1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		
2		OF COLUMBIA	
3	THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,		
4	Plaintiff,	Criminal Action No. 1:21-cr-00026-CRC-1	
5	vs.	<pre>Tuesday, April 18, 2023 9:10 a.m. *MORNING SESSION*</pre>	
6	CHRISTOPHER ALBERTS,	*MORNING SESSION*	
7	Defendant.		
8			
9	TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
10			
11	APPEARANCES:		
12			
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                 So we're going to take a break until noon. Feel
       free to -- Ms. Jenkins, can they walk -- they can walk
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       outside the building, if they like?
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 4
                 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Yes, Your Honor.
 5
                 THE COURT: So be back in the jury room by noon.
 6
       Okay?
 7
                 Thank you very much. No discussions about the
       case. No research about the case.
 8
 9
                 (Jury exits courtroom)
10
                 THE COURT: All right. Have a seat.
11
                 All right. Why don't we start with the self-
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       defense and defense of others, Mr. Dalke, if you're ready to
13
       be heard on that; and then we can move to everything else.
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                 MR. DALKE: So just in the self-defense and where
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       the government would start is we previously did file a
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       motion on this. It was Docket 106. It was the government's
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       motion in limine. It's still the government's position --
       and we briefed the law and the issues related to that.
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19
                 THE COURT: Okay. Hold on. Let me just -- let me
20
       just...
21
                 And I'm going to ask my counsel to come up to the
22
       witness stand because she's more familiar with the logistics
23
       of the instructions.
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                 MR. ROOTS: All this time I thought she was a U.S.
25
       Marshal.
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1 THE COURT: She's an infiltrator. 2 Okay. Go ahead. I think I'm with you. 3 MR. DALKE: And I just wanted to point that out. And we can cover the points here on the record, but I didn't 4 5 want you to think we hadn't addressed the issue already. 6 THE COURT: No, I understand. It was addressed in 7 the context of a motion in limine. Now that all the 8 evidence is in, the question is is there enough in evidence 9 to support an instruction. 10 MR. DALKE: So there's two fundamental principles I want to start out with before we even get to whether the 11 12 defense has put on enough to raise it, and those two points 13 are as follows: 14 First, the defendant cannot claim self-defense if 15 he was the aggressor or if he provoked the conflict upon himself. And that's the Waters v. Lockett decision from the 16 17 D.C. Circuit 2018 that I believe we cited in the briefing. 18 So that's principle number one. It just doesn't apply, 19 period, if he was the aggressor or if he provoked the 20 conflict itself relating to the specific assault, which is 21 the 1:54 time when the defendant grabs the officer and then 22 proceeds with the pallet. 23 The second kind of underlying fundamental 24 principle is that you don't have self-defense, in the 25 government's view, when you assault a federal law

1 enforcement officer. So self-defense, as a matter of law, 2 does not apply to resisting arrest or performances of duty 3 by law enforcement officers; and we cite two decisions in 4 our brief. The U.S. vs. Drapeau from the Eighth Circuit as 5 well as U.S. vs. Branch. 6 THE COURT: Sorry, the first one was...? 7 MR. DALKE: D-R-A-P-E-A-U. THE COURT: Got it. 8 9 MR. DALKE: Drapeau maybe. 644 F. 3d 646 from the 10 Eighth Circuit, pincite 654. And the quote from there is an individual -- this 11 12 is a direct quote, "An individual is not justified in using 13 force for the purpose of resisting arrest or other 14 performance of duty by a law enforcement officer within the 15 scope of his official duties." 16 And the Branch decision has a similar quote. 17 But the concept is that we don't think -- as a 18 preliminary matter with these two fundamental tenets of when 19 self-defense even comes into play, that it wouldn't be in 20 play here because the evidence in the record does show that 21 he's the aggressor, that he provoked this specific 22 advancement, and putting hands on. 23 And, second, he can't, as a matter of law, get 24 this instruction under these circumstances because he was 25 subject to arrest. He was committing multiple violations of

