

discovery generated from other sources.

Since our last Status Hearing, the parties have begun plea negotiations and expect to engage in discussions with counsel in the coming weeks. The Government also has provided a substantial portion of the most relevant, individualized discovery to counsel. However, the United States has some additional discovery that needs redaction before it can be disclosed. The Government also has multiple devices seized from Kristi Munn, Thomas Munn, Dawn Munn, Kayli Munn and their residences to review and disclose. Finally, the Government anticipates evidence from other charged defendants' devices, social media accounts, and other sources which has not yet been identified or examined. Thus, the Government seeks additional time to disclose discovery, allow counsel time to review and consider that discovery, and to engage in plea negotiations.

ARGUMENT

Section 3161(h) of the Speedy Trial Act sets forth certain periods of delay which the Court must exclude from the computation of time within which a trial must commence. As is relevant to this motion for a continuance, pursuant to subsection (h)(7)(A), the Court must exclude:

Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). This provision further requires the Court to set forth its reasons for finding that that any ends-of-justice continuance is warranted. *Id.* Subsection (h)(7)(B) sets forth a non-exhaustive list factors that the Court must consider in determining whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance, including:

- (i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result

in a miscarriage of justice.

- (ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section.
...
- (iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)(ii) and (iv). Importantly, “[i]n setting forth the statutory factors that justify a continuance under subsection (h)(7), Congress twice recognized the importance of adequate pretrial preparation time.” *Bloate v. United States*, 559 U.S. 196, 197 (2010) (citing §3161(h)(7)(B)(ii), (B)(iv)). Finally, an interests of justice finding is within the discretion of the Court. *See, e.g., United States v. Rojas-Contreras*, 474 U.S. 231, 236 (1985); *United States v. Hernandez*, 862 F.2d 17, 24 n.3 (2d Cir. 1988).

In this case, an ends-of-justice continuance is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) based on the factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)(ii) and (iv). The need for a reasonable time to organize, produce, and review voluminous discovery is among multiple pretrial preparation grounds that Courts of Appeals have routinely held sufficient to grant continuances and exclude the time under the Speedy Trial Act. *See, e.g., United States v. Bikundi*, 926 F.3d 761, 777-78 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The parties also have begun plea negotiations and request additional time to resolve those discussions. Accordingly, the ends of justice served by granting a request for a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and Defendant in a speedy trial.

Government counsel notified the defense of the filing of this motion, and all consent to the motion.

WHEREFORE, the Government respectfully requests that this Court grant the motion to continue the Status Hearing set for September 24 for an additional 60 days from the date this Court enters an Order on this motion through and including the date of the next hearing, and that the Court exclude the time within which the trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 *et seq.*, on the basis that the ends of justice served by taking such actions outweigh the best interest of the public and Defendant in a speedy trial pursuant to the factors described in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(i), (ii), and (iv).

Respectfully submitted,

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would be likely to make a continuation of this proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the ends of justice served by granting a request for a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Therefore, it is this ____ day of _____, 2021,

ORDERED that the United States' Unopposed Motion to Continue and to Exclude Time Under the Speedy Trial Act and Motion to Continue Status Hearing, is hereby GRANTED; it is further

ORDERED that this proceeding is continued to _____, 2021, at _____; and it is further

ORDERED that the time from the date of this Order through and including the date of the next hearing is hereby excluded from the computation of time within which trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 *et seq.*

THE HONORABLE BERYL A. HOWELL
UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE