

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	
	:	Case No. 21-CR-38 (CRC)
v.	:	
	:	
RICHARD BARNETT,	:	
	:	
Defendant.	:	

**GOVERNMENT’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
CHARGES AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO TRANSFER VENUE**

Defendant Richard Barnett, who is charged in connection with events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, has moved to dismiss all charges in the indictment or, in the alternative, to transfer venue in this case to another district. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Charges and in the Alternative to Transfer Venue (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 80, 81.¹ The defendant fails to establish that he “cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial” in this district, Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a), and the Court should deny his motion.²

¹ The defendant’s filings at ECF No. 80 and ECF No. 81 appear identical. Accordingly, the government refers to these filings collectively as the defendant’s motion. Citations to page numbers refer to the ECF automatically generated pagination reflected at the top of each page of ECF No. 80.

² Every member of this Court to have ruled on a motion for change of venue in a January 6 prosecution has denied the motion. *See United States v. Nassif*, No. 21-cr-421, ECF No. 42 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2022) (JDB); *United States v. Brock*, No. 21-cr-140, ECF No. 58 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2022) (JDB); *United States v. Williams*, No. 21-618, ECF No. 63 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022) (ABJ); *United States v. Garcia*, No. 21-cr-129, ECF No. 83 (D.D.C. July 22, 2022) (ABJ); *United States v. Bledsoe*, No. 21-cr-204 (July 15, 2022) (Minute Order) (BAH); *United States v. Rhodes*, No. 22-cr-15, ECF No. 176 (D.D.C. June 28, 2022) (APM); *United States v. Williams*, No. 21-cr-377 (June 10, 2022) (Minute Entry) (BAH); *United States v. McHugh*, No. 21-cr-453 (May 4, 2022) (Minute Entry) (JDB); *United States v. Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, ECF No. 78 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022) (APM); *United States v. Alford*, 21-cr-263, ECF No. 46 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2022) (TSC); *United States v. Brooks*, No. 21-cr-503, ECF No. 31 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2022) (RCL); *United States v. Bochene*, No. 21-cr-418-RDM, 2022 WL 123893 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2022) (RDM); *United States v. Fitzsimons*, No. 21-cr-158 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2021) (Minute Order) (RC); *United States v. Reffitt*,

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2021, a joint session of the United States Congress convened at the United States Capitol at approximately 1:00 p.m. to certify the vote count of the Electoral College of the 2020 Presidential Election, which had taken place on November 3, 2020. Temporary and permanent barricades were in place around the exterior of the U.S. Capitol building, and U.S. Capitol Police were present and attempting to keep the crowd that had gathered outside away from the Capitol building and the proceedings underway inside.

Shortly after 2:00 p.m., individuals in the crowd forced entry into the U.S. Capitol, including by breaking windows and by assaulting members of the U.S. Capitol Police, as others in the crowd encouraged and assisted those acts. Shortly thereafter, at approximately 2:20 p.m. members of the United States House of Representatives and United States Senate, including the President of the Senate, Vice President Mike Pence, were instructed to—and did—evacuate the chambers. Accordingly, the joint session of the United States Congress was effectively suspended until shortly after 8:00 p.m. Vice President Pence remained in the United States Capitol from the time he was evacuated from the Senate Chamber until the sessions resumed.

Following the 2020 Presidential Election, the defendant made numerous statements on local news outlets and social media about his opposition to the election results and his plan to be in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2021. He was among the crowd present on the restricted Capitol grounds, and he approached the Capitol building from the west side, traveling east. While approaching, he and others in the crowd followed and shouted at a group of Capitol Police officers making their way toward the building. The officers attempted to set up fencing to keep the crowd

No. 21-cr-32 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2021) (Minute Order) (DLF); *United States v. Caldwell*, 21-cr-28, ECF No. 415 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2021) (APM).

from further approaching the building as members of the crowd attempted to push the fencing away.

At approximately 2:43 p.m., the defendant pushed his way into the U.S. Capitol through the east side Rotunda doors with a crowd of rioters while carrying a U.S. flag and a ZAP Hike N Strike 950,000 Volt Stun Gun Walking Stick that he had purchased seven days earlier. The defendant had demonstrated the capabilities of the stun gun just the night before in his hotel lobby and had highlighted the stun gun, as well as the metal pole inside the flag, on social media before he traveled to D.C. Once inside the Capitol building, the defendant made his way to the office area of the Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi. While there, he took photographs, that were later circulated broadly to the public, with his feet propped up on furniture. As discussed further below, he also left menacing handwritten notes for the Speaker of the House.

The defendant was told to leave the Speaker's Office by a police officer. He then walked to the Rotunda, where, realizing that he had left his flag behind, he started yelling at officers to let him pass to get his flag back. The defendant said words to the effect of, "we are patriots, this is our building, I need my flag, you better get my flag . . . hey, I'm going to bring them in to get my flag. Y'all better get my flag, I going to bring 'em in . . . It's going to get really bad. I'm a patriot, I want my flag. Hey, we're fixin to call 'em in brother, get my flag . . . I want my fuckin flag. It's in Nancy Pelosi's office."

After leaving the building, while still on Capitol grounds, the defendant approached a line of police officers and shouted, "We're American citizens, we're patriots. Your boys maced me. This is my house, y'all maced me in my own house. This is gonna get real bad, not necessarily today, we're going to calm down and leave, but y'all gotta remember something. Y'all gotta pick a fucking side. This civil war, this isn't 'oh, somebody broke the law'—the fucking Communists

have declared war on us, boys.” He also used a bullhorn to give a speech to the crowd, declaring to loud cheers, “We took back our house, and I took Nancy Pelosi’s office!” He then gloated about his action of leaving a note for the Congresswoman, addressed her once again in disturbing terms, and, finally, initiated a chant of, “Our House.” The defendant proudly displayed an envelope that he had taken from the Speaker’s office, telling a news outlet, “I did not steal it. I bled on it because they were macing me and I couldn’t fucking see so I figured I am in her office. I got blood on her office. I put a quarter on her desk even though she ain’t fucking worth it. And I left her a note on her desk that says ‘Nancy, Bigo was here, you Bitch.’” One of several menacing handwritten notes recovered from the Speaker’s Office substantially matched the defendant’s description to the media.

In a January 8, 2021 interview with law enforcement, the defendant stated that while driving back home to Arkansas, he turned off his cell phone’s location services, used only cash, and kept his face covered. He also commented that the agents may not find much at his house because he is a “smart man.” The defendant’s property was searched pursuant to a warrant, and the clothing he wore the day of the offense was recovered from underneath a dog crate in the back of his significant other’s car. Although packaging for the stun gun was recovered, neither the stun gun itself nor the defendant’s phone were. However, the defendant used clips of video apparently recorded on the phone as exhibits in support of pretrial release. *See* Exhibit List, ECF No. 28-2. The defendant’s iCloud account was also searched pursuant to a warrant, with the results suggesting the defendant deleted all data reflecting his activities in Washington, D.C., on January 6, 2021.

Based on his actions on January 6, 2021, the defendant was charged with one count of obstruction of an official proceeding and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)

and 2; one count of entering and remaining in a restricted building or grounds with a deadly or dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A); one count of disorderly and disruptive conduct in a restricted building or grounds with a deadly or dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1752(a)(2) and (b)(1)(A); one count of entering and remaining in certain rooms in the Capitol building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(C); one count of disorderly conduct in a Capitol building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(D); one count of parading, demonstrating, or picketing in a Capitol building, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G); and one count of theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.

The defendant now moves to dismiss the charges brought against him or, in the alternative, for a change of venue based on juror prejudice. *See* Def.’s Mot. First, the defendant argues that “the government, in the persons of the President and the Congress under the January 6th Select Committee, has intentionally and irreparably poisoned the jury pool[]” in the entire United States, and that the resulting prejudice requires dismissal of the indictment in its entirety. *Id.* at 1. Second, the defendant contends that prejudice should be presumed in this district for several reasons: (1) the size and characteristics of the D.C. jury pool; (2) the pretrial publicity surrounding the events of January 6; and (3) the results of studies, surveys, and analysis regarding the D.C. jury pool. *Id.* at 11–14. Each of the defendant’s arguments is without merit, and his motion should be denied.