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       law at the time he was on those steps, and he was
2
       interfering with the performance of law enforcement.
 3
       there's no evidence in the record that those officers, you
       know, weren't discharging their duties.
 4
 5
                 So I just wanted that as the backdrop before we
 6
       get --
 7
                 THE COURT: Sure. Let's start with the first
 8
       point.
 9
                 I mean, my understanding is that the standard for
10
       an instruction is whether there is at least some evidence --
11
       I mean, you may think the evidence tilts in your favor as to
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       whether he was the aggressor or not, but, you know, to get
13
       an instruction on that isn't the standard whether there is
14
       some evidence? Right?
15
                 And here -- I will hear from Mr. Roots, but I'm
16
       sure the argument will be that he only started advancing
17
       after he was himself hit with nonlethal or observed others
18
       he was around having been hit with nonlethal rounds.
19
                 And so if there's a factual question about that,
20
       that's a jury question, and there should be an instruction
21
       on it.
22
                 MR. DALKE: I guess what I'm trying to get at is
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       with these fundamental underlying opinions, before we even
24
       get to that --
25
                 THE COURT: Well, let's talk about that first, and
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       then if it's totally out because it's a law enforcement
       officer, that's a different question.
2
 3
                 MR. DALKE: That's what I'm saying. The rules in
       the Red Book apply to assault, right?
 4
 5
                 THE COURT: Sure.
                 MR. DALKE: You're in Superior Court.
 6
 7
                 THE COURT: Sure.
 8
                 MR. DALKE: Two civilians, you get an assault.
 9
       get the situation.
10
                 That's not the situation we have here, so I think
11
       there is a question of whether we even get to Step B.
12
                 THE COURT: All right. Let's take it in your
13
       order then.
14
                 Judge Mehta gave an instruction in the Webster
15
             Did that involve a law enforcement officer?
       case.
16
                 MR. DALKE: It did, Your Honor.
17
                 THE COURT: So he was -- that was wrong?
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                 MR. DALKE: I think in the position of the
19
       government, that's not the instruction that we would -- we
20
       don't think those instructions should be given.
21
                 THE COURT: Okay.
22
                 MR. DALKE: I wasn't involved in the Mehta case.
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                 THE COURT: Do you know if the government proposed
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       that instruction or whether the government objected to it?
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                 MR. DALKE: I'm not sure of the origins of it. It
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       is the same instruction that we would be submitting; that if
2
       the Court was going to go that way, essentially that's what
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       we would be submitting.
 4
                 THE COURT: Okay. So the legal question is, as a
 5
       matter of law, if the evidence shows that the officers were
 6
       performing their duties, there is no self-defense
 7
       instruction under any circumstances?
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                 MR. DALKE: Because the individual's not justified
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       in using force under either resisting arrest or performance
10
       of a duty by a law enforcement officer within the scope of
11
       his duties. That's the first step.
12
                 THE COURT: Okay.
13
                 MR. DALKE: And I don't think they've presented
14
       any evidence contrary to that.
15
                 THE COURT: Okay.
16
                 MR. DALKE: So then you get to the second step --
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                 THE COURT: What if the force -- and I'm just
18
       thinking out loud here. What if the force by the police or
19
       the federal officials in this case was arguably excessive
20
       and a jury could make that finding? Is there a self-defense
21
       claim or right to self-defense in that situation?
22
                 MR. DALKE: I think that would go to whether it
23
       was within or outside the scope of their duties.
24
                 THE COURT: Okay.
25
                 MR. DALKE: I mean, we're starting to get into the
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kind of tail end of that kind of preliminary question.

THE COURT: So it's always within the scope of their duties to use reasonable force?

MR. DALKE: Reasonable force. And if you're getting beyond that, then I think you're outside the scope.

I think when we get to whether or not it's legally permitted for him to argue self-defense in this case, to -- it then comes to the question of what's the standard to raise that. And the -- I do think I've read the Webster instructions, and those would be where we're headed.

I guess the question is even to get to giving that instruction to the jury that was given in Webster, you know, he has to show through his own testimony, through the evidence, a standard which I don't think he's met that prima facie case. Right? So it is essentially that where a person reasonably believes that he or another is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from an adversary and the use of force is necessary to avoid the danger. And so that's what he must demonstrate.

And we cite the *United States vs. Slatten*decision, again, from the District of Columbia from 2018.

