a limited purpose --

THE COURT: So the vice president is temporarily visiting the white House every day?
mS. Loeb: No. Your Honor, the white House is carved out --

THE COURT: I know. But that's -- I'm just trying to understand what temporary visit means. The vice president lives at the vice presidential residence. Goes to work at least some days at the white House. I understand it's carved out in the sense that it's covered otherwise. I'm trying to understand what temporary visit means in your view. Your view is even if the vice president went to work in the West wing every single day or wherever the vice president's office is there, I don't even know, that would be a temporary visit?

MS. LOEB: Yes. Because he's going there again for a particular purpose for a limited amount of time and I think that --

THE COURT: So you are temporarily visiting your office at D.O.J. every day?

MS. LOEB: As many hours as I may spend there right now, yes.

THE COURT: Yes. I know it probably seems like a lot. So what that means is that I am a temporary visitor to my chambers here.

MS. LOEB: That you temporarily visit it. Yes.
THE COURT: Every day?
MS. LOEB: Yes. And, Your Honor, I think that if you were to create -- if there were a different definition of temporarily visiting, it would create very difficult line drawing --

THE COURT: Am I a temporary visitor to my house?
MS. LOEB: No.
THE COURT: Why? I spend almost as much time in chambers as my home when I'm working regular hours.

MS. LOEB: Because that is your permanent residence. That's the place you live.

THE COURT: So other than a permanent residence, I'm temporarily visiting every single other place in the world, no matter how frequent and no matter for how long. If I work 365 days a year in this courthouse, would I be temporarily visiting every time I came?

MS. LOEB: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. You would be. I
think there could be as I think Judge Bates noted, there could be a -- there could be at some point an upper balance, a temporal limit if you go --

THE COURT: But that means just --
MS. LOEB: If you go there somewhere for several years, for example. At some point you're not temporarily visiting it --

THE COURT: That means that just to use a different example that is about January 6th or I guess about Congress generally, that means that every single day of the year that they go there, Nancy Pelosi and Leader McConne11, Senator McConne11 are temporarily visiting the Capitol --

MS. LOEB: Yes.
THE COURT: -- as is every other member of Congress.
MS. LOEB: Yes. They're going there for a limited purpose for a limited duration. They're not living there.

THE COURT: So let's go back just to the Pence family for a second. So I think we just heard the defense counse1 essentially say that -- I'm not going to put any words in her mouth -- but very much weaker or different argument if we're talking about somebody who is not the vice president. The vice president's family clearly has no constitutional role as it relates to the senate and the like. Is there enough in the government's view before me to deny the motion on the ground that even if I thought the vice president wasn't
temporarily visiting the Capitol that day, his family members clearly were?

MS. LOEB: Yes, Your Honor. That's because the indictment is a notice pleading. We don't need to specify every single Secret Service protectee who is there inside the Capitol. That's the type of information, although it's available in the discovery, but that's the type of information that could be sought through a bill of particulars, for example, if the defendant wanted specificity. But we're not required as a matter of law to allege the name of every Secret Service protectee in the indictment.

THE COURT: You did hear mentioned one. Does that -- so in other words, my recollection is the indictment says Vice President Pence. It doesn't say just protectees. Is that relevant here in the sense that it's notice pleading, but the notice suggests we're talking about vice President Pence and only Vice President Pence?

MS. LOEB: I don't think so because it doesn't say on7y Vice President Pence. I think it does give some additional notice as to Vice President Pence. But I don't think it forecloses the government from relying on other Secret Service protectees.

THE COURT: Imagine hypothetically I thought that the vice president couldn't temporarily visit at least on that day the Capitol, that his family members clearly could, but
that the indictment needed to say something different. We11, a couple of things. One is can I rely on non-indictment facts for purposes of a motion to dismiss the indictment like the complaint or the facts around detention questions?

MS. LOEB: Your Honor, I know that some other courts in this district have. I believe the D.C. Circuit's decision in the Yakou case suggests that the Court is limited to the indictment and if there's a set of undisputed facts of which I don't believe we have before the court. So I do think the better course is to be limited to that, to the indictment here.

