

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	
	:	
v.	:	Case No.: 21-CR-266
	:	
BRANDON MILLER	:	
	:	
AND	:	
	:	
STEPHANIE MILLER,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

UNITED STATES’ MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

The United States of America hereby respectfully moves the Court for the entry of a protective order, including defendants’ acceptance of the order as contemplated in Attachment A of the proposed order, governing the production of discovery by the parties in the above-captioned case. Hereinafter, any reference to the term “Defendant” refers to each individual defendant captioned above.

A. There is good cause to issue the proposed protective order in this case

1. Defendant is charged via information with offenses related to crimes that occurred at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021. In brief, on that date, as a Joint Session of the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate convened to certify the vote of the Electoral College of the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, members of a large crowd that had gathered outside forced entry into the U.S. Capitol, including by breaking windows and by assaulting members of law enforcement, as others in the crowd encouraged and assisted those acts. Scores of individuals entered the U.S. Capitol without authority to be there. As a result, the Joint

Session and the entire official proceeding of the Congress was halted until the Capitol Police, the Metropolitan Police Department, and other law enforcement agencies from the city and surrounding region were able to clear the Capitol of hundreds of unlawful occupants and ensure the safety of elected officials. This event in its entirety is hereinafter referred to as the “Capitol Attack.”

2. The investigation and prosecution of the Capitol Attack will likely be one of the largest in American history, both in terms of the number of defendants prosecuted and the nature and volume of the evidence. Over 400 individuals have been charged in connection with the Capitol Attack. The investigation continues and the government expects that additional individuals will be charged. While most of the cases have been brought against individual defendants, the government is also investigating conspiratorial activity that occurred prior to and on January 6, 2021. The spectrum of crimes charged and under investigation in connection with the Capitol Attack includes (but is not limited to) trespass, engaging in disruptive or violent conduct in the Capitol or on Capitol grounds, destruction of government property, theft of government property, assaults on federal and local police officers, firearms offenses, civil disorder, obstruction of an official proceeding, possession and use of destructive devices, and conspiracy.

3. Multiple individuals charged or under investigation are: (a) charged or expected to be charged with crimes of violence; (b) associated with anti-government militia organizations and other groups (e.g., Proud Boys, Oathkeepers, Three Percenters, Cowboys for Trump) that deny the legitimacy of the United States government; (c) coordinated and/or participated in the violent events which took place at the Capitol; and (d) have made statements indicating an intention to continue in similar violent endeavors until the current administration is overthrown.

Dozens of the individuals charged, have been detained pending trial because a judicial officer determined that the release of such person will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person, as required; will endanger the safety of any other person or the community; and/or will pose a risk of obstruction of justice.

4. In connection with the above-described cases and on-going investigations, law enforcement and the government have obtained and continue to obtain voluminous amounts of information and evidence relating to both charged and uncharged individuals which may be discoverable pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 26.2, Local Criminal Rule 5.1(a), the provisions of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), *Giglio v. United States*, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972), and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. By way of illustration, such information and evidence includes but is not limited to: (a) more than 15,000 hours of surveillance and body-worn camera footage from multiple law enforcement agencies; (b) approximately 1,600 electronic devices; (c) the results of hundreds of searches of electronic communication providers; (d) over 210,000 tips; and (e) over 80,000 reports and 93,000 attachments related to law enforcement interviews of suspects and witnesses and other investigative steps.

5. Many of the above-described materials may contain sensitive information, such as (a) personal identity information as identified in Rule 49.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as telephone numbers, email addresses, driver's license numbers, and similar unique identifying information; (b) information regarding the government's confidential sources; (c) information that may jeopardize witness security; (d) contact information for, photographs of, and private conversations with individuals that do not appear to be related to the criminal conduct in this case; (e) medical or mental health information, (f) sources and methods law-

enforcement officials have used, and will continue to use, to investigate other criminal conduct related to the publicly filed charges; and (g) tax returns or tax information. Additional sensitive materials include surveillance camera footage from the U.S. Capitol Police’s extensive system of cameras on U.S. Capitol grounds, *see* Attachment A (Declaration of Thomas A. DiBiase, General Counsel for the United States Capitol Police), and repair estimates obtained from the Architect of the Capitol that constitute procurement information.

6. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court “may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief” relating to discovery by entering a protective order. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1). “The burden of showing ‘good cause’ is on the party seeking the order[.]” *United States v. Cordova*, 806 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations and alterations omitted). Once a showing of good cause has been made, the court has relatively unconstrained discretion to fashion an appropriate protective order. *See United States v. O’Keefe*, No. 06-CR-0249, 2007 WL 1239204, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2007) (describing the court’s discretion as “vast”); *Cordova*, 806 F.3d at 1090 (“[A] ‘trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the materials which they may be entitled to inspect.’” (quoting *Alderman v. United States*, 394 U.S. 165, 185 (1969))).

7. “Protective orders vary in range and type ‘from true blanket orders (everything is tentatively protected until otherwise ordered) to very narrow ones limiting access only to specific information after a specific finding of need.’” *United States v. Bulger*, 283 F.R.D. 46, 52 (D. Mass. 2012). “Courts use protective orders . . . to expedite the flow of discovery in cases involving a large amount of sensitive information.” *United States v. Johnson*, 314 F. Supp. 3d 248, 252 (D.D.C. 2018)(internal quotations and citations omitted).

8. Courts also use protective orders when necessary to protect the integrity of on-going investigations. “[W]here public disclosure of certain materials might officially reveal the sources and methods law-enforcement officials have used, and will continue to use, to investigate other criminal conduct related to the publicly filed charges, courts have found it appropriate to enter a protective order.” *United States v. Smith*, 985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), citing *United States v. Bin Laden*, No. 98–CR–1023, 2001 WL 66393, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2001)(noting that the court adopted a protective order because dissemination of discovery materials would “jeopardize the ongoing Government investigation into the activities of alleged associates of the Defendants”).