There is also the *United States vs. Middleton*, which is an 11th Circuit Decision, as well as Judge Mehta in *Webster*. I believe there's also the *Biggs* decision in the Ninth Circuit that we cited as well.

1 But it's clear from all these decisions, they just don't say self-defense and you give it. There's got to be a 2 3 showing to meet that burden, if it even applies. So that's 4 where we're at. 5 THE COURT: And which of those -- which parts of 6 that showing do you contend have not been met here? 7 MR. DALKE: I don't think there's a reasonable belief, I don't think there's an immediate danger, and I 8 9 don't think force is necessary to avoid the danger. So 10 those will be the three that there hasn't been a showing 11 about. 12 The first is the defendant was not in immediate 13 danger of unlawful bodily harm, nor were the others around 14 There's no evidence of injuries that have been him. 15 presented in this case. The only evidence of a rioter being 16 injured around that time was Guy Reffitt, the guy in the 17 blue jacket who was sprayed. 18 THE COURT: He showed his injuries in the 19 photographs of the bruises, right, the defendant's injuries? 20 MR. DALKE: You mean from the photographs 21 themselves? 22 THE COURT: Yes. And he testified he was injured. 23 MR. DALKE: And my counsel reminds me, those 24 injuries -- and I believe -- if I recall the testimony 25 correctly, were all after he advances up, gets hit with the

baton. I mean, that's the first contact. Right?

He doesn't have contact with law enforcement

before he moves up those steps. He wasn't -- he couldn't

have been shot with the PepperBalls because he's weaving his

5 way up through the crowd.

He gets up there. He takes the pallet; he moves up; they have the interaction. And that's when he testified, "This is when they hit me with the baton, and this is when they shot me in the groin area or in the leg area," when he was on that front line committing the assault. So I don't think there's evidence of injuries.

I do think, when we talk about defense of others, the case I want to talk about and the thing that we've got to get into is that only comes into play if others had the right to self-defense. Right? He doesn't just get to put a blanket around everyone around him and say, "Well, I'm going to defend you all." It has to go that they had to have a reasonable belief that they were in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm and that force was needed.

There's the Fersner decision, F-E-R-S-N-E-R, involving the United States from D.C. in 1984, and the quote was, "The trial court correctly observed that the right to use force in defense of a third person is predicated upon that other person's right to self-defense."

And here the evidence that's been shown is Guy

Reffitt repeatedly ignored those warnings that were on video, you know, and law enforcement didn't continue to use any force as to Guy Reffitt after he was sprayed. And there's no evidence of anything. He gets sprayed. He lies down. He continues to wave, but they're not -- there's no video of them shooting him. There's no video of, you know, any use of force.

So to say that he could take up arms and assault the officers to protect Guy Reffitt, there's no evidence of that in the record.

The second one is the immediate danger. Again, he's fully suited up. The evidence of -- there is no evidence that he was in immediate danger. I think from his own words, you know, it was, you know -- I forget the exact quote. I don't have it for you. But it was something to the effect of, you know, "Try that on me."

He's got the body armor. He's got the gas mask. I think he testified at one point he took the gas mask off and then he was sidelined.

But in that moment before the assault is all that matters, and I don't think there's been a showing of that.

And I don't think there's been a showing -- and this is where maybe it all comes down -- that force was necessary to avoid the danger, and they have to show that force was necessary to avoid the danger. That moving up

those steps, that putting the hands on the officer, to moving forward with the pallet was necessary. And it's not necessary. I mean, there's no -- he's four or five steps above the next rioter.

Guy Reffitt sat down, and he wasn't shot anymore. When Alberts came back down after confronting those officers, he wasn't shot anymore. Right? It was when he was moving up as the aggressor that they responded.

You know, I do think there was testimony from the defendant of people ducking in and out under the scaffolding, was his own words, "ducking in and out." You know, "ducking under."

He made his way up pretty easy, kind of weaving through the mob. He certainly could have made his way back down.

Again, to say that force was necessary and to put that question to the jury, they haven't -- and that's just to get it before the jury. I don't think they've met that.

I think he -- there is evidence -- what is in the evidence is that he ignored the warnings, that he escalated.

I think, as we also talked, there's evidence that at the time of this incident he was breaking the law, which goes to, you know, that underlying principle that use of force is not justified when they're resisting arrest or — and he certainly could have been arrested there. He's

subject to arrest.