ARGUMENT

The Constitution provides that “[t]he trial of all Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth Amendment similarly guarantees the right to be tried “by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. These provisions provide “a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place.”

United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 407 (1958). Transfer to another venue is constitutionally required only where “extraordinary local prejudice will prevent a fair trial.” *Skilling v. United States*, 561 U.S. 358, 378 (2010); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a) (requiring transfer to another district if “so great a prejudice against the defendant exists in the transferring district that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial there”).

The primary safeguard of the right to an impartial jury is “an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors.” *Morgan v. Illinois*, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (italics omitted). Thus, the best course when faced with a pretrial publicity claim is ordinarily “to proceed to voir dire to ascertain whether the prospective jurors have, in fact, been influenced by pretrial publicity.” *United States v. Campa*, 459 F.3d 1121, 1146 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “[I]f an impartial jury actually cannot be selected, that fact should become evident at the voir dire.” *United States v. Haldeman*, 559 F.2d 31, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam). And, after voir dire, “it may be found that, despite earlier prognostications, removal of the trial is unnecessary.” *Jones v. Gasch*, 404 F.2d 1231, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

I. Statements Made by the President and Other Political Leaders Do Not Justify Dismissal of All Charges.

The defendant moves to dismiss the Indictment in light of nationally televised remarks by the President of the United States on September 1, 2022, arguing that those remarks “are akin to an order for D.C. juries to find defendants guilty of any and every charge because they are insurrectionists and terrorists.” Def.’s Mot. at 5. The defendant further asserts that publicized statements by members of the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol (the “Select Committee”) have “mirrored those remarks.” *Id.* at 4. The defendant’s attempt to dismiss the indictment on this basis fails for several reasons.

As an initial matter, the defendant cites no authority for the proposition that pretrial publicity can disqualify all prospective jurors in every single one of the United States' judicial districts and, therefore, prevent a defendant from being tried *anywhere* for his crimes. Indeed, “there does not appear to be a single precedent anywhere in the federal court system granting so drastic a remedy[.]” *United States v. Poindexter*, 725 F. Supp. 13, 37 (D.D.C. 1989); see *United States v. Smith*, No. CR-13-14-RMP-1, 2014 WL 1744253, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2014) (citing *Poindexter*, 725 F. Supp. at 37). Furthermore, the Supreme Court's and D.C. Circuit's decisions relating to venue provide no support for this extreme position. More than 140 years ago, the Supreme Court observed that “every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits.” *Reynolds v. United States*, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878). And the Supreme Court has since maintained that the “mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more,” does not require a change of venue. *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). “It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” *Id.* There is simply no reason to believe that 12 such jurors cannot be found in this District or let alone all 94 federal districts.

The D.C. Circuit held that even a change of venue was not required in cases arising from the Watergate scandal, even though some of the publicity was “hostile in tone and accusatory in content.” *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 61. The court observed that much of the pretrial publicity was “national in . . . reach” and that “[s]candal at the highest levels of the federal government is not simply a local crime.” *Id.* at 64 n.43. But the court found that venue was nevertheless appropriate

in the District of Columbia, and it certainly did not suggest that national coverage could disqualify all potential jurors across the entire country. *Id.* at 61.

Courts have declined even to transfer venue—much less dismiss the charges—in some of the most high-profile prosecutions in recent American history. *See In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (capital prosecution of Boston Marathon bomber); *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 399 (fraud trial of CEO of Enron Corporation); *United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56, 155 (2d Cir. 2003) (trial of participant in 1993 World Trade Center bombing); *United States v. Moussaoui*, 43 F. App'x 612, 613 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished) (terrorism prosecution for conspirator in September 11, 2001 attacks); *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 70 (Watergate prosecution of former Attorney General John Mitchell and other Nixon aides). And even in *United States v. McVeigh*, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 1471 (W.D. Okla. 1996), which involved an act of domestic terrorism that killed 169 people, the district court transferred venue to an adjoining state; it did not dismiss the indictment entirely. The defendant fails to explain how the President's remarks make his case more difficult to obtain an impartial jury than other high-profile cases involving acts of violence.

Additionally, the defendant understates the important role of voir dire in selecting an impartial jury. The primary safeguard of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is "an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors." *Morgan*, 504 U.S. at 729 (italics omitted). Thus, the best course when faced with a pretrial publicity claim is ordinarily "to proceed to voir dire to ascertain whether the prospective jurors have, in fact, been influenced by pretrial publicity." *Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1146. "[I]f an impartial jury actually cannot be selected, that fact should become evident at the voir dire." *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 63. "[V]oir dire has long been recognized as an effective method of routing out [publicity-based] bias, especially when conducted in a careful and

thoroughgoing manner.” *In re Nat’l Broadcasting Co.*, 653 F.2d 609, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (italics omitted). After a careful voir dire, this Court can select a jury from those residents who either did not watch the President’s remarks or who, despite having watched the remarks, give adequate assurances of their impartiality. *See Haldeman*, 559 F.3d at 62 n.35 (rejecting claim of prejudice even though “several jurors” had “seen portions of the televised Senate hearings” related to Watergate).

In addition to having no legal support, the defendant’s argument rests on the incorrect factual assumption that the President’s remarks have not only reached, but also instilled a commitment to “reverse jury nullification[.]” Def.’s Mot. at 8, in every eligible juror in a nation of over 330 million people. He provides no factual support for such a claim, failing to point to any evidence regarding how many people nationwide tuned in to the President’s remarks on September 1, 2022. Moreover, while the President did mention “MAGA Republicans,” the only two remarks by the President specific to January 6 attack at the Capitol were regarding those who stormed the Capitol in general and a reference to law enforcement being brutally attacked on January 6, 2021. There is no reason to believe that the remarks will create such a degree of bias against the defendant throughout the nation that an impartial jury cannot be selected in any district, as the defendant asserts.

Finally, it bears noting that the defendant himself has generated substantial pretrial publicity of his own, as noted in the government’s June 17, 2021 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Modify Conditions of Release, ECF No. 35. For instance, on April 29, 2021, the defendant, along with his attorneys Joseph McBride and Steven Metcalf gave a videoed interview

to NewsMax that was broadcast on multiple news channels and remains available on YouTube.³ On July 20, 2021, Attorney McBride appeared on CNN, discussed the defendant, and asked the interviewer, “Are you okay with people being tortured?”⁴ On July 29, 2021, the defendant spoke with NBC News and discussed his experience in pretrial detention in this case in what he described as “the patriots’ wing.”⁵ As recently as July 22, 2022, the defendant and attorney McBride appeared on One America News and the defendant stated that he personally saw “the police, the Capitol Police, attack[] innocent protesters. Yes, sir, I saw it.”⁶ It would be a perverse result to dismiss (or transfer) the defendant’s case as a result of publicity, when he has actively fanned that flame himself.

II. The Pretrial Publicity Related to January 6 Does Not Support a Presumption of Prejudice in This District.

Alternatively, the defendant contends that pretrial publicity warrants a change of venue. Def.’s Mot. at 8. “The mere existence of intense pretrial publicity is not enough to make a trial unfair, nor is the fact that potential jurors have been exposed to this publicity.” *United States v. Childress*, 58 F.3d 693, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1995); *see Murphy v. Florida*, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (juror exposure to “news accounts of the crime with which [a defendant] is charged” does not “alone presumptively deprive[] the defendant of due process”). Indeed, “every case of public

³ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFzDmNHIXBg> (“‘Pelosi desk guy’ and lawyers speak out”) (last visited October 1, 2022).

⁴ See <https://www.rawstory.com/richard-barnett-2653864121/> (referencing CNN interview) (last visited October 1, 2022).

⁵ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKDe3WDwY2o> (“Jan. 6 Defendant Richard Barnett Speaks with NBC News”) (last visited October 1, 2022).

