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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                            DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                     ) Criminal Action
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                                     ) No.: 21-cr-0679
                 Plaintiff,
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                                     ) Washington, D.C.
           VS.
                                     ) January 13th, 2023
 5
      ROBERT WAYNE DENNIS
                                     ) 10:09 a.m.
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                 Defendant.
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                      Transcript of Bench Trial - Day 4
                   Before the Honorable James E. Boasberg
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                       United States District Judge
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      For the Government: Jason Manning
                              DOJ-CRM
                              1400 New York Avenue, NW
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                              Washington, D.C. 20005
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                            Nialah Ferrer
                              USAO-DC
14
                              601 D Street, NW, SUite 6-1301
                              Washington, D.C. 20530
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      For the Defendant: Allen Orenberg
                              The Orenberg Law Firm
                              12505 Park Potomac Ave, 6th Floor
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                              Potomac, MD 20854
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      Court Reporter: Christine T. Asif, RPR, FCRR
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                              Official Court Reporter
                              U.S. District & Bankruptcy Courts
                              333 Constitution Avenue, NW
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                              Room 6507
                              Washington, D.C. 20001
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PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

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THE CLERK: Good morning, everyone. We're here today for a verdict reading in 21-679, United States of America versus Robert Wayne Dennis.

THE COURT: Okay. Welcome everybody. Thank you for being back. So I just want to ask a few more questions on a couple of the counts, Mr. Manning. So I think we talked about it briefly, but you know, on Counts 6 and 8 -- well, what's really more concerned on 6. So the element is that the defendant engaged in disorderly or disruptive conduct, and I understand that element, but with the intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of government business or official functions. And so my question is, are the orderly conduct of government business and official functions the certification of the vote or are you're arguing that it's broader than that?

MR. MANNING: Glad to address that, Your Honor. We're arguing that it's broader than that in that it doesn't have the same degree of specificity as the obstruction of an official proceeding that could be charged under 1512(c)(2). That said, we're not arguing, for the purposes of this case at least, that it's so broad to encompass, you know, any activity of any police officer. That in this case we believe the evidence shows, and will rise or fall on whether the evidence shows, that the defendant intended to disrupt what was

happening in Congress that day. He was at the Capitol for a reason. He approached that police line for a reason. The reason was his anger at what he knew to be happening in the Capitol that day, where he went following the speech he heard on the Ellipse.

THE COURT: I think this is an interesting issue and I appreciate the fact that you're taking a, what I think is a more defensible position, as opposed to saying, well, government business and official functions can include any actions by the police, which I just -- I think that's probably a stretch. And I just wanted to -- so you would then agree that there's no daylight between Count 6 and Count 8 here, that he's either guilty of both or guilty of neither, but there's not, given the way you're defining government business, there's no real distinction then between those two counts; fair?

MR. MANNING: I think that's right. I mean, the only distinction is one is the restricted area and one is the Capitol building or grounds and the two happen to be the same — they were coterminous on that day for the same reasons.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

All right. Again, I appreciate everyone's advocacy here, your civility and your vigorous and effective work as counsel here. And Mr. Dennis, I've known Mr. Orenberg for a

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long time. In fact, he'll probably remember, I think I had cases against him when I was a prosecutor over 20 years ago. I know he appeared in front of me in superior court for many times. And you're fortunate to have such a good advocate on you behalf. I've seen a lot of lawyers and I can tell you you're lucky to have him next to you.

So the facts that I find here that the defendant came up from Texas to attend the stop the steal rally. He was coming because former president Trump called patriots to be there, and he believed he was a patriot and should be there. Now he never mentioned why he was coming beyond that the president asked patriots to come, aside for a vague mention about the election in response to my question. And he never said that he always does whatever a president wants him to do.

But in this case there was effectively no cross-examination of the defendant, which again is a tactical decision the government made. I'm not sure why. But there was no cross of him as to his motives or his intent either before or after. And here there were no social media posts or other statements about overturning the election or about Congress or about taking his country back. And so I don't -- given the government's decision not to cross, I don't really have any evidence that he was coming to D.C. to impede the vote, as opposed to coming to support president trump.