THE COURT: Right. These are true hypotheticals. If I believed all those things, would the government then have to go back to the grand jury and get another superseding indictment?

MS. LOEB: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I think at trial, we just would not rely on the vice president's presence as --

THE COURT: No. I'm saying in my view if I say the indictment is lacking or either because it needs to name someone else or it needs to not name the person who I think doesn't qualify. It needs to either include additional names or it needs to not specify the person who I think raises this potential issue. In other words, to amend the indictment in any way, you have to go back to the grand jury. Correct?

MS. LOEB: I believe in this case, we would need to. I know there are certain circumstances where we can file a motion to strike. But and it would depend on what were the facts that were introduced before the grand jury. So I mean I would need to go back and look to --

THE COURT: Fair enough. I understand.
MS. LOEB: -- give Your Honor a better answer.
I would also push back against the idea that because the vice president had an office somewhere in the Capitol, that anywhere on the Capitol grounds or maybe in the House office building or the Senate building, none of that can be restricted just because there's an office somewhere in that area even if the vice president didn't even go in that office on a particular day.

And I also just want to emphasize again that the statute is drafted broadly and is supposed to provide broad coverage for the Secret Service protectees. So again I don't think it would make sense here to read this kind of office carve-out which would create difficult line drawing in terms of when -- at what point someone has temporarily visited and also create these distinctions between the family and the public official for which there is not a good reason.

THE COURT: To be clear, I understand that. I don't think that this creates like a massive distinction between the public official and the family or between the vice president
and his public official and family. It would be one and one location only where the vice president it is argued by the defendant has a particular office and a particular constitutional role.

I get that your view is office is irrelevant because every person in the world is essentially temporarily visiting his or her office. But again assuming that I don't agree with that, then it's just a question of whether the vice president's office there is enough. And I get that for all the reasons you've discussed, you don't agree with that. But it's not as if such a holding would all of a sudden say that the Secret Service is sort of disabled from protecting the vice president vis-a-vis his or her children. Generally, that's no. It's only in Congress and it's not even about protection. It's just whether this criminal prohibition would necessarily kick in. And only when there's a perimeter or the kind of steps that have been taken that are -- that trigger the protection of the statute.

MS. LOEB: I would resist the idea that it would create just this one narrow exception because the vice president has other offices, too. You mentioned the vice president's office in the white House which I know we have another part of the statute. There are other offices in Camp David. The vice president may have an office in California. There may be many offices or work spaces set aside for public
officials and --
THE COURT: Right. But there, the -- I would be -to the extent that I was saying that the person is maybe not temporarily visiting, that's -- I guess your point is that -I understand the point. If, for example, Vice President Harris' husband went with her to Camp David and I were to say hypothetically, she is not temporarily visiting Camp David because she has an office there, but her husband would be and it would be anomalous in your view to have a distinction between them when they are at a place that the vice president has an office and that would be true equally of the president.
mS. loeb: And even if the Secret Service could still protect them, one of the tools to protect them are criminal prohibitions against trespassing such as this one. And it would be removing that tool.

THE COURT: Right. I understand. Okay. Thank you. MS. LOEB: I think if Your Honor has no further questions about 1752, we'11 move on to 1512.

THE COURT: Yes, please.
MS. LOEB: So starting with the official proceeding point, I think defense counsel is arguing that there needs to be an adjudicative purpose of a proceeding for it to qualify as an official proceeding. As several of Your Honor's colleagues have found, that is drawn from cases that are not talking about needing of a proceeding before Congress. And it
really makes very little sense to impose this adjudicative requirement on congressional proceedings because that is very little of what Congress does. Aside from an impeachment proceeding, there may be one other example of that. And that's certainly true of the Ramos case which defense counsel cited again, but it's not talking about a proceeding before the Congress.

The plain text of official proceeding, I mean I think it means what it says. There's nothing in there about an adjudicative requirement. As Judge Mehta noted, had Congress wanted to limit this proceeding to investigations or inquiries, Congress had ready-made models there at least in section 1505.