⁶ See <https://www.mediamatters.org/one-america-news-network/january-6-hearing-kicked-oan-counterprogrammed-fawning-interview> (last visited October 1, 2022).

interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits.” *Reynolds*, 98 U.S. at 155-56. Thus, the “mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more,” is insufficient to establish prejudice. *Irvin*, 366 U.S. at 723. “It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” *Id.*

The Supreme Court has recognized only a narrow category of cases in which prejudice is presumed to exist without regard to prospective jurors’ answers during voir dire. *See Rideau v. Louisiana*, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). In *Rideau*, the defendant’s confession—obtained while he was in jail and without an attorney present—was broadcast three times shortly before trial on a local television station to audiences ranging from 24,000 to 53,000 individuals in a parish of approximately 150,000 people. *Id.* at 724 (majority opinion), 728-29 (Clark, J., dissenting). The Court concluded that, “to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it,” the televised confession “in a very real sense *was* Rideau’s trial—at which he pleaded guilty to murder.” *Id.* at 726. Thus, the Court “d[id] not hesitate to hold, without pausing to examine a particularized transcript of the voir dire,” that these “kangaroo court proceedings” violated due process. *Id.* at 726-27.

Since *Rideau*, the Supreme Court has emphasized that a “presumption of prejudice . . . attends only the extreme case,” *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 381, and the Court has repeatedly “held in other cases that trials have been fair in spite of widespread publicity,” *Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). In the half century since *Rideau*, the Supreme Court has never presumed prejudice based on pretrial publicity. *But see Estes v. Texas*, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (presuming

prejudice based on media interference with courtroom proceedings); *Sheppard v. Maxwell*, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (same). And, as previously stated, courts have declined to transfer venue in some of the most high-profile prosecutions in recent American history. *See In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d at 15 (capital prosecution of Boston Marathon bomber); *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 399 (fraud trial of CEO of Enron Corporation); *Yousef*, 327 F.3d at 155 (trial of participant in 1993 World Trade Center bombing); *Moussaoui*, 43 F. App'x at 613 (terrorism prosecution for conspirator in September 11, 2001 attacks); *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 70 (Watergate prosecution of former Attorney General John Mitchell and other Nixon aides).

In *Skilling*, the Supreme Court considered several factors in determining that prejudice should not be presumed where former Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling was tried in Houston, where Enron was based. *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382-83. First, the Court considered the “size and characteristics of the community.” *Id.* at 382. Unlike *Rideau*, where the murder “was committed in a parish of only 150,000 residents,” Houston was home to more than 4.5 million people eligible for jury service. *Id.* at 382. Second, “although news stories about Skilling were not kind, they contained no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight.” *Id.* Third, “over four years elapsed between Enron’s bankruptcy and Skilling’s trial,” and “the decibel level of media attention diminished somewhat in the years following Enron’s collapse.” *Id.* at 383. “Finally, and of prime significance, Skilling’s jury acquitted him of nine insider-trading counts,” which undermined any “supposition of juror bias.” *Id.*

Although these *Skilling* factors are not exhaustive, courts have found them useful when considering claims of presumptive prejudice based on pretrial publicity. *See, e.g., In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d at 21-22; *United States v. Petters*, 663 F.3d 375, 385 (8th Cir. 2011). And contrary to

the defendant's contention, those factors do not support a presumption of prejudice requiring a change of venue in this case.

A. Nature of the pretrial publicity

The defendant argues that prejudice should be presumed based on statements by the President and other political leaders. Def.'s Mot. at 15. But harsh condemnation of a defendant's actions is not uncommon in high-profile criminal cases, and it does not suffice to establish prejudice. In *Skilling*, the news stories about the defendant's involvement in Enron's collapse "were not kind," but they "contained no confession or other blatantly prejudicial information of the type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382. And in *Haldeman*, although some of the coverage of the Watergate scandal was "hostile in tone and accusatory in content," the bulk of the coverage "consist[ed] of straightforward, unemotional factual accounts of events and of the progress of official and unofficial investigations." *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 61. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the coverage "was neither as inherently prejudicial nor as unforgettable as the spectacle of Rideau's dramatically staged and broadcast confession." *Id.* The same is true here, where news coverage has not reported on any blatantly prejudicial information about the defendant. And, again, statements by the President and other political leaders are ordinarily reported across the entire country, and exposure to these statements is hardly unique to the District.

The defendant also contends that the Select Committee's nationally televised hearings support a change of venue. Def.'s Mot. at 12. But this exposure was not limited to D.C. Instead, the hearings were carried on national networks across the country. In similar circumstances, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of a change of venue where the defendants—who were high-ranking members of the Nixon administration—complained that they were prejudiced by news

coverage of the Watergate-related hearings. *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 62-64 & nn.35, 43. The court of appeals observed that “a change of venue would have been of only doubtful value” where the “network news programs and legislative hearings” related to Watergate were “national in their reach.” *Id.* at n.43. In any event, the defendant has not pointed to any evidence that D.C. residents were more likely to have watched that hearing than citizens in other parts of the country. And even if D.C. residents tuned in at a higher rate, it is still likely that most D.C. residents did not watch the hearings.

Additionally, a careful voir dire—rather than a change of venue—is the appropriate way to address potential prejudice from the Select Committee hearings. Again, “voir dire has long been recognized as an effective method of routing out [publicity-based] bias, especially when conducted in a careful and thoroughgoing manner.” *In re Nat’l Broadcasting Co.*, 653 F.2d at 617 (italics omitted). After a careful voir dire, this Court can select a jury from those residents who either did not watch the hearings or who, despite having watched the hearing, give adequate assurances of their impartiality. *See Haldeman*, 559 F.3d at 62 n.35 (rejecting claim of prejudice even though “several jurors” had “seen portions of the televised Senate hearings” related to Watergate).

The defendant asserts that a fair trial cannot be had in the District because of the volume of news coverage of January 6 and the “arguably heavier” extent of coverage specifically regarding him. Def.’s Mot. at 15. But even “massive” news coverage of a crime does not require prejudice to be presumed, *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 61, even assuming the defendant was subject to a level of news coverage different from any other defendant. Indeed, unlike most cases involving pretrial publicity, where the news coverage focuses on the responsibility of a single defendant (as in *Rideau* or *Tsarnaev*) or small number of co-defendants (as in *Skilling* and *Haldeman*), the events of January 6 involved thousands of participants and have so far resulted in charges against more than

800 people. The Court can guard against any spillover prejudice from the broader coverage of January 6 by conducting a careful voir dire and properly instructing the jury about the need to determine a defendant's individual guilt.

And, in any event, any threat of such spillover prejudice is not limited to the District because much of the news coverage of January 6 has been national in scope. *See Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 64 n.43 (observing that “a change of venue would have been of only doubtful value” where much of the news coverage was “national in [its] reach” and the crime was of national interest); *Bochene*, 2022 WL 123893, at *3 (“The fact that there has been ongoing media coverage of the breach of the Capitol and subsequent prosecutions, both locally and nationally, means that the influence of that coverage would be present wherever the trial is held.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the news stories that the defendant cites were published by media organizations with wide national circulation, not purely local outlets. *See* Def.'s Mot. at 16–17 (citing articles from the Washington Post, NPR, and the New York Times). As the Select Litigation poll cited by the defendant demonstrates, the number of potential jurors exposed to “[a] lot” of news coverage of January 6 differs only slightly between Washington, D.C. (33%) and Atlanta (30%). Def.'s Mot., Exhibit B, Appendix A at 2 (Question 8). Thus, the nature and extent of the pretrial publicity do not support a presumption of prejudice.

Finally, as noted above, the defendant himself has actively sought pretrial publicity in connection with his criminal case. It is at best ironic for him now to claim that his case should be dismissed or transferred on the basis of pretrial publicity.

B. Size and characteristics of the community

The defendant also contends that a D.C. jury cannot be impartial because of various characteristics of the District's jury pool: the District's size, the political makeup of the District's

electorate, the impact of January 6 on D.C. residents, and the purported bias of residents in the District. Def.'s Mot. at 26-30. None of these claims has merit.