9. In determining whether to issue a protective order, courts also take into account “the safety of witnesses and others, a particular danger of perjury or witness intimidation, and the protection of information vital to national security.” *Cordova*, 806 F.3d at 1090 (citations and alterations omitted). “Considering the type of crime charged helps assess the possible threats to the safety and privacy of the victim. Defendants accused of securities fraud or shoplifting, for instance, may not pose as great a danger to victims as those charged with crimes of violence.” *United States v. Dixon*, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2019). “A long record of convictions for violent crimes may suggest a substantial danger to the safety of others. Similarly, a history of failures to follow court orders may justify a more restrictive protective order.” *Id.*

10. In this case, there is good cause to enter the attached proposed protective order. The entry of the order will facilitate the government’s ability to provide voluminous discoverable materials expeditiously, while adequately protecting the United States’ legitimate interests. The Order is reasonable – In the event of a dispute, the Order authorizes the government to remove or reduce a sensitivity designation after a discussion with defense counsel. Further, whenever the

redaction of specified information will resolve the basis for which a sensitivity designation was applied, the Order provides that the United States will agree to redaction, and such redaction will render the materials at issue no longer subject to the Order. In addition, the Order explicitly exempts materials that (1) are, or later become, part of the public court record, (2) were derived directly from either Defendant or that pertain solely to Defendant – e.g., Defendant’s own financial records, telephone records, digital device downloads, social media records, electronic communications, arrest records, and statements to law enforcement, or (3) that the defense obtains by means other than discovery. Finally, the Order is clear that the burden for showing the need for any sensitivity designation always remains with the United States.

B. Unique aspects of Defendants’ cases, and Capitol Attack cases generally, provide good cause to require each defendant to accept the protective order as contemplated in Attachment A of the proposed order.

11. While defense counsel for both defendants have indicated they do not object to the protective order generally, they both object to their clients’ acceptance of the protective order on the record as contemplated in “Attachment A”¹ (hereinafter “Defendant’s acceptance”) of the proposed order.

12. Defendant’s acceptance in the proposed protective order provides an important enforcement mechanism for securing the safe handling of discovery necessitated by the unique

¹ Attachment A, which bears the heading of “Defendant’s Acceptance” asks defendants to sign the attachment indicating the following:

I have read this Protective Order and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I am fully satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorney in connection with this Protective Order and all matters relating to it. I fully understand this Protective Order and voluntarily agree to it. No threats have been made to me, nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Protective Order fully.

As an alternative to signing Attachment A, the government has also suggested the defendants could each engage in a colloquy with this Court on the record in which they acknowledge the same considerations in Attachment A.

aspects of Capitol Attack cases. The defendants will have access to a large amount of discovery both specific to their own cases and regarding Capitol Attack cases generally; in order to comply with its discovery and disclosure obligations, the Government intends to make voluminous materials available in all pending cases arising out of the events of January 6, 2021, including this one. These materials will include information such as tips, witness statements, and the results of searches performed upon other individuals' devices and accounts. Additionally, Capitol Attack cases often create additional challenges, such as here, where the defendants are geographically separated from their defense counsel. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to pose even more obstacles that render in-person meetings complicated at best and healthy to avoid all together.² As a result, the proposed protective order contemplates defendants will be given this discovery in order to facilitate its review with restrictions placed on the use and handling of discovery labeled as sensitive and highly sensitive. Such wide-spread access of sensitive information creates additional risk that sensitive information will be mishandled. Defendant's acceptance offsets those risks by ensuring defendants are aware of the order and how sensitive information should be treated.

13. Defendant's acceptance ensures enforcement of the order through underscoring the importance of properly handling applicable discovery and providing accountability should defendants mishandle it. First, signing Attachment A in itself should highlight for each defendant the importance of following the limitations set forth in the protective order and

² The two recent standard orders from the District Court for the District of Columbia regarding court functions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, Standing Order 21-14, In Re: Fourth Extension of Authorization for Use of Video Teleconferences and Teleconferencing for Certain Criminal Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, and Standing Order 21-20, In Re: Modified Restrictions on Access to Courthouse During the Covid-19 Pandemic, both recognize the importance of limiting personal interactions, social distancing when necessary and use of masks.

seriousness of properly handling applicable discovery. Second, Defendant's acceptance ensures accountability if either of the defendants violates the order. Without such an acceptance on the record, the defendants could easily skirt responsibility from violating the order through asserting, whether sincere or feigned, that they were either unaware of the order or did not fully understand it. Defense counsel would then be a witness – and likely the only witness – to whether the order was properly explained to their client and whether their client understood how sensitive and highly sensitive information needed to be handled. Positioning defense counsel to be a witness against their client in such a manner creates an intractable problem toward accountability.

14. Moreover, given the larger context of the Capitol Attack, “considering the type of crime charged” further demonstrates the good cause for requiring the defendants to sign Attachment A in addressing “the possible threats to the safety and privacy of the victim.” *Dixon*, 355 F. Supp. 3d. at 4. Notably, the Capitol Attack not only involved members of a large crowd forcing entry into the U.S. Capitol and thereby preventing the Joint Session to break from their proceedings, but the members of the crowd brazenly photographed, recorded, posted on social media and bragged about their crimes in doing so. Indeed, Brandon Miller's broadcasting his walk through the U.S. Capitol on Facebook Live initiated law enforcement's investigation in this case. Such brazen disregard for criminal behavior and functions of the U.S. government likewise indicates a potential brazenness in disregarding orders from this Court. In order to facilitate providing discovery, the defendants will necessarily be placed in a position of trust to properly handle sensitive and highly sensitive discovery. Their obligation to follow this Court's orders will be the only restraint guarding against mishandling such evidence, including the possibility of posting sensitive information on social media. Consequently, the nature of the charged offenses

provides further good cause to require Defendant's acceptance of the protective order on the record to further ensure its enforcement.

15. Finally, the reasonableness of the proposed protective order, including Defendant's acceptance, is also demonstrated by the fact that, with or without minor modifications, the proposed protective order has already been adopted without opposition in Capitol Attack cases by this Court (*see U.S. v. Bauer*, 21-cr-49) as well as Judges Bates (*see U.S. v. Klein*, 21-cr-236), Berman Jackson (*see U.S. v. Black*, 21-cr-127), Boasberg (*see U.S. v. Jancart*, 21-cr-148), Brown Jackson (*see U.S. v. Nichols*, 21-cr-117), Cooper (*see U.S. v. Barber*, 21-cr-228), Kelly (*see U.S. v. Strong*, 21-cr-114), Kollar-Kotelly (*see U.S. v. Caldwell*, 21-cr-181), Lamberth (*see U.S. v. Munchel*, 21-cr-118), McFadden (*see U.S. v. Fellows*, 21-cr-83), Moss (*U.S. v. Montgomery*, 21-cr-46), Nichols (*see U.S. v. Miller*, 21-cr-119), Sullivan (*see U.S. v. Bonet*, 21-cr-121), and Walton (*see U.S. v. Goodwyn*, 21-cr-153), in addition to Magistrate Judges Faruqui (*see US v. Williams*, 21-mj-99), Harvey (*see U.S. v. Adams*, 21-mj-291), and Meriweather (*see U.S. v. Hernandez*, 21-mj-73). Moreover, recently decided opinions in Capitol Attack cases have determined there is good cause to issue the government's proposed protective order, including Defendant's acceptance, over defense objections to the order. *See U.S. v. Cudd*, 21-cr-68; *U.S. v. McCaughey III*, 21-cr-40.