And, again, all the evidence that the Court has seen and even from the defendant's own words is that he advanced; he moved forward; he moved forward and upward; he proceeded up those steps. There's nothing about the retreat.

It would be one thing if you say he stood there, and the law enforcement officers came down, and then there was a fight or a grapple. He advanced on those officers.

So I just don't think, for those reasons, both the underpinnings as well as the actual facts as applied to this case, the defendant has -- one, is not entitled to it; and, two, even if they were entitled to it under the circumstance, haven't met the preliminary showing for that issue to even reach the jury.

THE COURT: Okay. And if you could state as best you can what the standard is for that preliminary showing.

Any evidence? Scintilla of evidence? Prima facie case?

When I go back and decide whether there's enough in evidence -- assuming you're not right as a matter of law with respect to a federal law enforcement officer.

MR. DALKE: I think they have to make a showing, a prima facie case. They have to make some type of demonstration, and that's what we don't think is made here.

THE COURT: So something less than a

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       preponderance, but just some prima facie showing?
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                 MR. DALKE: I mean, it has to be a real showing.
 3
       It can't be --
 4
                 THE COURT: Sure.
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                 MR. DALKE: -- speculative, hypothetical. Like
 6
       it's got to be -- and it has to be consistent with the
7
       evidence that's in there.
                 THE COURT: Of course.
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 9
                 MR. DALKE: I think if it's clearly -- the videos
10
       confront -- you know, Mr. Alberts got up and for a day
       testified about all those things, but it's not consistent
11
12
       necessarily with the videos shown. So I don't think just
13
       saying "Well, he testified about it" is sufficient where,
14
       when he testifies, it's belied by the video evidence of the
15
       same time frame.
16
                 So I don't think that gets him there just to say,
17
       "Well, he listened to all the testimony throughout the week,
18
       and then he said otherwise." That doesn't get it. It needs
19
       to be a little bit more.
20
                 THE COURT: Okay.
21
                 All right. Mr. Roots? Mr. Pierce?
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                 MR. ROOTS: I think --
23
                 THE COURT: Hold on one second. I'm having
24
       trouble getting what I'm looking for.
25
                 (Pause)
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. PIERCE: Excuse me, Your Honor. We really 3 haven't had a break with everybody so far to use the 4 restroom, and I --5 THE COURT: Sure. Why don't we take a ten-minute 6 break. 7 MR. PIERCE: Thank you so much. (Recess taken) 8 9 THE COURT: All right. I am not going to give a 10 self-defense or defense of others instruction. I went back 11 and read the cases cited by the government, Drapeau from the 12 Eighth Circuit and Branch from the Fifth Circuit. 13 Obviously the application of self-defense in the 14 context of law enforcement officers performing their lawful 15 duties, which it's clear these officers were, is a different 16 sort of analytical issue than self-defense in regular 17 assault cases not involving law enforcement. 18 Quoting from the Drapeau case, "An individual is 19 not justified in using force for the purpose of resisting 20 arrest or in other performance of duty by a law enforcement 21 officer within the scope of his official duties." 22 In order to, I believe, establish the right to an 23 instruction or to justify an instruction, there must be 24 sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might 25 infer that either the defendant did not know the identity of

the law enforcement officer -- here there's testimony that the defendant obviously knew that the people at the top of the stairs were law enforcement officers -- or that the law enforcement officer's use of force viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that no reasonable juror that could conclude that the use of nonlethal pepper spray, tear gas, and plastic projectiles to protect rioters from scaling the stairs to eventually breach the Capitol who, from the perspective of the officers, were unauthorized to be there under all the circumstances reflected in the video and given the uses of those forms of lethal -- of nonlethal force testified to by Officer Kerkhoff, the Court does not think that there is sufficient evidence to justify a self-or-others defense instruction to a charge of assault against a law enforcement officer. And that is especially so given that there is no evidence of any injuries resulting from that use of nonlethal force other than the superficial injuries that Mr. -- that the defendant has testified to.

So we won't give a self-defense instruction.

Obviously your objections are noted for the record for any appellate review.

Okay. We distributed the latest version of the