1. The District of Columbia's size

The defendant argues, Def.'s Mot. at 12, that an impartial jury cannot be found in Washington, D.C., despite the District's population of nearly 700,000. Although this District may be smaller than most other federal judicial districts, it has a larger population than two states (Wyoming and Vermont), and more than four times as many people as the parish in *Rideau*. The relevant question is not whether the District is as populous as or possibly more transient than the Southern District of Texas in *Skilling*, but whether it is large enough that an impartial jury can be found. In *Mu'Min v. Virginia*, 500 U.S. 415, 429 (1991), the Court cited a county population of 182,537 as supporting the view that an impartial jury could be selected. And *Skilling* approvingly cited a state case in which there was "a reduced likelihood of prejudice" because the "venire was drawn from a pool of over 600,000 individuals." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382 (quoting *Gentile v. State Bar of Nev.*, 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991)). There is simply no reason to believe that, out of an eligible jury pool of nearly half a million, "12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled." *Id.*

2. The impact of January 6 on the District

The defendant contends that a D.C. jury could not be impartial because D.C. residents have been particularly affected by events surrounding January 6, including the deployment of the National Guard, the mayor's declaration of a state of emergency, road closures, and a curfew. Def.'s Mot. at 14. But January 6 is now more than a year in the past. Many D.C. residents do not live or work near the Capitol where the roads were closed and the National Guard was deployed. There is no reason to believe that the District's entire population of nearly 700,000 people was so affected by these events that the Court cannot seat an impartial jury here.

Indeed, courts routinely conclude that defendants can receive a fair trial in the location where they committed their crimes, despite the fact that some members of the community were victimized. See *In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d at 15 (Boston Marathon bombing); *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 399 (Enron collapse); *Yousef*, 327 F.3d at 155 (1993 World Trade Center bombing); *Moussaoui*, 43 F. App'x at 613 (September 11, 2001 attacks, including on the Pentagon). In *Skilling*, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Enron's "sheer number of victims" in the Houston area "trigger[ed] a presumption of prejudice." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 384 (quotation omitted). "Although the widespread community impact necessitated careful identification and inspection of prospective jurors' connections to Enron," the voir dire was "well suited to that task." *Id.* In this case too, voir dire can adequately identify those D.C. residents who were so affected by January 6 that they cannot impartially serve as jurors. There is no reason to presume prejudice.

C. Passage of time before trial

In *Skilling*, the Court considered the fact that "over four years elapsed between Enron's bankruptcy and Skilling's trial." *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 383. In this case, 21 months have already elapsed since the events of January 6, and more time will elapse before trial. This is far more than in *Rideau*, where the defendant's trial came two months after his televised confession. *Rideau*, 373 U.S. at 724. Although January 6 continues to be in the news, the "decibel level of media attention [has] diminished somewhat," *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 383. Moreover, only a relatively small percentage of the recent stories have specifically mentioned the defendant, see Def.'s Mot. at 15–16 (citing articles mentioning the defendant published in January 2021 and January 2022), and much of the reporting has been national in scope, rather than limited to Washington, D.C.

D. Jury Verdict

Because the defendant has not yet gone to trial, the final *Skilling* factor—whether the

“jury’s verdict . . . undermine[s] in any way the supposition of juror bias,” *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 383—does not directly apply. But the fact that *Skilling* considered this factor to be “of prime significance,” *id.*, underscores how unusual it is to presume prejudice before trial. Ordinarily, a case should proceed to trial in the district where the crime was committed, and courts can examine after trial whether the record supports a finding of actual or presumed prejudice. In short, none of the *Skilling* factors supports the defendant’s contention that the Court should presume prejudice and order a transfer of venue without even conducting voir dire.

The defendant insinuates that this factor actually *supports* his claim of prejudice because the other jury trials involving January 6 defendants have resulted in prompted and unanimous verdicts. *See* Def.’s Mot. at 25–26 (“[A]ll of the J[anuary] 6 trials before juries have resulted in unanimous jury verdicts promptly returned against the defendant[.]”). Although *Skilling* indicated that a split verdict could “undermine” a presumption of prejudice, it never suggested that a unanimous verdict—particularly a unanimous verdict in a separate case involving a different defendant—was enough to establish prejudice. The prompt and unanimous verdicts in prior January 6 jury trials resulted from the strength of the government’s evidence. And, as explained below, the jury selection in those cases actually demonstrates that impartial juries can be selected in this district.

III. The Polls Submitted by the Defendant Do Not Support a Change of Venue.

The defendant relies on three polls conducted at the request of defendants in other January 6 cases. Def.’s Mot. at 12–15 (relying on a poll conducted by In Lux Research, which the defendant refers to as the “Multi-District Study” and attaches as Exhibit A), 26–28 (relying again on the In Lux Research poll), 28–29 (relying on a poll conducted by Select Litigation at the request of the Federal Public Defender for the District of Columbia, which the defendant refers to as the

“PD Survey” and attaches as Exhibit B), 29–30 (relying on a poll conducted by John Zogby Strategies, which the defendant refers to as the “Zogby poll” and attaches as Exhibit C). None of these polls supports a change of venue.

A. Courts have repeatedly declined to find a presumption of prejudice based on pretrial polling without conducting voir dire.

Although the defendant contends that this Court should find a presumption of prejudice based on polls of prospective jurors, “courts have commonly rejected such polls as unpersuasive in favor of effective voir dire as a preferable way to ferret out any bias.” *United States v. Causey*, 2005 WL 8160703, at *7 (S.D. Tex. 2005). As one circuit has observed, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the important role of voir dire in addressing pretrial publicity “undercuts” the “argument that poll percentages . . . decide the question of a presumption of prejudice.” *In re Tsarnaev*, 780 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see *Mu’Min*, 500 U.S. at 427 (observing that, “[p]articularly with respect to pretrial publicity, . . . primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes good sense”).

Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has rejected a claim of presumed prejudice based on the results of a pre-voir dire survey. *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 64. In *Haldeman*, seven former Nixon administration officials (including the former Attorney General of the United States) were prosecuted for their role in the Watergate scandal. *Id.* at 51. According to a poll commissioned by the defense in that case, 93% of the Washington, D.C. population knew of the charges against the defendants and 61% had formed the opinion that they were guilty. *Id.* at 144, 178 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Recognizing that the case had produced a “massive” amount of pretrial publicity, *id.* at 61, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless held that the district court “was correct” to deny the defendants’ “pre-voir dire requests for . . . a change of venue,” *id.* at 63-64. The court observed that the district court “did not err in relying less heavily

on a poll taken in private by private pollsters and paid for by one side than on a recorded, comprehensive voir dire examination conducted by the judge in the presence of all parties and their counsel.” *Id.* at 64 n.43; *see Jones*, 404 F.2d at 1238 (observing that it is “upon the voir dire examination,” and “usually only then, that a fully adequate appraisal of the claim [of local community prejudice] can be made” (quotation omitted)).

Other circuits have similarly rejected attempts to elevate polling results over voir dire. In *United States v. Campa*, a pretrial survey found that 69% of respondents were prejudiced against anyone charged with spying on behalf of Cuba, as the defendants were. *Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1157 (Birch, J., dissenting). The en banc Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion for change of venue, explaining that “[w]hen a defendant alleges that prejudicial pretrial publicity would prevent him from receiving a fair trial, it is within the district court’s broad discretion to proceed to voir dire to ascertain whether the prospective jurors have, in fact, been influenced by pretrial publicity.” *Id.* at 1146 (majority opinion).

Similarly, in *United States v. Rodriguez*, 581 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2009), a poll indicated that 99 percent of respondents had heard about the brutal rape and murder with which the defendant was charged, nearly 88 percent of those respondents believed he was guilty, and about 42 percent of respondents had a strongly held opinion of his guilt. *Id.* at 786; Brief for the Appellant, *United States v. Rodriguez*, No. 07-1316 (8th Cir.), 2008 WL 194877, at *19. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit found no presumption of prejudice, observing that a district court was not required “to consider public opinion polls when ruling on change-of-venue motions.” *Rodriguez*, 581 F.3d at 786. And the court held that, in any event, the poll did not “demonstrate widespread community prejudice” because the “media coverage had not been inflammatory,” two years had passed since the murder, and “the district court concluded that special voir dire protocols would screen out

prejudiced jurors.” *Id.*

There are good reasons to rely on voir dire, rather than public-opinion polls, when assessing whether prejudice should be presumed. First, polling lacks many of the safeguards of court-supervised voir dire, including the involvement of both parties in formulating the questions. Surveys that are not carefully worded and properly conducted can produce misleading results, such as by asking leading questions or providing the respondents with facts that will influence their responses. *See Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1146 (noting problems with “non-neutral” and “ambiguous” questions). Second, polling lacks the formality that attends in-court proceedings under oath, and it does not afford the court the “face-to-face opportunity to gauge demeanor and credibility.” *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 395. Third, polls ordinarily inform the court only the extent to which prospective jurors have heard about a case and formed an opinion about it. But that is not the ultimate question when picking a jury. A prospective juror is not disqualified simply because he has “formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case.” *Irvin*, 366 U.S. at 722. Instead, “[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” *Id.* at 723. But pretrial surveys are poorly suited to answering that ultimate question, which is best asked in the context of face-to-face voir dire under oath. *See Rosales-Lopez v. United States*, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (observing that the trial judge’s function in voir dire “is not unlike that of the jurors later in the trial” because “[b]oth must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions”).