And there's just no basis in the text to provide -even though to limit it to an adjudicative proceeding even if -- even the legal definition of the term proceeding refers to the business conducted by an official body. It doesn't have any kind of adjudicative limitation. And I think even defense counsel's hypothetical about the January 6th Commission wouldn't necessarily even qualify as adjudicative because the people who are subpoenaed to appear are not parties to a dispute the way that a party -- you would have parties to an agency proceeding. So I think it would be kind of a bizarre narrow carve-out that's without basis in the text.

Defense counse1 also mentioned Judge McFadden's opinion in Guertin which Judge Kollar-Kotelly distinguished in the Grider case and is another example of what a proceeding might be in a different context that is not a proceeding before the Congress.

Defense counsel also dismissed the certification as ministerial or ceremonial. That's another argument that has been rejected because there are objections made and Congress needs to -- when there are objections, Congress breaks into their separate houses to deliberate and they are not adjourned until then. They make a decision about those objections and certify the proceedings. So it's not purely ministerial or ceremonial. Although our view is not that objections are required to make something an official proceeding, of course.

THE COURT: So let's assume it's an official proceeding. Do you agree with Judge Friedrich that corruptly requires an otherwise unlawful act, which is how I read her opinion?

MS. LOEB: Yes. I think corruptly -- and this is from I believe Judge Silverman in North that it can be an un7awful --

THE COURT: It could be unlawful --
MS. LOEB: It could be unlawful --
THE COURT: It could be corrupt purpose or corrupt means or both, something like that.

MS. LOEB: Yes. Although in the Reffitt case, I believe we have also defined it to include improper means. Let me just confirm that.

THE COURT: I read Judge Friedrich to have said -now, you know, I realize that this also can come up at jury instruction time -- but that to make sure there aren't constitutional concerns about the statute that corruptly should be defined to require an otherwise unlawful act, an act that is independently unlawful. Does the government agree with that view?

MS. LOEB: Well, I think -- I just don't want to foreclose the improper -- I think we believe you need unlawful means or an improper purpose or both. Although for this case, the indictment alone alleges independently unlawful acts.

THE COURT: Yeah. The reason I ask is because as I've parsed this, I don't understand how a requirement of unlawful means would work with (C)(1). You know, it seemed to me that (C)(1) is designed to create illegality by its terms and it would be weird to me to say whoever acting through otherwise unlawful acts or means alters, destroys, mutilates or conceals a record. It's designed to create an illegality for the conduct covered by (C) (1).

MS. Loeb: Well, I think corruptly does do some additional work there in that, for example, you could conceal a document because it's covered by attorney/client privilege
and I don't think that should qualify as corrupt.
THE COURT: But that's a bad purpose. Right? That would say that's not an improper purpose --

MS. LOEB: Right. Right.
THE COURT: -- if you withhold a document because it's covered by privilege. I'm talking about an interpretation of corruptly that requires, not permits, but requires you to act corruptly through otherwise unlawful act --

MS. LOEB: Right.
THE COURT: -- which is how I read her opinion.
MS. LOEB: Right. So although -- I mean she is also the judge in the Reffitt case and so has approved -- well, I'm not sure if those instructions -- the jury hasn't been instructed, but the --

THE COURT: It's going on right now.
MS. LOEB: Right. Right. The jury selection. So but I think that's a reason why we need not just unlawful means but the improper purpose because there may not always be kind of an independently unlawful act that is part of the obstruction. But as the Supreme Court defined corruptly in Arthur Andersen to require this consciousness of wrong doing, it didn't limit the definition there to illegality. So I think wrongfulness is slightly broader than purely as an independently unlawful means. Although that's certainly the
core conduct and that is -- I think that that clearly establishes that 1512 is not vague as applied to this defendant. And if it's not vague as applied to him, then he can't bring -- he can't challenge the statute as vague.

THE COURT: Right. So I think my -- and I've -this came up in the miller case. Why isn't at least a reading of (C)(1) and (2) -- that (C)(2) is essentially a residual clause for (1)? why isn't that a -- as good a reading as suggesting that it basically creates this untethered to (C) (1) criminal prohibition?

MS. LOEB: I think (C)(2) is -- I think that is a good reading of (C)(2). That it is a residual or a catch-all clause that covers acts that obstruct an official proceeding that are not covered by (C)(1).