So after the speech he walked down to the Capitol

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with others at the rally. And his motive again, absent any cross-examination, appeared to be to support the president and be a part of the crowd. There was no specific evidence beyond that. The Capitol grounds were closed to the public that day; and barricades, fences, and signs so proclaimed. Many of these were down by the time the defendant arrived and he proceeded after the Peace Circle up onto the Capitol grounds and under the scaffolding for the inaugural stage. There he heard of tear gassing and a woman being shot, but he decided to keep going forward to see what was going on. There were also people in ballistic gear with gas masks, helmets, et cetera, which the defendant could see was hardly a peaceful group of rally goers but rather plenty of people intent upon confrontation and violent confrontation.

The defendant made his way up to the top of the stage and he could see a police line forming at the top of the steps on the lower west terrace. The officers were yelling at people to move back and the defendant could see them pushing people off the higher terrace. Police established a clear line with batons and riot shields making clear that entry to the area was barred, as was entry to the Capitol behind them. People in the crowd were yelling that the officers were going to die and that they were traitors.

Upset by what he believed was the striking of the woman in red, the defendant came down from the stage, gestured

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angrily to members of the crowd to rile them up. And then walked directly up the steps to where Officer =Weible was standing. The defendant had his hands in front of his face, he said he was engaged by what had happened and felt compelled to act. He said he had tunnel vision and was looking at the police line only. He did not stop moving toward the police as he approached them.

So a critical dispute in this case was who was the first aggressor here. And I find it was the defendant. That based — I find this based mainly on the video evidence, which again is undisputed evidence. It is a video account of what occurred. I find that he first put his hands on Officer Wyble's baton and made contact with Officer Wyble's right arm, after which the officer to Officer Wyble's right, Officer Pacheco, struck him in the neck area with her baton.

Mr. Dennis fell back from that impact and grabbed Pacheco's baton. Whether that was for support as he was falling or as an aggressive act is not important, because he is no longer charged with assaulting her.

In any event, after he was propped up and supported by the man in the blue jean jacket, he then moved forward to strike Officer Stadnik. Once again I find he was the initial aggressor there. Stadnik then admittedly pulls him into a bear hug and the two fall to the ground, after which the defendant is restrained. But based on the video, I find that

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the defendant was the initial aggressor toward both Wyble and Stadnik. That he could have retreated after falling back down the stairs, but instead continued forward toward Stadnik. But it is not the push by the man in the blue jean jacket that propels the defendant toward Stadnik, but rather it's an independent decision by the defendant to continue his aggressive actions.

I find the defendant's account of the interactions with the officers not credible, because the video undermines it. I do find the officer's accounts largely credible but, again, my main reliance is on the video. In addition, in his July 21st interview the defendant admitted it was the dumbest thing he had ever done, which again shows some recognition that he was not merely a victim here.

So given those facts, we now look at the legal issues and we dispense with a couple of defenses. The first is the public authority defense, which the defense has raised. A number of courts in our district has explained why this is not available in a case like this, and I agree. For example, Judge Bates in the case of United States versus Sheppard, No. 21-203, and Judge Howell in *United States versus Chrestman*, C-h-r-e-s-t-m-a-n, 525 F.Supp.3d 14, in 2021. They both talk about the unavailability of the defense for two central reasons.

First, the defendant must show that he relied on a

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conclusion or statement of law by the relevant official, here Mr. Trump. But Trump never said to enter the restricted area of the Capitol in his speech or to overcome police to enter the Capitol or to impede the certification of the vote. And second, even if he implied this, he as the official must have actual authority regarding the statement. In other words, he must have actual authority to instruct people to impede the certification and to enter restricted areas in the Capitol. And clearly he had no authority to instruct any impeding of the electoral certification. And so, therefore, the public authority defense is not a valid defense here.

Further, I've already explained why the defense of self-defense is not valid here, given that I find that the defendant was the initial aggressor in relation to both Wyble and Stadnik, the defendant in addition was the one who provoked the incident by approaching the officers in the first place. And again, he's the one who initiated contact. And the defense itself has disclaimed any defense of others defense. So those defenses, I believe, are invalid.