In sum, federal courts have shown an overwhelming preference for assessing prejudice through court-supervised voir dire rather than through public opinion polls. And the defendant has not offered any reason to depart from that usual practice here. Thus, this Court need not give

substantial weight to the polling when considering whether to presume prejudice. Nevertheless, as explained below, the polls submitted by the defendant do not support a presumption of prejudice in any event.

B. The In Lux Research poll does not demonstrate pervasive prejudice in the District of Columbia.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the In Lux Research ("ILR") poll does not support a presumption of prejudice in this District. First, the poll demonstrates that respondents in all four jurisdictions surveyed were aware of the events of January 6 at similar rates. Def.'s Mot., Exhibit A ("ILR Poll"), Appendix B at 1 (Question 1) (93.12% of D.C. respondents "aware" of the demonstration at the U.S. Capitol, compared to 94.07% in Middle Florida, 91.60% in Eastern North Carolina, and 94.27% in Eastern Virginia). The survey also shows that respondents' media or conversational exposure to the events of January 6 did not vary significantly between jurisdictions. The survey asked respondents how often they "see, read or hear about the events of January 6th from either the Media, Local Leaders or the people around you." *Id.*, Appendix A at 1 (Question 4). The percentage of respondents reporting "[a]t least 10 times a week" was only slightly higher in D.C., with a response rate of 32.02%, compared to rates between 25% and 28% in the other three jurisdictions. *Id.*, Appendix B at 1. And the percentage of D.C. respondents answering "[s]everal times a week" or "[o]nce or twice a week" were generally within one or two percentage points of respondents from other jurisdictions. *Id.* (41.09% of D.C. respondents reported exposure "[s]everal times a week," compared to 39.82%, 39.30%, and 34.58% in the other jurisdictions, and 22.05% of D.C. respondents reporting exposure "[o]nce or twice a week," compared to 20.66%, 22.68%, and 23.99% in the other jurisdictions). The survey thus confirms that exposure to reports of the events of January 6 is not confined to D.C., and the relatively small difference does not suggest that news coverage has made it impossible to pick an impartial jury in

the District.

The ILR survey's summary focuses on responses to "prejudicial prejudgment" questions. *Id.* at 1. But those questions do not show that an impartial jury cannot be selected in this District.

The questions categorized as "prejudgment questions" were:

- (1) "Are you more likely to find a defendant charged with crimes for activities on January 6th guilty or not guilty? Or is it too early to decide?" (72% of D.C. respondents answered "Guilty.")
- (2) "In your opinion, which of the following terms best characterizes the Events of January 6th? 1) An insurrection, 2) An attack, 3) A riot, 4) A protest that got out of control, 5) A rally." (82% of D.C. respondents chose insurrection, attack, or riot.)
- (3) "Do you believe that the individuals who entered the Capitol on January 6th planned to do it in advance or decided to do it that day?" (71% of D.C. respondents selected "planned in advance.")
- (4) "Do you believe The Events of January 6th were racially motivated?" (40% of D.C. respondents answered in the affirmative.)

Id. at 2–3, 8, Appendix A at 1–2. The last three of these questions do not support a presumption of prejudice because they have little relevance to the potential issues at trial. The trial in this case would not require jurors to determine whether the events of January 6 were an "insurrection," an "attack," a "riot," or a "protest that got out of control." Indeed, no defendant has been charged with the offense of insurrection, 18 U.S.C. § 2383, or of violating the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101, in connection with the events of January 6.

Nor would the charges in this case require the jurors to determine whether the defendant "planned in advance" to enter the Capitol or whether the crimes were "racially motivated." The

fact that some D.C. respondents have formed “prejudgments” on those questions does not demonstrate that they cannot follow this court’s instructions and decide this case based on the law and the evidence. And even if it did, the solution would be to exclude prospective jurors who indicated “prejudgments” during voir dire. The ILR survey shows that some percentage of respondents in *all* surveyed jurisdictions expressed these so-called “prejudgments.” *Id.*, Appendix B at 2 (Questions 6 and 9) (between 39% and 49% of respondents in other surveyed jurisdictions thought entry into the Capitol was planned in advance, and between 11% and 20% believed the events of January 6 were racially motivated). This demonstrates that a careful voir dire would be necessary in any jurisdiction, and it fails to show that voir dire would be inadequate to weed out biased jurors in the District of Columbia.

Nor do the responses to the first “prejudicial prejudice” question support a presumption of prejudice. That question asked respondents whether, in the abstract, they were “more likely” to find a defendant charged in connection with January 6 “guilty or not guilty.” The question failed to ask about any specific crimes. And it failed to ask respondents whether they could keep an open mind and decide a case based on the law and the evidence if selected as a juror. Yet the Supreme Court has made clear that the key question in jury selection is whether a prospective juror could “lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” *Irvin*, 366 U.S. at 722-23.

When focusing on whether prospective jurors could set aside their “prejudgments” and decide a case fairly, the ILR survey’s responses actually undermine the defendant’s claim that prejudice should be presumed in this district. When asked whether it would be “possible for [them] to be a fair and unbiased juror for a January 6th Defendant,” ILR Poll, Appendix A, at 3, a full 70.13% of D.C. respondents said that they “could,” *id.*, Appendix B at 3. This number was actually

higher than the affirmative responses in the other three jurisdictions: Middle Florida (61.29%), Eastern North Carolina (65.38%), and Eastern Virginia (69.52%). *Id.*

The ILR survey's administrator asserts that "this representation may actually indicate a failure to recognize or admit threats to fairness and impartiality." *Id.* at 5. But the survey's findings do not justify that assertion. The administrator claims that because D.C. residents were more likely to characterize the events of January 6 as an "insurrection," "attack," or "riot," or to believe they were criminal, pre-planned, or racially motivated, *id.*, Appendix A at 2, Appendix B at 2, those residents "demonstrate[d] an inability to identify or unwillingness to report previously disclosed bias when asked if they could be a fair and impartial juror," *id.* at 5. But this assumes, contrary to clear decisions from the Supreme Court, that any knowledge of or preconceived opinions about a case make a juror unable to be impartial. *See Reynolds*, 98 U.S. at 155-56; *Irvin*, 366 U.S. at 723. It also assumes that these jurors would fail to report these views to a judge during voir dire. Particularly because the ILR survey had already asked respondents specific questions that the survey claims showed "prejudicial prejudice," there is no reason to believe that D.C. respondents were somehow unable or "unwilling[]" to report their own biases when asked if they could be impartial.

Moreover, when asked if their "neighbors would be fair and unbiased jurors for a January 6th Defendant," D.C. respondents still answered "Yes" at a higher rate than the other surveyed districts. ILR Poll, Appendix B at 3 (53.25% in D.C., compared to 36.57% in Middle Florida, 45.10% in Eastern North Carolina, and 40.89% in Eastern Virginia). Thus, even when controlling for respondents' potential inability to discern their own biases, the survey does not indicate that D.C. residents are substantially less able to be fair than prospective jurors from other jurisdictions. Nor were D.C. respondents significantly more likely to worry about negative consequences to their

career or friendships if they were to “find[] a January 6th defendant Not Guilty.” *Id.*, Appendix A at 2, Appendix B at 3 (19.29% in D.C., compared to 17.68% in Middle Florida, 19.66% in Eastern North Carolina, and 18.56% in Eastern Virginia). The ILR survey does not support the conclusion that an impartial jury cannot be found in Washington, D.C.