THE COURT: Well, but that's not really residual unless it has some -- unless you find its residual nature in (1). I mean I know Judge Moss said the link is -- Judge Moss says there has to be a link because otherwise serves to link -- the word "otherwise" serves to link (1) and (2). The link is it has to be about an official proceeding.

But in a residual clause, at least my sort of basic thinking about it is that it's designed to say we're talking about conduct that is like the first clause. we're just making sure that by talking about just, for example, here, altering, destroying, mutilating or concealing a record, that
we haven't missed something that's like that. And so we're going to have a residual clause that ensures we haven't missed something through our use of specific terms. Why isn't that a reasonable way of thinking about (2)?

MS. LOEB: I don't see why a residual clause or a catch-al1 clause isn't broader than (C)(1) which is a form of -- which you might also think about as sort of an example of conduct that might violate the prohibition in (C)(2) and Congress is just making it exceptionally clear that the act described in (C)(1) is illegal is the crime of obstruction.

THE COURT: In the government's view, what work, if any, does the word "otherwise" do?

MS. LOEB: Otherwise is --
THE COURT: Is it necessary at al1 to your view of the statute?

MS. LOEB: I mean I think it means in another manner or differently from (C)(1). So I think it makes clear that the conduct that violates (C)(2) may be broader and different than that violates (C)(1). But if the statute simply said "or," I'm just thinking about whether --

THE COURT: It seems to me that the argument about what the statute means or covers isn't really dependent on "otherwise." In other words, the government's view about what's covered by (C)(2) would be the same if we deleted the word "otherwise."

MS. LOEB: Your Honor, I think that --
THE COURT: That's not to say that the government's interpretation is not consistent with the included of "otherwise."

MS. LOEB: Yeah.
THE COURT: It's not clear to me that it is doing any work there.

MS. LOEB: I agree. I mean I'm hesitant to say there may be something I'm just not thinking of. But I don't think that otherwise is a very significant term. I mean it means as I said in another manner or differently. But I do --

THE COURT: Well, why couldn't that be in another manner or differently? Just figure out a way that someone else could, for example, do something with respect to records, documents or objects that just happens to not be alteration, destruction, mutilation or concealment. Falsification or -- I don't know. Pick another verb that isn't covered by those four terms and then you say, okay, whoever otherwise in another manner basically is trying to obstruct, influence or impede an official proceeding, but is doing it in a way that's different than in (C) (1), but it relates to a document, a record or other object.

MS. LOEB: Um-hum.
THE COURT: Why isn't that at least consistent with the way the government views "otherwise"?

MS. LOEB: I'm sorry. Could you run --
THE COURT: So it seems to me that (C)(1) is pretty clear. If you have a record, document or other object -MS. LOEB: Um-hum.

THE COURT: -- and you alter it, you destroy it, you mutilate it or you conceal it and obviously, of course, you have to act with a particular intent and corruptly and all that stuff, that you're guilty of (C)(1). And (C)(2) says whoever in another manner, right, that's otherwise, obstructs, influences or impedes any official proceeding.

What if in another manner is just whoever -- I'11 put it this way. By doing something that is not captured by those four verbs, but it still has something to do with a record, a document or another object or other record. So falsifying or -- I don't know. I could imagine a number of ways in which, one, a person could act with respect to tangible information and evidence that wouldn't fit within the four verbs used in (C) (1) and so (C) (2) is saying, hey, we're going to make sure that we're covering people who do similar stuff with documents, falsifying them or whatever. But that's what we're talking about here. (C) is about whether you are acting on documents.

MS. LOEB: Well, I think the verbs in (C)(2) don't really make sense regarding documents except perhaps influences. Obstruct a document, impede a document.

THE COURT: No, no. No. It would say, look, (C)(1), we are worried about people obstructing, influencing or impeding a proceeding through alteration, destruction, mutilation or concealment of a record. Then (C) (2) says whoever otherwise obstructs because those things in (C) (1) are obstructing, influencing or impeding an official proceeding and (C)(2) says whoever otherwise does that is also guilty. But the otherwise is saying as it relates to operation on a record, document or other object.