WHEREFORE, to expedite the government's provision of discoverable materials, and to adequately protect the United States' legitimate interests, the government requests that pursuant to the Court's authority under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1), the Court enter the attached proposed order.

Respectfully submitted,

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DECLARATION OF THOMAS A. DIBIASE

I, Thomas A. DiBiase, have personal knowledge of the following facts and will testify to them, if called to do so:

1. I have been the General Counsel for the United States Capitol Police (“USCP” or “Department”) since August of 2020. From October 2019 to August of 2020, I served as the Acting General Counsel, and from April of 2010 to October of 2019, I served as the Deputy General Counsel. Between 1991 and 2010, I worked as a litigator at two District of Columbia law firms and served for 12 years as an Assistant United States Attorney at the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia.
2. As part of my duties at the USCP, I have authorized the release of camera footage from the Department’s extensive system of cameras on U.S. Capitol Grounds (“Grounds”). These cameras, part of a sophisticated closed circuit video (CCV) system, are resident both inside and outside the buildings including the U.S. Capitol itself and the other Congressional office buildings on the Grounds. This CCV system provides the backbone of the security for the U.S. Capitol Grounds. The CCV system is monitored by sworn police officers 24-7 in our Command Center and is relied upon to provide real time information regarding any incident occurring on the Grounds. The first step whenever an incident occurs is for the Command Center to pull up the CCV cameras closest to the incident. This enables the Department to have a real-time view of the incident and provides an additional layer of safety for our officers when responding to any incident.
3. Access to this CCV system is strictly limited. Because the system is a closed circuit, access to the cameras only occurs from dedicated workstations and monitors located in a handful of locations on the Grounds. Our system is not “in the cloud” and may not be monitored or

hacked by anyone not connected via a dedicated workstation and monitor.

4. The disclosure of any footage from these cameras is strictly limited and subject to a policy that regulates the release of footage. Per Department Directive 1000.002, Retrieval of Archived Video (see Attachment 1), the release of *any* footage from the Department's CCV system must be approved by the Assistant Chief of Police for Operations, the Department's second highest sworn officer. The Directive notes that, "[t]he Capitol Police Board [which oversees the USCP] directed that cameras would only be used for matters related to national security and legitimate law enforcement purposes (e.g., serious crimes). The [Assistant Chief of Police for Operations] is the sole authority for the approval of any and all requests for archived video footage...." The Directive goes on to note that, "[v]ideo footage received through an approved request shall not be delivered, copied, or transmitted to anyone other than necessary parties (e.g., court, General Counsel) without approval from the [Assistant Chief of Police for Operations]."
5. There is a specific Department form, a CP-411 (Attachment 2), which must be completed and signed by several officials including the Assistant Chief of Police for Operations before any camera footage can be released.
6. As part of my duties as General Counsel and my prior duties as the Deputy General Counsel, I have often been consulted regarding the release of camera footage. The Office of the General Counsel has consistently taken a restrictive view of releasing camera footage in cases other than serious crimes or national security. We regularly deny footage to civil plaintiffs who may have been involved in accidents on the Grounds unless they involved serious injuries or death. (Even in those cases, I have only approved an attorney or investigator coming to the USCP and viewing the footage in our offices with a USCP

employee present.) We are also often asked for camera footage related to non-USCP administrative investigations, and we generally do not provide that footage. We will, however, allow investigators from agencies with which we regularly work, such as the Architect of the Capitol, to view such footage in the presence of a USCP employee. Even a member of Congress looking to view footage of our officers' interactions with his staff had to come to our office and view the footage with our employees present.

7. In 2014, the USCP, with the assistance of the District of Columbia's Office of the Attorney General (OAG), litigated the release of USCP camera footage in Driving under the Influence ("DUI") cases. The Department successfully argued that any footage of a DUI defendant, including arrest footage and footage of the defendant being processed in our prisoner processing area, should be subject to a protective order. Since 2015 the Department provides any relevant DUI arrest footage to the OAG who in turn provides it to the defendant subject to a protective order. (A sample protective order in a DUI case along with a sample motion is attached as Attachments 3 and 4.) As noted in this protective order, an attorney for a DUI defendant "may only show the street video to the defendant and any investigators working on this case and shall not share street video nor show it to any other person not directly affiliated with this case...." (Attachment 3 at 1.) The order further notes that the attorney for a DUI defendant may not "reproduce, share, disseminate, nor discuss with any person not named in this Order, the depictions shown in the video; and ... must return the street video to the [OAG] after the later of a plea, trial or sentencing in the above-entitled case." *Id.*

8. As noted in the motion for these protective orders, the OAG argues that:

Here, the release of Capitol security street videos could compromise USCP's ability to protect the Capitol. The USCP's primary mission is to police the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds, and it has the power to enforce the laws of the District of Columbia pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §1961. As part of its policing

responsibilities, the USCP maintains and controls a series of video surveillance cameras throughout the Capitol Grounds. The purpose of the cameras is to assist in the maintenance of national security by detecting threats to U.S. Congressmen, their staff, and constituents, deterring and preventing terrorism, and providing for the safety and security of the Capitol Buildings and Grounds. The cameras are generally not used to collect evidence in criminal matters.

(Attachment 4 at 3.)

9. It is my understanding that these protective orders are regularly signed by District of Columbia Superior Court judges, and the USCP has provided hundreds of videos pursuant to these orders since 2015.
10. I am familiar with the production of camera footage related to the attempted insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Soon after the events of January 6, the Department knew that its footage of the riots would be essential to both the criminal prosecutions arising out of the events as well as to assist Congress and possibly other entities to understand how such a vast breach of security could occur. The Department immediately preserved all the footage from that date, starting at noon and continuing until 8:00 p.m.¹ This footage² was then provided to two distinct groups: Congressional entities and non-Congressional entities.
11. The two main Congressional entities that requested the eight hours of footage were the Senate Rules Committee (“Rules”) and the Committee on House Administration (“CHA”). Rules and CHA are the primary oversight bodies of the USCP, and the Department provided the total footage from the eight-hour period to them.³ In addition, in response to a request from the House of Representatives General Counsel, the Department provided numerous

¹ Without affirmative preservation, all Department footage is automatically purged within 30 days.

² The total of footage provided is over 14,000 hours.

³ In response to later requests from both committees, the Department provided footage from the entire 24-hour period for January 6, 2021.

clips from our footage to the House Impeachment Managers who were prosecuting the case against former President Donald J. Trump.

12. The Department also provided the complete footage from the eight-hour period to two non-Congressional entities, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and the D.C.

Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the cases arising out of the events of January 6, 2021.⁴ It is our understanding that it is this footage for which the United States now seeks a protective order. When the Department provided its CCV camera footage to the FBI and MPD, it did so subject to several restrictions. The footage was: (a) to remain in the legal control of the USCP; (b) not to be subject to the Freedom of Information Act; and (c) to be returned to the USCP at the conclusion of any investigation. These restrictions did not apply to any footage used as “evidence or discovery as part of any prosecution of any criminal offense.” (Attachment 5 at 1, and Attachment 6 at 1.)

13. The Department has not provided this footage to any other entity other than those listed above. Any public release of this footage, to the extent there has been, is not because of any authorized release by the USCP. (Note that the use of footage by the House Impeachment managers during the trial was permitted since, as a part of the Legislative Branch, the House Impeachment managers have a right to use footage from our cameras for impeachment processes similar to what would be show in a court of law.) It is important to note the wealth of publicly available footage that comes from non-USCP sources such as social media posts, footage recovered from indicted or arrested insurrectionists and footage from body worn cameras from other police departments that responded on January 6, 2021. Notably,

⁴ The Department has provided a very limited number of video clips to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia for an investigation related to potential January 5th incidents.

published footage that contains sound is not from USCP, as our CCV system does not record sound. Further, USCP officers do not wear body cameras, and thus any published body-worn camera footage is from other police departments.

14. The Department has significant concerns with the release of any of its footage to defendants in the Capitol attack cases unless there are safeguards in place to prevent its copying and dissemination. The Department is aware of efforts made before January 6, 2021, by such defendants and others, to gather information regarding the interior of the U.S. Capitol, including references to the tunnels below the Grounds and maps of the building's layout, which information is generally not publically available.⁵ Our concern is that providing unfettered access to hours of extremely sensitive information to defendants who have already shown a desire to interfere with the democratic process will result in the layout, vulnerabilities and security weaknesses of the U.S. Capitol being collected, exposed and passed on to those who might wish to attack the Capitol again.

15. Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 1979, USCP information designated as “security information” may only be released with the approval of the Capitol Police Board. Security information is defined as information that:

- (1) is sensitive with respect to the policing, protection, physical security, intelligence, counterterrorism actions, or emergency preparedness and response relating to Congress, any statutory protectee of the Capitol Police, and the Capitol buildings and grounds; and
- (2) is obtained by, on behalf of, or concerning the Capitol Police Board, the Capitol Police, or any incident command relating to emergency response.

16. At this juncture, the Department in consultation with the Capitol Police Board, has designated only a small subset, consisting of less than 17 hours of footage, as “security

⁵ Indeed, the Architect of the Capitol treats its “blueprints” of the Capitol as “security information” under 2 U.S.C. §1979, *see below*.

information,” as that footage relates to evacuation of Members from their respective chambers on January 6. In addition, the Department is concerned that defendants may be provided access to large sections of footage or even all of the footage, and would deem such information, in the aggregate, to constitute “security information” under 2 U.S.C. § 1979. The ability of the defendants to copy or disseminate such footage would provide the defendants or others to whom it is released with a clear picture of the interior of the Capitol, including entry and exit points, office locations, and the relation of the crucial chambers and offices (such as the Speaker’s Office or Majority Leader’s Office) to other areas of the Capitol.⁶

* * * * *

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on this 17th day of March 2021.



Thomas A. DiBiase

⁶ The aggregating of information as creating a national security risk is known as the Mosaic Theory. See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mosaic_theory_of_intelligence_gathering, last accessed March 2, 2021.



Directive

Retrieval of Archived Video

Directive #: 1000.002
Initiating Unit: Security Services Bureau
CALEA: N/A

Effective Date: 02/06/2015
Review Date: 1st February

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Authority and Coverage

The Chief of Police is the chief executive officer of the United States Capitol Police (USCP) and is responsible for the day-to-day operation and administration of the USCP.

This policy may be revised at the discretion of the Chief of Police, consistent with applicable law, rule, and regulation.

Definition(s)

CP-411 Request for Copy/Review of Video Recordings. A form created by the USCP to document and control the request and dissemination or archived video footage.

General Policy

The Department must maintain appropriate internal controls on the use and duplication of archived video footage to ensure the chain of custody for all copied video footage. In support of national security and legitimate law enforcement purposes, the Department adjudicates any and all requests for recorded security

camera video footage to include the dissemination of footage through established channels. Prescribed law enforcement purposes for the CP-411 include: required for court, subpoena, Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), or training, but may include any authorized investigation. This policy will identify the parties that are able to request video (USCP sworn officials or their civilian equivalent) and the role of the Security Services Bureau (SSB) and Chief of Operations (COO) in assuring that any request for disseminating archived video follows an appropriate business purpose.

The USCP was tasked by its statutory oversight committees to expand the video retrieval capabilities of the Capitol Complex. The design, installation, and maintenance of this system are delegated to the SSB. The Capitol Police Board directed that cameras would only be used for matters related to national security and legitimate law enforcement purposes (e.g., serious crimes). The COO is the sole authority for the approval of any and all requests for archived video footage, with the exception of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) which has the ability to duplicate archived video footage for its own investigations.

In addition, this policy identifies the expectations for accessing and using video footage. This policy does not apply to the use of video as an operational aid (e.g., supporting the USCP Command Center Operations during an incident). Instead, this policy is intended to safeguard against the transfer of archival video for non-operational activities (e.g., as an aid to officers in filing reports). Video footage received through an approved request should not be delivered, copied, or transmitted to anyone other than necessary parties (e.g., court, General Counsel) without approval from the COO.

The USCP, through SSB, maintains a sophisticated closed circuit television system (CCTV) system that includes cameras strategically placed throughout the Capitol Complex to provide situational awareness to

1 USCP personnel, supporting national security, and
2 legitimate law enforcement purposes.

3 Requesting Archived Video Footage

4 The CP-411 must be routed through the chain of
5 command and ultimately approved by the COO. A
6 requesting official must also have signed the signature
7 sheet acknowledging they have received and reviewed
8 this policy and relevant standard operating
9 procedures. Requests for archived video footage via
10 the CP-411 must be made at least at the level of
11 Sergeant (or their civilian equivalent) and should be
12 reviewed and approved by the relevant Deputy Chief
13 (or civilian equivalent) before it is sent to the Office of
14 the COO for official approval. The COO will forward
15 the request to the SSB upon approval.