C. The Select Litigation poll does not demonstrate pervasive prejudice in the District of Columbia.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Select Litigation poll does not support a presumption of prejudice in this District. As an initial matter, the Select Litigation poll selected only one comparator jurisdiction—the Atlanta Division of the Northern District of Georgia. The defendant has not specifically requested a transfer to that district or division, but instead suggest a request this Court for a transfer to “the Eastern District of Virginia or some other [d]istrict.” Def.’s Mot. at 15. The Select Litigation survey tells the Court nothing about the views or media exposure of prospective jurors in the Eastern District of Virginia. The poll therefore cannot show that selecting an impartial jury would be any more difficult in the District of Columbia than in the defendant’s specified district. *See United States v. Haldeman*, 559 F.2d 31, 64 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per curiam) (observing that a change of venue “would have been only of doubtful value” where the pretrial publicity was national in scope).

Furthermore, to the extent the poll is useful at a more general level in comparing the District of Columbia to other districts, the poll indicates that levels of media exposure to the events of January 6 are not significantly different in Atlanta than in Washington, D.C. The number of respondents who had seen “[a] lot” of coverage in each jurisdiction differed only by three percentage points (33% in D.C. versus 30% in Atlanta), which is within the margin of error. Def.’s Mot., Exhibit B (“Select Litigation Poll”) at 1–2, Appendix A at 2. The number of respondents who had seen “[s]ome” coverage was exactly the same (25% in both jurisdictions), and the number

who had seen “[q]uite a bit” of coverage was not significantly different (28% in D.C. versus 20% in Atlanta). *Id.*, Appendix A at 2. The total percentage of respondents who were exposed to “[a] lot,” “[q]uite a bit,” or “[s]ome” news coverage was 86% in Washington, D.C. and 75% in Atlanta. *Id.* This relatively small difference does not suggest that news coverage has made it impossible to pick an impartial jury in Washington, D.C.

The defendant references, Def.’s Mot. at 26, that the survey indicated 71% of respondents in D.C. said they had formed the opinion January 6 arrestees were “guilty” of the charges brought against them. *See* Select Litigation Poll, Appendix A at 2. The survey failed, however, to identify (much less define) any of the charges brought against the defendant. It also failed to provide respondents with the option of saying they were “unsure” about guilt, even though such an option is required by professional standards that apply in this area. *See* American Society of Trial Consultants, Professional Standards for Venue Surveys at 9, available at <https://www.astcweb.org/Resources/Pictures/Venue%2010-08.pdf> (“Respondents must be made aware that they can say they do not know or have no opinion.”). The survey instead gave respondents a binary choice between “guilty or not guilty.” Select Litigation Poll, Appendix A at 2. Yet even without being provided the appropriate options, 26% of D.C. respondents voluntarily gave an answer of “Depends” or “Don’t know/Refused.” *Id.* This shows that, even in response to a poorly worded question, more than a quarter of the District’s residents realized the need to keep an open mind about guilt.

Understood in context, the Select Litigation poll does not indicate any higher degree of juror bias than in *Haldeman*, where the en banc D.C. Circuit found no presumption of prejudice. In *Haldeman*, 61% of respondents expressed a view that the defendants were guilty, as opposed to the 71% here. *See Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 144, 178 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). But the survey in *Haldeman* first asked respondents whether they had formed an opinion about whether the indicted Nixon aides were guilty or innocent, giving options for both “No” (*i.e.* had not formed an opinion) and “Don’t Know/No Opinion.” *Id.* at 178 n.2. The survey then asked whether respondents thought the defendants were “guilty or innocent in the Watergate affair,” giving options for “Not Guilty Until Proven” and “No Opinion/Don’t Know.” *Id.* Only after (a) being prompted to consider whether they could actually form an opinion, and (b) being reminded of the presumption of innocence, did 61% of respondents say “guilty.” *Id.* Here, by contrast, respondents were not provided a “don’t know” option, were not reminded of the presumption of innocence, and were asked only whether they thought the “several hundred people” arrested in connection with January 6 were “guilty.” Select Litigation Poll, Appendix A at 2 (Questions 3, 4).

When asked about guilt in the context of a criminal trial, however, respondents in the Select Litigation survey were far less likely to give an answer of “guilty.” Question 5 asked them to “[a]ssume [they] were on a jury for a defendant charged with crimes for his or her activities on January 6” and then asked whether they were “more likely to vote that the person is guilty or not guilty.” *Id.* In response to this question, only 52% of D.C. respondents said “Guilty,” and 46% volunteered a response of “Depends” or “Don’t know/Refused.” *Id.* Thus, when asked to consider guilt or innocence in the context of a “defendant charged with crimes,” as opposed to the “several hundred people . . . arrested,” nearly half of D.C. residents were committed to keeping an open mind—even without being instructed on the presumption of innocence or being provided an option for “Do not know.” This indicates, if anything, a lower degree of prejudice than was present in *Haldeman*.

The defendant also points out, Def.’s Mot. at 29, that 62% of D.C. respondents (compared

to 48% of Atlanta respondents) would describe “most of the people who were arrested for their involvement in the events on January 6th” as “criminals.” Select Litigation Poll, Appendix A at 2 (Question 10). The answers to this question likely reflect the commonly held view that most people arrested for crimes are in fact guilty of those crimes. But the fact that 62% of D.C. respondents expressed this off-the-cuff view about “most” of the 700-plus January 6th arrestees does not demonstrate that all of those respondents would be unable to impartially find the facts in a specific case after being properly instructed by the Court. Moreover, the question demonstrates that fully 28% of D.C. respondents would *not* describe those arrestees as criminals, and 9% were unsure or refused to answer. *Id.* And the 14% difference between D.C. and Atlanta—which could easily be explained by demographic differences such as age and education levels (*see* Select Litigation Poll, Appendix A at 3)—would not justify the conclusion that this is an “extreme case” in which a change of venue is required. *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 381.

Nor should prejudice be presumed because a substantial numbers of respondents “would” describe “the people who forced their way into the U.S. Capitol” as “[t]rying to overturn the election and keep Donald Trump in power” (85%), engaging in “[i]nsurrection” (76%), or “[t]rying to overthrow the U.S. government” (72%). Select Litigation Poll, Appendix A at 3. For one thing, this question asked specifically about those who “forced their way into the U.S. Capitol,” which suggests a higher degree of culpability than simply entering the Capitol. For another, the poll did not provide an “undecided” option but asked only whether respondents “would” or “would not” use those descriptions. *Id.* Nor did the question define the offenses of “insurrection” or advocating the overthrow of government, *see* 18 U.S.C. §§ 2383, 2385, offenses with which no defendant has been charged in connection with January 6. And, most importantly, the poll did not answer the key question: whether a sufficient number of prospective jurors can “lay aside [their] impression[s]

or opinion[s] and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” *Irvin v. Dowd*, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); *see Patton v. Yount*, 467 U.S. 1025, 1029 (1984) (no presumption of prejudice where nearly 99% of prospective jurors had heard of the case and 77% indicated on voir dire that “they would carry an opinion into the jury box”). In short, the Select Litigation poll does not come close to demonstrating that “12 impartial individuals could not be empaneled” in Washington, D.C. *Skilling*, 561 U.S. at 382.

D. The Zogby poll does not demonstrate pervasive prejudice in the District of Columbia.

Nor does the poll conducted by John Zogby Strategies at the request of another January 6 defendant, Gabriel Garcia, support a presumption of prejudice. In fact, there are particularly strong reasons to doubt poll’s reliability. For one thing, the poll does not provide the Court with all the information needed to assess its accuracy. The American Society of Trial Consultants’ Professional Standards for Venue Surveys state the following:

The trial consultant’s presentation of survey results to a court shall include [t]he questionnaire that was used in the survey, identification of the primary persons who performed the work (including their qualifications), and descriptions of how each of the following standard steps for conducting a survey was completed:

- Design of the survey instrument.
- Determination of eligibility and sampling measures.
- Training of interviewers and supervisors to conduct the interviewing.
- Interviewing procedures.
- Dates of data collection
- Calculation of sample completion rate.
- Tabulation of survey data.

American Society of Trial Consultants (ASTC), Professional Standards for Venue Surveys at 7, available at <https://www.astcweb.org/Resources/Pictures/Venue%2010-08.pdf>.