MS. LOEB: Well, that would be inconsistent with the many Courts of Appeals that have upheld convictions under 1512(C)(2) for conduct that doesn't have anything to do with documents.

THE COURT: Agreed.
MS. LOEB: And then I think also at that point we may also run into an issue with overlap with 1519. And it just would create and have a gaping loophole especially relating to things like false statements which again has been the basis for many 1512(C)(2) prosecutions.

THE COURT: why would there be a overlap at all with 1519? I mean 1519 doesn't require an official proceeding.

MS. LOEB: That is correct, Your Honor. But it does relate to evidence spoliation.

THE COURT: Yes.
MS. LOEB: Right. So and I think it's just another
indication that when Congress --
THE COURT: Well, wait. I mean this is actually a pretty good example for one view of maybe of 1512 (c). So 1519 says whoever alters, destroys, mutilates or conceals. Right? That's the same verbs as in (C) (1) of 1512. Then it says covers up, falsifies or makes a false entry in. Those verbs are not in 1512(C)(1). Why isn't it at least a reasonable interpretation of (C)(2) to say that's what Congress was worried about, was making sure that when it picked four verbs in (C)(1), it wasn't sort of failing to cover the waterfront of ways in which people can act on documents. We have some examples in 1519.

MS. LOEB: Those examples show that Congress knows exactly how to draft a statute that relates to those kinds of impairments. And it chose not to do that here. And it's especially true when you consider that I believe 1519 was one of the original core provisions of Sarbanes Oxley. 1512(C)(2) was added shortly thereafter. So I mean if Congress just wanted to copy over those list of terms for 1519, Congress could have done that and it didn't.

And there is -- I don't think the Court needs to or should resort to legislative history here and the legislative history of $1512(\mathrm{C})(2)$ is very limited. But the little bit we do have doesn't indicate that what Your Honor suggested is the purpose of 1512(C)(2) --

THE COURT: But is there any suggestion in the legislative history that Congress was intending to create a 20-year criminal statute for just general obstruction, influence or impeding the official proceedings without any worry about the core of Sarbanes Oxley issues which was document destruction?

MS. LOEB: I mean I don't think the legislative history goes to that level of detail. But I believe 1512(C)(2) was originally proposed with -- at the time that the penalty was ten years. I know that one of Your Honor's colleague's opinions has gone through the penalties. I can't recal1 if it was Judge Mehta or perhaps Judge Moss.

THE COURT: Or maybe both.
MS. LOEB: But I know they have addressed that --
THE COURT: But is there anything -- so everyone agrees that the core of this provision was to deal with one or two related problems. One is document destruction and the other is as I understand it was the concern that the earlier versions of the statute prohibited the influencing of someone else as it related to document destruction, but not sort of primary liability on the document destructor, him or herself.

Is there anything in the legislative history to suggest that while those were the core concerns, we need to worry about document destruction and we need to have a prohibition that applies to the document destructor, not the
influencing of a third party, that there is also a concern that, hey, we don't have nearly enough criminal prohibitions on just a general instruction like somebody who wants to prevent a court proceeding from going on altogether or someone who wants to stop a proceeding in Congress from happening rather than document destruction?

MS. LOEB: Your Honor, I'm not aware of a statement that is that in the legislative history --

THE COURT: Is there anything directionally that way?

MS. LOEB: I mean Senator Hatch explained that the amendment strengthens the existing federal offense that is often used to prosecute document shredding and other forms of obstruction of justice. So he's saying forms of obstruction of justice. But again we have --

THE COURT: It seems like he's thinking of these other forms as things like document shredding.

MS. LOEB: We just don't have a lot of legislative history here and we have the plain text that is not limited in that way and there's really no reason to resort to the legislative history.

THE COURT: I agree.
MS. LOEB: The legislative history are floor statements which are of exceptionally little value and then we also have the court statement from Oncale that statutes can go
beyond the principal evil that animated them.
If Your Honor has no further questions about 1512, I would like to move on to Section 231.

THE COURT: I just want to -- my apologies. I had one last question I wanted to ask, but I've now forgotten it. But I think principally because we covered it which is just -and I think it's already been briefed. It goes to the extent to which all of the various interpretations of (C)(1) that have been either advocated for, adopted or mused about in this argument do create a surplusage issue I think no matter where one comes out.