16 Accessing Archived Video Footage

17 Workstations, as well as the requisite access
18 privileges for access to archived video footage from
19 the Video Management System (VMS), are issued by
20 the SSB to officials (mostly at the rank of Captain and
21 above) in the Operational Bureaus. In addition, the
22 SSB provides access privileges to any individual in
23 organizations that frequently require video footage for
24 operational purposes, including the USCP Command
25 Center, Communications, the Criminal Investigations
26 Section, OGC, OPR, OIG, and SSB. Archived video
27 can be used for operational activities, including
28 supporting Command Center Operations during an
29 incident or supporting USCP investigation. USCP
30 personnel should not use or reference archived video
31 in their reports which are used in court proceedings
32 unless they have written approval from the COO.

33 Retrieving, using, or duplicating archived video footage
34 in cases not related to national security or significant
35 law enforcement operations (e.g., traffic stops,
36 accident reporting), could expose the location of our
37 CCTV cameras or identify our surveillance tactics. This
38 presents a threat to national security, as making this
39 information public could be utilized by a potential
40 adversary.

41 Video footage should be used only in the prescribed
42 manner documented in the CP-411 within the strict
43 controls outlined in this policy. If the reason for a
44 request or usage of the video footage changes,
45 another CP-411 form should be completed and

46 provided through the proper chain of command to
47 amend the initial CP-411.

48 Responsibilities/Procedures

49 Security Services Bureau

50 SSB is responsible for the following:

- 51 1. Process an approved request and schedule a time
52 for the requesting official to pick-up the video
53 footage. Only the requesting official or an alternate
54 designated in writing by the requesting official may
55 pick up the video.
- 56 2. Assign a request tracking number to ensure
57 accountability and proper internal controls and
58 record all video requests and custody transfers
59 with the assigned tracking number in an approved
60 location. Any changes to the original request will
61 require a new CP-411.
- 62 3. Stores video footage for 30 days per system
63 capabilities. Officials should be aware that system
64 maintenance or malfunctions may make video
65 unavailable prior to the 30 days. For this reason,
66 video retrieval requests should be made promptly.
67 SSB will maintain an archive of any approved
68 video footage requests.

69 Additional Information

70 Retrieval, use, or duplication of archived video footage
71 would not be in compliance with the intent of Congress
72 when it established the VMS.

73 Cancellation

74 None.

75 Appendices

76 None.



77 Kim C. Dine
78 Chief of Police

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
REQUEST FOR VIDEO RECORDINGS

(Please Type or Print Legibly)

TO BE COMPLETED BY REQUESTING EMPLOYEE			
1. TYPE OF RECORDING	☐ REVIEW ☐ CD/DVD ☐ PHOTO/SHOT		
2. REASON FOR REQUEST	☐ COURT ☐ SUBPOENA ☐ TRAINING ☐ OPR ☐ OGC/OEC ☐ OTHER (explain) _____		
3. REQUEST DATE		4. DATE NEEDED	
4. TYPE OF EVENT	5. EVENT DATE AND TIME	6. LOCATION OF EVENT	7. CAMERAS
8. VIDEO START DATE		10. VIDEO END DATE	
9. VIDEO START TIME		11. VIDEO END TIME	
12. CFN		13. CCN	
14. NAME AND UNIT OF OFFICER(S) INVOLVED		15. UNIT	
16. REQUESTING OFFICIAL		17. UNIT	
18. OFFICE PHONE		19. CELL PHONE	
20. DESIGNATED ALTERNATE (PICK-UP)		21. UNIT	
22. OFFICE PHONE		23. CELL PHONE	
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS APPROVAL			
24. SIGNATURE	25. PRINTED NAME		26. DATE
TO BE COMPLETED BY SYSTEM OPERATIONS SECTION (SOS)			
27. SIGNATURE	28. PRINTED NAME		
29. VIDEO REQUEST TRACKING NUMBER	30. DATE COMPLETED		
TO BE COMPLETED BY EMPLOYEE RECEIVING VIDEO			
WARNING: UNAUTHORIZED USE, DUPLICATION OR DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS CD/DVD MAY RESULT IN APPROPRIATE ADVERSE ACTION			
31. EMPLOYEE SIGNATURE	32. EMPLOYEE PRINTED NAME		33. DATE

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION**

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

v.

RICKY WISEMAN

:
:
:
:
:
:

**Docket No.: 2018 CTF 017464
Court Date: January 22, 2019
Courtroom 116**

**PROTECTIVE ORDER CONCERNING THE DISCLOSURE AND USE OF UNITED
STATES CAPITOL POLICE SURVEILLANCE VIDEO**

It is this _____ day of _____, 201_, hereby

ORDERED that Bryan Brown, attorney for the defendant be permitted to obtain a copy of the street video; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Bryan Brown may show the street video in court as necessary to litigate this matter and the video shall not be used for any other case or purpose; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Bryan Brown may only show the street video to the defendant and any investigators working on this case and shall not share the street video nor show it to any other person not directly affiliated with this case; and it is


FURTHER ORDERED that neither Bryan Brown, his investigators, nor the defendant are to reproduce, share, disseminate, nor discuss with any person not named in this Order, the depictions shown in the street video; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Bryan Brown must return the street video to the Office of the Attorney General after the later of a plea, trial or sentencing in the above-entitled case.

Honorable Judge _____

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 26th day of December, 2018, a true copy of the foregoing District of Columbia's Motion for Protective Order Concerning the Disclosure and Use of United States Capitol Police Street Video was sent electronically to Bryan Brown, counsel for the defendant.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Joshua D. Karpoft", with a stylized flourish at the end.

JOSHUA KARPOFF
Assistant Attorney General

**SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION**

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

v.

RICKY WISEMAN

:
:
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**Docket No.: 2018 CTF 017464
Court Date: January 22, 2019
Courtroom 116**

**DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER CONCERNING
THE DISCLOSURE AND USE OF UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE STREET
VIDEO**

The District of Columbia (“District”), by and through its attorney, the Office of the Attorney General, hereby moves for a protective order concerning the disclosure and use of United States Capitol Police (“USCP”) street video. In support of its motion, the District makes the following representations:

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 28, 2018, the defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”), in violation of D.C. Code § 50-2206.11(2014 Repl.), and Operating a Vehicle While Impaired (“OWI”), in violation of D.C. Code § 50-2206.14 (2014 Repl.). The case is set for status on January 22, 2019. On December 26, 2018, undersigned counsel received a copy of street video footage related to this case. For national security reasons, as indicated below, the District now files its motion for a protective order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On November 1, 2018, at approximately 11:01 p.m., Ricky Wiseman (“defendant”) was arrested for impaired driving after he was observed exiting the C-Street garage of the U.S. House of Representatives Cannon building, located at 25 Independence Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C.