The Zogby poll fails to provide critical information, such as how the 400 survey participants were selected for the vaguely described “online survey” and whether they self-selected. Def.’s Mot., Exhibit C (“Zogby Poll”) at 2; *see United States v. Thomley*, No. 2:18-CR-

18-KS-MTP, 2018 WL 5986754, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 14, 2018) (“The Court is . . . troubled by [the polling firm’s] failure to explain *how* they selected their sample. Did they obtain responses online or via social media? Did respondents self-select?”). Additionally, the explanation that is provided indicates that the poll was underinclusive, in that it was only of “Washington DC registered voters,” Zogby Poll at 2, whereas this Court’s jury pool is generated based on voter registration, Department of Motor Vehicles records, and D.C. income tax forms. Jury Selection Plan for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for the Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors at 1, available at <https://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/JurySelectionPlan2016.pdf>.

Moreover, the Zogby poll uses a number of compound, non-neutral, and leading questions. *See Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1131-32, 1146 (affirming district court’s decision to reject venue survey that used “ambiguous” and “non-neutral” questions). For example, Question 8 asked respondents which description of January 6 “comes closer to your opinion,” giving options only for (A) “a dire threat to the fabric of our nation and . . . the worst assault on US democracy since 9/11, Pearl Harbor, or even the Civil War” or (B) “unwise and caused senseless damage to the Capitol building and people’s lives, some of which were lost, but the events were not insurrectionist and did not pose a threat to US democracy.” Zogby Poll at 21, 40. These answers, in addition to being compound, forced respondents into a binary choice between extreme options. For example, there was no choice for someone who believed the events *did* pose a threat to U.S. democracy but did not approach the level of 9/11, Pearl Harbor, or the Civil War. Nor was there a choice for someone who believed the events did *not* pose a threat to U.S. democracy but was also unwilling to describe them as “unwise” or “senseless.”

The survey’s next question asked whether respondents believed that “any individual who

was inside the US Capitol on January 6, 2021 should be convicted of insurrection.” Zogby Poll at 22, 40. This question is poorly worded, considering that hundreds of “individual[s] who w[ere] inside the US Capitol on January 6” had every right to be there, including the Vice President, the members of Congress, and the U.S. Capitol Police and U.S. Secret Service. Moreover, the question provided no background on potential criminal offenses involved in the events of January 6 other than “insurrection”—which the question does not define or describe, *see* 18 U.S.C. § 2383, and with which no defendant has been charged in connection with the events of January 6. And the setup for this question naturally prompted respondents to condemn the actions of January 6 rather than to consider whether they actually believed everyone who entered the Capitol without permission was an insurrectionist. In short, these questions have the earmarks of an inappropriate “push poll” that is “primarily designed to influence survey respondents’ opinions in a particular direction by presenting systematically biased information.” ASTC Professional Standards for Venue Surveys at 7; *see id.* at 8 (“Efforts should be made to avoid context, wording or other influences that raise the likelihood of responses due to social desirability or other response bias.”); *Campa*, 459 F.3d at 1146 (observing that “the survey was riddled with non-neutral questions”).

Even if the Zogby poll’s results are taken at face value, the poll does not support a presumption of prejudice in this district. The defendant asserts that “88% of registered D.C. voters believe that if [Gabriel] Garcia went inside the Capitol building on January 6, 2021, he should be convicted of obstruction of justice and civil disorder[.]”⁷ Def.’s Mot. at 30. In fact, the Zogby poll shows that this belief was held by 125 (88%) of the 143 respondents who were (a) familiar with the events of January 6 *and* (b) familiar with the Proud Boys *and* (c) familiar with Garcia

⁷ As with the question about “insurrection,” the question makes no effort to inform respondents about what is required for the government to prove the relevant criminal offenses. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) (obstruction of justice); 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (civil disorder).

himself. Zogby Poll at 27 (125 of 143). When the respondents who lacked this familiarity are accounted for, the percentage of overall respondents believing Garcia should be convicted if he entered the Capitol falls to 31%. *Id.* at 19, 27 (125 of 401). That is hardly sufficient to support a presumption of prejudice.

The defendant contends that the Zogby poll shows that “73% of respondents believed that anyone who merely entered the Capitol building on January 6, 2021 is guilty of insurrection[.]” Def.’s Mot. at 30. In fact, the Zogby poll showed that 73% of respondents who were “Very familiar” or “Somewhat familiar” with January 6 held this belief. Zogby Poll at 22 (277 of 380 respondents). When respondents who were “Not familiar/Not sure” are taken into account, the percentage falls to 69%. *Id.* at 19, 22 (277 of 401 respondents). And this does not raise a presumption of prejudice. In *Patton v. Yount*, nearly 99% of prospective jurors had heard of the case, and 77% indicated on voir dire that “they would carry an opinion into the jury box,” yet the Supreme Court rejected a claim of presumed prejudice. *Patton*, 467 U.S. at 1029. Thus, the number of poll respondents who had formed a general opinion about January 6 defendants was lower than in *Patton*, even though the Zogby poll did not ask respondents whether they could set aside their opinions and determine guilt based solely on the evidence if called as jurors. *Compare Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 144, 178 n.2 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (61% of survey respondents held the opinion that defendants were “guilty” in connection with Watergate even when provided a survey option for “Not Guilty Until Proven”). At most, these responses indicate the Court might have to call a somewhat larger venire in order to find 12 impartial jurors; they do not demonstrate that it is impossible to pick an unbiased jury.

The defendant discusses several other findings from the Zogby poll, many of them variations on the findings just discussed. Def.’s Mot. at 30. But all these findings suffer from the

same flaw—they fail to show a level of bias against the defendant so high that this Court can presume prejudice, forgo voir dire, and transfer venue to another jurisdiction. In fact, the Zogby poll fails to provide *any* information about prospective jurors’ familiarity with and prejudice toward the defendant in this case.

In any U.S. jurisdiction, most prospective jurors will have heard about the events of January 6, and many will have various disqualifying biases. But the appropriate way to identify and address those biases is through a careful voir dire, rather than a change of venue based solely on pretrial polling and media analyses. As in *Haldeman*, there is “no reason for concluding that the population of Washington, D. C. [i]s so aroused against [the defendant] and so unlikely to be able objectively to judge [his] guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” that a change of venue is required. *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 62.

IV. The January 6-Related Jury Trials That Have Already Occurred Have Demonstrated the Availability of a Significant Number of Fair, Impartial Jurors in the D.C. Venire.

At this point, multiple January 6 cases have proceeded to jury trials, and the Court in each of those cases has been able to select a jury without undue expenditure of time or effort. *See Murphy*, 421 U.S. at 802-03 (“The length to which the trial court must go to select jurors who appear to be impartial is another factor relevant in evaluating those jurors’ assurances of impartiality.”); *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 63 (observing that “if an impartial jury actually cannot be selected, that fact should become evident at the voir dire”). Instead, the judges presiding over those trials generally have been able to select a jury in one or two days. *See United States v. Reffitt*, 21-cr-32, Minute Entries (Feb. 28 and Mar. 1, 2022); *United States v. Robertson*, 21-cr-34, Minute Entry (Apr. 5, 2022); *United States v. Thompson*, 21-cr-161, Minute Entry (Apr. 11, 2022); *United States v. Webster*, No. 21-cr-208, Minute Entry (Apr. 25, 2022); *United States v. Hale-Cusanelli*, 21-cr-37, Minute Entry (May 23, 2022); *United States v. Williams*, 21-cr-377, Minute Entry (June

27, 2022); *United States v. Bledsoe*, No. 21-cr-204, Minute Entry (July 18, 2022); *United States v. Herrera*, No. 21-cr-619, Minute Entry (D.D.C. August 15, 2022); *United States v. Jensen*, 21-cr-6, Minute Entries (Sep. 19 and Sep. 20, 2022). The only exception has been a trial involving seditious conspiracy charges against five members of the Oath Keepers, in which the jury selection took three days. See *United States v. Rhodes, et al.*, No. 22-cr-15, Minute Entries (Sept. 27, 28, 29). And, using the first five jury trials as exemplars, the voir dire that took place undermines the defendant's claim that prejudice should be presumed.⁸

In *Reffitt*, the Court individually examined 56 prospective jurors and qualified 38 of them (about 68% of those examined). See *Reffitt* Trial Tr. 521. The Court asked all the prospective jurors whether they had “an opinion about Mr. Reffitt’s guilt or innocence in this case” and whether they had any “strong feelings or opinions” about the events of January 6 or any political beliefs that it would make it difficult to be a “fair and impartial” juror. *Reffitt* Trial Tr. 23, 30. The Court then followed up during individual voir dire. Of the 18 jurors that were struck for cause, only nine (or 16% of the 56 people examined) indicated that they had such strong feelings about the events of January 6 that they could not serve as fair or impartial jurors.⁹

In *Thompson*, the Court individually examined 34 prospective jurors, and qualified 25 of them (or 73%). See *Thompson* 4-11-22 Tr. 169, 171, 180, 189, 192. The court asked the entire

⁸ Because they remain restricted on PACER, the transcripts from the voir dire proceedings in two of these cases are being submitted under separate cover to the Court and counsel.