I obviously asked you some questions about whether it would be reasonable to so interpret. Do you have a view of how ambiguous a statute needs to be for lenity to kick in?

MS. LOEB: Grievously and beyond the terms on their face to determine whether or not there's vagueness, the Court can also look at whether courts have construed them and here we have case law construing the term "corruptly." So it is the combination of both the terms that do have an ordinary meaning, but is readily comprehensible combined with courts from around the country constructing the term that gives sufficient notice and does not trigger the rule of lenity here.

THE COURT: Thank you. So let's do the Count One. MS. LOEB: I wanted to point out that counse1
asserted that she's making a facial challenge $I$ believe here to Section 231 and she mentioned the scenario of someone who is just standing there. To the extent that she is making a facial vagueness challenge, $I$ don't think that is an issue because the statute requires any act. So just standing around wouldn't qualify as any act. And certainly, this defendant is accused of committing an assault. So he's not been charged simply for standing around.

In addition, of course, the mens rea which Judge Bates noted --

THE COURT: Can we just pause there for a second?
MS. LOEB: Yes.
THE COURT: Going back to our earlier conversation about facts in or not in the indictment, does the indictment -- and this may be clear that it does -- I'm sorry. I'm just not seeing it. Does the indictment allege that he assaulted someone?
mS. Loeb: That's Count Two of the indictment is assault.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes. Of course. Thank you.

MS. LOEB: But --
THE COURT: I'm sorry. I was looking at the rest of it. Right. So it's assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate and interfere with. So any of those in your view
is sufficient for --
mS. LOEB: Yes. But I also think the terms of the statute are sufficiently clear and we don't have a vagueness problem here.

To just respond, $I$ also believe the mens rea point came up. And as Judge Bates found, there is a mens rea in the statute to specific intent is required and even if there weren't, under the Elonis case, the Court would read the statute to include a mens rea requirement.

I believe those were all the points on Section 231 that I wanted to respond to. If Your Honor has questions about it, otherwise I would rely on our briefs.

THE COURT: No. Thank you.
MS. LOEB: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. Ms. Ulrich?
MS. ULRICH: Your Honor, I don't have any specific rebuttal unless you have some followup questions. I did want to talk to you about the issue of venue. But first --

THE COURT: So let me just tell you where I am on the motion which is that I am going to take it under advisement. As the government knows, I've been -- I've had in front of me a motion in another case that presents just the 1512 question which I'm still working through as you can imagine from the argument today. So that is clearly important to me and relevant here. But there are two issues that I have
not confronted. So I am going to take that motion under advisement. I will definitely be writing an opinion. It may be that that follows the miller case. But no promises about when that's going to be. So in terms of the ark of this case, I'm not going to decide the motion orally today or know for sure when I wil1. So that then gets us to the case more generally.

The venue motion which has been sort of suspended for the present time. So why don't we talk about that?

MS. ULRICH: Thank you. So the federal public defenders here in D.C. had done a survey I think of potential jurors in this area and so that I think that would be data that the Court might be interested in in looking at the change of venue. And so what I propose, I proposed this in my other case, that we supplement our argument and that we file a brief on March 23 rd with that data and then I talked to Ms. Loeb about their response being April 25th and I believe she's in agreement and able to do that. And so that's what I would propose if the Court would be okay with that.

THE COURT: That seems preliminarily just fine to me. Obviously, the pendency of the motion is very relevant here. Assuming we do that, then I would be taking up the venue question sometime in early may, depending on whether you want to file a reply brief.

What are your thoughts more generally about where
the case stands? Obvious7y, if for whatever reason, venue were to be transferred, then it would no longer be here and we'd be worrying about someone else's trial schedule altogether. But assume not for present purposes or just more generally, all the things that have to happen wherever this thing gets tried, where are we?

MS. ULRICH: In terms of?
THE COURT: Discovery, discussions, thoughts about trial prep.