ARGUMENT

THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO ISSUE THE PROTECTIVE ORDER IN THIS CASE.

The Court has discretion to issue the protective order given the parameters the government requests. *See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest*, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (recognizing the need to protect confidential sources in criminal investigations); *Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America*, 184 U.S. App. D.C. 46, 60-61, 564 F.2d 531, 545-46 (1977) (same). Courts also have recognized the importance of protecting investigative techniques. *Id.* at 60-61, 564 F.2d at 545-46. *Harris v. United States*, 594 A.2d 546, 548-49 (D.C. 1991) is instructive. In *Harris*, the Court issued a protective order to defense counsel prohibiting him from sharing a video-taped statement with the defendant, but allowed defense to speak to the defendant regarding the substance of the information. *Id.* The Court held that “[a] restriction on defense counsel that prevents him from revealing what is possibly *Jencks* material does not materially interfere with counsel's duty to advise a defendant on trial-related matters.” *Id.*, 594 A.2d at 549, citing *State v. Schaeffer*, 217 Neb. 4, 6, 346 N.W.2d 701, 703 (1984) (“It is difficult to equate denial of the right to speak to a client with a prohibition against disclosure of the contents of a nonrelevant document...”). Furthermore, the Court found that this restriction was reasonable. It went on to hold that “the trial court imposed the temporary restriction on defense counsel to allow him the opportunity to review the tape before the trial court ruled on the government's request for a protective order. The trial court's procedure enabled counsel to argue the next day against the issuance of a protective order.” *Id.*, 594 A.2d at 549, relying on *United States v. Eniola*, 282 U.S.App.D.C. 176, 181, 893 F.2d 383, 388 (1990) (“The essence of the sixth amendment threshold is whether defense counsel has demonstrated that the [argued] defense has

legitimate potential such that [defense counsel] is entitled freely to discuss the strategies with his client for attempting to prove the defense. ”).

Here, the release of Capitol security street videos could compromise USCP’s ability to protect the Capitol. The USCP’s primary mission is to police the United States Capitol Buildings and Grounds,¹ and it has the power to enforce the laws of the District of Columbia pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §1961. As part of its policing responsibilities, the USCP maintains and controls a series of video surveillance cameras throughout the Capitol Grounds. The purpose of the cameras is to assist in the maintenance of national security by detecting threats to U.S. Congressmen, their staff, and constituents, deterring and preventing terrorism, and providing for the safety and security of the Capitol Buildings and Grounds. The cameras are generally not used to collect evidence in criminal matters.

The release of security information by USCP is governed by 2 U.S.C. § 1979 (b):

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any security information in the possession of the Capitol Police may be released by the Capitol Police to another entity, including an individual, only if the Capitol Police Board determine in consultation with other appropriate law enforcement officials, experts in security preparedness, and appropriate committees of Congress, that the release of security information will not compromise the security and safety of the Capitol buildings and grounds or any individual whose protection and safety is under the jurisdiction of the Capitol Police.

“Security information” is defined as any information that is “sensitive with respect to the policing, protection, physical security, intelligence, counterterrorism actions, or emergency preparedness and response relating to Congress ... and the Capitol building and grounds” which is obtained by the Capitol Police. 2 U.S.C. § 1979 (a). The locations and capabilities of the

¹ The streets and physical locations included in USCP’s jurisdiction are outlined in 2 U.S.C. § 1967 (b).

street cameras fall under this definition of security information, as this information directly concerns the policing and protection of the Capitol grounds.

Revealing the locations and capabilities of these cameras could jeopardize USCP's mission to protect the Capitol grounds. The dissemination of information concerning the location and technical capabilities, including the ability to focus, pan, and zoom on a moving or stationary object, as well as information about the image quality will aid people who are intent on finding weaknesses in the United States' ability to protect the Capitol buildings, grounds, and individuals whose protection and safety is under the jurisdiction of the Capitol Police. In the past year the District has prosecuted hundreds of impaired driving cases brought by Capitol Police. Even assuming that many of these arrests were not caught on video and that some of the arrests occurred at the same locations, the systematic release of all of these Capitol security videos in the future would compromise the ability of USCP to protect the Capitol.

The District acknowledges that pursuant to its duty under Super Ct. Crim. R. P. 16, street video obtained by USCP may be discoverable. In *Howard v. United States*, 656 A.2d 1106, 1111 (D.C. 1995), the Court also allowed reasonable issuance of a protective order. The Court held

Before trial, the prosecutor, out of concern for his obligations under *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), informed the court and defense counsel that Derrick Ross was a suspect in an unrelated armed robbery, although there was no basis for believing that Ross was aware he was under suspicion. The court ruled that this information was too attenuated to fall within the demands of *Brady*. The court issued a protective order prohibiting defense counsel from discussing this information with appellant Howard and from using it as a basis for cross-examining Ross. On appeal, Howard contends that this protective order violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as well as his rights under the Confrontation Clause. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's issuance of this protective order.

Howard, 656 A.2d 1106, at 1111 relying on *United States v. Anderson*, 509 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1975) ("the district court can and should, when appropriate, place defense counsel under

enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the evidence that he has heard.”). The government seeks to impose a similar reasonable restriction in this case. Preventing the defense from sharing the locations of these cameras does not interfere with the defendant’s rights to confer with counsel or assist with his defense.

The Court should balance the public safety interest of protecting our elected officials with the defendant’s right to prepare his defense by issuing a protective order that permits the defendant to prepare for trial and litigate the case but which limits the defendant, and his counsel, from reproducing the videos or using them for any reason not directly related to the litigation of this matter. Thus, the District respectfully asks this Court to issue a protective order pursuant to Super Ct. Crim. R. P. 16 (d), which would control the disclosure and use of the street camera video by the defendant and defense counsel.

A protective order is required in this case because the release of USCP security street videos could compromise USCP’s ability to protect the Capitol. Therefore, the government requests that the Court order that when the defendant obtains a copy of the street video, he shall not use this video for any other case or purpose and that his defense counsel shall only be allowed to show the video to the defendant and any investigators working on the case. The government also requests that the Court order that neither defense counsel, his investigators, nor the defendant are to reproduce, share, disseminate, nor discuss with any person not named by the Court in the requested protective order, the depictions shown in the street video. This order should include that all shall be identified to the government and they shall sign a protective order to be prepared by the government which precludes the dissemination to any other person of the disclosed information; "disclosed information" includes any later acquired information derived from the initial disclosure. Finally, the government requests that the Court order that defense

counsel must return the street video to the Office of the Attorney General after the later of a plea, trial or sentencing in the above-entitled case.