So then moving to the specific counts, Count 1, I find that the defendant did knowingly and intentionally commit an act to interfere with Officer Stadnik, namely his assault of that officer. Stadnik was engaged in his official duties which were incident to a civil disorder. The civil disorder did both affect commerce, we heard evidence about safeway

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stores closing, and in addition it affected the performance of a federally protected function, namely the Secret Service protection of the vice president. Again, we heard evidence that the Secret Service had to move the vice president because of disorder. So I find the defendant guilty of Count 1.

Counts 2 and 4 relate to the assault and impeding of officers. And I explained in detail in my factual recitation why the defendant did assault and interfere with both Wyble and Stadnik. He acted intentionally and voluntarily. He made contact with both of them intentionally and when he did so they were assisting federal officers, namely the United States Capitol police officers in their official duties, and I therefore find him guilty of Counts 2 and 4, which are the assault counts.

Count 5 is entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds. I find the defendant knew when he was under the scaffolding and heard of people being tear gassed and shot that he wasn't allowed to be at that place on the Capitol grounds, even if he reasonably believed that he could be on the Capitol grounds between the Peace Circle and the stage, which I don't need to find, but I find that he knew that he wasn't allowed to be there under the inaugural stage. And even if he was, at the very least he knew he could not go to the top of the steps where the police line was.

Now, the defense at trial and in their brief, which

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they submitted after the trial, argued that the police line had low visibility and so the defendant did not necessarily know that he could not proceed to the top of the steps there on the lower west terrace, but I don't find that a credible The defendant could see both from the stage and from down the steps that the police had established a strong and serious line. The fact that one man with a cane was behind the line, lying on the ground, doesn't diminish that. And so the officers were telling people to move back. They had shoved people back. And they established a clear line with batons and riot shields. Anyone would know they did not have the authority to be there. And yet the defendant, knowing that, still walked up to the top of those steps. addition, this was a restricted building because the vice president was there, who is a person protected by the Secret Service. I therefore find the defendant quilty of Count 5.

Count 6, again, speaks of disorderly and disruptive conduct in a restricted building or grounds. And clearly this was disorderly and disruptive conduct. But again, the question is was this an intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of government business or official functions, or was his intent simply to assault the police. In other cases there's been some social media posting or other statement by the defendant saying what his intent was, that it was to in fact impede a vote. Now, there's certainly an

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argument that anybody at the Capitol that day was engaging —
that that was the conduct they were engaging in. But again
here, I think it's a close call. I must find beyond a
reasonable doubt the defendant so acted. As I said, in the
absence of any government cross-examination of the defendant,
I cannot find that his — beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was intending to impede or disrupt Congress as opposed to
simply being on the Capitol grounds to support President Trump
and to support other rally goers. And given that the
government agrees, at least for purposes here, that police
functions are not necessarily government business or official
functions, I find — I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt
in this case that he was intending to impede or disrupt the
orderly conduct of government business or official function.
So I'll find him not guilty of Count 6.

Count 7, relates to engaging in physical violence in a restricted building or grounds. Again, he engaged in physical violence because of the assault. He engaged in so knowingly and he was in a restricted building or grounds, which he knew as I explained in relation to Count 5. So I'll find him guilty of Count 7.

Count 8 is disorderly conduct in a Capitol building.

And for the reasons he's not guilty of Count 6, he's not guilty on Count 8, because there's no evidence of an intent to disturb the orderly conduct of a session of Congress. And