⁹ For those struck based on a professed inability to be impartial, see *Reffitt* Trial Tr. 49-54 (Juror 328), 61-68 (Juror 1541), 112-29 (Juror 1046), 172-73 (Juror 443), 174-78 (Juror 45), 202-09 (Juror 1747), 223-35 (Juror 432), 263-74 (Juror 514), 358-69 (Juror 1484). For those struck for other reasons, see *Reffitt* Trial Tr. 168-172 (Juror 313, worked at Library of Congress), 209-24, 281 (Juror 728, moved out of D.C.), 284 (Juror 1650, over 70 and declined to serve), 340-51 (Juror 548, unavailability), 382 (Juror 715, anxiety and views on guns), 398 (Juror 548, medical appointments), 441-43 (Juror 1240, health hardship), 453-65 (Juror 464, worked at Library of Congress), 465-81 (Juror 1054, prior knowledge of facts).

venire 47 standard questions, and then followed up on their affirmative answers during individual voir dire. *Id.* at 3-4, 34. Of the nine prospective jurors struck for cause, only three (or about 9% of those examined) were stricken based on an inability to be impartial, as opposed to some other cause.¹⁰

Similarly, in *Robertson*, the Court individually examined 49 prospective jurors and qualified 34 of them (or about 69% of those examined). See *Robertson* Trial Tr. 302. The Court asked all prospective jurors whether they had “such strong feelings” about the events of January 6 that it would be “difficult” to follow the court’s instructions “and render a fair and impartial verdict.” *Id.* at 14. It asked whether anything about the allegations in that case would prevent prospective jurors from “being neutral and fair” and whether their political views would affect their ability to be “fair and impartial.” *Id.* at 13, 15. The Court followed up on affirmative answers to those questions during individual voir dire. Of the 15 prospective jurors struck for cause, only nine (or 18% of the 49 people examined) indicated that they had such strong feelings about the January 6 events that they could not be fair or impartial.¹¹

In *Webster*, the Court individually examined 53 jurors and qualified 35 of them (or 66%). *Webster* 4-26-22 AM Tr. 6, though it later excused one of those 35 based on hardship, *Webster* 4-

¹⁰ For the three stricken for bias, see *Thompson* 4-11-22 Tr. 52 (Juror 1242), 85 (Juror 328), 158 (Juror 999). For the six stricken for hardship or inability to focus, see *id.* at 43 (Juror 1513), 44 (Juror 1267), 49 (Juror 503), 40 (Juror 1290), 92 (Juror 229), 109 (Juror 1266).

¹¹ For those struck based on a professed inability to be impartial, see *Robertson* Trial Tr. 26-34 (Juror 1431), 97-100 (Juror 1567), 121-30 (Juror 936), 136-42 (Juror 799), 160-71 (Juror 696), 189-93 (Juror 429), 256-65 (Juror 1010), 265-68 (Juror 585), 287-92 (Juror 1160). For those struck for other reasons, see *Robertson* Trial Tr. 23-26 (Juror 1566, hardship related to care for elderly sisters), 83-84 (Juror 1027, moved out of D.C.), 156-60 (Juror 1122, language concerns), 193-96 (Juror 505, work hardship), 245-50 (Juror 474, work trip); 279-82 (Juror 846, preplanned trip).

25-22 PM Tr. 217-18. The Court asked all prospective jurors whether they had “strong feelings” about the events of January 6 or about the former President that would “make it difficult for [the prospective juror] to serve as a fair and impartial juror in this case.” *Webster* 4-25-22 AM Tr. 19. During individual voir dire, the Court followed up on affirmative answers to clarify whether prospective jurors could set aside their feelings and decide the case fairly. *See, e.g., id.* at 32-33, 41-42, 54-56, 63, 65-66. Only 10 out of 53 prospective jurors (or about 19%) were stricken based on a professed or imputed inability to be impartial, as opposed to some other reason.¹² The *Webster* Court observed that this number “was actually relatively low” and therefore “doesn’t bear out the concerns that were at root in the venue transfer motion” in that case. *Webster*, 4-26-22 AM Tr. 7.

In *Hale-Cusanelli*, the Court individually examined 47 prospective jurors and qualified 32 of them (or 68%). *Hale-Cusanelli* Trial Tr. 226, 231. The Court asked prospective jurors questions similar to those asked in the other trials. *See id.* at 72-74 (Questions 16, 20). Of the 15 prospective jurors struck for cause, 11 (or 23% of those examined) were stricken based on a connection to the events of January 6 or a professed inability to be impartial.¹³

In these first five jury trials, the percentage of prospective jurors stricken for cause based on partiality is far lower than in *Irvin*, where the Supreme Court said that “statement[s] of

¹² Nine of the 19 stricken jurors were excused based on hardship or a religious belief. *See Webster* 4-25-22 AM Tr. 46 (Juror 1464), 49-50 (Juror 1132), 61 (Juror 1153), 68 (Juror 951), 78 (Juror 419); *Webster* 4-25-22 PM Tr. 102-04, 207, 217 (Juror 571), 188 (Juror 1114), 191 (Juror 176), 203-04 (Juror 1262). Of the ten other stricken jurors, three professed an ability to be impartial but were nevertheless stricken based on a connection to the events or to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. *See Webster* 4-25-22 AM Tr. at 58-60 (Juror 689 was a deputy chief of staff for a member of congress); *Webster* 4-25-22 PM Tr. at 139-41 (Juror 625’s former mother-in-law was a member of congress); 196-98 (Juror 780 was a former Assistant U.S. Attorney in D.C.).

¹³ *See Hale-Cusanelli* Trial Tr. 62 (Juror 499), 67-68 (Juror 872), 84-85 (Juror 206), 92-93 (Juror 653), 124-25 (Juror 1129), 152 (Juror 182), 156 (Juror 176), 182 (Juror 890), 197-98 (Juror 870), 217 (Juror 1111), 224 (Juror 1412). For the four jurors excused for hardship, *see id.* at 77-79 (Juror 1524), 99 (Juror 1094), 132 (Juror 1014), 151 (Juror 899).

impartiality” by some prospective jurors could be given “little weight” based on the number of other prospective jurors who “admitted prejudice.” *Irvin*, 366 U.S. at 728. In *Irvin*, 268 of 430 prospective jurors (or 62%) were stricken for cause based on “fixed opinions as to the guilt of petitioner.” *Id.* at 727. The percentage of partiality-based strikes in these first five January 6-related jury trials—between 9% and 23% of those examined—is far lower than the 62% in *Irvin*. The percentage in these cases is lower even than in *Murphy*, where 20 of 78 prospective jurors (25%) were “excused because they indicated an opinion as to petitioner’s guilt.” *Murphy*, 421 U.S. at 803. *Murphy* said that this percentage “by no means suggests a community with sentiment so poisoned against petitioner as to impeach the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their own.” *Id.* As in *Murphy*, the number of prospective jurors indicating bias does not call into question the qualifications of others whose statements of impartiality the Court has credited. Far from showing that “an impartial jury actually cannot be selected,” *Haldeman*, 559 F.2d at 63, the first five January 6-related jury trials have confirmed that voir dire can adequately screen out prospective jurors who cannot be fair and impartial, while leaving more than sufficient qualified jurors to hear the case. The Court should deny the defendant’s request for a venue transfer and should instead rely on a thorough voir dire to protect the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss all charges in the indictment or, in the alternative, to transfer venue in this case to another district should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

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