This protective order would serve the security interests of USCP in protecting our elected officials while allowing the District to comply with its Rule 16 obligations.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing facts and arguments, the District respectfully requests that this Court grant the District's motion for a protective order concerning the use, reproduction, and disclosure of the United States Capitol Police street video.


Respectfully submitted,

KARL A. RACINE
Attorney General for the District of Columbia

TAMAR MEEKINS
Deputy Attorney General, Public Safety Division



PETER SABA [975945]
Chief, Criminal Section



BY: JOSHUA KARPOFF [1015629]
Assistant Attorney General
441 4th Street, N.W., Suite 1060N
Washington, D.C. 20001
PHONE: (202) 727-3398
Joshua.Karpoff@dc.gov



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7218

Phone 202-224-5151

January 11, 2021

Information Sharing Agreement

Officials and agents of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia (MPD) coordinating with the United States Capitol Police (USCP) during the course of investigations related to the events of January 6, 2021 relating to the U.S. Capitol, acknowledge, understand, and agree that the USCP is a legislative branch agency and, as such, all information, to include video, audio, photographic and documentary information, shared by the USCP during these investigations, shall remain in the legal control of the USCP subject to any and all applicable release and non-disclosure requirements of Congress. Information exchanged as part of these investigations shall not be reclassified. All information originating with and provided by the USCP as part of these investigations remains the property of and under the legal control of the USCP, and if provided to MPD will be returned to the USCP at the conclusion of the investigation. This restriction does not apply to any video, audio, photographic or documentary evidence that is used as evidence or discovery as part of any prosecution of any criminal offense.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. P. Gallagher", is written over a horizontal line.

Sean P. Gallagher
Acting Assistant Chief
United States Capitol Police

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Carlos Heraud", is written over a horizontal line.

Captain Carlos Heraud
Homicide Branch Commander
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia




UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7218

Phone 202-224-5151

January 10, 2021

Information Sharing Agreement

Officials and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) coordinating with the United States Capitol Police (USCP) during the course of investigations related to the events of January 6, 2021 relating to the U.S. Capitol, acknowledge, understand, and agree that the USCP is a legislative branch agency and, as such, all information, to include video, audio, photographic and documentary information, shared by the USCP during these investigations, shall remain in the legal control of the USCP subject to any and all applicable release and non-disclosure requirements of Congress. Information exchanged as part of these investigations shall not be reclassified. All information originating with and provided by the USCP as part of these investigations remains the property of and under the legal control of the USCP, and if provided to the FBI will be returned to the USCP at the conclusion of the investigation. This restriction does not apply to any video, audio, photographic or documentary evidence that is used as evidence or discovery as part of any prosecution of any criminal offense.


Sean P. Gallagher
Acting Assistant Chief
United States Capitol Police


Steven Michael D'Antuono
Assistant Director in Charge
Washington Field Office
Federal Bureau of Investigation

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	
	:	Case No.: 21-CR-266
v.	:	
	:	
BRANDON MILLER	:	
	:	
AND	:	
	:	
STEPHANIE MILLER,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

PROTECTIVE ORDER GOVERNING DISCOVERY

To expedite the flow of discovery material between the parties and adequately protect the United States' legitimate interests, it is, pursuant to the Court's authority under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) and with the consent of the parties, ORDERED:

1. **Materials Subject to this Order.** This Order governs materials provided by the United States at any stage of discovery during this case and which the United States has identified as either "Sensitive" or "Highly Sensitive." Examples of materials that the United States may designate as "Sensitive" or "Highly Sensitive" pursuant to this Order include but are not limited to:

- a. Personal identity information as identified in Rule 49.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as telephone numbers, email addresses, driver's license numbers, and similar unique identifying information;
- b. Information regarding the government's confidential sources;
- c. Information that may jeopardize witness security;
- d. Contact information for, photographs of, and private conversations with individuals that do not appear to be related to the criminal conduct in this case;
- e. Medical or mental health records;
- f. Sources and methods law-enforcement officials have used, and will continue to use, to investigate other criminal conduct related to the publicly filed charges;
- g. Surveillance camera footage from the U.S. Capitol Police's extensive system of cameras on U.S. Capitol grounds;¹

¹ To be clear, this does not include footage from body worn cameras from other police departments that responded

- h. Repair estimates from the Architect of the Capitol;
- i. Materials designated as “security information” pursuant 2 U.S.C. §1979; and
- j. Tax returns or tax information.

This Order will not be used to designate materials as Sensitive or Highly Sensitive unless such designation is necessary for one of the reasons stated in this paragraph or for a similar reason not anticipated by this Order. The government agrees to make every effort to provide discovery in a manner that will allow for most discovery to be produced without such designations.

2. **Defendant.** Any reference to “Defendant” herein refers individually to each defendant identified in the caption above.

3. **Legal Defense Team.** The “legal defense team” includes defense counsel (defined as counsel of record in this case, including any post-conviction or appellate counsel) and any attorneys, investigators, paralegals, support staff, and expert witnesses who are advising or assisting defense counsel in connection with this case.

4. **Rules for the Handling of Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Materials.**

- a. **Limitations on Use.** Defendant and the legal defense team may use Sensitive and Highly Sensitive discovery materials solely in connection with the defense of this case and any other case connected to the events at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, including any post-conviction or appellate litigation, and for no other purpose, and in connection with no other proceeding, without further order of this Court.
- b. **Limitations on Dissemination.** No Sensitive or Highly Sensitive materials, or the information contained therein, may be disclosed to any persons other than Defendant, the legal defense team, or the person to whom the Sensitive or Highly Sensitive information solely and directly pertains or his/her counsel, without agreement of the United States or prior authorization from the Court.
- c. **Limitations on Reproduction.** Defendant, the legal defense team, and authorized persons shall not copy or reproduce the Sensitive or Highly Sensitive materials except in order to provide copies of the materials for use in

on January 6, 2021, the vast amount of which the United States will *not* designate as Sensitive or Highly Sensitive. (Body worn camera footage will be marked Sensitive or Highly Sensitive only if it contains material described in paragraph one above or for a similar reason not anticipated by this Order.)

connection with this case by Defendant, the legal defense team, the person to whom the Sensitive or Highly Sensitive information solely and directly pertains or his/her counsel, and other persons to whom the Court may authorize disclosure (collectively, “authorized persons”).