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again, you know, it's not -- it's far from frivolous to argue
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      that everybody on the grounds that day had the intent to
      disrupt, but I think here, beyond a reasonable doubt, I can't
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      find without any statements by the defense -- by the
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      defendant, I mean, before or during the incident that he was
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      there to do that as opposed to simply -- that he was simply
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      angry at the police.
                And then finally -- so not guilty of Count 8.
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      Finally, Count 9 is physical violence in a Capitol building or
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      grounds. Again, he did engage in the act of physical violence
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      as I've explained it, and he did so in the grounds of the
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      Capitol, and he acted willfully and knowingly. So I find him
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      quilty of Count 9.
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                So once again, guilty of Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9.
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                Any question as to the verdict, Mr. Manning?
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                MR. MANNING: No, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: Mr. Orenberg?
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                                No, Your Honor.
                MR. ORENBERG:
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                THE COURT: Okay. So we need to set a date for
      sentencing.
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                THE CLERK:
                            April 13th.
                THE COURT:
                            What did you say?
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                THE CLERK:
                            90 days would be April 13th.
                THE COURT:
                            And what day of the week is that?
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                THE CLERK:
                            That's a Thursday.
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THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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                            It does not look like we're in trial.
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                THE CLERK:
                THE COURT: Okay. April 13th is a Thursday, 11:00
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      o'clock, Mr. Manning?
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                MR. MANNING: That works for the Government, Your
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      Honor.
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                MR. ORENBERG: What time, Your Honor?
                THE COURT: 11:00 okay?
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                               That's fine.
                MR. ORENBERG:
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                THE COURT: Again, that will be in person, Mr.
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      Orenberg, because it has to be.
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                              It has to be. I understand.
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                MR. ORENBERG:
                THE COURT: All right. So Mr. Dennis, you will
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      be -- you're going to be interviewed by the probation
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      department in regard to a presentence report. That means that
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      they're going to talk to you about your background, your
      employment, education, family. If you wanted Mr. Orenberg
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      present during that interview you may do so. In addition, he
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      and the government may submit memoranda regarding a
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      sentencing. Each of them will have a chance to talk at
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      sentencing. You'll have a chance to talk at sentencing.
      you want to submit letters on your own, behalf you may also do
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      that. Do you understand all of that?
                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
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                THE COURT: And anything else then for the
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Government today?

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MR. MANNING: Just the question under 18, U.S.C., 3143, Your Honor, of the conditions.

THE COURT: Okay. And is there -- yes.

MR. MANNING: Your Honor, the defendant has been on release up till now. Typically, under these charges of conviction, the government would contend that detention is now warranted under Section 3143. However, the government and defense counsel have been communicating about this. And we do believe that with some heightened conditions that we understand that defense will propose and agree to, that under those heightened conditions, and under the particular circumstance of this case, that could satisfy ongoing remainder under 1343.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Orenberg.

MR. ORENBERG: Good morning, Your Honor. Appreciate the government's recommendation. We have been discussing, I guess, a joint proposal to the Court. He is currently under conditions that include, obviously, no firearms in the home. When he was initially arrested he was reporting once a week to Pretrial Services in the Northern District of Texas. I understand that's been relaxed or modified to monthly. So I think what we'd jointly propose is that the Court, I guess in the way that it can, instruct the Northern District of Texas

to ask him to report on a weekly basis. Again, no -THE COURT: In person or phone reporting.

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MR. ORENBERG: No, by phone. And no travel outside the Northern District of Texas without permission by either the Pretrial Services officer down there, or if necessary by the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine with me. I think what the best thing, if you -- maybe the government and you can just submit a proposed modification of conditions form.

Just coordinate with the courtroom deputy to just submit the form that makes those changes in the conditions and I'll sign that.

MR. ORENBERG: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

All right. So Mr. Dennis, given the recommendation by both sides, I will not detain you pending sentencing. I believe that given your compliance so far that that's appropriate as a recommendation. And it is what I expect I would have done absent recommendation. And so there are going to be a couple of other restrictions; you need to report weekly and you can't leave the Northern District of Texas without consent of pretrial. If you want to leave and they don't consent, you can ask your lawyer to ask me if there's some special occasion like a funeral or something you need to go to, you can let me know. All right?

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                 THE DEFENDANT:
                                 Yes, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you all.
                 MR. ORENBERG:
                                 Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: We'll see you in April.
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                 (The proceedings were concluded at 10:33 a.m.)
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                 I, Christine Asif, RPR, FCRR, do hereby certify that
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       the foregoing is a correct transcript from the stenographic
       record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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                                   <u>/s/</u>
                               Christine T. Asif
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                           Official Court Reporter
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