MS. ULRICH: Right now, our plea negotiations have kind of stalled. So I don't know if we're going to resurrect them or not. I guess right now, we're on track for trial. But Mr. Fischer is out. So we're -- you know, I'm not looking to have a trial anytime soon. So I don't know what the Court's schedule is. If we can't resolve this with a plea, I have no idea. I know that this court is inundated with these cases.

THE COURT: Yeah.
MS. ULRICH: So we're --
THE COURT: There are obviously these motions that are pending to be supplemented and the like. Other than that, are there significant amounts of discovery or other facts development that needs to happen or is that where it needs to be or getting close to where it needs to be?

MS. ULRICH: And that's a good question. From our
standpoint, I mean I know the government intends. We keep getting these big briefs saying that there's even more voluminous discovery coming and I know they are working very we11 -- I mean I know they are working very hard to get that for us.

From our standpoint, we are kind of at like -- like we -- given the facts that we know, he was, you know, there in a very small area for less than five minutes, I don't know what else the government could give us to change, you know, what the facts are that we already know. But I know they are claiming that there's more and more and more coming. So I guess I'm not sure about that, what their timetable is on the rest of this discovery. But again from our standpoint, you know, we're not talking hours in the Capitol. We're talking less than five minutes in one small area. That's what we are dealing with.

THE COURT: Let me just hear from the government and then we can talk about that motion's practice. Thank you.

Ms. Loeb? Can you start with that question, just where are things generally in this case discovery-wise?

MS. LOEB: We've completed most of the case specific discovery. There will always be additional items. I mean there will not always be. We have some small number likely of additional reports we would turn over. But it's pretty much completed.

The global discovery is ongoing as Ms. Ulrich said. It seems like there could be things in there that could end up being relevant to the defendant. For example, if there was some other defendant in the area who videotapes the encounter on his device, that's not available yet. And I know the defendant has made -- has suggested that there may be officers who were not resisting or allowing him to enter. So they would want -- they may want the relativity database populated so that they can search for that officer and find all the information related to him. So I do think there are some things in the global discovery that could be relevant. And the status report really is the best information I have there.

Aside from the venue motion, I would think we would want a date for motions in limine and 404(b) disclosure. So we need some time for that. And we can talk about our various trial schedules, too, if that makes sense.

THE COURT: It seems a little premature to do that because there is at least the hypothetical possibility, I don't know how likely it is, that I would grant the venue motion. And if what I was hearing was we are done, a hundred percent and we're ready to go to trial, then I might want to just set a trial date and then deal with it if the trial is not going to be here.

But it seems to me what I'm hearing is we agree there is a venue motion that should get litigated and we are
suggesting essentially a two-month briefing schedule. I obviously have the pending motion to dismiss that I need to work through. There is additional fact development production and review that needs to happen. And so if we don't set a trial date today and I think I heard the pretty clear implication from Ms. Ulrich that she wasn't pushing for one. You may be pushing for one. But it seems to me that we can wait a little while to set a trial date.

MS. LOEB: I think that's fine, Your Honor, particularly in light of the ongoing discovery.

THE COURT: And really that's where I wanted to 1and -- that general view is where $I$ wanted to be before we -before I just agree that the venue briefing schedule was appropriate. But it seems appropriate to me in light of this conversation which is there is still some more stuff to do. Obviously, I have the motions still in front of me. And so if we allow two more months to pass before I take up the venue motion because that's what we're really talking about. It's not going to be briefed until the end of April. That's not going to substantially delay where the case would otherwise be.

MS. LOEB: Yes. And I may be jumping the gun here, but in terms of speedy trial, I think we have another 30 days from the hearing where the clock would be tolled based on the motion to dismiss, but the venue motion would be filed within

30 days. So then we would -- that would toll the clock. That would stop the clock.

THE COURT: In other words, we are currently tolling.

MS. LOEB: Yes.
THE COURT: And we will do so through almost the end of March and then we'11 have another motion?
ms. loeb: Yes.
THE COURT: Although I guess that motion is -- it's stayed. So maybe it's not tolling. But why don't we do this then? Okay. I agree with the parties' proposal on the venue motion, which means March 23rd, it will be supplemented to include the survey that FPD is doing. Government's opposition due April 25th.