If defense counsel provides Defendant access to Sensitive or Highly Sensitive materials, defense counsel must advise Defendant that Defendant may not record any personal identity information as identified in Rule 49.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or any telephone numbers, email addresses, driver’s license numbers, and similar unique identifying information. By signing the attached affirmation, Defendant agrees not to do so.

Copies and reproductions, and any notes or records made in relation to the contents of the Sensitive and Highly Sensitive materials, are to be treated in the same manner as the original materials.

- d. **Court Filings.** Absent prior agreement by the parties or permission from the Court, no party shall disclose materials designated as Sensitive or Highly Sensitive in any public filing with the Court. Such materials shall be submitted under seal in accordance with Local Criminal Rule 49(f)(6). The Clerk of Court shall accept for filing under seal any filings made in compliance with that Rule and so marked by the parties pursuant to this Order.
- e. **Court Hearings.** The restrictions in this Order shall not limit either party in the use of the materials in judicial proceedings in this case. The procedures for use of designated Sensitive and Highly Sensitive materials during any hearing or the trial of this matter shall be determined by the parties and the Court in advance of the hearing or trial. No party shall disclose materials designated Sensitive or Highly Sensitive in open court without agreement by the parties that such materials may be disclosed in open court or prior authorization by the Court.

5. **Additional Rules for Handling of Sensitive Materials.** The following additional terms apply to Sensitive materials:

- a. **Storage.** Sensitive materials must be maintained in the custody and control of Defendant, the legal defense team, and authorized persons. This restriction shall not apply to the person to whom the Sensitive information solely and directly pertains or his/her attorney.

6. **Additional Rules for Handling of Highly Sensitive Materials.** The following additional rules apply to Highly Sensitive materials:

- a. **Additional Limitations on Dissemination.** Defense counsel may not provide a copy of Highly Sensitive materials to Defendant or permit Defendant to view such materials unsupervised by defense counsel or an attorney, investigator, paralegal, or support staff person employed by defense counsel. The parties agree that defense counsel or an attorney, investigator, paralegal, or support staff person employed by defense counsel, may supervise Defendant by allowing access to Highly Sensitive materials through a cloud-based delivery system that permits Defendant to view the materials but does not permit Defendant the ability to download; provided that, prior to doing so, defense counsel first provides notice to the United States and allow the United States to file an objection with the Court if no agreement is reached.
- b. **Additional Limitations on Reproduction.** Counsel agrees that prior to showing materials to Defendant designated as Highly Sensitive, counsel or an attorney, investigator, paralegal, or support staff person employed by defense counsel will read Defendant the relevant parts of this Order, and remind Defendant of the consequences of violating the Order. If Defendant takes notes regarding Highly Sensitive materials, counsel or an attorney, investigator, paralegal, or support staff person employed by defense counsel must take reasonable steps to determine whether Defendant has copied any personal identity information as identified in Rule 49.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or any telephone numbers, email addresses, driver's license numbers, and similar unique identifying information.
- c. **Storage.** Highly Sensitive materials must be maintained in the custody and control of the legal defense team and authorized persons. This restriction shall not apply to the person to whom the Highly Sensitive information solely and directly pertains or his/her attorney.

7. **Viewing by Incarcerated Defendants.** If Defendant is in the custody of the United States Marshals Service, defense counsel is authorized to provide a copy of discovery materials to the appropriate point of contact so that the defendant can view the discovery materials, subject to the terms of this Order.

8. **Disputes.** The parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute about a sensitivity designation before requesting the Court's intervention. The United States may agree to remove or reduce a sensitivity designation without further order of this Court. Whenever the redaction of specified information will resolve the basis for which a sensitivity designation was applied, the United States will agree to redaction, and such redaction will render the materials no

longer subject to this Order. Any agreement to reduce or remove a sensitivity designation or to redact specific information shall be memorialized in writing.

9. **Modification Permitted.** Nothing in this Order shall prevent any party from seeking modification of this Order nor prevent the defense from contesting a sensitivity designation. The parties agree that the burden of demonstrating the need for a protective order remains with the government at all times.

10. **Failure not Waiver.** The failure by the United States to designate any materials as Sensitive or Highly Sensitive upon disclosure shall not constitute a waiver of the United States' ability to later designate the materials as Sensitive or Highly Sensitive but the government must separately identify and memorialize the changed status of those materials in writing.

11. **Automatic Exclusions from this Order.** This Order does not apply to materials that:

- a. Are, or later become, part of the public court record, including materials that have been received in evidence in this or other public trials or hearings;
- b. Were derived directly from Defendant or that pertain solely to Defendant. Examples of such materials include Defendant's own financial records, telephone records, digital device downloads, social media records, electronic communications, arrest records, and statements to law enforcement;² and
- c. Materials that the defense obtains by means other than discovery.

12. **Government's Discovery Obligations.** Nothing in this Order modifies the United States' obligations at any stage of discovery in this case pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 26.2, Local Criminal Rule 5.1, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (the Jencks Act),

² Discoverable materials that were derived directly from Defendant or that pertain solely to Defendant are exempt from this Order regardless of whether the United States has designated any such materials as "Sensitive" or "Highly Sensitive" because the same materials are being provided or made available to co-defendants or other persons charged in connection with the events at the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021.

and the government's general obligation to produce exculpatory and impeachment information in criminal cases.

13. **Defense Counsel's Obligations.** Defense counsel must provide a copy of this Order to, and review the terms of this Order with, members of the legal defense team, Defendant, and any other person, before providing them access to Sensitive or Highly Sensitive materials. Defense counsel must obtain a fully executed copy of Attachment A before providing Defendant access to Sensitive or Highly Sensitive materials, and must file a copy with the Court within one week of execution.

14. **No Ruling on Discoverability or Admissibility.** This Order does not constitute a ruling on the question of whether any particular material is properly discoverable or admissible and does not constitute any ruling on any potential objection to the discoverability or admissibility of any material.

15. **Duration.** The terms of this Order shall remain in effect after the conclusion of this case and the parties shall be bound by it unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

SO ORDERED this ____ day of _____, 2021.

HONORABLE TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge

ATTACHMENT A

Defendant's Acceptance

I have read this Protective Order and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I am fully satisfied with the legal services provided by my attorney in connection with this Protective Order and all matters relating to it. I fully understand this Protective Order and voluntarily agree to it. No threats have been made to me, nor am I under the influence of anything that could impede my ability to understand this Protective Order fully.

Date

NAME:
Defendant