MS. LOEB: Yes.
THE COURT: I'm not going to toll the Speedy Trial Act today because I think it is being tolled as you said by operation of the pending motion. Do you believe, Ms. Loeb, that when the venue motion is supplemented, it would then have the -- if I've already decided the motion to dismiss, that it would then have the effect of re-tolling the statute?

MS. LOEB: If it's treated as a renewed motion, the filing of a pretrial motion --

THE COURT: Yes. It should.
MS. LOEB: -- but given that we've talked about the
ongoing voluminous discovery and the preparation of pretrial motions, I would also suggest that we can make a finding that time should be excluded --

THE COURT: I would agree. Ms. Ulrich, do you object to that?

MS. ULRICH: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So let me ask one more question. Let me just wrap all this up together. Do the parties believe it would be helpful or appropriate to set a status in this matter for sometime within the next 60 days to take up any other issues that may arise between now and then recognizing that that venue motion will only just have been fully briefed within that 60 -day period?

MS. LOEB: Your Honor, I would suggest we set the status that might also serve as a hearing on the venue motion.

THE COURT: Let me just look at my calendar now. So what I am thinking is then so renewed venue motion, March 23rd, response Apri1 25 and then because I have a trial starting May 9th, then I would want to do the status/argument in this case the week before. So May 3rd or May 4. Are the parties available? Do you have windows within those periods? And I would just propose a 2 p.m. May 3rd status conference/argument on the venue motion as appropriate.

MS. LOEB: Your Honor, I have a 4 p.m. sentencing before Judge Sullivan that day. But by 2 p.m., we should be
able to get it done by then.
THE COURT: How about 1:30 to be safe?
MS. LOEB: Sure.
THE COURT: It shouldn't go two and a half hours.
Ms. Ulrich, does that work for you?
MS. ULRICH: Yes, Your Honor.
MS. LOEB: would that be --
THE COURT: I thought it was important to have this hearing in person because I had obviously substantive questions. That's not to say $I$ won't on the venue question. My preference would be in person. But, Ms. Ulrich, I know that might be a little burdensome.

MS. ULRICH: Actually, no. I like in person. It's probably more burdensome for Ms. Loeb. She's from California.

THE COURT: Ms. Loeb.
MS. ULRICH: Yes. I'm from Pennsylvania.
THE COURT: I knew that. I had forgotten that you were in California. So would you give me another argument?
mS. Loeb: Yes. Yes. Your Honor, I can come back in person. And if Your Honor does not see the need for a hearing on the motion, I would appreciate if the court would let me know.

THE COURT: Absolutely. Why don't we do this? Let's do 1:30 p.m. May 3rd in person, status and argument on the venue motion. If I decide I don't need argument on the
venue motion, then my goal would be to decide that very quickly after the 25th and to inform the parties and to convert it to a virtual status.

MS. LOEB: Should we set a deadline for a reply brief on the venue motion?

THE COURT: Do you want a reply brief, Ms. Ulrich? MS. ULRICH: No. I doubt it. I don't think I need a reply brief deadline.
mS. Loeb: okay.
THE COURT: Okay. So that's the schedule for the next two and a half months or so. Not quite two and a half months. And I conclude that for the various reasons discussed today to include the current resolution of current motions, the receipt to the report from FPD and the renewed venue motion, the continued production of discovery and review thereof by defendant that is appropriate to toll time under the Speedy Trial Act between today's date and May 3rd. Are there any other things we should discuss today?

MS. LOEB: Nothing from the government, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Loeb.
MS. ULRICH: Nothing from the defense. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
(Proceedings concluded.)

## CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Lisa K. Bankins, an Official Court Reporter for the United States District and Bankruptcy Courts for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify that I reported, by machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the proceedings had and testimony adduced upon the oral argument in the case of the United States of America versus Joseph Fischer, Criminal Number 21-cr-00234, in said court on the 28th day of February, 2022.

I further certify that the foregoing 51 pages constitute the official transcript of said proceedings, as taken from my machine shorthand notes, together with the backup tape of said proceedings to the best of my ability.

In witness whereof, I have hereto subscribed my name, this 20th day of March, 2022.

Lisa K. Bankins<br>Lisa K. Bankins Official Court Reporter

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